

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY
OF THE
SCIENCE OF POLITICS

BY

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NEW EDITION, REVISED

"They be farre more in number, that love to read of great Armies, bloudy Battels, and many thousands slaine at once, then that minde the Art, by which the Affaires, both of Armies, and Cities, be conducted to their ends."—HOBBS,
Preface to Thucydides

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
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To the Memory
OF
LORD ACTON



ADVERTISEMENT

THIS Essay, delivered as a course of lectures at the Royal Institution in 1882, and afterwards printed as a series of articles in the *Fortnightly Review*, was first issued in its present form in 1890. After several reissues with minor alterations it was thoroughly revised in 1911.

Since that date further slight alterations and additions, mostly in critical and bibliographical matter, and a few verbal amendments due to lapse of time, have been made as occasion required. There is no material change in the present reprint.

It now seems to me that I ought to have said more of Rousseau's "volonté générale" by which the sovereignty of the people is put in action. His statement (*Cont. Soc.*, Bk. II. c. iii.) is short and far from clear, but he appears, in conformity with his extreme individualist assumptions, to regard the general will as a kind of arithmetical balance to be arrived at by striking out the opposite judgments of this and that citizen representing their particular interest. Every one having experience of public affairs and committee work, which Rousseau had not, must perceive that this is an absurd conception. The collective opinion, whether of all or of a majority, which emerges from discussion is not in the nature of a balance or average; it is more like the resultant of several forces, necessarily different in magnitude and direction from any one of them; the mechanical analogy is still too simple, but it is fairly correct to say that the process is not arithmetical but dynamical. Rousseau's answer to this, one may guess, would be that such is the common

practice, but it is a bad practice and ought to be suppressed. Party government and the existence of political parties as distinct bodies in the commonwealth are wholly repugnant to his doctrine; so is the political activity of trade unions and other associations. Cp. W. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, Camb. 1920, pp. 53, 155.

The late war has aggravated the discords and controversies of Socialism in its many varieties (p. 133), and has taught us by forcible experience that, although most Socialists profess anti-militarist principles, the political and civil mechanism of modern warfare is essentially socialist.

A Japanese translation of this book by Mr. Kenkichi Kodera was published last year, and this year an Italian one by Signor V. Beonio-Brocchieri of Turin with an introductory preface.

F. P.

October 1923.

It seems desirable to add at this time that the book in its revised form does not attempt to give any account of political speculation since the beginning of the present century. The whole theory of unitary state sovereignty has been powerfully attacked, especially by M. Duguit, and the problems of federal government will probably lead to other developments in the near future.

These matters are not yet ripe for concise exposition, even if I had the time and ability to deal with them, and I must be content to leave them to some successor.

The same may now (1930) be said of Italian Fascism, an extremely interesting political experiment which combines novel construction with revival, in some respects, of medieval ideals unduly neglected in the individualist period of the nineteenth century.

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
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I

THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE—SCIENCE IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

No good Brahman begins any literary work without a formula of salutation to Ganeśa, the elephant-headed patron-god of learning. In the West we are not so punctilious about forms; yet we might with some fitness open our undertakings in philosophy and science by saluting expressly or tacitly the memory of Aristotle. For, as Greece is to us the mother of almost everything that makes life worthy to be lived, so is Aristotle especially the father of science and scientific method; and during the centuries when the lessons of Greece were forgotten, the name and work of Aristotle (used indeed in a manner and for purposes he would have marvelled at) were almost the only links that still bound the modern to the Hellenic world.

With regard to our present subject Aristotle's claim is evident and eminent. He has been recognised as the founder of political science by the general voice of posterity. There was political speculation before him.

but it was he who first brought to bear on political phenomena the patient analysis and unbiassed research which are the proper marks and virtues of scientific inquiry. The science of politics, like so much else of our knowledge and endeavours to know, begins with Aristotle. In this as in other things his organising genius consolidated the scattered material of his predecessors, and left a compact structure. From Aristotle onwards we shall now try to follow the fortunes and growth of this science. It is not a tale of continuous and rapid advance like the history of the exact sciences, or even of those natural sciences in which mathematical precision is not attainable. On the contrary, we shall find much wild speculation, and many grave mistakes. But we shall also find a good deal of real advance, if we attend to what has been done by scientific inquirers rather than what has been put forward under the name of science by social and political agitation, and do not allow the failures to blind our eyes to the success.


Before we enter on the history it may be as well to take a rough general view of the place of the theory of politics in human knowledge. Many persons would perhaps deny that there is any science of politics at all. If they meant that there is no body of rules from which a Prime Minister may infallibly learn how to command a majority, they would be right as to the fact, but would betray a rather inadequate notion of what science is. There is a science of politics in the same sense, and to the same, or about the same, extent, as there is a science of morals. Whatever systematic moralists may have

professed to think, it is at least doubtful whether systems of moral philosophy have been of much direct use in helping people to decide actual questions of conduct. For my own part, I would in a case of conscience rather consult a right-minded and sensible friend than any moral philosopher in the world. I should think neither the better nor the worse of his advice if he happened also to be a student of philosophy. Nevertheless few educated persons will refuse to admit that inquiry into the nature and origin of moral rules is legitimate and useful, or will maintain that the endeavour to refer them historically or rationally, to general principles is altogether idle. Men, being moral beings, are led to reflect on the nature of right and wrong, and the functions of conscience; being citizens, they are equally led to reflect on the nature of the State, the functions of government, and the origin and authority of civil duty. This latter inquiry is indeed more practical than the other; for political theories of the most general kind often have considerable direct influence in public affairs, which cannot, I think, be said of ethical theories. The declaration of the Rights of Man by the French Constituent Assembly has certainly not been without practical effect. It consists of general statements of what men, as men, are entitled to and may justly demand. If true, the statements are of the utmost importance to politicians and legislators; if false, they are highly mischievous. In either case they purport to be propositions of political science. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire informed the world in 1848 that they were the crown and sum

of all the political science of all former ages. Claiming such authority, and having in fact influenced men's minds, the principles thus enounced cannot be merely disregarded; and it is scientific criticism that must establish or refute them. To the persons who deny the necessity or possibility of philosophy it is a sufficient answer that at all events critical philosophy is needful for the exposure of philosophies falsely so called; and in the same way political science must and does exist, if it were only for the refutation of absurd political theories and projects.

To show how I conceive politics to fit into the general scheme of our knowledge, I adopt the old-fashioned division of the sciences into natural and moral.¹ By this I do not mean to commit myself to any general

¹ SCIENCE OR PHILOSOPHY (in widest sense).



doctrine. I do not see why there should be any one classification which is absolutely right in itself, or why we should not use different classifications for different purposes. From some points of view it may be proper to neglect entirely the distinction I now mean to use, as was done, for example, by Herbert Spencer in his essay on the classification of the sciences. In ultimate analysis the distinction may be made to vanish. At present I do not want to carry matters to ultimate analysis, but to regard the study of politics as belonging to a kind of inquiries which for ordinary practical purposes are sufficiently well marked off from others. In the natural sciences we have to do with the material world, and man's bodily organism as part thereof. In the moral sciences we have to do with man as intelligent, and to study the laws of his intelligent action. The general aim and method are the same—the discovery of truth by the reasoned investigation of facts; but the means are widely different. In the natural sciences the work is done, broadly speaking, on phenomena present to the senses and with instruments of manual use. In the moral sciences the matter is present only in reflection, and the instruments are language and books. Hence there are wide differences in the manner of the student's work, the nature of the results, and the power of verifying them; and these are worth marking, it only to perceive that the comparative inexactness of the moral sciences is not the fault of the men who have devoted their abilities to them, but depends, as Aristotle already saw, on the nature of their subject-matter. The sub-

divisions of natural science do not now concern us.¹ The moral sciences may be divided into speculative and practical branches. In the former we consider man as knowing and thinking; in the latter as feeling and acting. It is questionable, again, if this division will hold in final analysis. My own opinion is that it will not, or that knowledge and action are not really separable; but it corresponds to a difference sufficiently obvious in the common course of life. For the speculative branch, or the laws of thought, we have logic (whatever its exact place among or beside the speculative sciences ought to be) and metaphysic, which leads us to the all-devouring question of questions—what knowledge is, and how it is possible at all. Thus from the theory of knowledge on the speculative side, as also from ethics on the practical side, we are landed (or cast adrift might be thought by some the better phrase) on philosophy in the special sense, which is really apart from the sciences both moral and natural; for the organised knowledge of particular kinds of phenomena cannot include the analysis of knowledge itself. This I mention only by the way, to show that philosophy will not be exorcised by any ingenious arrangement of the sciences. She

¹ Not attempting a complete division, I purposely leave much open: as whether the pure sciences of space and number should stand at the head of the physical sciences, or be set apart by themselves, as not dealing with any one fact of nature, but fixing the general conditions of exact knowledge of the external world. Again, I offer no opinion about logic, save that it belongs to the speculative as distinct from the practical side of the moral sciences. There is a question (analogous to that of the pure sciences) whether it is a special science at all, and further and very difficult questions of its relation to psychology and metaphysics.

laughs at the pitchfork of Auguste Comte, and comes back at every turn, taking her revenge in a thousand ways on the blunders of popular thinking. Psychology belongs in a manner to both the speculative and the practical branch, being intimately connected alike with metaphysics and with ethics. On the practical side we may regard it as the study of man's action considered simply as an individual. But then we cannot be content with studying men as individuals. They live together in societies, and we know of no time when they did not. Hence the actions of man in society are the subject of a further kind of study, which is now commonly called Sociology. The word is offensive to scholars as being a barbarously formed hybrid;¹ and although it is too late to quarrel with anybody for using it, I should prefer Economy as a general name for the study of men's common life short of specific reference to the State. Such usage of the term corresponds pretty closely to Aristotle's. An important branch of this is what we all know as political economy, remarkable as the one department of the moral sciences which has assumed a semi-exact character. We must not be tempted to pursue the inquiry how far that character can in truth be justly ascribed to it. Another branch is ethics, if with the Greeks we regard ethics as dealing essentially with man in his relations to his fellow-men.

¹ If such a Latin word could exist at all, it could only mean a science of partnerships or alliances. One must not push these objections too far, however. Suicide, as was once pointed out at Cambridge by the opponent of a Latin thesis, "*Recte statuit Paleius de suicidiis*," could as a Latin word mean nothing but killing swine.

And indeed, whatever may be thought of the existence of absolute or purely self-regarding duties, or of the possibility of a moral sense arising otherwise than in society, it is undoubted that the great bulk of moral duties have regard to other persons. Without passing judgment on controverted questions, therefore, we may practically class ethics as a social science. Lastly, we come to consider man not only as a member of society, but as a member of some particular society, organised in a particular way, and exercising supreme authority over its members ; in other words, we consider man as a citizen, and the citizen in his relations to the State. Thus the field is indicated for the science of politics : a science dealing with matter so rich and various that from the beginning it has been embarrassed by this weight of wealth. Its sub-divisions will be more conveniently mentioned when we arrive at the period of its history in which they become distinct. At this point it is enough to say that the foundation and general constitution of the State, the forms and administration of government, and the principles and method of legislation seem naturally to fall asunder as heads under which the topics of political science may be grouped, though a strictly accurate and exclusive division is hardly possible ; and we must add as another head, more clearly marked off from all these, the consideration of the State as a single and complete unit of a higher order, capable of definite relations to other like units.

Aristotle, as we have said, is the founder of the science ; but not even the greatest of men can make a

science out of nothing, and a word of remembrance must be given to the men and the conditions that made Aristotle's work possible. There cannot be a theory of constitutions and statesmanship until civilised politics and statesmen exist in fact, any more than there can be a theory of ethics unless in a society which is already moral. Political speculation was suggested and invited by the variety of political constitutions existing in Greek cities, and most of all by the brilliant political activity and resource displayed in the city of cities, where in art, in letters, and in civil life the power and beauty of Hellenic genius came to their full height; the city which our own Milton, an artist and Hellenist in spite of his Puritanism, celebrated as the eye of Greece,¹ and Swinburne, who had studied Greek poetry and art as deeply as Milton, and more freely, sang of in his *Erechtheus* in lines not unworthy of her own tragedians—

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"The fruitful immortal anointed adored
Dear city of men without master or lord,
Fair fortress and fostress of sons born free,
Who stand in her sight and in thine, O sun,
Slaves of no man, subjects of none;
A wonder enthroned on the hills and sea,
A maiden crowned with a fourfold glory
That none from the pride of her head may rend,
Violet and olive-leaf purple and hoary,
Song-wreath and story the fairest of fame,
Flowers that the winter can blast not or bend;
A light upon earth as the sun's own flame,
A name as his name,
Athens, a praise without end."

¹ True, it is by the mouth of Satan; but Milton constantly neglects the caution expressed at a later time about letting the devil have the best tunes.

les.

Pericles, the first of Athenian statesmen, was also one of the greatest statesmen who have ever lived. The speech delivered by him at the funeral of the Athenians who fell in the first campaign of the Peloponnesian war, and related by Thucydides, contains a description, and an ideal of the state which, though sketched out in bold and broad lines and for popular effect, may help us to the knowledge of the soil that was ready for Plato and Aristotle to till. We cannot be sure, indeed, that Pericles actually spoke the words attributed to him by Thucydides; but we may be sure, at the very least, that they are such as Thucydides thought Pericles likely to say, and an Athenian audience to approve; and, considering the publicity and solemnity of the occasion, and the number of persons (Thucydides himself, in all probability, being among them) who must have preserved a vivid memory of what they heard, I am much disposed to think that we have in Thucydides a substantially correct account of what Pericles did say. What the student of politics has to note is this: there runs all through the speech the conception of the city, not as a mere dwelling-place or provision for material security, but as the sphere of man's higher activity. There is embodied in the city, in its laws, customs, and institutions, a pattern and ideal of life for the citizen. And the glory of Athens is that her ideal is better than others; Athens has reached the highest pitch of civilisation yet attained, and is a school for all Hellas. She aims at producing a better type of man than other cities; natural abilities being equal, man's faculties are more

fully and variously developed at Athens than anywhere else. And this is effected, not by a pedantic and irksome course of training (after the fashion of the Lacedæmonian enemy),¹ but by the free and generous education of a refined life. "We aim," said Pericles, "at a life beautiful without extravagance, and contemplative without unmanliness; wealth is in our eyes a thing not for ostentation but for reasonable use; and it is not the acknowledgment of poverty we think disgraceful, but the want of endeavour to avoid it"—words from which our modern society still has much to learn. And it was this loftiness of aim, this appreciation of the worth of human life, which justified Athens in aiming likewise at primacy among the Greek states. If Pericles had used the jargon of modern diplomacy, he would have said that Athens had a mission to fulfil in holding up the best attainable exemplar of a civilised community. And therefore he bade the Athenians to quit themselves like men for a city dear to them by such titles, and to be strong in their father's renown and in their own courage, knowing that their renown too would be preserved, not by the praise of poets, which may be idle or exaggerated, but

¹ The Spartans have had their day of glorification from rhetoricians and second-hand scholars. To me they have always appeared the most odious impostors in the whole history of antiquity. Even in the military art to which they sacrificed everything else they were repeatedly distanced by others, as witness their discomfiture by the light infantry of the Athenian Iphicrates: and with all their pretentious discipline they produced in the whole course of their wars only two officers who are known to have been gentlemen, Brasidas and Callitadas. As for their attempts at fine art disclosed by recent excavation, any man with an eye and an elementary historical knowledge of Greek sculpture may judge them.

by the lasting marks of their achievements in history. On this part of the speech we cannot dwell now; but one may be allowed to hope that no Englishman reads it without feeling a glow of something more than cosmopolitan sympathy for the men who delivered Hellas from the invincible armada of the Persian despot, and carried the name and fame of Athens wherever their ships could sail.

"Sons of Athens born in spirit and truth are all born free men;
Most of all we, nurtured where the north wind holds his reign:

Children all we sea-folk of the Salaminian seamen,
Sons of them that beat back Persia, they that beat back Spain."¹

The conception of the State, then, was a very living reality to the Athenians among whom Socrates was born and lived. And of the many subjects on which Socrates was never tired of questioning and discoursing, we may suppose that this was not the least interesting to his hearers. Yet we have no direct evidence that he dwelt much on it. We can only suspect from Plato that he had more to say of it than Xenophon lets us know. Xenophon reported only what he could understand, and probably we shall never know what we have lost by Xenophon being a man of timid and commonplace mind—a man who deserved (to say the worst of him at once) to become half a Lacedæmonian and forget how to write Attic. Whatever may be the reason, we find in any case but slender beginnings of political science in the conversations of Socrates as reported by him. The passage where Socrates enforces obedience to the laws as they stand, comparing a citizen who dis-

¹ Athens, in Swinburne's *Tristram of Lyonesse*, etc., 1882.

regards the law because it may be changed to a soldier who runs away in battle because there may be peace,¹ may be said to contain a doctrine of civil allegiance. We also find a roughly-sketched classification of forms of government.² The names given are royalty (*βασιλεια*), tyranny, aristocracy, plutocracy, and democracy. The terms monarchy and oligarchy do not occur here, but appear in Plato's *Politicus*. It was Plato like-
 wise who first worked out the theory, lightly touched by Socrates, that government is a special art, and, like all other special arts, can be rightly exercised only by competent persons.³ This is a branch of the general Socratic doctrine that excellence of every kind, including moral virtue, is analogous to that excellence in particular skilled occupation which, as everybody knows, can be acquired by the appropriate kind of discipline, and cannot be acquired otherwise. Socrates appears to have used this application of the doctrine by way of practical exhortation to those who possessed political power to take politics seriously. Plato developed it into fanciful aspirations, which he himself acknowledged to be impracticable, for government by an absolute and perfectly wise despot, who, not being bound by inflexible general rules, will do what is absolutely fitting in every case that occurs.⁴ The elaborate construction of an ideal commonwealth in his *Republic* proceeds on similar principles. Under the actual conditions of life political franchises cannot be

¹ Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 14.

² Op. cit. iii. 2, 10.

³ Op. cit. iv. 6, 12.

⁴ Plat. Polit. 294.

adjusted according to political competence, even if an infallible judge of competence could be found: and the only application that can be made of the position laid down by Socrates is to endeavour to secure, as far as may be, that the conditions of competent judgment shall not be wanting to those who must in any case have political power. Lord Sherbrooke's injunction to educate our masters was thoroughly Socratic both in spirit and in form.

The Platonic *Republic*, I think, must be considered as a brilliant exercise of philosophical imagination, not as a contribution to political science. Plato's latest work, the *Laws*, appears to have been intended as a kind of compromise between the ideas of the *Republic* and the conditions of practical politics. In this it was not successful. Except that it stimulated Aristotle's criticism, it took no definite place in the development of systematic thinking on political matters. Moreover, it is hardly too much to say that Plato never got to the point of having a theory of the State at all. In the *Politicus* he seeks to determine the character of the ideal statesman, and touches only by a kind of afterthought on actual and practically possible forms of government. It would be best of all to be governed by a perfectly wise ruler unfettered by any laws whatever; but it is worst of all to be in the hands of a ruler who has not wisdom and is not restrained by law. Since the wise governor whom the philosopher desires is hardly to be discovered in the world as it exists, government by fixed laws is accepted as being, though a clumsy business in itself

more tolerable than the tyranny which is the only practical alternative. In the *Republic*, again, Plato starts from the character of individual men and its formation. As a Greek naturally would, and as we have seen that Pericles did, he regarded this as largely depending on the type and institutions of the State in which the individual was a citizen. The individual is for Plato the city in miniature; and to define the notion of justice, the problem by which the dialogue of the *Republic* is opened, and to the solution of which the whole discussion is ostensibly auxiliary, he magnifies the individual into the State. In order to construct the perfect citizen Plato finds himself under the need of constructing the State itself. This point of view left its mark impressed upon the work of Aristotle, in whose treatise on politics, as we now have it, the theory of education occupies one-eighth of the whole: an indefensible arrangement according to modern ideas, giving to the subject, as it does, too much for an incidental consideration, and too little for a monograph. It is better, however, to have one's theory of education not exactly in the right place than to have none at all, which last is about the condition in which we moderns have been, until quite lately, since the tradition of the Renaissance sank into an unintelligent routine.

Aristotle struck out a new and altogether different path. In the first place he made the capital advance of separating ethics from politics. Not only is this not done in the Platonic writings, but the very opposite course is taken in the *Republic*: man is treated as a

micropolis, and the city is the citizen writ large. Another and hardly less important point in Aristotle's favour is his method of dealing with political facts and problems. Without abandoning the ideal construction of the State as it ought to be, he sets himself to make out the natural history of the State as it is. He begins not with an ideal, but with the actual conditions of human society and the formation of governments. He made a full and minute study of the existing constitutions of Greek cities, and thus collected a great body of information and materials, unhappily lost to us for the most part.¹ And we regret the loss the more keenly in that we know how accurate Aristotle was, and feel more at home with him than with those who went before him.

aristotle
seen
to
like

Plato's splendour of imagination and charm of language have indeed deserted us; but we get an exact observation of men and things and a sound practical judgment, which set us on firm ground and assure us of solid progress. A balloon is a very fine thing if you are not anxious to go anywhere in particular; a road is common, and the travelling on it may be tedious, but you come to the journey's end. Plato is a man in a balloon who hovers over a new land, and now and then catches a commanding view of its contours through the mist. Aristotle is the working colonist who goes there and makes the roads. The more one considers his work, the more one appreciates his good sense, his tact in dealing with a question in the best way possible to him under the given conditions, and his candour towards the reader. When he does not

¹ The "Constitution of Athens" discovered in our own time is the one known exception.

see his way to critical analysis, or does not care just then and there to undertake it, and builds upon the data given by common language and opinion, he frankly tells us what he is doing. He always knows exactly what he is undertaking, and works with careful reference to his particular object. His practical insight is very seldom at fault.¹ Even those points in Aristotle's work which are so trite by incessant quotation and allusion that we are now apt to think them obvious have been repeatedly shown to be neither obvious nor superfluous by the most conclusive of all evidence—the mistakes of clever men who have disregarded them.

These merits are conspicuously shown in the general introduction which forms the first book of Aristotle's *Politics*. He plunges without preface, as his manner is, into the analytical inquiry. A State is a community, and every community exists for the sake of some benefit to its members (for all human action is for the sake of obtaining some apparent good): the State is that kind of community which has for its object the most

¹ I may mention an instance that occurs to me in detail. In *Eth. Nic.* v. 8 (where, though the book is not of Aristotle's own writing, the matter may be taken as Aristotelian), the harm that may be done by one person to another is classified under four degrees. These are ἀτύχημα, or pure misadventure; ἀμέλεια, or injury by negligence, where the harm might have been foreseen (ὅταν μὴ παραλόγως); ἀδικημα, or injury wilful but not premeditated; and ἀδικία or μοχθηρία, where the injury is deliberate. If the notes taken by me many years ago of the late Mr. Cope's lectures (to which I here acknowledge my great obligation for what I know of the *Politics*) are correct, Mr. Cope thought this last distinction over-refined. But this, as well as the whole classification, corresponds to the gradation attempted by the law of modern civilised countries with a closeness which, considering the rudimentary state of public law in Aristotle's time, deserves admiration rather than criticism.

comprehensive good. The State does not differ from a household, as some imagine, only in the number of its members. We shall see this by examining its elements. To begin at the beginning, man cannot exist in solitude; the union of the two sexes is necessary for life being continued at all, and a system of command and obedience for its being led in safety. Thus the relations of husband and wife, master and servant, determine the household. Households coming together make a village or tribe. The rule of the eldest male of the household is the primitive type of monarchy. Then we get the State as the community of a higher order in which the village or tribe is a unity. It is formed to secure life, it continues in order to improve life.¹ Hence—and this is Aristotle's first great point—the State is not an affair of mere convention. It is the natural and necessary completion of the process in which the family is a step. The family and the village community are not independent or self-sufficient; we look to the State for an assured social existence. The State is a natural institution in a double sense: first, as imposed on man by the general and permanent conditions of his life; then it is the only form of life in which he can do the most he is capable of. Man is born to be a citizen—*Ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον*. There is hardly a saying in Greek literature so well worn as this; nor is there any which has worn better, or which better deserved to become a proverb. It looks simple enough, but it is one of the truths in which we go on perceiving

¹ γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν, οὕσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.

more significance the more our knowledge increases. This is a thing which happens even in the exact sciences. The full importance of Newton's Third Law of Motion, as enounced and explained by himself, escaped his contemporaries, and was not realised even by the leaders of science until a new light was thrown on it by the development of the modern doctrine of energy. Newton's law, in Newton's own form, was restored by Lord Kelvin and Professor Tait to its rightful place in the forefront of mathematical physics. And we may confidently expect that our children will find more wisdom and light in Charles Darwin's writings than we have as yet found. So, too, in philosophy, "Back to Kant" has become a kind of watchword in Germany. This does not mean that philosophy has been barren ever since Kant, but that the years of a century, even a century remarkable for philosophical interest and activity, were all too short for us to take the full measure of a man of Kant's greatness. And in our present case of Aristotle we may well say that twenty centuries have been none too much; for there have been times once and again when there was sore need of a wise and sober man to cry "Back to Aristotle" to nations deluded by specious political fallacies, and no such man was found.

This axiom of Aristotle contradicts by anticipation the worst and the most widely spread of modern errors, the theory of the Social Contract, which, consistently worked out, can lead to nothing but individualism run mad, until individualism devours itself in giving birth

to a covenanted dictatorship of militarism or capitalism. Should there be, says Aristotle, a really *cityless* man (as distinct from one who has lost political standing by misadventure; Aristotle was probably thinking of the common case of exile, or of the total subversion which had befallen his own native city), what can we say of such an one? He must be either superhuman or beneath contempt; he must be in a natural state of war, with his hand against every man. Now this *ἄπολις*, the clanless and masterless man whom Aristotle regards as a kind of monster, is identical with the natural man of Hobbes and Rousseau. He is the unit out of whom, if there be only enough of them, theorists of the Social Contract school undertook to build up the State. This is an enterprise at which Aristotle would have stared and gasped. We have seen pretty well what comes of it. Rousseau and the Social Contract have had their innings in revolutionary France; and I think we have by this time ample warrant of experience for saying that Aristotle was right, and Hobbes and Rousseau (assuming for the moment that we have the real mind of Hobbes in Hobbes as commonly understood) were altogether wrong.

Thus in Aristotle's view the State is natural and necessary to man; in the rational order it is even prior to the individual man, since man cannot live a complete or tolerable life apart from the State. Inasmuch as the State is composed of households, preliminary questions arise which Aristotle includes in the general term

5 Economy (the ordering of the *οἰκία*, which is the component unit of the *πόλις*); these amount to the study of society apart from the particular form of government. There is nothing, or next to nothing, left to be said about Aristotle's much-discussed defence of slavery, which comes in at this point. The English reader will do well to bear in mind that Aristotle justifies slavery only under conditions which, if applied in practice, would have greatly mitigated the institution as it existed in his time. Of more permanent interest is the sketch of what Aristotle calls the art of trade or wealth-getting (*χρηματιστική*)—an art which, in his view, is not included in that of the general conduct of social life, but is separate and auxiliary to it. It would be going rather too far to call Aristotle the father of political economy on the strength of this incidental discussion. But it is quite plain that he had a shrewd notion of the scientific handling of economical problems. In particular there are some clear and thoroughly sound remarks on exchange and currency. Lord Sherbrooke (whose bad words for classical studies were after all only *amantium ira*) cited them with the happiest effect in a paper on Bimetallism. Aristotle goes wrong, indeed, on the matter of the interest of money, and professed moralists and statesmen went wrong for many centuries after him. Our own usury laws were finally repealed as late as 1854. Economy, however, is treated by Aristotle as a purely subordinate study, auxiliary to the general welfare of the State and the promotion of the most desirable type of life.

6

Modern economists have found it necessary to work out their problems as if wealth were an end in itself, leaving statesmen to take up the results and place them in their due relation to the wider purposes and aims of society. But this leads to some danger of forgetting that there really are other and higher aims in life, and notwithstanding Aristotle's economical errors, we may do well to take a lesson from him herein, or rather from the Greeks: for on this point Aristotle represents the universal feeling of the cultivated Greek society of his time.

Before entering upon any details on his own account, Aristotle clears the way by criticism of some earlier political speculations, Plato's and others. What he says of the community of goods and so forth in Plato's *Republic* is open to the remark that Plato was constructing an ideal which he knew to be impracticable, and Aristotle criticises as if he were dealing with a practical proposal. But the intrinsic value of Aristotle's opinions is not affected by this, nor has it been in any way diminished by the lapse of time and growth of experience. His decisive condemnation of communism remains as forcible, as just, and I fear it must be said as necessary, as ever it was. No one has better expressed what in our own time has been called the magic of ownership. "Carefulness is least in that which is common to most; for men take thought in the chief place for their own, and less for the common stock." Duly regulated private ownership combines the supposed advantages of communism with those of several enjoyment. The higher and only true communism

for men in society is that of the proverb, "Friends goods are common." How to foster and maintain a state of generous friendship in which a man shall give and take in turn of the good things of life, so that property shall in effect be several in title, but common in use—that is the high social problem which the communist evades and the true statesman must attack. "Moreover, the pleasure we take in anything is increased beyond expression when we esteem it our own; and I conceive that the individual's affection for himself is by no means casual, but is of man's very nature."¹ Aristotle goes on to show that the grievances which are now the communist's stock in trade, as much as they were in his time, have no necessary or real connection with the existence of private property; and in the course of this criticism he repeats his warning that the State is not to be considered as a mere magnified family, nor yet as an alliance of independent and similar individuals, but as a specific organism made up of divers parts, all working together, and each fitted for its own proper function. A scheme for the division of property among the citizens in equal shares, which had acquired some reputation in Aristotle's day, is dealt with by him in the same spirit. He goes straight to the root of the matter with a piercing question. It is all very well, he says, to make plans for equal distribution, or for limiting the amount of property that may be held by one owner, but supposing it done, the deaths and

¹ Pol. ii. 5, 5-8.

births of a single generation will bring about an altered relation of citizens to property, and upset all your calculations. After the question of property you will have a question of population before you; and how do you mean to dispose of that? Again, it is idle to talk of equality for its own sake, as if it were an absolute good: an equality in pinching poverty would not help us much. Nor would all be done even if you could fix exactly the reasonable and sufficient portion, and give everybody that; "it is of more importance to equalise men's wants than their substance." This is another of Aristotle's deep and pregnant sayings; forgetfulness of it has made shipwreck of many splendid expectations. It would be impracticable in this place, and for the purpose now in hand, to follow into more detail Aristotle's discussion of ideal and actual constitutions. Enough has been said to give some sort of general notion of his critical method.

Still less shall we attempt to follow Aristotle into the special part of his work where he considers the institution of a model State and the several possible types of government. But there remains something of the general part to which we may give a word. The third book of the *Politics* still deals with preliminary questions. It fixes the general terminology and classification of forms of government (which, let us note in passing, have been retained in use ever since), and includes a discussion corresponding to what we now call the theory of sovereignty. One incidental question is, what do we mean by a citizen? Who is a citizen in

the full sense? The full citizen, in Aristotle's meaning, is defined by the right to take part in legislation and the administration of justice. This corresponds with curious exactness to the old English notion of the "lawful man"; and it corresponds very nearly to the modern understanding of political franchises in constitutional countries, though neither Aristotle nor any one for many centuries later had thought of the indirect form of legislative power conferred by the right of sending representatives to form a legislative assembly. In the Greek view the size of the State was limited by the number of citizens who could effectually take a direct part in public affairs. Babylon was all within one wall, but it was not a city in the proper Greek sense; that is not a city which can be taken by an invader at one end (as the tale went of Babylon) a couple of days before the other end knows of it.¹ What then constitutes the identity of a State, since lying within a ring-fence will not? Is it continuity of race within the manageable compass of a State, as the river is the same though the particles of water are constantly changing? Neither is this enough, says Aristotle; for a tragic and a comic chorus are not the same, though the men who perform in them may be the same. Continuity of constitution is also needful. After a revolution which changes the

¹ Pol. iii. 3, 5. The collection of geographically continuous parishes covered with buildings in the counties of Middlesex, Surrey, and Kent, which in 1888 was officially called London, and made an "administrative county," would have been a hopelessly bewildering object to an old Greek; but of one thing he would have been sure, and rightly, that nothing could well be less like a *πόλις*.

type of government there is no longer the same State, though it may be called by the same name. Aristotle was obviously not thinking of international relations, which would be entirely confused by applying this test, for example, all treaties to which France was a party would have been annulled over and over again in the course of the nineteenth century. But no theory of the relations of independent States to one another was put into shape until long after this time. From Aristotle's pure natural history point of view there is much to be said for drawing the line where he does.

Again, having defined the citizen and the city, where shall we find our criterion of the merit of particular constitutions? The answer is clear and simple. A normal or right constitution is that which is framed and administered for the common good of all, whether the sovereign power be with one, with few, or with the many. A constitution framed in the exclusive interest of a class, even though it be a majority of the whole, is wrongful and perverse. Royalty, aristocracy, and commonwealth (πολιτεία) are the normal forms; their respective corruptions are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy—tyranny being a monarchical government worked for the advantage of the monarch over all subjects; oligarchy, the government of a privileged class for the advantage of the rich over the poor; and democracy, the government of the multitude for the advantage of the poor over the rich. *Tyranny* is still always used in a bad sense, and *oligarchy* generally; but as to *democracy* Aristotle's distinction has fallen out of

political language, perhaps because his term for the normal state was not specific enough. In English there would be no difficulty in using *commonwealth* or *republic* in Aristotle's good sense, and *democracy* in his bad one; but it has never been done.

A last word may be added on the Greek ideal of the State, if it should still be thought we have nothing to learn from it. Herbert Spencer invited us to look forward to a state of ultimate enlightenment on political matters, in which "law will have no other justification than that gained by it as maintainer of the conditions to complete life in the associated state." This is almost as much as to say that, after all this time, we are at last coming up to the level of Aristotle, or we might indeed say of Pericles. For in Aristotle's view "complete life in the associated state" is precisely the end and aim of government. It is what the city exists for, and a government which does not honestly aim at it has no business to exist. All other ends are subordinate to this. The other ends or reasons assigned in later times would have appeared to Aristotle absurd or irrelevant.¹ In fairness to ourselves, however, we must remember that the problem of modern statecraft is of much greater extent and more formidable complexity than those of Greek political philosophers. After all, the citizens for whose welfare Aristotle conceived the State to exist were, even in the most demo-

¹ The *legal* doctrine of the authority of law is a different matter altogether. It belongs to the theory of sovereignty, which we shall come to later.

cratic of constitutions, a limited and privileged class. They are people of leisure and culture, not living by the work of their hands. To make a true citizen of the worker in mechanical arts, the handicraftsman who has not leisure, is thought by Aristotle a hopeless task, and this even with reference to the skilled and finer kinds of work. The grosser kind of labour is assumed to be done by slaves, who are wholly outside the sphere of political right. Not that Aristotle would neglect the welfare of inferior freemen or even of slaves. He would have the statesman make them comfortable, and bring them as near happiness as their condition admits. But of happiness in the true sense they are incapable. We have swept away these restrictions, and find ourselves applying the ideal of a Greek city to our vast and heterogeneous modern political structures—a tremendous extension of the difficulties. Indeed it may be doubted whether democracy can be called perfect unless there is equality by custom and in fact as well as by law; whether such equality can really be found in any modern commonwealth;¹ and whether it can exist except within a limited and privileged, and therefore homogeneous association. If we are not much more successful than the Greeks, the task is greater and the aim higher. It is a lamentable fact that governments still exist which pretend to be civilised, but which, instead of encouraging the completeness of life in their citizens, deliberately hamper or suppress it in many directions, and by the most detestable means. In

¹ Iceland, I believe, shows the nearest approximation.

such cases, however, it is not that civilisation has failed, but that an essentially barbarous rule has contrived to put on some of its outward appearances. On the other hand, the Greeks can hardly be said to have made any serious progress in the art of governing dependencies; and a continuing union of self-governing colonies with the mother country for purposes of external policy does not seem to have been so much as conceived by them. Aristotle would have found interesting matter in the endeavour towards British imperial organisation which has been carried on for several years with varying but on the whole promising fortune: and, although no sensible Englishman or American affects to treat other civilised nations as inferior, he might have seen some remarkable analogies to the Hellenic sentiment of his own time in the growing ideal of Anglo-Saxon or English-speaking brotherhood.¹

Aristotle was in a singularly favourable position for his political studies. By circumstances in no way touching his personal credit, he was discharged from taking an active part in public affairs. He could survey the Greek world as a disinterested observer, and the tranquillity produced by the establishment of Macedonian supremacy gave increased opportunities of observation, while the practical extinction of Greek independence had not yet borne its fruit in the visible decay of public life. After Aristotle's time the decay spread rapidly,

¹ These terms are conventional. The bond is in common political institutions and tradition more than in language, and much more than in race. As to the prospects of imperial unity in January 1918, see my article in *Quarterly Review* of that date, which now (1920) I hope may before long be superseded by the results of an Imperial Conference.

and its effects were striking. His immediate successors are said to have worked on the theory of politics, but their books are lost, and very little seems to be known of their results. In the later Greek schools political speculation became stagnant. The old public spirit was supplanted by a kind of cosmopolitan indifference. The Roman conqueror was regarded by the Greek rhetoricians as the ruling Englishman in India is now regarded by most Brahmans—as a masterful barbarian sent by the fates, whose acts and institutions were of no importance to the philosophic mind. There were exceptions among thoughtful Greeks, but I believe it is generally true that no Greek author through the whole period of Roman dominion shows any interest in Latin literature, or treats the Romans as intellectual equals. Whatever genuine philosophical interest was left ran to the study of ethics, and that as a study regarding the conduct, not of man as a citizen, but simply of man living among men. In many things the post-Aristotelian schools not merely failed to make any advance on what Aristotle had left, but fell back from the point he had reached. Their teaching, as Mr. Newman has said,¹ tended on the whole to detach the individual from politics. Accordingly they contributed to political science nothing worth mentioning. In Epicurus we may find a rudimentary form of the Social Contract;² and the Stoics had one fine idea, that of the world as a kind of great city in which individual cities were like households

¹ W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, i. 549.

² συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

This idea (which is more than once used by Cicero) might, under other conditions, have led them to consider the relations of independent states to one another, and perhaps to develop something like international law. But there were no independent states left; there was only the Roman power which had absorbed all the civilised world, surrounded by dimly known and more or less barbarous tribes and kingdoms. In the early Roman period there is one example of a Greek who made a serious study of Roman institutions, Polybius. His panegyric of the Roman constitution is remarkable as presenting, in a distinct form and concrete application, the theory of mixed and balanced powers which was so much in vogue with British publicists of the eighteenth century, and is hardly yet obsolete among their Continental imitators. In the original Greek form the doctrine is rather concerned with the mixture in one commonwealth of elements belonging to different types.¹

The Romans were great as rulers and administrators, and they created systematic law. But in philosophy they were simply the pupils and imitators of the Greeks, and showed themselves as little capable of invention in politics as in any other branch. Cicero, a man both of letters and of affairs, devoted a considerable part of

¹ A governing assembly maintained by co-optation from special classes of the governed, its executive being appointed from its own number by rotation and having considerable powers, may be an example of a constitution mixed in the Aristotelian, but hardly in the modern sense. The reader may exercise himself in discovering this constitution; it really exists in certain English societies.

① his life to making Latin a philosophical language. He succeeded admirably in transcribing the current ideas of the Greek schools, especially those of the Stoics, in a language far more attractive and eloquent than that of his post-Aristotelian models. More than this he did not attempt, and in any case did not achieve. Nobody that I know of has yet succeeded in discovering a new idea in the whole of Cicero's philosophical or semi-philosophical writings; and the portions of his work on the Commonwealth which have come down to us in a fragmentary state are no exception to this. His theory was mainly Stoic, and the chief peculiarity of the work was a pretty full historical discussion of the Roman constitution, which, after the example of Polybius,¹ he praised as combining the merits of all forms of government. Even Roman Law, the really great and original work of Roman intellect, owes something of its theoretical form to Greek philosophy. It is not our business to consider in this place whether the debt is of serious amount. Jurisprudence is a branch of politics, but too peculiar a branch for its history to be dwelt on in a general sketch like the present. But the Greeks themselves, as we have just said, ceased to produce anything of vital interest. The overmastering might of the Roman empire, levelling men of all kindreds and nations in a common subjection, finished the work which the Macedonian supremacy had begun, and with political independence the scientific study of politics

¹ It seems that Cicero had some knowledge of Aristotle's *Politics*, Polybius probably had none. Newman, *op. cit.* ii. xii.-xvi.

became extinct. It was a sleep of many centuries that followed, broken only by half-conscious stirrings in the Middle Ages. There were brilliant attempts and notable precursors. But there was no serious revival of interest in the theory of politics until the Renaissance; and the definite new birth of political thinking, and its consecutive growth in forms adapted to the civilisation of modern Europe, may fairly be dated from Hobbes, and at most cannot be put back earlier than Machiavelli.

II

THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE

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UNDER the Roman Empire the absence of independent political life on the one hand, and the vast development of municipal law and administration on the other, left no room for theoretical politics. It was enough for the Roman lawyers that supreme power over the Roman world had been conferred on Cæsar. So things remained until the Empire was broken up. On its ruins there gradually arose a new state of society, and ultimately of public law. But still the conditions of political philosophy were wanting. The cultivated leisure in which Greek speculation was nurtured, and which Aristotle required as the security for even an ordinary citizen's political competence, had been utterly destroyed, and awaited reconstruction. The new or renovated institutions that were consolidating the shattered frame of European civilisation were as yet hardly political in any proper sense. As Lord Bryce has well said, the Middle Ages were essentially unpolitical. Only one great question came into prominence in the thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries, and drew to itself whatever power or interest men's minds then had in the theoretical treatment of affairs of State. This was the controversy between the temporal and the spiritual power. It was the common ground of the disputants that the Papacy and the Empire were both divinely ordained, and each in its own sphere had universal jurisdiction over Christendom. The point of difference was as to the relation of these two jurisdictions to one another. Was the temporal ruler in the last resort subordinate to the spiritual, as the lesser to the greater light? or were their dignities co-ordinate and equal? The whole reign of Frederick II., by the confession even of his enemies the most extraordinary man of his age, was an unrelenting battle between the Roman Emperor and the Roman Pontiff on this ground. Frederick, who had entered on his office as the special favourite of the Holy See, found himself ere long in open hostility to it, and at last under its formal ban. Indications are not wanting that he was prepared not only to maintain the independence of the Empire, but to carry the war into the enemy's camp. He aimed at nothing less than making himself supreme in spiritual as well as temporal government. It seems not clear how far his plans were laid in detail, but his general intention is certain. He openly treated the Papal censures as of no authority, and affected in his own person the titles especially appropriate to spiritual dominion. He called himself, or encouraged his followers to call him, the vicar of God on earth, the reformer of the age, a new Elijah discomfiting the

priests of Baal. He denounced the Pope as a Pharisee
anointed with the oil of iniquity and sitting in the seat
of corrupt judgment, a false vicar of Christ and deceiv-
ing serpent, who disturbed the world out of mere envy
 at the majesty and prosperity of the Empire. It is
 thought that he contemplated the erection of a new
 Church in subjection to the Empire, whose centre would
 have been in Sicily.¹ The princes and people of Europe
looked by no means unfavourably on Frederick's anti-
papal policy. But in what seemed its full tide of
 success it was cut short by a death almost sudden, and
 at the time not free from suspicion. The excommuni-
 cated Emperor's memory was darkened, as was always
 the fate of the Roman See's enemies, by the fame of
 monstrous heresies and blasphemies. In his lifetime
 these charges got little credence. St. Louis of France,
 the model of Catholic kings, turned a deaf ear to them.
 Frederick himself indignantly repudiated and retorted
 them. But he had notoriously committed the un-
 pardonable crime of making a treaty on just and equal
 terms with the Sultan of Egypt, which indeed was a
 sign of political ideas too much in advance of his time
 to be acceptable; and the hostility of a power which
 outlives dynasties, and never forgets or forgives,
 had its effect in the long run. Dante felt bound
to place Frederick II. among the unbelievers in
his *Inferno*, though all his sympathies must have

¹ Huillard-Bréholles, *Vie et Correspondance de Pierre de la Vigne*,
 Paris, 1865. The learned author draws an ingenious parallel between
 Frederick II. and his minister Peter de Vineia and our Henry VIII
 and Thomas Cromwell.

gone with him in his lifelong struggle against the Roman Curia.¹

The strife which Frederick II. had failed to conclude in action was left as a heritage for the ingenuity of mediæval dialectics. It produced a considerable literature, among which there were two books, one on either side, bearing names of lasting renown. The Papal claims were defended in a treatise Of the Government of Princes, begun, but left unfinished, by Thomas Aquinas, and continued by his disciple, Ptolemy of Lucca; the independence of the Empire was maintained by Dante in his equally celebrated De Monarchia.²

We cannot say that these works develop anything like a complete political theory. So far as they make an approach to this, they show an unconscious reaction from the Aristotelian to the Platonic way of handling the subject. Both the Imperialist and the Papal champion abandon the problem of distributing power on rational principles among the different elements in the State. They fall back on unlimited monarchy as the only means of keeping the peace, and trust to Providence for the ruler being endowed with wisdom.³

Dante goes even further than St. Thomas. His argu-

¹ The words put into the mouth of Peter de Vineia (*Inf.* xiii. 64-75) afford positive proof, if it were needed.

² As to the *De Regimine Principum*, there appears to be no reason to doubt the attribution of the two first books or most of them to St. Thomas himself. The third is a later, but not much later, addition; the fourth is incongruous with the body of the work, and bears the stamp of the Renaissance. See further Poole, *Medieval Thought*, 2nd ed., p. 210.

³ St. Thomas disapproves tyrannicide, but holds that a tyrannical ruler may be justly deposed, at all events in an elective monarchy.

ment is not only for monarchy as the best form of government, but for a universal monarchy, as necessary for the welfare of mankind; and he maintains that the universal monarch, having no rival to fear and no further ambition to satisfy, can have no motive for ruling otherwise than wisely and justly. The Monarcha of Dante's treatise is Plato's heaven-born statesman, the ἀνὴρ βασιλικός, transferred from the Greek city to the larger stage of mediæval Christendom. It is only under his rule, Dante says, that true freedom is possible to men, and this is the justification of his universal dominion. Aristotle's doctrine, that the merit of a government must be tested by its promotion of the common weal of all the subjects, is fully and expressly adopted.

"Since the Monarch is full of love for men, as was before touched upon, he will have all men good, which cannot be if they live under perverted constitutions:¹ wherefore the Philosopher in his Politics saith, That in a perverted Commonwealth the good man is a bad citizen; but in a rightful one good man and good citizen are convertible terms. And the aim of such rightful Commonwealths is liberty, to wit that men may live for their own sake. For citizens are not for the sake of the Consuls, nor a nation for the King; but contrariwise the Consuls are for the sake of the citizens, the King for the sake of the nation. For as a Commonwealth is not subordinate to laws, but laws to the Commonwealth;

¹ "Quod esse non potest apud oblique politizantes," with reference to the *παρεκβάσεις* of Aristotle's classification.

so men who live according to law are not for the service of the lawgiver, but he for theirs; which is the Philosopher's opinion in that which he hath left us concerning the present matter. Hence it is plain also that though a Consul or King in regard of means be the lords of others, yet in regard of the end they are the servants of others: and most of all the Monarch, who without doubt is to be deemed the servant of all."

We are not concerned here with the scholastic arguments in favour of monarchy, drawn from the intrinsic excellence of unity as compared with plurality, which are used both by Dante and by St. Thomas; nor can we dwell at length on Dante's reasons for identifying his ideal monarch with the actual prince who wore the crown of the revived Western Empire. They deserve some passing mention, however, if only to show what had taken the place of political science in even the best minds of the time. There is nothing more curious in literature than the proof in the second book of the *De Monarchia* that the Roman people were ordained of God to conquer the world. The Psalmist, Aristotle, Cicero, Virgil, and Aquinas are cited as equally relevant and binding authorities; and the application of the language of the second Psalm to the Roman dominion is almost as strong as anything addressed to Frederick II. by his Chancellor and courtiers. It is argued that the Roman victories over all the other powers of the earth were not mere vulgar conquests, but due and formal trials by battle of the dispute for universal sovereignty, the result of which declared the judgment

of God.¹ Most curious of all is the argument that the title of the Roman Empire was confirmed by the highest possible authority in the passion of Christ. The sin of Adam was punished in Christ, but there is no punishment without competent jurisdiction; and, since Christ represented all mankind, a jurisdiction extending to all mankind was in this case the only competent one. Such a universal jurisdiction was that of Rome as exercised by Pilate. In the third and last book Dante proves that the authority of the Roman Empire proceeds immediately from God, and is not held of the Pope or the Church. His minute refutations of the reasons adduced on the Papal side from the sun and moon, the offerings of the Magi, the two swords, and so forth, now seem to us only one degree less grotesque than the reasons themselves.

Yet there is an earnest endeavour in this work of Dante's, though it is but feeling about in a dim twilight, to find a solid ground for a real system of European public law. The monarch he conceives is not a universal despot, but a governor of a higher order set over the princes and rulers of particular states, and keeping the peace between them. He is to have the jurisdiction, in modern language, of an international tribunal. "Wheresoever contention may be, there judgment ought to be;" and therefore the monarch is need-

¹ The "formalia duelli" prescribed by Dante as the conditions of a just and judicially decisive war are, as might be expected, extremely vague. As to the early history of trial by battle see Fustel de Coulanges, *La Monarchie Française*, p. 453, and Mr. George Neilson's *Trial by Combat*, and cp. Pollock and Maitland, *Hist. Eng. Law*, ii. 597, 630 (600, 632 in 2nd edition).

ful to give judgment in the contentions which arise between independent princes. The desire for such an authority had not apparently been felt by the Greek philosophers. Dante says nothing of the manner in which the Emperor's jurisdiction is to be exercised, or of the means whereby his judgments are to be executed. He must have known that his idea was far removed from anything likely to be put in practice. Even now we have made only the first steps towards realising it. Still the idea was a noble one, and we may say for it of Dante, in his own words concerning his master Virgil—

“Onorate l'altissimo poeta.”

For the rest, we must say of all the mediæval writers on politics, as we said before of Plato, but in a much more unqualified sense, that they really have no theory of the State. Their aim is to maintain the cause of the Papacy or of the Empire as the case may be. Disinterested study of politics was a thing beyond them. B2a Our own Bracton (or some one who amplified his text not long after it was written) has elements of a constitutional doctrine, but such beggarly elements as only to show the poverty of the age in systematic thought on such matters. He rejects the notion of an English king being an absolute sovereign. The king is under the law, and if he attempts to govern against law, the great men of the land who are his companions must do something to check him. But how the check is to be applied we are not told: much less where, if not

1. in the Crown, the ultimate political authority really is. Marsiglio of Padua, who wrote early in the fourteenth century,¹ shows a certain return to Aristotelian method and results, as well as familiarity with the *Politics*, of which he adopts the terminology.

② He defended government by the majority by the same argument that Aristotle had already used as applicable to the imperfect condition of actually existing communities. True it is that the people at large are not fit to govern; but they can tell whether they are well or ill governed, as a man knows whether his shoe fits him or not without being a shoemaker. In one passage there is a suggestion of representative government, or at any rate the framing of laws by elected representatives.

③ Marsiglio likewise distinctly marked the separation of the executive power (which he calls by its modern name) from the legislative; moreover, he advocated a

④ complete separation of temporal from spiritual authority, and would have the temporal laws and magistrates make no difference of persons on the score of religious

⑤ opinion. Being a zealous Imperialist, Marsiglio pro-

¹ His book was first printed, it seems at Basel, in the sixteenth century (opus insigne cui titulum fecit autor Defensorem Pacis, etc. s.l. 1522). In the British Museum Catalogue it has to be sought under the title *Menandrinus*, a Latinised form of his surname, which, however, the Bodleian catalogue censures as erroneous. Our countryman William of Ockham's gigantic Dialogue, practically accessible only in Goldast's eighteenth-century collection *Monarchia*, came next in importance to Marsiglio. He was sure the people of Rome had a natural right, and thought they had a divine right, to elect their own bishop. It seems that Wycliffe used his work. See now two articles on Marsiglio in *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, 1922-3: Part 1, "Life," xxxvii. 501 (C. Kenneth Brampton); Part 2, "Doctrines" (C. W. Previté-Orton), xxxviii. 1. Mr. Previté-Orton has now published a critical edition of the *Defensor Pacis* (Cambridge University Press, 1929).

ceeded to deny the pre-eminence of the Roman See even in spiritual matters, and naturally incurred excommunication. Half a century later his steps were followed with no small vigour and effect (but this time for Gallican and patriotic rather than Imperial ends) in the French dialogue known as the *Songe du Verger*, or in Latin *Somnium Viridarii*,¹ of which the authorship is now attributed to Philippe de Mézières.²

~~Machiavelli~~ The modern study of politics, however, begins with Machiavelli. Not that he made any definite or permanent contribution to political theory which can be laid hold of as a principle fertile of new consequences. His works are more concerned with the details of statecraft than with the analysis of the State. But we find in him, for the first time since Aristotle, the pure passionless curiosity of the man of science. We find the separation of Ethics and Politics, which had fallen into neglect, not only restored, but forming the groundwork of all Machiavelli's reasoning, and made prominent even to the point of apparent paradox and scandal. Machiavelli takes no account of morality. He assumes cer-

¹ It is a distorted version of a Latin dialogue by Giov. da Legnano. See G. d. L. *Tractatus de bello*, etc., ed. Holland, 1917 (Carnegie Institution). The French text ("Le songe du vergier qui parle de la disputacion du clerc et du chevalier") was first printed at Lyons by Jacques Maillet in 1491. The only modern edition is in vol. ii. of *Traitez des droits et libertez de l'Eglise Gallicane*, 1731. The Latin version was published in Paris in 1516. The dialogue form and the interlocutors appear to have been borrowed from William of Ockham's *Disputatio inter clericum et militem super potestate praelatis ecclesiae atque principibus terrarum commissa*.

² Gierke, *Staats. u. Korporationslehre des Alterthums u. d. Mittelalters*, p. 507; *Revue Historique*, May 1892. But see Ducoudray, *Les origines du Parlement de Paris*, 1902, p. 137.

tain ends to be in the view of a prince or nation. They might be, we know by his own life and sufferings that often they were, ends of which Machiavelli himself disapproved. But he considers, as a purely intellectual problem, by what means an Italian ruler of the sixteenth century is most likely to attain those ends. Religion and morality are in his assumed point of view simply instruments in the hand of the ruler; not masters, not always even safe guides, but useful servants and agents. The art of politics depends on the constant principles and motives of human self-interest. Its details are to be learnt from history and experience. Machiavelli's own account of his best known (though perhaps not his most important) work, as he gave it in a familiar letter to his friend Francesco Vettori, leaves nothing to desire in clearness as far as it goes. The letter describes how he spends the day in out-of-door pursuits; fowling in the season, or looking after his wood-cutting, and then gossiping or playing cards at the roadside inn nearest his country retreat, picking up news and noting men's various humours. But his time of real pleasure is in the evening; then he casts off his rough and muddy country dress, and arrays himself as becomes a statesman in good company; his company are the ancients, among whose history and thoughts he spends this time, forgetting misfortune and poverty. He has meditated over what he learns from these companions, and set down the chief results. "I have made," he says, "a treatise, *De Principatibus*, where I go to the depth of my ability into the consideration of this matter.

discussing what is the nature of sovereignty,¹ what kinds of it there are, how they are acquired, how maintained, and for what causes lost." He describes his treatise, that is, as a study of pure natural history, an inquiry by what means despotic rulers (such as then abounded in Italy, some of greater, some of smaller pretensions) are, in fact, successful or unsuccessful in consolidating their power. And that is exactly what the book is on the face of it. Machiavelli does not approve or advise fraud and treachery, as he has been charged with doing. His own public conduct, so far as known (and he was a public servant for many years), was upright both abroad and at home. He only points out that power gained in certain ways must be maintained, if at all, by corresponding means. It is not strange that a man living among Italian politics, such as they then were, and as they were closely observed and described by himself, should regard the separation of policy from morality as a remediless evil which must be accepted. There is no ground for saying that he did not perceive it to be an evil at all. Nor is it to be set down as the evil fruit of his advice that other despots and usurpers in later times have been successful by those arts which Machiavelli described as leading to success. No man ever learnt the secret of despotism out of a book.

It has always been assumed, however, that Machia-

¹ Machiavelli's *Principato* is not easy to translate exactly. He means by it every form of personal government, under whatever title, as opposed to popular government (*repubblica*): these being the only two kinds into which he thinks it worth while for his purposes to divide governments in general.

velli had some further object in his political writings: and much controversial ingenuity has been expended on determining what it was. All kinds of opinion have been advanced, from the vulgar prejudice that Machiavelli was a cynical counsellor of iniquity to the panegyric of the modern writers who place Machiavelli with Dante and Mazzini as one of the great preparers and champions of Italian unity.¹ This latter view contains at all events more truth than the old one. Machiavelli, though by education and preference a Republican, despaired of a strong and stable republican government in the Italian States as he knew them. The one pressing need for the restoration of prosperity to Italy was to deliver her from the invaders, French, German, and Spanish, who spoiled and ruined her: and this could be done, as it seemed to Machiavelli, only by some Italian prince wiser, more fortunate, and more nobly ambitious than others making himself the chief power in Italy, and gathering such strength of native arms as would enable him to withstand the foreigner. For an end so sacred in Italian eyes all the political means of the time were justified; and beside the possibility of attaining it questions of municipal politics and forms of domestic government sank into insignificance. National unity and independence was to be made the supreme aim, even if it had to be attained through a military despotism. We, who saw German unity

¹ F. Costèro, Preface to *Il Principe*. Milan, etc., 1875. See further J. A. Symonds, *Ency. Brit.* 9th ed. s.v. Machiavelli, and Lord Acton's and Mr. Burd's introductions to Mr. Burd's edition of *Il Principe*, Oxford, 1891, and cp. T. Whittaker, *The Theory of Abstract Ethics*, 1916, p. 100.

accomplished (allowing for differences of civilisation and manners) in almost exactly the same fashion that Machiavelli conceived for Italy, can at any rate not suppose that his idea was chimerical. That such was indeed one of his leading ideas is beyond doubt. It is not only avowed in the last chapter of the *Prince*, but the subordination of internal to external politics throughout Machiavelli's work is explicable by this fixed purpose, and by this only. For Machiavelli as for Dante, the question of assuring political life at all is still pressing to be solved before there is time to consider narrowly what is the best form of it. In Aristotle's phrase, the process of γίγνεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν is as yet barely accomplished, and the final problem of εὖ ζῆν is thrust into the background. Therefore even Machiavelli, full as he is of observation and practical wisdom, is only on the threshold of political science. His doctrine is a theory of the preservation of States rather than a theory of the State.¹

In Jean Bodin's treatise *Of Commonwealth* we get for the first time the definite enunciation of at least one capital point of modern political doctrine. He is entitled, indeed, to share with Hobbes the renown of having founded the modern theory of the State; and it may be said of him that he seized on the vital point of it at the earliest time when it was possible. The doctrine referred to is that of political sovereignty. In every independent community governed by law there

¹ Or in more technical terms: "Machiavelli's field is *Politik*, not *Staatslehre*": Dunning, *History of Political Theories*, 1902, p. 293.

must be some authority, whether residing in one person or several, whereby the laws themselves are established, and from which they proceed. And this power, being the source of law, must itself be above the law: not above duty and moral responsibility, as Bodin carefully explains; but above the municipal ordinances of the particular State—the positive laws, in modern phrase—which it creates and enforces. Find the person or persons whom the constitution of the State permanently invests with such authority, under whatever name, and you have found the sovereign. "Sovereignty is a power supreme over citizens and subjects, itself not bound by the laws." (This power somewhere is necessary to an independent State, and its presence is the test of national independence. Such is in outline the principle of sovereignty as stated by Bodin, taken up and enlarged a century later by Hobbes, and adopted by all modern publicists with only more or less variation in the manner of statement. It is one of the things which appear tolerably simple to a modern reader. The history of English politics and legislation has made it specially acceptable to English readers, and to an English lawyer it needs a certain effort of imagination to conceive that people ever thought otherwise. Yet a little consideration will make it equally obvious that the proposition could not have assumed a definite shape much before the sixteenth century. The legal supremacy of the State is conceivable only when the State has acquired a local habitation and a permanent establishment. The mediæval system of Europe was not a system of States in our

sense or in the Greek sense. It was a collection of groups, held together in the first instance by ties of personal dependence and allegiance, and connected among themselves by personal relations of the same kind on a magnified scale. Lordship and homage, from the Emperor down to the humblest feudal tenant, were the links in the chain of steel which saved the world from being dissolved into a chaos of jarring fragments. The laws and customs which were obeyed by princes and people, by lords and their men, were not thought of as depending on the local government for their efficacy. The Roman law, in particular, was treated as having some kind of intrinsic and absolute authority. We see its influence even in England, where it was never officially received. Men sought in the shadow of the Roman Empire and its dead institutions the unity of direction and government which their actual life had not yet found. The old unity of the clan had disappeared, and it was only gradually and slowly, as kingdoms were consolidated by strong rulers, that the newer unity of the nation took its place. Here and there, as in England, where a clear territorial definition was from an early time assured by the geographical nature of things, and foreign disturbance was easily kept aloof, a true national feeling and life rose up soon and waxed apace. But on the Continent the fifteenth century was still a time when nations were forming rather than formed; and when in the succeeding century the French monarchy began to feel its real strength, the masterly definitions of Bodin gave

expression to a change in the political face of Europe which was yet young.

Here the question occurs whether, as Hobbes and his followers have maintained or assumed, sovereign power in this sense must be unlimited, single and indivisible. Can there be divers authorities within one State, each of them supreme in its own sphere? As matter of fact, the answer is that it not only may be but must be so under any federal constitution, as every instructed Australian or Canadian citizen well knows, and American publicists have known much longer. A statute of Rhode Island made in due form and within the powers reserved to State legislatures by the Constitution cannot be legally overruled by any human authority, while an Act of Congress duly made in exercise of the powers conferred on the federal legislature must be obeyed in Rhode Island whether the men of Rhode Island like it or not. It is true that the Constitution itself provides ways of amendment, purposely made elaborate and difficult: and some men would say that the amending authority is the real sovereign. That authority not only is very seldom active, but has no power to legislate in detail for any State. It can add articles to the federal Constitution; it cannot enact a new statute for Rhode Island. Such an indirect and remote control is not the sovereignty of practical politics. If we must find a single authority "not bound by the laws" in any sense whatever, we must go back to an undefined and unorganised body, the people of the United States from whom the Constitution itself proceeded. If we deny that there is any real

sovereign power in the United States or in the Commonwealth of Australia, we reduce sovereignty to a mere logical figment having no useful relation to facts. These points cannot be fully worked out here ; but it is well to give a taste of them before we come to deal with Hobbes.¹

Bodin was a man of vast learning, and, with one strange exception,—his polemic against sorcerers,—it was an enlightened learning. On public economy and many other matters his opinions were far in advance of those current in his age. He not only strove to put in practice, but distinctly announced as a necessary principle, the foundation of political theory on a broad base of historical observation. Like Machiavelli, he showed in his own conduct as a citizen a settled attachment to freedom and justice, and suffered for his constancy. Yet we find in Bodin's doctrine, as in that of Machiavelli before him and Hobbes after him, a certain apparent leaning in favour of absolute power. He not only defines sovereignty as a power not subject to the laws, but, on the contrary, maker and master of them— a power which so far may belong² to one, to few, or to many, to a king, to an assembly, or to both together—but he is prone to identify the theoretical sovereign with the actual king in States where a king exists. For his

¹ See "The Nature of Sovereignty" in Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, 1901, ii. 49-111. There is no doubt that the weight of American opinion, from the Fathers of the Constitution downwards, ascribes ultimate sovereignty to the people of the United States as a whole. But each State is regularly said to be sovereign within the jurisdiction left to it.

² Bodin regarded sovereignty, with a surviving touch of mediæval realism, as a kind of estate or dignity capable of being possessed and granted in the full technical sense of those terms.

own country this might be done without grave difficulty; but Bodin was not content without foreign instances, and England, even when in the hands of the Tudors the power of the Crown had reached its utmost height, gave him a great deal of trouble. He recognises more fairly than Hobbes the possibility of a limited monarch. The Emperor, he says, is no absolute sovereign, for he is bound by the ordinances and decrees of the German princes. Probably Bodin's position is to be accounted for by his practical view of the French monarchy. Doubtless the king's power appeared to him, as indeed it was, the only one then capable of governing France with tolerable efficiency and equity. And it is curious to see what limits Bodin, herein less rigidly consistent than Hobbes, proceeds to impose on monarchical power after he has defined it as unlimited. Sovereign authority, as we have seen, is the absolute power in the State, wherever that may be. It is that power which is neither temporary, nor delegated, nor subject to particular rules which it cannot alter,¹ nor answerable to any other power on earth. "Maiestas nec maiore potestate, nec legibus ullis, nec tempore definitur . . . princeps populusque in quibus maiestas inest rationem rerum gestarum nemini

¹ Yet if it has rules of procedure, as every composite or numerous body must have, its acts will not be recognized unless they are regular; and in making new rules it must proceed according to the existing ones. The question is not whether any one can punish a sovereign body for irregularity, but whether irregular action will be treated as binding. "Suppose King, Lords, and Commons should meet in one chamber and vote together, an order passed by them would not be obeyed by the English people": John C. Gray, *The Nature and Sources of the Law*, 1909, s. 173.

præterquam immortalī Deo reddere coguntur.”¹ And such power, as matter of legal and historical fact, belongs to the kings of France. But this only means that they have no legal duties to their subjects. They have moral duties, or, as Bodin says in the language of the jurisprudence of his day, they remain bound by the law of nature: “Quod summum in Republica imperium legibus solutum diximus, nihil ad divinas aut naturæ leges pertinet.” Thus an absolute prince is bound in moral duty and honour by his conventions with other princes and rulers, and even with his own subjects. In certain cases he is bound by the promises of his predecessors; though no sovereign power (as ancient writers had already seen) can bind its successors in the sense of making a law that shall be unalterable and of perpetual obligation. Bodin shows at some length, and with much perspicuity, both on principle and by historical examples, the idleness of assuming to make laws irrevocable. The sovereign power could, it is admitted, repeal the law but for the clause forbidding repeal. But such a clause is itself part of the law, so that the sovereign can repeal the body and the supposed safeguard of the law together. If there is a legislative power which cannot do this, it is not really sovereign. Thus Bodin distinguished legal obligation in the strict sense from purely moral and honourable duties on the one hand, and from the duties created by convention between independent powers on the other, and thereby made

¹ Bodin's own Latin version of his work is really a new recension and is fuller and more precise in language than the French.

a great step towards the clear separation of the legal from the ethical sphere of thought within political science itself—a thing only less in importance than Aristotle's original separation of Politics from Ethics.

But Bodin shrinks from the extreme consequences to which Hobbes pursued a similar conception. He tells us of organic laws or rules which may be so closely associated with the very nature of this or that sovereignty that they cannot be abrogated by the sovereign power itself, and he instances the rule of succession to the French crown. Again, there are institutions of society, such as the family and property, which he assumes as the foundation of the State; and with these even the sovereign power cannot meddle.¹ From the inviolability of property he draws the consequence that not the most absolute monarch can lawfully tax his subjects without their consent. At this day we should say that these are excellent maxims of policy, but do not affect the State's legal supremacy, or (to anticipate the classical English name for the thing as it appears in our own constitution) the omnipotence of Parliament. There are things which no ruler in his senses would do, things which very few or none can afford to do. Just so there are many things a private man is legally entitled to do which he will not do if he is wise, or which no man of common sense or common good feeling will do. But his legal right is

¹ Bodin charges Aristotle with omitting the family from his definition of the State. As Aristotle explicitly leads up to the State from the family, and defines the family as the unit of the State, it is difficult to see what Bodin meant.

not thereby affected. And so, too, particular authorities in the State may have legal powers which are in practice never exercised, and which it would be impolitic to exercise in almost any conceivable case. There is no doubt that in England the King is legally entitled to refuse assent to a Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament, though such a thing has not been done for about two centuries, and as far as human foresight can go will never be done again. As a harsh or foolish exercise of legal or political rights does not cease to be within the agent's right because it is harsh or foolish, so an unwise or morally wrongful act of sovereign power is not the less an act of sovereign power because it is unwise or wrong. Bodin's doctrine, expressed in modern terms, would be that constitutional limitations as to the form of government may be imposed by custom as well as by a written instrument; whereas Hobbes said he could never understand what a fundamental law signified. Something very like a doctrine of undefined constitutional limitations was current in England till the eighteenth century, but never had practical effect.

Bodin's opinions in matters of detail are for the most part worthy of his exposition of leading principles. He condemned slavery without reserve, and advocated a comprehensive toleration of religious opinion. Not only did he anticipate, as we have just seen, the analytical method of Hobbes; he anticipated the historical method of Montesquieu by a detailed discussion of the influence of climate and geographical conditions on political

institutions and government. His work attained a great reputation in a short time. Besides the author's own Latin version, an English translation appeared early in the seventeenth century. There is little doubt that Bodin not only prepared the way for Hobbes and Montesquieu, but that both of them—writers differing from one another as widely as possible in method, manner, and purpose—actually studied and profited by him.

Turning to England, we find attempts in speculative politics arising out of the study of the English constitution and laws as early as the fifteenth century. Fortescue, both in his book *De laudibus legum Angliæ* and in his less known treatises on the Law of Nature and the Monarchy of England,¹ is careful to represent the king's power as not absolute but limited by the law, or, to use the language borrowed by him from St. Thomas Aquinas's *De Regimine Principum*, not "royal" but "political." The king is the head of the body politic, but can act only according to its constitution and by the appropriate organs in each case. And it is said in general terms that the king's power is derived from the consent of the people. But the question where political supremacy really lies is not followed up.

¹ Fortescue's *Monarchia*, otherwise "On the Governance of England," was critically edited for the Oxford University Press in 1885 by Mr. C. Plummer, with an introduction and notes abounding in excellent learning on mediæval history and politics. For the relation of Fortescue's doctrine to Lancastrian policy see Stubbs, *Const. Hist.* iii. §§ 364, 365. His conception of a true limited monarchy as "*dominium politicum et regale*" seems to have been original; the common opinion was that only elective kings could have limited authority.

Neither is any definite theory of the origin of government put forward. More's *Utopia* calls for mention on account of its literary fame; but, though it contains incidentally not a few shrewd criticisms, open and covert, on the state of English society in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, we cannot count it as an addition to political science. It is a Platonic or ultra-Platonic fancy, bred of the Platonism of the Renaissance. Even more than the *Republic* of Plato it belongs to the poetry as distinguished from the philosophy of politics. In the *De Republica Anglorum* or *English Commonwealth* of Sir Thomas Smith, first published after the author's death in 1583,¹ we find something much more like a forerunner of Hobbes. Indeed, so clear and precise are Smith's chapters on Sovereignty that one is tempted to think he must somehow have had knowledge of Bodin's work. At the outset he defines political supremacy in a manner by no means unlike Bodin's. "To rule is understood to have the highest and supreme authority of commandment. That part or member of the commonwealth is said to rule which doth control, correct and direct all other members of the commonwealth." When he comes to English institutions in particular, he states the omnipotence of Parliament in the most formal manner, and so far as I know for the first time, as if on purpose to contradict Bodin's argument that the monarchy of England is really

¹ Ed. L. Alston, Cambridge, 1906. Mr. Alston endeavours, I think with mistaken ingenuity, to minimize the importance of the classical passage on Parliament here quoted. It was Tudor policy to exalt the power of Parliament, and Smith had been a Secretary of State.

absolute. "The Parliament abrogateth old laws, maketh new, giveth order for things past and for things hereafter to be followed, changeth right and possessions of private men, legitimateth bastards, establisheth forms of religion, altereth weights and measures, giveth form of succession to the crown, defineth of doubtful rights whereof is no law already made. . . . And to be short, all that ever the people of Rome might do, either *Centuriatis Comitiis* or *tributis*, the same may be done by the Parliament of England; which representeth and hath the power of the whole realm, both the head and body." It is true that Bodin's *De Republica* was published only in 1577, the year of Smith's death. But we know that Smith's work was composed while he was ambassador at the French Court, and considering how long books often waited for publication at that time, we may fairly suppose that Bodin's treatise, or at least the introductory part of it, was already in existence, and that a certain number of scholars were acquainted with its contents. Even a century later a great deal of private communication of this kind went on.¹ Sir Thomas Smith's principles, wherever he got them, have the merit of being much the clearest which down to that time had been put into shape by an English author or in the English language.

We now come to Hobbes, with whom the modern school of political theory begins. Aristotle effected the separation of Ethics from Politics. From Hobbes, or

¹ It is hardly probable that there was any personal meeting, nor is there any need to suppose one.

rather through Hobbes, we get the further separation of policy from legality—of that which is wise or expedient from that which is allowed by positive law. The political theory of Hobbes runs more or less through everything that he wrote, but is especially contained in his *Leviathan*.¹ This famous and much decried treatise contains a great deal of curious learning of all sorts, including not a few theological eccentricities. But the principles laid down by Hobbes which have had a serious effect upon later political thinking may be reduced to two. One of these is the principle of sovereignty; the other is the theory of the origin of civil society in contract. We have already seen the doctrine of sovereignty as it was stated in the preceding century by Bodin. With him it rested on a pure analysis of the fact of civilised government. In every form of government you must come at last to some power which is absolute, to which all other powers of the State are subject, and which itself is subject to none. The possession of such power is sovereignty, and the person or body in whom it resides is sovereign. Hobbes is in one respect less enterprising and straightforward than Bodin. In his anxiety to fortify the doctrine of sovereignty and to leave no excuse for disputing the authority of the State, he gives an elaborate account of the construction of the State by an original covenant between its members. Some

¹ Some further details may be found in papers of mine on Hobbes, *National Review*, September 1894, and Hobbes and Locke, *Journ. Soc. Comp. Legisl.*, 1908. The earlier book, *De Cive* (in Hobbes's own English version, *Elements of Government and Civil Society*), is rather less dogmatic.

such imaginary covenant, modified in its terms and circumstances according to the conclusion which the particular author sought to establish, was already current in the Reformation controversies and was familiar to later publicists as the Original or Social Contract: as we have already noticed,¹ the conception of it goes much farther back. In Hobbes's form there is no agreement between the ruler and the subject, only an agreement among the subjects to place or leave all power in his hands, and this is vital to the scheme of the *Leviathan*. If we are called upon to say in one sentence what Hobbes did, we must say that he supported a plain and sound doctrine by needless and untenable fiction, and for the purpose of deducing consequences from it which it would not bear. This, however, is no more than has to be said of many of the most able men in all ages. Hobbes's firm grasp of all his ideas, and the admirable clearness with which his arguments and results, whether right or wrong, are invariably stated, make him the first classic of English political science.

Let us now see how Hobbes goes to work to construct the State. Men, taking them all round, are by nature equal, none being so strong in body or mind that he need not be in fear of others, or so weak that he may not be dangerous to them. Men living without any common power set over them would be in a state of mutual fear and enmity, that is, in a state of war. Such a state of things in permanence would be intoler-

¹ P. 30 above.

able; in it there is no property, no law, and no justice. Every man will aim at securing his own safety, and for that purpose will take all he can get. Peace is good, but life is necessary, and in the state of war it is our right to use all means to defend ourselves.

The only way to peace is for men to abandon so much of their natural rights as is inconsistent with living in peace. This again can be done only by mutual agreement; and the faithful performance of such an agreement, as evidently tending to self-preservation, is a rule of reason, or in the terms of the Schoolmen which Hobbes adopts in his own sense, a law of nature. But a mere agreement to live together in peace is insufficient. Men's individual passions and ambitions would speedily break up a society resting on no better foundation. There must be "a common power to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit." This is effected by all the members of the community giving up their natural rights to some man or body of men in whom their united power is henceforth to be vested. Every member of the community gives up to the chosen head the right of governing himself on condition that every other member does the same. The person or body so invested with the power of the whole becomes a kind of new person; "and he that carrieth this person is called sovereign, and hath sovereign power; and every one besides, his subject."

It is by no means easy to make out whether Hobbes intended this to be taken as a true account of the

manner in which civil governments had been established as a matter of fact. I think he would have been prepared to say that it would make no difference to his argument whether it were so or not; at any rate, he is prepared to show to any one who presumes to traverse the story of the original covenant that if he disputes it he has no title to live in society at all. Hobbes proceeds to deduce from this institution of the Commonwealth, as he calls it, the attributes of sovereignty. The sovereign's authority is derived from the consent of the subjects, and he is their agent for the purpose of directing their united strength for the common benefit; *acter of the sovereign* but he is an agent with unlimited discretion, and with an authority which cannot be revoked. The subjects cannot change the form of government, for that would be a breach of the original covenant both in respect of the sovereign and towards one another. The sovereign cannot forfeit his power, for he made no covenant, and there is none therefore which he can break.¹ It is true that no promise is made to him, but there is no need of it; his authority is enforceable not by any covenanted right but by the natural right or power which the subjects' mutual covenant has left to him and him alone. Any subject who dissents from the institution of the sovereign thereby ceases to be a member of the community and remits himself to the original state of war, in which any

¹ Some earlier writers had maintained that the natural obligation of keeping faith was strong enough to support a subsequent promise by the ruler to his subjects. But this would not suit Hobbes.

one who can may destroy him without violating any right. For similar reasons the sovereign is irresponsible and unpunishable. No man can complain of what his agent does within the authority given him, and in the case of a political sovereign all acts of sovereignty have been authorised beforehand by all the subjects. Holders of sovereign power may commit iniquity but not injustice. The sovereign, again, is the sole judge of what is necessary for the defence and security of the commonwealth, and, in particular, of the question what doctrines are fit to be taught in it. There are likewise annexed to sovereignty the powers of legislature and judicature, of making war and peace, of choosing counsellors and officers, of rewarding and punishing, and of regulating titles and precedence. All these rights are indivisible and incommunicable; the sovereign may delegate them, but cannot abandon them.¹ Hobbes is perfectly aware that the sovereign thus defined need not be one man; but he is nevertheless anxious to show that in England the king alone is sovereign. Yet in his principal work he gives very little express argument to this topic, which is worked out separately in the dialogue entitled *Behemoth*. He purports to show, as Bodin had done before him, that sovereign power cannot be divided, and this he seems to think fatal to all doctrines of mixed or limited monarchy. The loose language of some constitutional

¹ This was the point of agreement between Hobbes and the partisans of divine right. Filmer spoke of his work with much respect.

advocates is taken by him as stamping their cause itself with repugnance to the nature of things. It does not occur to him as possible that sovereignty should be vested in a compound as well as in a simple body; still less does he conceive that legal power, the formal authority of enacting indisputable commands, should reside in one part of the Commonwealth, and the political supremacy which in fact wields the legal power in another; as, in England, the legislative power of Parliament is guided by the Cabinet and ultimately controlled by the majority of the House of Commons.

The limits of sovereignty, or the liberty of the subject, as they may be indifferently called in Hobbes's view, are defined as consisting in those powers or rights of the individual man which he cannot surrender by any covenant. Thus no man can be bound to kill himself, to abstain from self-preservation, or to accuse himself; and more generally the obligation of subjects to the sovereign lasts no longer than he has power to protect them.

Hobbes's further consideration of civil laws gives him occasion to enter more in detail upon the relation of the sovereign power in a State to its municipal laws. His definition, with its introductory explanation, really contains all the points which were developed in the course of the nineteenth century by the English school of jurisprudence.

"Law in general is not counsel but command; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of him

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whose command is addressed to one formerly" (i.e. already, by having agreed to be his subject) "obliged to obey him. And as for civil law, it addeth only the name of the person commanding, which is persona civitatis, the person of the Commonwealth.

"Which considered, I define civil law in this manner. Civil law is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth hath commanded him by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule."

Right and wrong, in the legal sense, are that which the law of the State allows¹ and forbids, and nothing else. To understand this is one of the first conditions of clear legal and political thinking, and it is Hobbes's great merit to have made this clear beyond the possibility of misunderstanding. No one who has grasped Hobbes's definition can ever be misled by verbal conceits about laws of the State which are contrary to natural right, or the law of nature, not being binding. All such language is mischievous, as confusing the moral and political grounds of positive law with its actual force. In practice we all know that the officers of the State cannot entertain complaints that the laws enacted by the supreme power in the State are in the complainant's opinion unjust. It would be impossible for government, to be

¹ I substitute this word for "command," as the use of that word in a universal definition can easily be seen to be contrary to historical fact.


carried on if they did. Laws have to be obeyed, as between the State and the subject, not because they are reasonable, but because the State has so commanded. The laws may be, and in a wisely ordered State will be, the result of the fullest discussion which the nature of the case admits, and subsequent criticism may be allowed or even invited. But while the laws exist they have to be obeyed. The citizen who sets himself against the authority of the State is thereby, so far as in him lies, dissolving civil society; and this was the solid truth which Hobbes expressed in the curiously artificial form of his original covenant. Some of Hobbes's consequences from his definition of civil law are these: The sovereign is the sole legislator in all commonwealths, and having power to make and repeal laws is not subject to the civil law. For practical purposes it would be more useful to convert this proposition and say that the ultimate test of sovereignty in a given commonwealth is the unlimited (or better, plenary) power of legislation. If Hobbes had applied the rule in this form to England, he would have found some trouble in escaping Sir Thomas Smith's conclusion. Then customary law depends for its force on "the will of the sovereign signified by his silence." For custom "is no longer law, than the sovereign shall be silent therein." When it is said that law can never be against reason, this is true, but with the explanation that the commonwealth, that is, "the sovereign, which is the person of the commonwealth," is the supreme judge of what is reasonable. The next consequence would startle the reader who took up Hobbes expect-

ing to find in him nothing but maxims of despotism. It is that law, being a command addressed to the subject, must be communicated in order to be effectual. No one is answerable for breach of the law who is incapable of entering into the original covenant of institution or understanding its consequences; nor is a man answerable if without his own default he had not "the means to take notice of any particular law."

We said above that the distinction between legality and policy comes to us through Hobbes. The survey of Hobbes's leading doctrines has now enabled us to see how it comes. Hobbes defines legal sovereignty and legal obligation with admirable strength and precision; but then he endeavours to swallow up policy, and to a considerable extent even morality, in positive law. This made it necessary to carry the work of division further. But it was a long time before this was done. It was Austin who completed the process in England: and even his work was so encumbered and entangled with irrelevant and mostly bad moral philosophy as to spoil his philosophy of law. It would not be too much to say that Professor Holland's *Elements of Jurisprudence* is the first work of pure scientific jurisprudence which has appeared in England—that is, of the general science of law distinctly separated from the ethical part of politics. Hobbes had indeed influence enough in England to provoke a reaction. But its leaders applied themselves to the wrong part of Hobbes's work. Instead of making the doctrine of sovereignty the starting-point of fresh

criticism and construction, they endeavoured to avoid Hobbes's consequences by devising a different sort of original contract as the assumed foundation of society.¹ This task we shall see undertaken by the publicists of the eighteenth century. We shall see the original contract, seized on as a watchword by the enthusiasm of Rousseau, grow from an arid fiction into a great and dangerous deceit of nations. But we shall also meet with penetrating and observant minds, which the construction of society by fiction fails to satisfy. We shall see the dawn of the historical method in the great Frenchman Montesquieu; we shall see it in its full power in the work of one greater than Montesquieu, one of the profoundest political thinkers, and yet, by no fault of his own, one of the least fortunate statesmen who ever lived—our own Burke.

¹ The right kind of improvement on Hobbes was attempted by Spinoza in his unfinished *Tractatus Politicus*. But the general aversion to Spinoza's philosophy which prevailed for a century after his death prevented this, so far as I know, from having any influence whatever. Cp. T. H. Green, *Lectures on Political Obligation*, Lond. 1895, p. 60. Very full and able consideration of Spinoza's political theory may now be found in the late Prof. C. E. Vaughan's posthumous *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau*, Manchester and Lond. 1925.



III

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

THE movement in political speculation of which Locke stands at the head was the result not of a pure development of scientific ideas, but of the necessity for having a theory to justify accomplished facts. Locke's Essay on Civil Government¹ is in truth an elaborate apology for the Revolution of 1688; not ostensibly for its righteousness or policy in the particular circumstances, but for the possibility of such a proceeding being rightful in any circumstances. The partisans of James II. took their stand on a supposed indefeasible right of kings, derived from a supposed divine institution of monarchy. The doctrine of divine right has to modern eyes no sort of merit. It was not rational, it was not ingenious, it was not even ancient. A certain sanctity had indeed attached to kings from time immemorial. But this belonged to the office, not to the person apart from the office. Because the man had a kind of sacred character while he was king, it by no means followed that being once made king he could not be unmade, or was entitled

¹ I have contributed a fuller discussion of Locke's theory of the State to vol. i. of the *Proceedings* of the British Academy, Lond. 1905. A view much like his was prevalent from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. See Carlyle, *Hist. of Medieval Political Theory*, vol. iii. (1915).

to retain and exercise the office without conditions. The notion of the office itself being something above human disposition and jurisdiction had been accepted only in the current century. Still, absurd as it was, it was fortified by a great show of respectable authority. It had taken root in many minds, and become a motive or a stumbling-block in many good men's consciences. The Whigs needed an antidote, and Locke found one in his modified version of the original compact. Hooker had to some extent prepared the way. Long before his time Fortescue, and probably others, had, in a confused fashion, represented the English constitution as in some way founded on the deliberate assent of the original founders of the Commonwealth. In the first book of Hooker's treatise of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity the conception takes a distinct shape. The plainer-spoken doctrine of the natural state of war which afterwards gave so much offence in Hobbes is virtually foreshadowed in Hooker's paragraph on the condition of men without civil government: and the origin of government is in express terms referred to "deliberate advice, consultation, and composition between men." Hooker adds his opinion that there is "no impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that men might have lived without any public regiment"; a phrase which looks like a wilful contradiction of Aristotle's axiom, though, considering the respect with which Hooker

¹ In its origin it seems to have been an anti-papal doctrine intended to fortify the authority of secular princes against the claims of the Holy See: Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*, Cambridge, 2nd edition, 1914.

constantly cites Aristotle, it is difficult to believe that it was in fact so meant. We may also discover both here and in the unfinished eighth book a nascent theory of sovereignty, but it is nascent at most. Had the divine to whom the name of Judicious was eminently applied by the next generation worked out anything definite in this direction, it would probably have shown more regard for the historical conditions of English politics and the practical possibilities of government than the heroic method of Hobbes.

Locke sets to work to cast the ideas of Hooker (whom he expressly cites) into a better defined form. His definition of political power is curiously lumbering and loaded with qualifications, as if he were afraid of giving a handle to despotism. He begins with a state of nature, but he conceives of it otherwise than Hobbes. The mark of the state of nature is the "want of a common judge with authority"; but men in this state are not in absolute anarchy. They are subject to the law of reason, which "teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions." As there are no adequate means of enforcing that law, their peace is precarious; nevertheless an actual state of war arises only when some one, not having the law of reason before his eyes, puts himself out of its protection by offering violence to others. Locke has an answer in due form to the question by what right the others may resist and even kill the offender. In the state of nature every one alike

has the executive power of the law of nature; and this power is even in modern societies the only justification for the exercise of sovereignty over aliens within the territorial dominion of a State. One would here expect Locke to come at once to the original compact; but he is too wary for this. He will first establish as much private right as he can; and he argues with much ingenuity for a natural right of property which is altogether antecedent to government. Every man is said to have "a property in his own person,"¹ and this is extended to things which he has changed from their natural state by doing work upon them, or in Locke's phrase, "hath mixed his labour with." Conflict of interests is foreseen, and is accordingly forestalled by the rule of nature that the right of property is limited by capacity of enjoyment, or at any rate of permanent safe custody. After some preliminary discussion of the constitution of the family we come at length to political society, which is described in a curiously indecisive manner. Man "has by nature a power not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of and punish the breach of that law" (i.e. the law of nature) "in others. . . . But because no political society can be, nor subsist without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all of that society; there, and there only, is political society, where every one of the

¹ Ulpian's contrary opinion "*dominus membrorum suorum nemo videtur*" (D. ix. 2, ad. leg. Aquil. 13) is more acceptable both to modern lawyers and to modern philosophers.

members hath quitted this natural power, and resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire by settled standing rules, indifferent and the same to all parties." Every man gives up his actual power to the community, not to a sovereign ruler as with Hobbes; and he gives it up not absolutely, but for particular and limited purposes. Whoever joins an existing commonwealth becomes a party to the original contract on which it rests by accepting the benefit of it, and is as much bound as if he had been present and assisting at the first institution. Locke then proves (no doubt as against Hobbes) that an absolute monarchy is not a civil society at all, for an absolute monarch, being no "common judge with authority" to decide between himself and his subjects, is really in the state of nature with regard to them. When a political society is formed, the right of a majority to be the ultimate source of power is deduced as a practical necessity. Without such right the commonwealth could not act as one body at all. And for this Locke appeals to actual usage: "We see that in assemblies empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having by the law of nature and reason the power of the whole."

Political society, then, is in Locke's theory constituted by the compact of its original members, a compact renewed from generation to generation in the person of every citizen when he comes to an age of discretion to choose his allegiance. If he chooses, as in the vast majority of cases he does, to go on living in the State where he was brought up, he thereby becomes a party to its Constitution, and authorises its sovereignty over him. But the sovereignty of the society is not absolute. It is limited to the ends for which it was conferred; the State is like a corporate joint-stock company, whose operations cannot lawfully extend beyond the purposes for which it was incorporated. Men have established governments not to control their lives altogether, but "for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates." Forms of government may be and are various, but the fundamental principles are the same. The legislative power is supreme, and all members of the State owe obedience to it; but its authority is not arbitrary. First, it must be exercised as it was given, for the good of the subjects. Secondly, it must dispense justice by standing laws and authorised judges; for under irregular arbitrary power the subjects would be worse off than in the state of nature. Thirdly, no man can be deprived of any part of his property without his own consent, given either in person or by his representatives; or as Locke more correctly puts it in summing up, "they must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies." Fourthly, the legislature

cannot transfer its powers to any other person or body. These are organic maxims of government which (so far as one can make sure of Locke's meaning) cannot be dispensed with by any power whatever. Excellent maxims they are, but we should now say that they are rules of political expediency, not limits to the legal capacity of the authority by whom laws themselves are made; unless indeed they are expressed in a formal constitution which the ordinary legislature cannot alter, but Locke does not consider any such case.

Locke is aware, it should be said, of the objection that the state of nature is an unproved and improbable assumption, and the original contract, therefore, no better than a fiction. He seriously endeavours to deal with it, though the attempt cannot be pronounced successful. The state of nature, he says, is exhibited as a thing really existing in modern times by the relation of independent States to one another. As to the want of evidence that it was the primeval state of mankind in general, he says that the very obscurity of all early records and absence of positive knowledge leave the ground all the more clear for any probable hypothesis of the origin of society.

Subject to these conditions, which in some points curiously resemble those imposed on sovereignty by Bodin, Locke is quite clear that, "whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme power; for what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him." But its authority is not indefeasible: "being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends," it may be forfeited

by misuse. Under every form of government the community retains a supreme power of self-preservation, a power which, underlying all positive institutions, and not being bound to any of them, "can never take place till the government be dissolved." Hobbes would say that this alleged power is merely a specious name for the *de facto* possibility of a successful rebellion, followed by a return to the natural state of war, in other words for that anarchy which is to be avoided at all costs. Further on Locke, as if to meet this objection, is at no small pains to show that the dissolution of governments is to be distinguished from that of societies. "Where the society is dissolved, the government cannot remain;" but governments may be altered or dissolved from within, and the society not be destroyed. Locke seems to regard the original agreement as having two stages. First, people agree to live in a commonwealth; next, that the institutions of their particular commonwealth shall have this or that form and in the form so chosen shall be observed.¹ So far as the agreement concerns the establishment of a community in general, it is perpetual and irrevocable; so far as it places authority in the hands of a dynasty or an assembly, it is subject to revision whenever organic change is demanded by the common good. Locke illustrates his position by cases hypothetical in terms, but having

¹ *Pactum unionis* and *pactum subiectionis* in the language of Continental Publicists. It is the second or auxiliary compact that is renewed in every member's person. Locke does not make it very clear whether he postulates a double compact, but on the whole he seems to do so.

a transparent reference to the English Constitution and the Revolution of 1688. He never distinctly faces the question whether a change of government can take place within the limits of positive law. This omission seems remarkable when we remember that the Convention Parliament, "lawfully, fully, and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm," had expressed itself in the affirmative in sufficiently plain terms. It is impossible to read the Bill of Rights carefully without seeing that its framers were convinced not only of the justice and policy but of the strict legality of their proceedings, though it is far from certain that they were right on this point. Technical difficulties were felt as to the exact manner in which James II. had legally ceased to be king. But the Revolution was conducted throughout as a reformation within the law, nay, as a restoration of the law, not as a breaking of legal bonds which had become intolerable. It was Locke's way, however, to swallow up legality in policy almost as much as Hobbes had swallowed up policy in legality.

At one point Locke comes down, as against Hobbes, on the hard bottom of facts, and does it with great effect. He expects the objection that "this hypothesis" (of the possible forfeiture of political power) "lays a ferment for frequent rebellion." And he answers, "No more than any other hypothesis; for when the people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill-usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them be

sacred or divine, descended or authorised from heaven, give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen." The preaching of Hobbes's irrevocable covenant of sovereignty, or Filmer's patriarchal title of kings deduced from Adam, will not make people endure a government that is in fact unendurable. It is by no means clear that Hobbes was not ready to say it would; it is clear, at any rate, from divers passages in his *Leviathan* and elsewhere, that he set an exaggerated value upon the influence of political theories propagated under colour of civil or ecclesiastical authority. He seems to have thought the bulk of men would believe whatever their superiors told them, even when their own obvious interests were concerned, and the sovereign might make them believe what he pleased if he took care to allow no superior but himself.

For the rest, the hesitations and half-truths of Locke and his followers are partly to be accounted for by the practical conditions of their work. They dared not say distinctly that the king of England was not sovereign in the political sense of sovereignty. Locke says, for example, that "in some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in being, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in the legislative, there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supreme." Besides this, Locke was evidently afraid on principle of over-definition. He is nowhere so precise on the supreme authority of Parliament (for the English Parliament is constantly in his mind when he speaks of the "legislative") as Sir

Thomas Smith a century before him. On prerogative, again, he is not so plain-spoken or exact as Selden had been. Selden, like a clear-headed lawyer, said there was no mystery at all. Prerogative is the law which peculiarly concerns the Crown, and is not different in kind from any other branch of law.¹ With Locke there is still a shadow of mystery about it. Prerogative is a vague and extraordinary discretion, limited, like the legislative power itself, by the rule that it must be employed in good faith for the public advantage.

The plastic fiction of the original contract had been used by Hobbes to generate the absolute power of his *Leviathan*, and by Locke to show that a moderate constitutional government not merely was justified by the law of nature, but was the only government so justified. It remained for Rousseau to employ the same fiction for purposes which Hobbes would have thought the very madness of anarchy, and at which Locke would have been appalled. Locke's propositions, as Lord Morley has pointed out, are guarded by practical reserve on all sides, and are as far as possible from being portable and universal dogmas. Rousseau was more popular than Locke, and more dogmatic than Hobbes. The result was that the *Contrat Social* became one of the most successful and fatal of political impostures.²

¹ Selden, *Table-talk*, s.v. Prerogative.

² It contains incidentally the ambiguous maxim: "La guerre n'est point une relation d'homme à homme, mais une relation d'état à état," which contains some truth, but as a universal proposition is far too wide. For fuller statement see W. A. Dunning, "Rousseau's Political Theories," *Pol. Sci. Quarterly*, September 1909.

Rousseau's¹ social contract is distinguished from that of other speculators in purporting to create a common and sovereign power, and yet leave every contracting party as free as he was before, and owing obedience only to himself. Every man gives up himself and his individual rights as fully as in Hobbes's covenant. But the surrender is to the whole society, not to a sovereign. "Chacun se donnant à tous ne se donne à personne." The terms of the contract (for Rousseau knows all about the terms) are as follows:—"Each of us puts his person and faculties in a common stock under the sovereign direction of the general will; and we receive² every member as an inseparable part of the whole." Every member is called *citizen* as having a share in the sovereignty, *subject* as owing obedience to the laws made by the State. Whoever refuses to obey the general will is to be compelled by the whole body to obey it: "which is as much as to say that he will be compelled to be free"—an ominous phrase. The sovereign power thus created is spoken of in a tone which Hobbes could not surpass. It is inalienable, indivisible, and, it would seem, infallible, if you can only get the "general will" truly expressed. The sovereign is bound to be just in the sense of having no respect of persons. Law is defined by the one mark of generality, so that the choice of a king or a dynasty cannot be a legislative act. A definition by which the Bill of Rights is partly a law and partly not, and the Act of Settlement is not one

¹ See now Vaughan's critical edition of his political writings, 1916.

² "Recevons en corps."

at all, does not particularly commend itself to the English student of politics. Rousseau's object is apparently to reconcile Hobbes's dictum that no law can be unjust, which he adopts, with his own definition of the justice required in the sovereign. Further, no power in the State can be sovereign. The legislator is not sovereign, but the organ and servant of the sovereign community. The government is not the sovereign, but a mediator between the community in its corporate and sovereign capacity and its individual members as subjects. As the government cannot legislate, so the sovereign cannot govern directly. But the tendency of governments is to aim at usurping sovereignty; sooner or later the ruler subjugates the sovereign, and the fundamental pact of society is broken. This is the inherent weakness of all commonwealths, by which they ultimately perish. The political as well as the natural body is on the way to death from the moment it begins to live.

Rousseau does not fail to see that the complete exercise of sovereign power, according to his notion of it, is impossible; for how are the sovereign people all to come together? His answer is that modern States are a great deal too large: he would restore the independent Greek city, or what he supposed it to be. When the people are assembled every citizen is equally a magistrate, and all government is in abeyance. Representative government, where it exists, is only a makeshift; deputies of the people cannot really represent its power, they can be only limited agents whose acts need ratification. English liberty is an illusion; for the English people is the slave of the Parliament it makes. Political

representation is indeed no better than a rag of feudal iniquity. Thus for want of a proper declaration of the "general will" there is hardly a nation on earth which possesses laws in any proper sense. But then, how to unite the just and true sovereignty of the people with the size and defensive resources of the modern State? Rousseau promised to deal at large with this question, but did not perform his promise in the *Contrat Social*, or any other published writing.¹ Apparently his plan would have been the establishment of some sort of federal government for purposes of external policy. The federal constitution of Switzerland, though in his time a very imperfect one, would have no doubt furnished a good part of his matter for this head.

The social contract had sometimes been represented as including, or identical with, a contract between the king or other ruler and the people. Rousseau formally repudiates this. Government is created in his view, not by contract, but by an act of sovereignty. The supposed contract, he says (truly enough, but the remark comes strangely from him), would be not civil but merely natural, and would be under the sanction of no common authority. There is only one contract, the original contract of society; this leaves no room for any other, for the community has acquired by it all the rights of its individual members.² So confident is Rousseau in the

¹ It is stated that he left materials on this subject which were destroyed from political scruples. Their custodian need not have feared to publish them. It would have been difficult to add to the mischief wrought by the *Contrat Social* without their aid.

² In technical terms, the original *pactum unionis* created a supreme power and a subsequent *pactum subiectionis* is needless.

indefeasible rights of the sovereign people that he seems to approve of delegations of authority which constitutional writers like Locke thought dangerous and unwarrantable. He speaks with equanimity of a dictatorship. In the days of the Committee of Public Safety the Jacobin governors of France more than acted up to his principles. One more great difficulty remained about the exercise of the sovereign people's rights. Rousseau had of course, like all other absolute theorists on government, to make out why a dissenting citizen should be bound by the will of the majority. This he does in a fashion both more sophistical and more clumsy than Locke's. Locke indeed is frank enough in his appeal to practical convenience on this point.

Thus much for a rapid sketch of Rousseau's political system, of which the historical importance is that it is in great measure answerable for the Declaration of the Rights of Man.¹ This Declaration (which belongs to the earliest stage of the Revolution) carries the confusion of legal right and political expediency, and the enunciation of pompous platitudes under qualifications so wide as to make them illusory, to a pitch seldom, if ever, equalled in any other political document. The birth of all men free and with equal rights, the collective sovereignty of the nation, and the "volonté générale"

¹ The full text of this document (which most historians strangely neglect) is given in Henri Martin's *Histoire de la France depuis 1789*, vol. i. p. 78. It has, however, lost most of its importance in modern French politics, as the learned French translator of the present work has pointed out in his note here.

which positive laws express, are taken straight from Rousseau. It would be unjust to deny all merit to the Declaration. The 7th, 8th, and 9th articles express, in language fairly free from objection, important maxims of legislation and administrative jurisprudence. But so far as the Declaration embodies a political theory, it is a standing warning to nations and statesmen not to commit themselves to formulas. The original contract between king and people had been much talked of at Westminster in the debates on the abdication of James II.; but happily we escaped having it embodied in the Bill of Rights. The effect of the Principles of 1789, as the Declaration of the Rights of Man is often called, has been to hinder and prevent the development of politics in France, in practice as well as in theory, to an almost incalculable extent.

While Rousseau's *Contrat Social* was almost fresh from the press, Blackstone was handling Locke's principles in England after quite another fashion. If we dismiss from our minds Bentham's fervid criticism, and approach Blackstone in an unprejudiced mood, we shall find that he not only was faithful to his lights, but materially improved on Locke in more than one point.¹ For one thing, he distinctly refuses to believe

¹ It is easy for us now to make light of Blackstone's constitutional theory. Two things, I conceive, ought to be remembered in fairness to him. (1) Blackstone wrote as a lawyer; and, as far as positive law goes, a hopeless deadlock was and is quite possible in the working of the English Constitution as it stood in his time and stood till 1911. (2) The distribution of real political power between the Crown and the two Houses of Parliament was still undefined at the date of Blackstone's description. We now say that political power, as distinct from legal sovereignty, is in the last resort with the majority of the House of Commons. Blackstone not only would not but could not have said so

in the state of nature as an historical fact, and thereby avoids a difficulty which Locke had palliated rather than met by ingenious but weak excuses. "Society had not its formal beginning from any convention of individuals." Blackstone treats the family as the unit of society, and reduces the original contract, though he does not abandon the term, to the fact that men hold together in society because they cannot help it. On the doctrine of sovereignty, again, he is much clearer than Locke. In all forms of government "there is and must be a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the *jura summa imperii* or the rights of sovereignty reside." And, going back to Sir Thomas Smith's doctrine, he affirms, as against Locke's vague reservations, that in England this authority belongs to Parliament, and there is no legal possibility of looking further. "What the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo." The separation of law from policy is still far from complete, but Blackstone is nearer to the true state of the facts than either Hobbes or Locke.

Rousseau and Blackstone have been taken out of their order in time for the convenience of bringing into one view the social contract in its various forms. Meantime the doctrine had not escaped criticism on its native soil. Hume, taking a double pleasure, we may be sure, in dissecting a philosophical fallacy which was almost a Whig article of faith, exposed its hollowness in such fashion as really left nothing more to be said. But Hume was a destroyer, not a rebuilder. He had nothing to put in the place of the beloved fiction, which

accordingly went on living in political commonplace, as Leslie Stephen has said, long after the brains were out. His own political conceptions were poor and mechanical, and his idea of a perfect commonwealth is one of the most barren and least pleasing exercises of political imagination ever produced. It was a Frenchman who supplied beforehand, if his countrymen would have appreciated it, an antidote to Rousseau's fictions. Montesquieu,¹ with all his faults and irregularities, is the father of modern historical research. His information was often crude and imperfect, his inferences often hasty, and his judgment often misdirected. Yet he held fast to the great truth that serious politics cannot be constructed in the air by playing with imaginary men of no particular race or country, and building them into arbitrary combinations, as a child builds castles with wooden bricks. He applied himself to study political institutions as belonging to societies of definite historical types, and determined by historical conditions. One may remember with a certain pride that he was a member of our own Royal Society, which thus early recognised in his person that the questions of politics as well as of physics may be treated in a scientific spirit, so as to give a truly scientific character to the inquirer's work.

Montesquieu's plan included two ideas, which were

¹ See now M. Albert Sorel's monograph *Montesquieu*, Paris, 1887, and cp. Sir Courtenay Ilbert's Romanes lecture on Montesquieu, Oxford, 1904. Montesquieu's great work was published anonymously at Geneva in 1748, and officially admitted to circulate in France only two years later. An Edinburgh edition of 1750 was still anonymous.

brilliant in themselves and quite out of the common course of the publicists of the time. He aimed at constructing a comparative theory of legislation and institutions adapted to the political needs of different forms of government, and a comparative theory of politics and law based on wide observation of the actual systems of different lands and ages. In the first branch of this design Machiavelli had, after a sort, been before him, but in a limited field and for a special purpose. The second was entirely new. We have already said that the execution was not equal to the conception. The means did not exist for making it so. Few books are so unfit to be judged by extracts or cursory inspection as the *Esprit des Lois*. There are many chapters in it which might have come from a mere gossiping collector of traveller's tales. Nor is Montesquieu by any means always happy in his reflections. He was above many of the illusions of his time, but he could not escape the besetting temptation of the eighteenth century to regard men as more rational than they are. Thus we find him assigning conjectural reasons of State policy for all kinds of barbarous customs, more or less correctly reported by Jesuit missionaries and others. He rightly saw that customs which appear to us foolish or monstrous do not exist without any reason at all. He no less rightly saw that the institutions of a society depend on its particular conditions, and must be studied in connection with them ; but in counting the conditions he left out the men themselves. He did not see that to understand a civil society widely differing from our own

we must first get some knowledge of the ancestral habits and character of its members, and of the stage they have reached in general culture. In one word, he stopped short of discovering that institutions are an affair of race as well as of circumstances ;¹ not far short, for he went a considerable way in the application of physiology to politics. It is not so much that Montesquieu neglects race as that he exaggerates the modifying effect of external conditions. And we also find his historical method, imperfect as it was, preserving him from a great many current mistakes. For example, he completely sees through the rose-coloured accounts of the Chinese empire which were the common stock of eighteenth-century moralists and even of Voltaire, and this because he has taken the trouble to study the facts as a whole.

Again, Montesquieu's remarks on England, of which he has a good many (though sometimes thinly disguised, like Locke's, in the form of suppositions), are by no means free from mistakes ; but they show on the whole a wonderful insight into the effectual forces of English policy, and what is more, into English character.² It is needless to say much of his general enlightenment and robustness of mind. A writer who in the middle of the

¹ M. Sorel says, "L'erreur de Montesquieu n'est pas d'avoir recherché l'influence de ces éléments [l'air, le sol, le pays, la race], c'est de n'en avoir considéré qu'un seul et de ne l'avoir considéré qu'avec des données très incomplètes."

² On "some points of English foreign and colonial policy Montesquieu, though to some extent he is describing facts already observed, is almost prophetic.—*Esp. des Loix*, book xix. c. 27. Sorel justly called attention to the scientific prevision displayed in this chapter.

eighteenth century could suggest, though in an ironical passage, an international convention against the slave trade, needs no further commendation. Once more, he meets with rare straightforwardness the ancient objection to popular government—that the people at large are not competent in politics. It is not to be expected, says Montesquieu, that they should be competent, nor does it much matter. The main thing is that they should be interested. Experience and discussion must be trusted to make error find its level. “Dans une nation libre, il est très-souvent indifférent que les particuliers raisonnent bien ou mal ; il suffit qu’ils raisonnent : de là sort la liberté, qui garantit des effets de ces mêmes raisonnements.”

Montesquieu was vastly honoured in his own country, but not much attended to for any practical purpose. In so far as the politicians of the Revolution did make any use of Montesquieu, it was to follow and exaggerate his errors. He was much better understood in England, and has even been called the spiritual father of Blackstone.¹ But there was barely time for his work, first published in 1748, to have much influence on Blackstone's, which was put into shape as a course of lectures² at Oxford as early as 1753. Our own Burke fared even worse than Montesquieu ; he had the melancholy satisfaction of seeing his wisest counsels neglected, and seeing the neglect of them followed by the evils he predicted ;

¹ Sorel, p. 143 ; “Blackstone procède de lui.”

² Not Vinerian lectures : the Vinerian chair was established, and Blackstone became the first Professor, only in 1758.

and when at last he was taken into favour it was because his political reason fell in for once with the blind passions of those who had denounced him as a renegade.

Just now I said that Montesquieu was a difficult author to give a fair representation of in any summary manner. For, though he professes to be systematic, he is too discursive and unequal to be judged of in abridgment. Neither will an epitome of the matter serve much for knowledge of his real import, since his merit is often far more in the disposition and handling than in the matter itself. With Burke the difficulty is yet greater; he is full of ideas more instructive than other men's systems, but they are so admirably woven into the discussion of particular and actual questions that they refuse to be torn out as examples of him. They proceed from a settled way of thinking, but are nowhere reduced into a collected argument. A light of great wisdom shines in almost everything of Burke's making, but it is a diffused light, of which the focus is not revealed but only conjectured. This is in the first place due to the manner of Burke's life and to the occasions of his activity; but it is also connected with the nature of his thought itself. We may be pretty sure that Burke would under no conditions have constructed a formal theory of politics. He mistrusted formalism even to excess, and was never so happy as when he used the most splendid power of political reasoning ever exhibited in English oratory to denounce the danger of reasoning overmuch. He was not afraid to say that he feared definitions. "Metaphysics cannot live without

definitions, but prudence is cautious how she defines." He declared himself "resolved not to be wise beyond what is written in the legislative record and practice." Not only is Burke not formally complete as a political teacher, but if we look for formal consistency in him we shall not find it. When he is denouncing the monstrous penal laws of Ireland he sets the conventional value of positive laws as low as possible. Curiously anticipating in one point almost the very language of the greatest master of the modern historical school, Burke says that "as a law directed against the mass of the nation has not the nature of a reasonable institution, so neither has it the authority: *for in all forms of government the people is the true legislator*;¹ and whether the immediate and instrumental cause of the law be a single person or many, the remote and efficient cause is the consent of the people, either actual or implied; and such consent is absolutely essential to its validity." Even the whole people "have no right to make a law prejudicial to the whole community." When the same Burke is combating the Declaration of the Rights of Man he speaks of legal power in a strangely different tone. In the Tracts on the Popery Laws Hobbes is just mentioned as having broached a monstrous doctrine; in the *Reflections on the French Revolution* we catch for a moment the ring of Hobbes's doctrine almost in Hobbes's own words. "If civil society be the offspring of convention that convention must be its law;" no person can claim any right inconsistent with it. "That he may obtain justice

¹ Compare Savigny's "Das Gesetz ist das Organ des Volksrechts."

he gives up his right of determining what it is in points the most essential to him. That he may secure some liberty he makes a surrender in trust of the whole of it." Government is a thing apart from natural rights; it is contrived to provide for men's wants and to restrain their passions, which "can only be done *by a power out of themselves*"—Hobbes's "common power to keep them in awe." And for the moment we think Burke is ready to fall down and worship the Leviathan if Leviathan will put a sword in his hand to smite the Jacobins with.

Yet it is the same Burke who speaks in both places, and really with the same voice. His anger against Protestant oppression in Ireland and Jacobin violence in France comes from one and the same root. His constant purpose, whether in the affairs of Ireland, of England, or of France, is to appeal to experience against dogmatism. He will have for the guide of politics neither the bare letter of positive institutions nor bare deduction from universal propositions, but a rule of equity and utility founded on and preserving the rights and liberties which exist. He will treat politics as an experimental science, not a scheme of *à priori* demonstration. Once he was challenged with substantial defection from his own principles. His *Reflections on the French Revolution* were said to be repugnant to his former public life. The result was the *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, in which, by dint of criticising the Jacobin theory of society, Burke is brought nearer than in any other of his works to an explicit statement of his own.

We are bidden, he says, in the name of the supreme authority of the people to recognise as a matter, not of extraordinary necessity, but of common right, an unlimited power of changing the foundations of government. What are the people? "A number of vague, loose individuals"—the imaginary parties to the social contract—are not a people, neither can they make themselves one off-hand by convention. A "multitude told by heads" is no more a people after it has been told than before. The corporate unity of a people is artificial indeed; but art is long, and for that very reason a nation is easier unmade than made. And how is the supreme authority of the people exercised? By the will of a majority. But what power has the majority to bind the rest? Again an artificial power, nay, a most artificial power. First there is a fiction to make one corporate person of many men; then another fiction, "one of the most violent fictions of positive law," to enable a majority to act as this one person. And on these artificial and judicial conceptions, confusing, as Burke says, judicial with civil principles, the French revolutionary speculators would rest the authority of positive law itself. Whether a majority shall have power to decide, in what cases, and what majority, is an affair of convention. These people have no right, on their own principles, to exercise any of the authorities of a State. If "prescription and long possession form no title to property," what better claim have they than a horde of brigands or squatters to the territory called France? Civil society will not come by counting of

heads; it is a social organism and a social discipline. And if it is artificial in its perfection, yet it is more truly a state of nature "than a savage and incoherent mode of life," or rather it is this because it is artificial, for "art is man's nature." Such is the substance of Burke's comment on the fundamental axiom of Aristotle. Man is born to be a citizen in that he comes into an existing social order, and is attached to it by duties of others to himself and himself to others, which are not, and cannot be, of his own making. He does not come into the world as an unrelated unit and acquire by some convention a fantastic title to some hundred-thousandth undivided part of the indivisible sovereignty of the people.

Never was there a more complete tearing to pieces and trampling underfoot of political sophistries. The *Contrat Social* is reduced in Burke's powerful hands to what he had elsewhere called it—"chaff and rags and paltry blurred shreds of paper about the rights of man." It seems hardly possible that such a critic should fall into sophistries himself; but he thought little of being guarded, and more than once he stumbles. Regarding political science as above all things experimental and practical he took up, as he tells us himself, whatever point he thought most in need of defence, and urged his case without qualification of the matter, and without thinking much of other sides. Thus we find in him forms of statement and objection which in a lesser man we should call obtuse. Believing, as he justly did, in the respect due to the continuity of the present with

the past, and to associations which cannot be replaced, he looked on the analysis of the ultimate forces of society as a kind of sacrilege. He could see no practical security for the British Constitution if the French principles of 1789 were to be held tolerable even in speculation. The security of sympathisers with the revolution—those who profess to be peaceable ones—“amounts in reality to nothing more than this, that the difference between their republican system and the British limited monarchy is not worth a civil war.” And this is called by Burke “the poorest defensive principle that ever was infused into the mind of man against the attempts of those who will enterprise.” As if in the last resort any frame of society whatever had any other defensive principle, or as if any stronger were conceivable. Hobbes could find no firmer ground to set under the feet of the Leviathan. The vast majority of men adhere to their established institutions, not because they admire them, not even because of any positive prejudice in their favour, but because they dread the unknown. They cling to any tolerable certainty for certainty and custom's sake, and when they break loose from their accustomed order it is a vehement presumption that their present state is not only imperfect but intolerable. When it comes to that point no prescriptive majesty of the ancient order will help it, not though the voice of a Burke were there to defend it. In 1832 a large part of the English people were of opinion that the difference between an unreformed and a reformed Parliament *was* worth a civil war; and it was

the knowledge of their opinion and of their readiness in extremity to act on it that then narrowly saved the State. Burke failed to see this in the case of the French Revolution, and therefore was violent and one-sided. Shallow or false he could not be ; stripped of their rhetorical exaggerations, or often even with them, his charges were mostly true, and his foresight of the course of events was marvellously fulfilled. In 1789, and even later, many good people, both in Paris and London, were dreaming of a happy and peaceful change from the old French monarchy to some new version of the British Constitution. Burke warned them from the first that at all events they would not see *that*, and he was terribly in the right.

After Burke it was impossible for any one in England to set up the Social Contract again, either in Rousseau's or in Locke's form, for any effectual purpose. There is another distinct contribution both to political science and to exactness of reasoning in practical politics, which I think we may ascribe to him : the separation of expediency from legality. It might be difficult to show in his writings any full and formal enunciation of this ; but it is the whole burden of his great speeches and letters on the American War. Englishmen were declaiming on the right of the British Parliament to tax the colonists. Burke told them the abstract right might be what it would, but they were fighting against justice, convenience, and human nature, and for the sake of their abstract right were making a breach in the dominions of the British Crown. The event signally and unhappily showed his wisdom.

Burke, however, was too great for his generation. He restored history to its place in politics, but, like some of the greatest thinkers in pure philosophy, he left no disciples. The formal development of political science in the nineteenth century is not traced through him, but was taken up in England from a wholly different side, and on the Continent by an independent impulse, though in a spirit, and sometimes even in a form, which have more affinities with Burke than with any other Englishman.

IV

MODERN THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGISLATION

WE have now come down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, a date from which the development of political speculation becomes too vast and multifarious to be dealt with on a uniform scale in such a summary sketch as the present. A choice must of necessity be made among the various branches of the subject. An attempt to exhibit their general character is made in the accompanying tables. In one group we have the oldest branch of political science, the general theory of the State and its possible forms. This has received much additional definition at the hands of modern authors, and in England in particular the doctrine of sovereignty has been found inadequate, like all dogmatic formulas, to account for complex facts. In a second group comes the study of particular institutions and the action of the State for particular purposes, which may be called as a whole the theory of government. Here seems to be the fittest place for the question of what things ought to be dealt with by the State and what left alone, a question associated with sundry terms and phrases such

as *laissez faire*, limits of the State, individual liberty. Then a more technical branch of the subject has to do with the State in its legal aspect, in other words with the method, form, and application of positive law. This may be named the theory of legislation in a wide sense, and legal science as specially understood by lawyers may be regarded in the logical order as an offshoot from it, though the shoot is considerably larger than the parent stem, and, in the historical order, much older. Lastly, the State is personified for the purpose of external action, and regarded as having duties towards other States and claims upon them. A systematic doctrine of these duties and rights is given by the law of nations and the speculative theories which profess to support or account for it. This division, except as to the last branch, is to a great extent not really a division of different subjects, but a distinction of the forms and relations under which the same subjects are presented; neither does it attempt exact analysis, which indeed the nature of the matter hardly admits. But it may serve to show the range and variety of modern political science.

THEORETICAL POLITICS.

APPLIED POLITICS.

A. THEORY OF THE STATE.

A. THE STATE.

Origin of Polity.

Existing forms of government.

a. Historical.

Confederations and Federal States.

b. Rational.

Constitution.

Independence.

Classification of forms of government.

Protectorates and extra-territorial jurisdiction.

Political Sovereignty.

THEORETICAL POLITICS.

APPLIED POLITICS.

B. THEORY OF GOVERNMENT.

B. GOVERNMENT.

Forms of institutions.
 Representative and Ministerial Government.
 Executive Departments.
 Defence and Order.
 Revenue and Taxation.
 Wealth of Nations.
 Province and Limits of Positive Law.

Constitutional Law and Usage.
 Parliamentary Systems.
 Cabinet and Ministerial Responsibility.
 Administrative Constitutions.
 Army, Navy, Police.
 Currency, Budget, Trade.
 State regulation or non-interference.

C. THEORY OF LEGISLATION.

C. LAWS AND LEGISLATION.

Objects of Legislation.
 General Character and Divisions of Positive Law (Philosophy of Law or General Jurisprudence).
 Method and Sanction of Laws.
 Interpretation and Administration.
 Language and Style (Mechanics of Law-making).

Legislative Procedure. (Embodiment of theory in legislative forms: memorandum, *exposé des motifs*, etc.) Parliamentary drafting.
 Jurisprudence of particular States.
 Courts of Justice and their machinery.
 Judicial precedents and authority.

D. THEORY OF THE STATE AS ARTIFICIAL PERSON.

D. THE STATE PERSONIFIED.

Relation to other States and bodies of men.
 International Law.

Diplomacy, Peace and War.
 Conferences, Treaties and Conventions.
 International agreements for furtherance of justice, commerce, communications, etc.

It seems natural to choose for closer inspection such

topics as, being in themselves important, have been more than others handled by English writers and connected with practical questions of legislation and policy. Dismissing international law, which otherwise answers this description, as too technical and standing too much apart, we find political sovereignty and the limits of State intervention to be topics of the desired kind. On these English literature, if not abundant, can make a fair show, and on one or other of them a great part of modern English political discussion has turned, so far as it has involved speculative ideas at all. It will therefore be convenient to mention particularly what has been done by English writers on these subjects, marking in other directions only the most general characters of the different modern schools of political theory. In a fuller exposition it would be proper to give some special attention to theories of the State presented by philosophers in organic connexion with their general view of the universe, and the influence of such theories, especially the Hegelian, on modern publicists who were not professed philosophers. But this cannot be attempted here.¹

There is no doubt who has the first claim upon us. It was Bentham who, after the interval of a century, took up the theory of sovereignty where Hobbes had left it, and showed it to be capable of a reasonable interpretation, and fruitful of practical consequences.

¹ So far as I know, the only complete work of the kind recently published in English is Mr. Bernard Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899). T. H. Green's posthumous lectures on Political Obligation should also be consulted.

His *Fragment on Government*, a short book, but containing all his leading ideas, appeared in 1776.¹ Not only the ideas are there, but they are much better expressed than in Bentham's own later versions of them. No man ever laboured more assiduously than Bentham in his old age to make the outward form of his thoughts repulsive or ridiculous to the public. Happily the thoughts have now become common property, and the later volumes of Bentham's collected works may repose undisturbed, save by any curious student of the follies of great men who may have the patience to see what violence can be done to the English language by a philosopher under the dominion of his own inventions. The *Fragment* is a merciless criticism on the introductory part of Blackstone's Commentaries, then in the height of their first renown. Bentham was stirred to indignation by the tone of comfortable optimism that pervaded Blackstone's classical treatise. He denounced Blackstone as an enemy of reform whose sophistry was so perverse as to be almost a crime, an official defender of abuses with a "sinister bias of the affections." It does not now concern us to adjust the merits of the controversy as between Blackstone and his critics. It should be remembered, however, that while much of Bentham's animadversion is captious and unfair in detail, he was quite right in attacking the people who maintained that English law as it stood in 1776 was the perfection

¹ The *Comment on the Commentaries*, out of which this grew, was never completed for publication, but nearly all of it was identified among Bentham's papers and edited by Mr. C. S. Everett in 1928.

of reason, and in taking Blackstone as their best representative. And to Blackstone's merits as an expounder he does full justice, declaring that "he it is who, first of all institutional writers, has taught jurisprudence to speak the language of the scholar and the gentleman." But we must pass on to Bentham's own doctrine.

The foundation of the modern English theory of the State is laid in Bentham's definition of political society. "When a number of persons (whom we may style subjects) are supposed to be in the habit of paying obedience to a person, or an assemblage of persons, of a known and certain description (whom we may call governor or governors), such persons altogether (subjects and governors) are said to be in a state of political society."¹ It is worth noting, in the light of Sir H. Maine's later criticism, that Bentham explicitly admits the difficulty there may be in deciding whether in a particular society a known and certain governor is habitually obeyed, and consequently whether the society should be reckoned political or natural; a natural society being defined "as one where this habitual obedience does not exist. He is quite aware that there is in the facts of human society nothing corresponding to the definition with perfect accuracy. "Few, in fact, if any, are the instances of this habit being perfectly *absent*, certainly none at all of its being perfectly *present*." Practically the mark of a political society

¹ I spare the reader Bentham's profuse italics and capitals. Does his "supposed" mean "understood in fact"? or does it mean or include being required by law? Sovereignty, as formal authority to issue rules not amendable by any higher authority—the plenary power of legislation—is matter of law; habitual obedience is matter of fact.

is "the establishment of names of office," the existence of people set apart for the business of governing and issuing commands.

Laws are the commands of the supreme governor, or, to use the term now adopted, the sovereign. And the field of the supreme governor's authority is indefinite. In practice, indeed, it is limited by the possibility of resistance, and there are conditions under which resistance is morally justifiable or proper. But these conditions are not capable of general or precise definition. For the purpose of scientific analysis the power of the sovereign must be treated as unlimited. The difference between free and despotic governments is in the constitution of the sovereign authority, not in its power; in the securities for the responsibility of the particular persons who exercise it, and for free criticism of the manner of its exercise, not in any nominal restriction of its scope. To say that a supreme legislature cannot do this or that, or that any act of such a body is illegal, is an abuse of language. "Why cannot? What is there that should hinder them?" Those who profess to discuss the power of the sovereign are really discussing, in a confused and obscure way, whether the acts of that power are useful or mischievous; in the last resort, whether they are so mischievous that resistance appears better than submission.

Bentham admits, however, that there is no reason in the nature of things why the authority of a sovereign body should not be "limited by express convention," though he regards this case as exceptional and seems

to be thinking only of the relations between federated States or between a protecting and a protected or semi-sovereign State. If such a limitation is defined, there is no difficulty in conceiving it; whether it shall be imposed in any given case is a question of expediency. Thus Bentham has some notion of what Lord Bryce and Prof. Dicey have in our time named a rigid constitution; and he further suggests the possibility of a regular machinery for constitutional amendment: and this eleven years before the Constitution of the United States was adopted. He clearly dissents from the Hobbist dogma (whether he knew it in Hobbes or not) that sovereignty is illimitable and indivisible.¹ Where the ultimate supremacy may be in a federal government, or whether we are bound to say that it is anywhere, Bentham does not stop to inquire.

Again, he distinguishes between the legal duty of obedience (the supreme power itself being supposed unchallenged) and the political doctrine of non-resistance. The sovereign prince or assembly governs without any assigned superior or formal check, but always at the peril of being in fact overthrown, if it appears to a competent number of the subjects that the evils of submission are greater than those of resistance. Here

¹ "To say . . . that not even by convention can any limitation be made to the power of that body in a state which in other respects is supreme, would be saying, I take it, rather too much: it would be saying that there is no such thing as government in the German Empire; nor in the Dutch Provinces; nor in the Swiss Cantons: nor was of old in the Achæan league" (c. iv. s. 34). European federal systems, as known in the eighteenth century, were very loose as compared with those which have succeeded them.

too Bentham and Hobbes part company. Hobbes, if called on to state his real position in Bentham's language, would no doubt have said that the evils of resistance are always greater; but Bentham would have declined either to accept this as evident, or to accept Hobbes's forcible description of the miseries of a state of war as amounting to proof. In short, to be legally supreme governor is one thing, and to govern as you please is another. Political duty is one thing, moral duty is another. In the political sense (which at the present time we rather call legal) supreme governors cannot have any duties. Bentham is particularly severe on Blackstone for speaking of the duty of the sovereign to make laws.

Yet we may say in another sense that the duty of the sovereign to make laws is Bentham's capital discovery in political science. For Bentham has, besides and beyond the formal theory of sovereignty, a decided and confident theory as to the purpose for which governments exist. They exist for the common advantage of the governed; or, in terms which to Bentham appeared more accurate, in order to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Only one standard can be found by which their acts can be judged, that of general utility. Here Bentham found the rule both of private morals and of public expedience; and the practical inference from combining this with his theory of sovereignty is that the State has no excuse for being backward in well-doing. The greatest happiness is the end of human action; abuses and grievances exist; let

then the supremacy of the State, the most powerful form of human action, be set to work to abolish them. Let the machinery of government and justice be simplified; let irrational and anomalous rules be swept away; let the motives of abuse and corruption be removed, and political duties made plain and easy of comprehension. Let there be no superstition about old rules being inviolable merely because they are old. Let no prescriptive privilege stand in the way of the general good. Above all, let none pretend a want of power to do these things. The State bears not sovereignty in vain. *Non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei*, says Hobbes: therefore fear the sovereign and obey. True, says Bentham, obedience is good; but while I "obey punctually" I will "censure freely." What is sovereignty for, if it is not to be directed by every light of reason towards the attainment of the common happiness? The formula of the greatest happiness is made a hook to put in the nostrils of Leviathan, that he may be tamed and harnessed to the chariot of utility. Indeed, if Leviathan will haul the chariot, it matters little whether he has one head or many. Bentham was equally willing to be legislator in ordinary to the United States, the French Republic, and the Emperor of Russia. Such is the connexion between Bentham's theory of the State and his theory of legislation. Taken together, they give us the ideal of modern legislation, in which the State is active, not merely in providing remedies for new mischiefs, but in the systematic reform and improvement of its own

institutions. Down to the eighteenth century legislation was considered as an exceptional instrument of policy, and in England at all events regarded with a certain jealousy. The mysterious authority of custom which to this day rules the Eastern world was still in the air of Europe. The change which has come over the spirit and methods of law-making in the last few generations is almost entirely due to Bentham.

We have nothing to do here with the ethical value of Bentham's doctrine. It is enough to say that it had to be seriously modified even by his immediate followers. But there is no doubt of its power in the political field. Had it been more subtle, it might have been less successful. It had exactly that amount of generality and apparent reasonableness which even in England will make speculative conceptions operative in practice. Everybody thinks he knows what happiness means; and for practical purposes, indeed, it matters little whether it is precisely known or not. A public judgment of happiness, expediency, well-being, or whatever else we call it, is in the nature of human affairs a rough thing at best; and there is plenty of work to be done which ought to be done on any possible view of the nature of duty. The main point was to rouse the State to consciousness of its power and its proper business; and by persistent and confident iteration Bentham did this effectually.

We cannot, again, say anything here either of the many actual reforms which may be traced to Bentham,

or, on the other hand, of that part of his proposals, by no means an inconsiderable one, which was hopelessly out of relation to the feelings and habits of mankind. There is an extraordinary mixture in his work of practical good sense on some topics with impracticable extravagance and obstinacy in others.¹ But there is no leisure to discuss this, nor would there be much profit. Bentham's eccentricities have passed away harmlessly, save so far as they prejudiced the reception of his really valuable ideas. It remained to complete the separation of the theory of political sovereignty from that of the ethical and historical foundations of political society. This was done by John Austin, who finally cleared the way, with labour which now seems uncouth and excessive,² to the conception of a pure science of positive law. The worker in this field assumes the sovereign authority of the State as for his purposes the ultimate source of laws and legal institutions as they exist, and he analyses and classifies them without regard to the moral,

¹ Bentham's want of touch of public feeling and its tendencies comes out in startling ways in his doctrine of penalties. Utilitarianism is, in common understanding, associated with rational philanthropy, and justly so on the whole. Yet Bentham seems at one time to have thought it practicable and rather desirable to burn incendiaries alive, and several of his other suggestions are both cruel and otherwise absurd.

² Austin's manner is so repulsive (as even his admirers allow) that it is hard to be quite just to his matter. There is no injustice, however, in saying that Austin's lectures are at all events not a desirable text-book for novices in jurisprudence. Perhaps the best general criticism of his doctrine is Leslie Stephen's: *The English Utilitarians*, vol. iii. ch. 5. The shortest is Lord Melbourne's, which the curious may find in the *Greville Memoirs*, iii. 138, anno 1834. J. S. Mill's essay is useful as an exposition in good English by an unquestioning disciple.

social, or historical reasons which may have moved the sovereign to approve them. Now this requires a process of highly formal abstraction, and the abstraction cannot be maintained in its ideal purity when we come to dealing with even the simplest facts. This, however, is really the case with all scientific and philosophical abstractions. Another short consideration has, I think, been commonly overlooked. If, in order to frame a science of positive law, we are to take the contents of existing legal systems as given facts to be sorted out by some logical method, it really does not matter from what source they are given, except that we must verify their formal authenticity. Municipal law is the sum of the rules of conduct binding on members of a particular commonwealth as such. Talk of the command of the State, the imprint of the King's printers, an authorized report, or what you will, the material is just existing bodies of rules; and it is certainly not the sovereign authority in the State that can or will, in point of fact, tell us in any particular case what the rule is. Interpretation is not less important than enactment from a legal point of view; while experience shows that it is, oftener than not, equally stable. Committing oneself to any theory of origins beyond historical fact seems to be, for a lawyer, the very heresy of confusing politics and law which Austin exhorts him to avoid. Austin, however, did useful work in his own country and generation. If his manner had been less dogmatic, and I fear we must say pedantic, a great deal of misunderstanding might

have been saved. As it was, he not only dogmatised overmuch in his own chosen field, but despised accurate knowledge even of the law as it existed, and absolutely ignored history.¹ Further criticism of the "analytical school" became indispensable, and was supplied by Sir Henry Maine² and Mr. Frederic Harrison.³ More lately Professor Holland has exhibited the results of the English school in a form wholly freed from the old controversial encumbrances, and thereby freed also from the extreme insularity which has prevented our former English publicists from being appreciated by Continental thinkers; and Lord Bryce has discussed the nature of sovereignty with not only technical but historical and statesman-like competence. His demonstration that the cases which Austin's ultra-Hobbiist theory will fit are really exceptional has not been answered.⁴

British writers, in truth, were content for almost a century to generalise from their own constitution,

¹ Merely technical criticism is beyond the scope of this work. We are not therefore concerned with the perplexing questions why John Austin, being a member of the Equity Bar, discoursed of law and legal institutions like one imbued with the vulgar error found among laymen that their sole function is punishment; and why, having studied Roman law in Germany, he not only failed to learn its spirit, but made mistakes in the letter almost as gross as Blackstone's.

² *Early History of Institutions.*

³ *Fortnightly Rev.* 1878-9, reprinted *sub tit.* *On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws*, Oxford 1919.

⁴ *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, Oxford 1901, vol. ii. Essay X.; cp. Essay III. on Flexible and Rigid Constitutions; and see Prof. Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, and H. Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*.

assuming the unlimited supremacy of Parliament to be a normal example of legislative power. England was visited, in the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century, by a combination of rising intellectual curiosity with grossly defective training; and this made it possible for authors who knew a little political philosophy to impose the shallowest of dogmas upon lawyers who knew none. When we turn to the facts of the civilised world, we can hardly find a legislature with unlimited competence outside these islands. Least of all does any such power occur, where one might at first sight look for it, in despotic governments; for such government is hardly possible without controlling traditions which have all the force of law. No one could ever have said of the Tsar or the Sultan that he "establisheth forms of religion"; a Christian Sultan, a Lutheran Tsar, would be more revolutionary than a Turkish or a Russian republic, and neither the Holy Synod¹ nor the Shaikh-ul-Islám acknowledges any superior in spiritual affairs. Hobbes would no doubt have advised the Sultan that he was no true monarch until he got rid of the Shaikh-ul-Islám; but the Sultan might reply that the adventure of reducing two heads of the Faithful to one was like to be as much as his own head was worth. In these cases there are elements which are not formally mutable at all; in the case of a "rigid" constitution there are institutions alterable only by a special process differing

¹ On the occasion of Tolstoy's death in November 1910, this body spoke with a voice which openly contradicted the Tsar's.

in a greater or less degree from that of current legislation. A "flexible" constitution, knowing no difference between ordinary reforms and extraordinary innovation, is the only type which the universal formulas of Hobbism will explain; and, as we have said, there are very few such. Thus the definition of sovereignty as illimitable and indivisible breaks down even before we come to the problems of federal government. Bentham confessed and avoided these difficulties to some extent. Austin and his followers have attempted to dismiss them off-hand, but have signally failed. In federal states they are driven to assign the title of sovereign to an authority which may be active not more than once or twice in a century, or else to confound sovereignty with the ultimate and unformed political control of the people at large: a confusion which it was the very purpose of the "analytical" definition to avoid. It is true, as Maine¹ pointed out, that the scope of legislative experiment and the importance of legislation have greatly increased and are still increasing; and it was by their foresight in this respect that the utilitarians were justified. But it is not at all true that formal limitations of legislative power are out of date in federal or even unitary constitutions, or tend to be less important. It may be that some readers of these lines, if not the writer, will live to see such provisions in force at Westminster itself.

We may now see that the doctrine of sovereignty, so far from closing discussion, opened up another field

¹ His criticism does not touch upon the objections above mentioned.

of search beyond the domain of positive law. We have separated the actual existence and authority of government from the foundations and reasons of government. The voice of the sovereign is the command of the State, and the State acknowledges no superior.¹ But the sovereign may be an artificial and composite body. Such is now the case in every civilised government in the world. This raises a new distinction between formal and substantial, or if we substitute *legal* for Bentham's *political*, and set free the latter term for a new special use, we may say between legal and political sovereignty. Where does the supreme power of a corporate or compound sovereign in practice reside? Even in the simplest case of a single assembly, say the Athenian Demos, the whole assembly is formally sovereign, but practically the whole are not sovereign unless they are unanimous. The power of the whole is exercised by a majority; whoever wishes it exercised in a particular way must persuade a majority to think with him, and if he can do this it is enough. What then of him who persuades the majority, Pericles for example? Is he sovereign too? Or if Aspasia persuades Pericles? Is not this the vain and infinite search for causes of causes? The answer is plain. Successful persuasion is not sovereignty. Pericles persuades the majority of Athenian citizens, but that majority has no need to persuade any one: it commands. And a

¹ This does not imply that the State need be an independent State for international purposes. Here is another Austinian confusion. But this brief warning must suffice.

majority one way or the other will always be found. We may conceive, indeed, though not believe, that a sovereign assembly should be equally divided, and there should be nobody with authority to give a casting vote. In this practically impossible case the form of sovereignty would be unimpaired, but the State would be at a deadlock. From this we may proceed to imagine the more complex cases of assemblies voting not collectively, but by sections or estates; of several bodies meeting and deliberating separately, but acting only by the concurrent decision of all; and finally to apply these ideas to the peculiar system of the British Constitution, which appears to us by long habit familiar and natural, and has been copied, with variations partly designed and partly undesigned, all over the world. We have seen what confusion arose among the earlier publicists from unwillingness to carry out the separation of politics from ethics. A similar confusion long prevailed in the thought of British publicists (not excluding those of the modern utilitarian school), because they could not or would not distinguish legal supremacy from the practical power of guiding its exercise. Parliament is the supreme power in England, or, in our technical terms, is the sovereign. Everybody since Hobbes, who vainly strove to deny it (though even he admitted a corporate sovereign to be theoretically possible), has admitted and asserted so much. But what is Parliament? Who is the wielder of sovereign power? Let us open the last volume of statutes. "Be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the

Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows." Here are, to all appearance, three distinct powers ; they might have been, and as a matter of history were near being, four. It is part of the positive law of the land, the law by which courts of justice are governed, that to make a new law they must all agree. The Crown cannot legislate without the estates of the realm, nor with one House of Parliament against the other, nor can the Houses of Parliament jointly or severally legislate without the Crown. But what is to make them agree ? What security is there that they shall not constantly disagree ? Why do Englishmen go about their business in confidence that this complicated machine, with apparently independent parts, will work smoothly and all together ? As far as the purely legal constitution goes, it is like a clock with three distinct sets of works for the hour and minute hands and the striking part, and no provision for their keeping the same time. The publicists of the eighteenth century were content to say, in effect, that the component parts of Parliament were really independent, and (to use the language of their own time) in a state of nature with regard to one another. The risk of a dead-lock, so far from being unreal, was regarded as the peculiar virtue of the British Constitution, and as exercising a moderating influence on all parties. It was argued with great ingenuity that the powers of King, Lords, and Commons were not only different in kind, but that they had been kept apart by the wisdom of our ancestors because the

conjunction of them in the hands of any one man or assembly would be fatal to liberty. De Lolme, working on lines similar to those of Blackstone, whom he often cites,¹ proved that the balance could not subsist if the executive power were not one, or the legislative were not divided. The doctrine of sovereignty, even in its barely legal aspect, is a complete solvent of this theory. No one who has assimilated Hobbes can go on believing in the balance of constitutional powers. It has been shown by Bagehot (as thinking people must have felt before his time, but did not plainly say) that the British Constitution in its modern form gives the practical sovereignty to the majority of the House of Commons and gives it in a most effectual manner. The machine works as well as it does, not because the powers are balanced, but because in the last resort there is only one power.² The ultimate unity of sovereignty is disguised by the very means which secure it; for those means do not appear at all on the legal face of our institutions. Government is carried on by a system of understandings which for the most part have never been authentically defined, much less acquired the force of positive law. The study of these informal conventions, as distinct from

¹ He first published his work in 1771, and dedicated the revised English edition to George III. in 1784.

² The foregoing sentences are purposely left as they were written. Bagehot could not anticipate the crisis of 1909-1910. The two Houses of Parliament having failed to agree in their interpretation of the constitutional conventions, a new kind of problem was raised. The Parliament Act, 1911, does not purport to be a final solution, but in my opinion (which not all competent persons would agree with) is acceptable as a provisional restoration, with the unavoidable drawbacks incident to statutory definition, of the doctrine generally held in the latter nineteenth century.

the positive constitutional law which in the United States and in most Continental countries is to be found in some one solemn act of state, and in our country in such statutes as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement, is really a new branch of political science.

No attempt will be made here to follow the course of political speculation on the Continent of Europe in the nineteenth century. There, for better or worse, professed philosophers have had a greater share of it than in these islands, and the publicist is apt to talk the language of metaphysics, whereas here, even if he happens to be a philosopher, he tries to make himself understood by men of ordinary intelligence. Hence it is not possible to discuss Continental theories of the State in a moderate compass without assuming a certain knowledge of the general history of philosophy. The separation of politics from ethics (including the ultimate metaphysical foundations of ethics), of which we spoke above, is not only not effected, but in many Continental schools would have been very lately regarded as impracticable; in some it would still be so. But it may be useful to point out why the English utilitarians always remained outside the main stream. Down to the time when the remnant of them was swept, some willing and others unwilling, into the flood-tide of Evolutionism,¹ they supposed themselves to be

¹ Not Darwinism: and this not merely because Herbert Spencer claimed, and justly, to have been an evolutionist and made extensive applications of that way of thinking before Darwin declared himself, but because the corresponding movement in moral and political science was independent and earlier.

maintaining the teaching of experience against the whole brood of dogmatists. Troubling themselves little, as our insular manner has been since the Reformation, with what foreigners were about, and being concerned to wake English political and legal thought from a particular kind of dogmatic slumber, they quite honestly thought they had nothing in common with the "monkish" ages and the fancies of the Schoolmen. Bentham cheerfully dismissed "the pretended Law of Nature" as "nothing but a phrase,"¹ which a simple application of reason would explode. Little did he or his followers suspect that his touchstone of the greatest happiness had been used, four centuries before, by his brilliant countryman, William of Ockham, under the name of *communis utilitas* and in the very name of the Law of Nature. Still less did he remember, if indeed he ever read, that the principle of Reason or Reasonableness which runs through the whole of our Common Law, wherever technicality leaves it room, is just an English version of the Law of Nature. Least of all could the denouncer of "judge-made law" (an aberration disclaimed by all his followers) guess that in the fourteenth century one English judge had passed the censure in jest, and another rebuked him. "Hillary. Law is what the Justices will. Stonore. No; Law is reason."² And if he had been told that the Law of Nature—that is, the doctrine of man's duties as a moral and social being, so far as discover-

¹ *Fragment*, c. iv. ss. 18, 19.

² Y. B. 18-19 Ed. III. (Rolls ed. 1905) p. 379.

able by natural reason alone—had been a rationalising and liberal influence throughout the Middle Ages and even in the Renaissance controversies,¹ he would probably not have believed it. In English thought, even now, Bentham's ethical theory is often opposed to those of modern Continental philosophers or an English adherent, such as Coleridge, as a system founded on experience and not derived from transcendental ideas; and it is assumed that the like opposition holds between the respective political theories. In truth, Bentham's principle of utility is no whit less dogmatic than Kant's principle of the Practical Reason. Whatever validity either of them has depends on its correctness as an interpretation of human experience, and they both appeal to experience to justify them. In the political application it is abundantly clear that Bentham is as much a dogmatist as any propounder of natural law, in any of its varieties, or in the particular modern variety which may be described as theory of legislation based on philosophy of ethics. He assigns a final cause to the State by abstract considerations of human motives in general, such as they appear to him, and without taking the slightest trouble to consult history or specific facts, and he constructs a universal theory of legislation accordingly.

¹ After being used against the extreme claims of the Roman See, it was used by Romanists against the extreme letter-worship of Protestant controversialists. Accordingly some Protestant writers expressly, and contrary to the scholastic tradition, declared the Law of Nature to be inferior in authority to the Law of God, by which last they meant the text of the scriptures interpreted in their own sense without regard to tradition.

His construction is of pattern institutions and rules of law not limited in terms or intention to the circumstances of England or any other particular country. His chapter on "Title by Succession" in *Principles of the Civil Code* is as much *Naturrecht* as anything one can find in Germany, for it lays down rules purporting to be justified by the universal nature of human relations, and qualified by no respect of time or place. Such is not the positive law which lawyers discuss and administer at Leipzig or Paris any more than in London.¹ An English lawyer may come upon a bit of land in one parish which descends to all the tenant's sons equally, and a bit in the next parish which descends to the youngest son alone. It concerns him not for the matter in hand which rule looks more like an expression of the rational will of the community, or better fitted to promote the greatest happiness. Each rule will be enforced as to the land subject to it, and without discussion of its being reasonable or otherwise, and his client's title will depend on the correct ascertainment and application of the rule as it exists. Again, if there is any work of political reasoning which belongs purely and simply to the English school, it is the collection of notes appended to the first draft of the Indian Penal Code, a most interesting and instructive document which for many years has been accessible to English readers in Lady Trevelyan's edition of Lord Macaulay's

¹ German critics having both a philosophical and a legal outlook, Brunner and Kohler, have perceived this, and dismiss the utilitarians, none too civilly, as a mere belated variety of natural-right theorists, or *Naturrechtler*, incapable of profiting by history.

works.¹ But the substance of these notes, except so far as they relate to provisions specially adapted to the circumstances of British India, and except so far as the framers of the Code may have been influenced, without knowing it, by any peculiarities of English positive law, is no less pure and simple *Naturrecht*.

Still there is a certain mutual repulsion between English and Continental speculation in this field. We must not say British, for Scotland goes, on the whole, with the Continent. What is the explanation of this? The German or Germanising philosopher is ready with an easy one. "It just means," he would say, "that you English have not taken the pains to understand modern philosophy. You are still in the darkness of the præ-Kantian epoch, and you will never get a real theory of the State or of law till you come out of it. When you show signs of doing that, we may attend to what you have to say." There are Englishmen on the other hand who would be no less ready with their answer. "We confess," they would say, "that we know very little of your transcendental philosophies, and care less. It appears to us that you get nothing out of them but interminable vague talk about *Persönlichkeit* and *Menschenwürde*, or *le bien* and *l'idéal*, as the case may be, and that when it comes to distinct questions of policy you have to deal with them really by the same empirical methods as we do, and in much more cumbrous language." In each of

¹ It has been largely and properly used by the commentators on the Penal Code; but it should be read as a whole.

these charges there is both truth and exaggeration. Continental critics ignore the English school because they suppose it to be tied down to Bentham's form of utilitarianism, whereas the true character of English political science is to be found in the series of distinctions by which our publicists have assigned separate fields to political ethics, constitutional politics, and positive law. The process was begun by Hobbes and virtually completed by Hume. Hobbes began it unconsciously by trying to make legal supremacy the final and conclusive standard of political ethics. The Whigs, with Locke's aid, strove to restore the ethical element by working the law of nature, through the machinery of the original contract, into the technical conception of political supremacy itself. The original contract was slain by Hume and trampled upon by Burke, and the separation of the ethical part of politics, as the theory of legislation and government, from the analytical part, as the theory of the State and of positive law, was forced upon Bentham and his successors. The theory of legislation must to some extent involve a theory of ethics, though it need not involve any decision upon ultimate metaphysical questions. But the analytical branch of political science, including the pure science of positive laws, is altogether independent of ethical theories, though not of the fact that in every commonwealth there are received moral standards which the rules of law must in the long run follow. And that is the definite scientific result which we in England say that the work of the past

century has given us. The precision and abstraction which we have succeeded in attaching to our technical terms was mistaken, until quite lately, by foreign students, and even by able Scottish followers of the Continental methods like Lorimer of Edinburgh, for crudeness and narrowness of thought.

The English student, in turn, is naturally repelled by this misunderstanding, and is prone to assume that no solid good is to be expected of philosophers who have not yet clearly separated in their minds the notion of things as they are from that of things as they ought to be. The German school seems to him to mix up the analytical with the practical aspect of politics, and politics in general with ethics, in a bewildering manner. But he must not assume that we and the Germans are talking about the same things when we use corresponding terms, or even an Englishman and a Scotsman when they use the same terms. He must allow for the necessary difference in point of view between those who have the two words *law* and *right*, and those for whom *Recht* or *droit* covers both, so that our "law" and "right" (even when "right" means the particular right of an individual) appear as aspects of one and the same thing, "*Recht im objectiven Sinne*" and "*Recht in subjectiver Hinsicht*." Probably the Germans think this a difference to their advantage. We do not; but the difference must be remembered in any case. When we take the thing as we find it, not expecting it to be something else, we shall discover this mysterious and terrible *Naturrecht* to be no worse

than a theory of government and legislation quite legitimately descended from the old law of nature;¹ or, to preserve better the wide generality given to it by its authors, a kind of teleology of the State and its institutions, differing much, indeed, from anything of the kind in English literature, and as much involved with ethical philosophy of Kantian or post-Kantian schools as Bentham's theory of legislation is involved with his utilitarianism. But we shall make out, held in solution in this unfamiliar vehicle, much subtle discrimination and sound political thought. There is no intrinsic reason why the two methods should not come to a *modus vivendi*, or at least to intelligent and useful criticism of one another.

The difference between the two points of view is hardly to be attributed to any essential difference between the English and the German mind, but rather to the difference of historical conditions. In England² the positive law of the land has for centuries been single, strong, and conspicuous in all public life, and therefore positive law presented itself as an adequate object for distinct scientific study. In Germany there were down to our own time a great number of independent States, many of them very small, and each with its own local law, but all having their laws framed more or less on the same sort of pattern, and looking for authority, in the absence of specific

¹ This has to be remembered in considering Continental (and to some extent American) treatment of the law of nations, which was raised by Grotius from the same stock.

enactment or custom, to a common stock of Roman or Romanised German tradition. In this state of things it was impossible that theory should not busy itself with the common stock of ideas to the neglect of their multitudinous and varying applications in actual use. And it is significant that in the United States, where a number of independent municipal jurisdictions find their general source of authority in the common law, much as the German States found theirs in the Roman law, and share the common stock of English legal ideas, exactly the same thing has happened. In spite of English tradition and communications, the bent of modern American publicists has been rather towards the Continental habit of thought.

In fact, however, the chances of an understanding between the abstract political thinking of England and of Germany were spoilt by the advent of a wholly different school which dominated European studies in most of the moral sciences for half a century or more, the historical school eminently so called. J. S. Mill was perhaps the last considerable English writer on politics who ignored its importance. Publicists of this school seek an explanation of what institutions are, and are tending to be, more in the knowledge of what they have been and how they came to be what they are than in the analysis of them as they stand. Savigny, the greatest master of jurisprudence in modern times, is the chief representative of the historical school in Germany, though the application of the method to the general theory of politics

fills but a small proportion of his admirable work. In England Burke is recognised by the Germans themselves as his forerunner, and Coleridge's political writings, which, though less practical, are similar in their spirit and influence, must be assigned to the same class. The general idea of the historical method may be summed up in the aphorism, now familiar enough, that institutions are not made, but grow. "The state does not exist for purposes of men, and is not governed by laws of their devising, but by the cosmic force above. . . . Laws are found, not made . . . the force preparing the future is the same that made the past."¹ Thus Savigny, instead of giving a formal definition of law, describes it as an aspect of the total common life of a nation; not something made by the nation as matter of choice or convention, but, like its manners and language, bound up with its existence, and indeed helping to make the nation what it is; so that (as we have already noted) he says, in almost the same words as Burke, that the people is always the true legislator: *Das Gesetz ist das Organ des Volksrechts*. Thus Coleridge, in his essay on Church and State, considers the Church of England not as he actually finds it, nor yet as somebody might wish the Church to be if he were devising an ideal commonwealth, but in what he calls its *idea*; that is, what the English Church, from its place and conditions in the English commonwealth, seemed to him fitted to be, and but for disturbing causes might be.

¹ Lord Acton, "German Schools of History," *Eng. Hist. Rev.* i. 9, reprinted in *Historical Essays and Studies*, 1907 (which see for fuller account from the historian's point of view).

This method leads to a certain optimism which is its danger; not the rationalist optimism of the eighteenth century which makes out that whatever is is best, but a speculative optimism which tries to see that whatever is becoming, or is continuously in a way to be, is best. Exactly the same danger has beset the kindred doctrine of evolution in modern natural science, and we may call this the optimism of historical evolution. For the rest, the historical method is many-sided, and in England it has never been appropriated by any defined school. It is needless to dwell on the power with which Maine used it among ourselves to throw light on legal and political ideas. In the field of the English Constitution it has been excellently represented by Freeman. Cornwall Lewis's book on the *Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics* is another good English example of the method in a more general way. The reader is purposely left to supply later ones from his own studies. In the last forty years of the nineteenth century historical knowledge in every department was reinforced or rather transformed by the progress of archaeology and anthropology, by the adoption of more exacting standards of criticism, and above all by the comparative study of institutions. The work of Jhering, a man of genius not to be neatly classified, may be said to mark the transition: Amari of Palermo was a precursor who, falling on the evil times of Italy, and dying in 1870, was not known as he ought to have been. Among recent and living representatives of modern methods one may name Lord Acton, Maitland, Sir A. Lyall,

Salomon Reinach, Esmein, Brunner, Gierke, Redlich, Villari, President Lowell. The cult of original research may, no doubt, be exaggerated. A handful of new documents does not make a historian. Still the fault is on the right side.

Want of space must be the excuse for omitting to follow out or even indicate other modern developments of political speculation. It would be tempting to trace in the work of independent writers who were not professed historians or archaeologists, such as Bluntschli, Holtzendorff, Taine, Henry Sidgwick, the results of a philosophical temper combined with technical training and a wide command of historical knowledge; to endeavour to fix the place of Positivism among other recent theories, or to assign the relation to previous English thought of the system unfolded in our own day by Herbert Spencer, a much more important one in my opinion than Auguste Comte's. But not one of these topics could be dealt with to any good purpose in these few pages.

The utilitarians rather disliked the newer fashion of research so far as they knew anything of it; Maine got only perfunctory recognition at the hands of their remnant. Yet in another direction they were in line with a European movement of considerable importance. Benthamism was not individualist in the sense required by the figment of a Social Contract, which, as we have seen, Bentham repudiated. Still the formula, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," taken word for word, regards the State as a

numerical sum of its citizens, contrary to the opinion of all the deeper thinkers on politics from Plato and Aristotle downwards. Hence a presumption that the business of the State is only or mainly to prevent individuals from jostling one another beyond what is inevitable or tolerable; and this, being encouraged by other and purely economic doctrines, produced the watchword "laissez faire,"¹ so that in the result "legislative utilitarianism is nothing else than systematised individualism."² Further, this view was in harmony with the conception of sovereignty from which Bentham started. Law was regarded merely as the command of the supreme power, and exclusive attention to its restraining function caused legal compulsion to be regarded as in its nature evil; and it followed that there ought to be as little of it as was compatible with the preservation of society. Continental speculation on the limits of State action had an independent origin. The question how far the State ought to exercise general control over the private action of its citizens, whether severally or in association, was definitely stated in its modern form by Wilhelm von Humboldt in a little book written in 1791, but not published till after the writer's death, sixty years later. Meanwhile a good many things had happened. Among others,

¹ Some individualists have even attempted, by a curious perversion, to regard Free Trade as a mere branch of an assumed universal principle of non-interference. The nearest approach I know to a contrary formula is the familiar precept of the elder sister in *Punch*: "Go and see what baby's doing and tell him he mustn't."

² Dicey, *Law and Public Opinion*, 174. Cf. the whole section, pp. 145-209.

Wilhelm von Humboldt himself, who in this book had proved that public instruction was one of the things the State ought on no account to meddle with, had been the Prussian Minister of Education. I do not know that he ever retracted his former opinion; he had no occasion to do so, not having published it; but deeds are more eloquent than words in such a case. His earlier essay was, in fact, the most natural protest of an active mind against the fussy paternal government of the little German States in the latter half of the eighteenth century. No doubt it was expressed in general terms. Equally general in terms was Locke's plea for the Revolution of 1688. How far Humboldt's arguments remained applicable to Prussia or other German States in 1851, it is not our business to inquire. It seems, however, a curious and at first sight a gratuitous proceeding to adopt them as at that time applicable to the state of government and public opinion in England. But we have a way of infelicitous borrowing from our neighbours. In metaphysics Sir William Hamilton had some little time before invented, by a wonderful misunderstanding of Kant, the spectre called the Unconditioned, which was gravely taken by himself and a few disciples for a hopeful foundation of systematic philosophy. Somewhat after the same fashion the English publicist who was afterwards Hamilton's most brilliant opponent was pleased to take up the cry of the over-regulated Prussian, and the result was the essay which we all know as *Mill on Liberty*. The same line was taken up by Eötvös in Hungary (as

Hungary was under Austrian repression), and M. Edouard Laboulaye in France, a few years later, summed up and adopted the arguments of all these writers; with what provocation, any one who knows even slightly what French administration was during the nineteenth century, and particularly during the Second Empire, may easily guess. Later Herbert Spencer followed on the same side (though he declared himself in his earliest work, *Social Statics*, some years before J. S. Mill's essay was published),¹ and was encountered by Huxley, who called the minimising doctrine by the ingenious name of "Administrative Nihilism."² This was not acceptable to Spencer, who proposed the more neutral but less striking term, "Specialised Administration." In "The Man *versus* the State" (1884) Spencer reasserted his opinion of the mischief of State interference. On one point, that of the regulation of railways, he forgot that railways owe their existence to wholesale interference with private ownership, and that their liability to special control (whether or not it be wisely exercised in the interest of the public) is only a price paid to the State for special privileges, and therefore at all events involves no essential injustice. Mill's particular exposition was vigorously criticised by the late Sir James Stephen

¹ He afterwards explained that *Social Statics* must not be taken as representing his matured opinions. In that work he even talked of a supposed "right of the individual to ignore the State." In the natural organism a member that attempts to ignore the body is taught its mistake swiftly and sharply enough.

² See his *Method and Results*.

in his book named *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, so much entangled with transitory polemic that its real merit is obscured in the eyes of a younger generation. For some time past the controversy has run more upon economical and social than upon political lines, being mixed up with discussion of private property, co-operation or profit-sharing as against compulsory distribution of capital, and other like matters which it is beyond my purpose to deal with. Socialism, so far as the many different and even contradictory senses in which that word is used have any common root, is the political application of economic tenets and not a theory of politics at all. It has no necessary connexion with any form of government. A despotic monarchy or theocracy may be socialist; a democracy may be anti-socialist.¹

The only remark of my own I have to add is this: that the minimisers appear not to distinguish sufficiently the action of the State in general from its centralised action. There are many things which the State cannot do in the way of central government, or not effectually, but which can be very well done by the action of local governing bodies. But this is a question between the direct and the delegated activity of the State, not between State action and individual enterprise. It is just as much against the pure principles of Humboldt and Herbert Spencer for the Town Council of Birmingham or Glasgow to

¹ Flaubert thought the French nineteenth-century Socialists were "des bons hommes du moyen âge": *Corresp.* iii. 269 (1863).

regulate the gas and water supply of its own city as it would be for the Board of Trade to regulate it. It is hardly needful to point out that, on the principles of pure individualism, all national and public museums, picture galleries, parks, and the like, must cease to be provided for out of public resources, and the further maintenance of such things, if they are to be maintained at all, must depend wholly on private munificence and voluntary contributions.

As to the question in its general bearing, I do not think it can be fully dealt with except by going back to the older question, "What does the State exist for?" And although I cannot here justify myself at length, I will bear witness that for my own part I think this a point at which we may well say, "Back to Aristotle." The minimisers tell us that the State exists only for protection. Aristotle tells us that it was founded on the need for protection, but exists for more than protection—*γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν, οὔσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*. Not only material security, but the perfection of human and social life, is what we aim at in that organised co-operation of many men's lives and works which is called the State. I fail to see good warrant of either reason or experience for limiting the corporate activity of a nation by hard and fast rules. We must fix the limit by self-protection, says Mill; by negative as opposed to positive regulation, says Spencer. But where does protection leave off and interference begin? If it is negative and proper regulation to say a man shall be punished for building his house

in a city so that it falls into the street, why is it positive and improper regulation to say that he shall so build it, if he builds at all, as not to appear to competent persons likely to fall into the street? It is purely negative regulation, and may therefore be proper, to punish a man for communicating an infectious disease by neglect of common precautions. Why is it improper to compel those precautions, where the danger is known to exist, without waiting for somebody to be actually infected? Herbert Spencer would have had the State protect both property and contracts. One or two zealous maintainers of his views have outdone their master by arguing that the State should protect only property in the strict sense, and leave contracts to take care of themselves.¹ Why stop there? Somebody else may say that law is restraint, and restraint is force, and the State ought to use its force only against actual force; in other words, to protect persons directly, and property not otherwise than indirectly through persons; from which it would be but one step more to the triumphant establishment of the perfect "liberty of the subject" in Hobbes's state of nature, which is a state of universal war. I prefer to say with Huxley, who was no dealer in empty phrases, that government is the corporate reason of the community; with Burke, philosopher and statesman, that a State "is not a partnership

¹ Many vigorous individualists, however, are indignant at the least appearance of disparaging the sanctity of contract: which would be more intelligible if they believed in a Social Contract as the foundation of the commonwealth.

in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature," but "a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection;" and with Hobbes, but in a higher and deeper sense than he enforced, *Non est super terram potestas quas comparetur ei.*

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
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
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A5





STATUE OF RAYMUND LULL AT PALMA, MAJORCA.

RAYMUND LULL

First Missionary to the Moslems

By

SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, D.D., F. R. G. S.

AUTHOR OF

"Arabia, The Cradle of Islam," "Topsy-Turvy Land," etc.



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Dr. Zwemer's son is named
Raymond Lull Zwemer. Dr.
Zwemer visited this college January
1911.

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*Introduction By Robert
Esper (Princeton class of 1888) who
is Secretary of the Board of Missions
over this college*

INTRODUCTION

• It would be difficult to find another so competent as Dr. Zwemer to write a life of the first great missionary to the Moham-medans. For twelve years he has been working with his associates of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church on the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula and in the Turkish region northwest of the Persian Gulf. To an almost perfect command of Arabic, an accurate knowledge of the Koran, untiring zeal and indomitable courage, he has added an absorbing love for the Mohammedans, and a desire to make known to them in truth that Savior whom in their belief, their prophet annuls and supersedes.

Introduction

As I passed down the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1897, the captains of the steamers, without qualification, spoke out in praise of the "lion-hearted" missionary, as they called him, who would sit on the hatches with the Arab travelers and confound them out of their own scriptures. In the interval of itinerating journeys into the interior of El Hasa and Oman Dr. Zwemer has found time to produce a volume on Arabia (published in 1900), which is the standard authority on the peninsula, and one of the best books available on the questions of interest to all Christians springing from the rise and extension of Islam. Loving the Mohammedans and knowing their religion thoroughly, and working constantly for an enlargement of the missionary force attempting the evangelization of the Moslem world, Dr. Zwemer has qualifications for understanding the life of Raymund Lull, and for

Introduction

describing it sympathetically, which few possess in the same measure.

And there has been great need that an adequate life of Raymund Lull should be written for English readers of this modern day. He was the greatest missionary who has ever gone out to the Moslem world. He was one of the outstanding figures of the Catholic Church in the thirteenth century. He was a Christian of the modern spirit of Catholicity—neither Roman nor Protestant—a man of spiritual judgment, of divine love. He saw the futility of authority in matters of religion at the time that other men were busy with the most devilish expression of belief in authority ever conceived—the Inquisition. He loved Christ with a passionate love, and saw that the only true missionary method was the method of love. To leave his life in obscurity would involve an incalculable loss to the Church of our time. We need to

Introduction

revive the memory of it, to relearn its secrets, and to confirm the highest Christian tendencies of our day by the recollection of their noble illustration in the life of Lull. Of all the men of his century of whom we know, Raymund Lull was most possessed by the love and life of Christ, and most eager, accordingly, to share his possession with the world. The world sadly needed it; the Church scarcely less. It sets forth the greatness of Lull's character the more strikingly to see how sharply he rose above the world and Church of his day, anticipating by many centuries moral standards, intellectual conceptions, and missionary ambitions, to which we have grown only slowly since the Reformation.

The movement of our thought, theological and philosophical, is now strongly toward biological conceptions. It is a gain that it should be so. We see that life is the supreme thing, and that we must state

Introduction

our notions in its terms. The missionary work will gain greatly by this new mode of thinking. Its purpose is to give life. Its method is to do by the contact of life. Raymund Lull proved this. He went out to give a divine life which he already possessed in his own soul. Somerville, in "St. Paul's Conception of Christ," points out that it was "in the consciousness of what the glorified Christ was to Paul in his personal life that we are to look for the genesis of his theology." It was in his inner experience of the glorified Christ that we are to look for the secret and source of Raymund Lull's doctrine and life: what he thought, what he was, what he suffered. And this must be true of all true missionaries. They do not go out to Asia and Africa to say, "This is the doctrine of the Christian Church," or "Your science is bad. Look through this microscope and see for yourselves and abandon such error,"

Introduction

or "Compare your condition with that of America and see how much more socially beneficial Christianity is than Hinduism, or Confucianism, or fetichism, or Islam." Doubtless all this has its place: the argument from the coherence of Christianity with the facts of the universe, the argument from fruit. But it is also all secondary. The primary thing is personal testimony. "This I have felt. This Christ has done for me. I preach whom I know. That which was from the beginning, that which I have heard, that which I have seen with my eyes, that which I beheld and my hands handled, concerning the Word of life (and the life was manifested, and I have seen, and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life, which was with the Father and was manifested unto me), that which I have seen and heard declare I unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with me; yea, and my fellowship

Introduction

is with the Father and with His Son, Jesus Christ." The man who can not say this may be able to change the opinions of those to whom he goes, to improve their social condition, to free them from many foolish errors and enslaving superstitions, but after all this, the one thing which, if done, would of itself have attended to these things and a thousand others, may be still unaccomplished—namely, the gift of life. The missionary who would do Paul's work or Lull's must be able to preach a living Christ, tested in experience, saved from all pantheistic error by the Incarnation and the roots thus sunk in history, and by the Resurrection and the personality thus preserved in God above, but a Christ here and known, lived and ready to be given by life to death, that death may become life.

It would be easy to draw other parallels than this between Paul and Lull: their conversions, their subsequent times of sep-

Introduction

aration, their visions, their untiring toil, their passion for Christ, their sufferings and shipwrecks, their intellectual activity and power, their martyrdoms, the rule of Christ supreme thus in death, supreme also in life, its thought, its purpose, its taste, its use, its friends, its sacrifice. But the essence of all such comparison—the real essence of all true missionary character—is the possession by the life of Christ as life, and the ability thus to give, not a new doctrine only, not a new truth to men, but a new life. The work of missions is just this: the going out from the Church over the world of a body of men and women knowing Christ, and, therefore, having life in themselves; their quiet residence among the dead peoples; and the resurrection from among these peoples of first one, then a few, then more and more, who feel the life and receive it and live.

Lull sought in every way to fit himself

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for contact with men so that he might reach them in the deepest intimacies of their life, and be able thus to plant the seed of the divine life which he bore. Therefore he learned Arabic, became a master of the Moslem philosophy, studied geography and the heart of man. And, therefore, he became also a student of comparative religion, as we would call him to-day. There was a great difference between his view, however, and that of a large school of modern students of comparative religion. Lull had no idea that Christianity was not a complete and sufficient religion. He did not study other religions with the purpose of providing from them ideals which Christianity was supposed to lack. Nor did he propose to reduce out of all religions a common fund of general principles more or less to be found in all and regard these as the ultimate religion. He studied other religions to find out how bet-

Introduction

ter to reach the hearts of their adherents with the Gospel, itself perfect and complete, lacking nothing, needing nothing from any other doctrine. With him there was a difference between Christianity and other religions, not in degree only, but in kind. It possesses what they lack, which is desirable. It lacks what they possess, which is unworthy. It alone satisfies. It alone is life. They are systems of society or politics, religions of books, methods, organizations. It and it alone is life, eternal life. Lull studied other religions, not to discover what they have to give to Christianity, for they have nothing, but to find how he might give to those who follow them the true life, which is life, and which no man shall ever find until he finds it in Christ.

Blessed as the influence of Lull should be upon the Christian life and experience of all who feel it in reading this sketch, it

Introduction

will fall short of its full purpose if they are not led to desire to make amends for the neglect of the centuries. It is six centuries since Lull fell at Bugia. Is that martyrdom never to have its fruitage? Shall we not now at last wake from the sleep of the generations and give the Savior His place above the Prophet, and the crescent its place beneath the cross?

ROBERT E. SPEER.

To the Reader

"Who faulteth not, liueth not; who mendeth faults is commended: The Printer hath faulted a little: it may be the author over=sighted more. Thy paine (Reader) is the least; then erre not thou most by misconstruing or sharpe censuring; least thou be more oncharitable, then either of them hath been heedlesse: God amend and guide vs all."

—*Robartes on Tythes, Camb. 1613.*

PREFACE

THE subject of this biography is acknowledged by all writers on the history of missions to be the one connecting link between the apostles of Northern Europe and the leaders who followed the Reformation. Eugene Stock, the editorial secretary of the Church Missionary Society, declares "there is no more heroic figure in the history of Christendom than that of Raymund Lull, the first and perhaps the greatest missionary to Mohammedans."

No complete biography of Lull exists in the English language; and since the twentieth century is to be preeminently a century of missions to Moslems, we should

Preface

rescue the memory of the pioneer from oblivion.

His philosophical speculations and his many books have vanished away, for he knew only in part. But his self-sacrificing love never faileth and its memory can not perish. His biography emphasizes his own motto:

"He who lives by the Life can not die."

It is this part of Lull's life that has a message for us to-day, and calls us to win back the Mohammedan world to Christ.

SAMUEL M. ZWEMER.

BAHREIN, ARABIA, March, 1902.

Biography of Raymund Lull

CHAPTER I

EUROPE AND THE SARACENS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

(A.D. 1200-1300)

"Altho the history of an age is going on all at once, it can not be written all at once. Missionaries are proceeding on their errands of love, theologians are constructing their systems, persecutors are slaying the believers, prelates are seeking the supremacy, kings are checking the advance of the churchman—all this and an infinitude of detail is going on in the very same period of time."—*Shedd's "History of Doctrine."*

WE can not understand a man unless we know his environment. Biography is a thread, but history is a web in which time is broad as well as long. To unravel the

Biography of Raymund Lull

thread without breaking it we must loosen the web. To understand Raymund Lull, we must put ourselves back seven hundred years and see Europe and the Saracens as they were before the dawn of the Renaissance and the daybreak of the Reformation. Altho the shadow of the dark ages still fell heavily upon it, the thirteenth century was an eventful epoch, at least for Europe. The colossal power of the empire was waning, and separate states were springing up in Italy and Germany. The growth of civil liberty, altho only in its infancy, was already bringing fruit in the enlargement of ideas and the founding of universities. In England, Norman and Saxon were at last one people; the Magna Charta was signed, and the first Parliament summoned. About the time when Lull was born, the Tatars invaded Russia and sacked Moscow; Saracens and Christians were disputing not only the possession of the Holy Land, but the

Europe and the Saracens

rule of the world. Altho in the East the long struggle for the Holy City had ended in the discomfiture of the Christians, the spirit of the Crusades lived on. The same century that saw the fall of Acre also witnessed the fall of Bagdad and the extinction of the califate. In Spain, Ferdinand of Castile was winning city after city from the Moors, who were entrenching their last stronghold, Granada. The year 1240 marks the rise of the Ottoman Turks; Lull was then five years old. Before he was twenty, Louis IX. had failed in his crusade and been taken prisoner by the Sultan of Egypt; emperors had deposed popes and popes emperors; and the Inquisition had begun in Spain to torture Jews and heretics. At Cologne the foundations of the great cathedral were being laid, and at Paris men were experimenting with the new giant, gunpowder.

All Europe was heated with the strong

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wine of political change and social expectations. In the same century sudden and subversive revolutions were taking place in Asia. The Mongolian hordes under Genghis Khan poured out, like long-pent waters, over all the countries of the East. The califate of Bagdad fell forever before the furious onslaught of Hulaku Khan. The Seljuk empire soon advanced its Moslem rule into the mountain ranges of Anatolia, and Turks were disputing with Mongols the sovereignty of "the roof of the world."

The beneficial effects of the Crusades were already being felt in the breaking up of those two colossal fabrics of the Middle Ages, the Church and the Empire, which ruled both as ideas and as realities. The feudal system was disappearing. The invention and application of paper, the mariner's compass, and gunpowder heralded the eras of printing, exploration, and conquest in the century that followed. It was

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not dark as midnight, altho not yet dawn. The cocks were crowing. In 1249 the University of Oxford was founded. In 1265 Dante was born at Florence. The pursuit of truth by philosophers was still a game of wordy dialectics, but Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura and Albertus Magnus left a legacy of thought as well. The two former died the same year that Raymund Lull wrote his "Ars Demonstrava." It was in the thirteenth century that physical science struggled into feeble life in the cells of Gerbert and Roger Bacon. But these men were accounted magicians by the vulgar and heretics by the clergy, and were rewarded with the dungeon. Marco Polo the Venetian, the most famous of all travelers, belongs to the thirteenth century, and did for Asia what Columbus did for America. His work was a link in the providential chain which at last dragged the New World to light. But both Marco Polo and Roger

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
Bacon lived ahead of their age. Gibbon says with truth that, "If the ninth and tenth centuries were the times of darkness, the thirteenth and fourteenth were the age of absurdity and fable." Thought was still in terror through dread of the doom declared on heretics and rebels.

The maps of the thirteenth century show no appreciation of Marco Polo's discoveries. The world as Raymund Lull knew it was the world of medieval legend and classic lore. The earth's surface was represented as a circular disk surrounded by the ocean. The central point was the Holy Land or Jerusalem, according to the prophecy of Ezekiel. Paradise occupied the extreme east and Gog and Magog were on the north. The pillars of Hercules marked the boundary of farthest west, and the nomenclature of even Southern Europe was loose and scanty. It is interesting to note that the first great improvement of these



A TENTH-CENTURY MAP OF THE WORLD.

A restored copy of the Cotton or Anglo-Saxon map,
current in the time of Raymund Lull.



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maps took place in Catalonia, the province of Spain where Lull's ancestors lived. The remarkable Catalan map of 1375 in the Paris Library is the first world-map that throws aside all pseudo-theological theories and incorporates India and China as part of the world. Nearly all the maps of the Middle Ages are inferior to those in our illustration. Clever artists concealed their ignorance and gave life to the disk of the world by pictures of turreted towns, walled cities, and roaring lions in imaginary forests. Swift has satirized their modern descendants as—

“Geographers who in Afric’s maps
With savage pictures fill their gaps;
And o’er unhabitable downs
Place elephants for want of towns.”

Regarding the general attitude of the masses toward intellectual progress, a writer* justly remarks: “There were by no

*J. A. Symonds: “The Renaissance,” *Encyc. Brit.*, xx., 383.

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means lacking elements of native vigor ready to burst forth. But the courage that is born of knowledge, the calm strength begotten by a positive attitude of mind, face to face with the dominant overshadowing sphinx of theology, were lacking. We may fairly say that natural and untaught people had more of the just intuition that was needed than learned folk trained in the schools. Man and the actual universe kept on reasserting their rights and claims in one way or another; but they were always being thrust back again into Cimmerian regions of abstractions, fictions, visions, spectral hopes and fears, in the midst of which the intellect somnambulistically moved upon an unknown way."

The morality of the Middle Ages presents startling contrasts. Over against each other, and not only in the same land but often in the same individual, we witness sublime faith and degrading superstition,

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angelic purity and signs of gross sensuality. It was an age of self-denying charity to suffering Christians, and of barbarous cruelty to infidels, Jews, and heretics. The wealthy paid immense sums to redeem Christian slaves captured by the Saracens; and the Church took immense sums to persecute those who erred from the faith. When the Crusaders under Godfrey of Bouillon (who refused to wear a crown of gold where his Savior had worn a crown of thorns) came in sight of Jerusalem, they kissed the earth and advanced on their knees in penitential prayer; but after the capture of the city they massacred seventy thousand Moslems, burned the Jews in their synagogs, and waded in blood to the Holy Sepulcher to offer up thanks! The general state of morals even among popes and the clergy was low. Gregory VII. and Innocent III. were great popes and mighty reformers of a corrupt priesthood, but they were excep-

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tions in the long list. One of the popes was deposed on charges of incest, perjury, murder, and blasphemy. Many were in power through simony. Concubinage and unnatural vices were rife in Rome among the clergy. Innocent IV., who became pope the very year Lull was born, was an outrageous tyrant. Nicholas III. and Martin IV., who were popes toward the close of the thirteenth century, rivaled each other in infamy. The pontificate of the former was so marked by rapacity and nepotism that he was consigned by Dante to his Inferno. The latter was the murderous instigator of the terrible "Sicilian Vespers."

Martensen says that "the ethics of this period often exhibit a mixture of the morals of Christianity with those of Aristotle." And this is natural if we remember that Thomas Aquinas represents the height of medieval morals as well as of dogmatics. Sins were divided into carnal and spiritual,

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venial and mortal. The way to perfection was through the monastic vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience.

The poetry of the period reflects the same startling contrast between piety and sensuality, composed as it was of the tenderest hymns of devotion and bacchanalian revels. The seven great hymns of the medieval Church have challenged and defied the skill of the best translators and imitators. The wonderful pathos of the "Stabat Mater Dolorosa" and the terrible power of "Dies Iræ" appear even in their poorest translations. In spite of its objectionable doctrinal features, what Protestant can read Dr. Cole's admirable translation of the "Stabat Mater" without being deeply affected?

Yet the same age had its "Carmina Burana," written by Goliardi and others, in which Venus and Bacchus go hand-in-hand and the sensual element predominates.

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"We do not need to be reminded that Beatrice's adorer had a wife and children, or that Laura's poet owned a son and daughter by a concubine." Nor were Dante and Petrarch exceptions among medieval poets in this respect. It was a dark world.

The thirteenth century was also an age of superstition, an age of ghosts and visions and miracles and fanaticism. The "Flagellants" wandered from city to city calling on the people to repent. Girded with ropes, in scant clothing or entirely naked, they scourged themselves in the open streets. The sect spread like contagion from Italy to Poland, propagating extravagant doctrines and often causing sedition and murder. Catherine of Sienna and Francis of Assisi in the fervor of their love saw visions. The latter bore the *stigmata* and died of the wounds of Christ, which are said to have impressed themselves on

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his hands and side through an imagination drunk with the contemplation and love of the crucified Redeemer. The author of the two most beautiful hymns of the mediæval period went to fanatical extremes in self-sought torture to atone for his own sins and for the good of others. Peter Nolasco in 1228 saw a vision of the Virgin Mary, and devoted all his property from that day to the purchasing of freedom for Christian captives from their Moorish masters. He founded the order of the Mercedarians, whose members even gave themselves into slavery to save a fellow Christian from becoming an apostate to Islam. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the monastic orders increased in numbers and influence. They formed the standing army of the papacy and were generally promoters of learning, science, and art. The Franciscans were one of the strongest orders, altho one of the latest.

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In 1264 this order had eight thousand cloisters and two hundred thousand monks. Some of these monks were saints, some scientists, and some sensualists; alongside of unmeasured superstition and ignorance in the mass of the priesthood we meet with genius of intellect and wonderful displays of self-forgetting love in the few.

Yet the most sacred solemnities were parodied. On "Fools' Festival," which was held in France on New Year's day, mock popes, bishops, and abbots were introduced and all their holy actions mimicked in a blasphemous manner.

Practical mysticism, which concerned itself not with philosophy but with personal salvation, was common in the thirteenth century, especially among the women of the Rhine provinces. St. Hildegard, Mechthild, and Gertrude the Great are striking examples. There were also attempts at a reformation of the Church and

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the abuses of the clergy. The Albigenses and the Waldenses were in many ways forerunners of Protestantism. Numerous other sects less pure in doctrine and morals arose at this time and spread everywhere from Eastern Spain to Northern Germany. All of them were agreed in opposing ecclesiastical authority, and often that of the state.

Such was the political, intellectual, moral, and religious condition of Europe in the days of Raymund Lull.

The Mohammedan world was also in a state of ferment. The Crusades taught the Saracen at once the strength and the weakness of medieval Christianity. The battle-field of Tolosa, strewn with two hundred thousand slain Moslems, was the death-knell of Islam in Spain. Saracen rule and culture at Granada were only the after-glow of a sunset, glorious but transient. What dominions the Saracens lost in the west they regained in Syria and the

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East. In 1250 the Mameluke sultans began to reign in Egypt, and under Beybars I. Moslem Egypt reached the zenith of its fame. Islam was a power in the thirteenth century not so much by its conquests with the sword as by its conquests with the pen. Moslem philosophy, as interpreted by Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel, but most of all the philosophy of Averroes, was taught in all the universities. Aristotle spoke Arabic before he was retranslated into the languages of Europe. "The Saracens," says Myers, "were during the Middle Ages almost the sole repositories of the scientific knowledge of the world. While the Western nations were too ignorant to know the value of the treasures of antiquity, the Saracens preserved them by translating into Arabic the scientific works of the Greeks." Part of this learning came to Europe through the Crusaders, but it came earlier and more largely

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through the Arabian schools of Spain. No other country in Europe was in such close touch with Islam for good and ill as the kingdoms of Castile, Navarre, and Aragon in the north of what we now call Spain. There the conflict was one of mind as well as of the sword. There for three centuries waged a crusade for truth as well as a conflict on the battle-field between Christian and Moslem. In this conflict Raymund Lull's ancestors played their part. During all the years of Lull's life the Moslem power held out at Granada against the united Spanish kingdoms. Not until 1492 was the Saracen expelled from Southern Europe.

Regarding missions in the thirteenth century, little can be said. There were a few choice souls whom the Spirit of God enlightened to see the spiritual needs of the Saracen and Mongol and to preach to them the Gospel. In 1256 William de Rubruquis was sent by Louis IX., partly as a

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diplomat, partly as a missionary, to the Great Khan. In 1219 Francis of Assisi with mad courage went into the Sultan's presence at Damietta and proclaimed the way of salvation, offering to undergo the ordeal of fire to prove the truth of the Gospel. The Dominican general Raimund de Pennaforti, who died in 1273, also devoted himself to missions for the Saracens, but with no success.

The only missionary spirit of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was that of the Crusaders. They took up the sword and perished by the sword. But "Raymund Lull was raised up as if to prove in one startling case, to which the eyes of all Christendom were turned for many a day, what the Crusades might have become and might have done for the world, had they been fought for the cross with the weapons of Him whose last words from it were forgiveness and peace."*

* George Smith : "A Short History of Missions."

CHAPTER II

RAYMUND LULL'S BIRTHPLACE AND EARLY LIFE

(A.D. 1235-1265)

"I think that I better understand the proud, hardy, frugal Spaniard and his manly defiance of hardships since I have seen the country he inhabits. . . . The country, the habits, the very looks of the people, have something of the Arabian character."—*Washington Irving's "The Alhambra."*

RAYMUND LULL was born of an illustrious family at Palma in the island of Majorca of the Balearic group in 1235.* His father had been born at Barcelona and belonged to a distinguished Catalonian family. When the island of Majorca was taken from the Saracens by James I., king of


*Some authorities give the date 1234, and one 1236, but most agree on the year 1235. See Baring-Gould: "Lives of the Saints," vol. vi., p. 489.

Biography of Raymund Lull


Aragon, Lull's father served in the army of conquest. For his distinguished services he was rewarded with a gift of land in the conquered territory, and the estates grew in value under the new government.

Southern Europe between the Atlantic and the Adriatic is almost a duplicate in climate and scenery of Northern Africa. When the Moors crossed over into Spain and occupied the islands of the Western Mediterranean they felt at home. Not only in the names of rivers and mountains and on the architecture of Spain did they leave the impress of their conquest, but on the manners of the people, their literature, and their social life.

Catalonia, the eastern province of Spain, which was the home of Lull's ancestors and for a time of Lull himself, is about one hundred and thirty miles broad and one hundred and eighty-five miles long, with a coast of two hundred and forty



A GENERAL VIEW OF PALMA, ON THE ISLAND OF MAJORCA, SPAIN.



Birthplace and Early Life

miles. It has mountain ranges on the north, three considerable rivers, and woodland as well as meadow. The climate is healthy in spite of frequent mists and rains, sudden changes of temperature, and great midday heat. Mountains and climate and history have left their impress on its people. The Catalonians are distinct in origin from the other inhabitants of Spain, and differ from them to this day in dialect, dress, and character. About 470 A.D., this part of the peninsula was occupied by the Goths, whence it was called Gothallonia, and later Catalonia. It was taken possession of by the Berbers in 712, who in turn were dispossessed by the Spaniards and the troops of Charlemagne. In 1137 Catalonia was annexed to Aragon. The Catalonians are therefore a mixed race. They have always been distinguished for frugality, wit, and industry; they have much national pride and a strong revolutionary spirit.

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The Catalan language and its large literature are quite distinct from that of the other Spanish provinces. The poetical works of Lull are among the oldest examples of Catalan extant.

The Balearic Islands have always belonged to the province of Catalonia as regards their people and their language. On a clear day the islands are plainly visible from the monastery of Monserrat, and by sea from Barcelona it is only one hundred and forty miles to Palma. Between these two harbors there has always been and is now a busy traffic. Majorca has an area of fourteen hundred and thirty square miles, a delightful climate, beautiful scenery, and a splendid harbor—Palma. Some of its valleys, such as Valdemosa and Soller, are celebrated for picturesque luxuriance. The northern mountain slopes are terraced; the olive, the vine, and the almond-tree are plenteous everywhere in the plains.

Birthplace and Early Life

According to the description of modern travelers it is an earthly paradise. During the summer there is scarcity of water, but, following a system handed down from the Arabs, the autumn rains are collected in large reservoirs. On the payment of a certain rate each landholder has his fields flooded.


Palma, Lull's birthplace and burial-place, is a pretty town with narrow streets and a sort of medieval look except where modern trade has crowded out "the old-world, Moorish character of the buildings."

The cathedral is still a conspicuous building, and was commenced in 1230 and dedicated to the Virgin by the same King James who gave Lull's father estates near Palma. Portions of the original building still remain, and the visitor can enter the royal chapel (built in 1232) with assurance that if Lull did not worship here he at least saw the outside of the building frequently.


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Palma probably owes its name and harbor to Metellus Balearicus, who in 123 B.C. settled three thousand Roman and Spanish colonists on the island, and whose expedition is symbolized on the Roman coins by a palm branch. He also gave his name to the island group, and the Balearic slingers are famous in Cæsar's "Commentaries."

Palma is to-day a busy little port, and direct commerce is carried on with Valencia, Barcelona, Marseilles, Cuba, Porto Rico, and even South American ports. The present population is about sixty thousand. Formerly, Palma was a great center for shipbuilding, and there is little doubt that in Lull's time this industry also, gave importance to the town. As early as the fourteenth century a mole, to a length of three hundred and eighty-seven yards, was constructed to improve the harbor of Palma. This picturesque town was the birthplace of our hero, and to-day its in-



CHURCH OF SAN FRANCISCO AT PALMA, MAJORCA.



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habitants are still proud to lead you to the church of San Francisco where he lies buried. As late as 1886 a new edition of Lull's works was printed and published at Palma by Rosselló.

The significance or the derivation of Lull's family name is lost in obscurity. His personal name Raymund (in Spanish Ramon or Raymundo) is Teutonic and signifies "wise protection" or "pure in speech." It was borne by two distinguished counts of Toulouse: one of them, Raymund IV., was a Crusader (1045-1105), and the other (1156-1222) befriended the Albigenses against the Pope. It is possible that Lull received his first name from one of these martial heroes whose exploits were well known in Catalonia.

Of Lull's infancy and early youth nothing is known for certain. He was accustomed to medieval luxury from his birth, as his parents had a large estate and his

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father was distinguished for military services. Lull married at an early age, and, being fond of the pleasures of court life, left Palma and passed over with his bride to Spain, where he was made seneschal at the court of King James II. of Aragon. Thus his early manhood was spent in gaiety and even profligacy. All the enthusiasm and warmth of his character found exercise only in the pleasures of the court, and, by his own testimony, he lived a life of utter immorality in this corrupt age. Wine, women, and song were then, as often since, the chief pleasures of kings and princes. Notwithstanding his marriage and the blessing of children, Lull sought the reputation of a gallant and was mixed up in more than one intrigue. For this sort of life his office gave him every temptation and plenty of opportunity.

A seneschal (literally, an old servant) *

* From Latin *sene* + *scalus*, or Gothic *sineigs* + *skalk*.

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was the chief official in the household of a medieval prince or noble and had the superintendence of feasts and ceremonies. These must have been frequent and luxurious at the court of James II., for Aragon, previous to the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, enjoyed the most liberal government of Europe. According to one authority, "the genius and maxims of the court were purely republican." The kings were elective, while the real exercise of power was in the hands of the Cortes, an assembly consisting of the nobility, the equestrian order, the representatives of cities, and the clergy. A succession of twenty sovereigns reigned from the year 1035 to 1516. At such a court and amid such an assemblage, probably in the capital town of Zaragoza (Sargossa), Lull spent several years of his life. He was early addicted to music and played the cithern with skill. But he was yet more celebrated as a court poet. Accord-

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ing to his own confessions, however, the theme of his poetical effusions was not seldom the joys of lawless love. "I see, O Lord," he says in his *Contemplations*, "that trees bring forth every year flowers and fruit, each after their kind, whence mankind derive pleasure and profit. But thus it was not with me, sinful man that I am; for thirty years I brought forth no fruit in this world, I cumbered the ground, nay, was noxious and hurtful to my friends and neighbors. Therefore, since a mere tree, which has neither intellect nor reason, is more fruitful than I have been, I am exceedingly ashamed and count myself worthy of great blame."* In another part of the same book he returns thanks to God for the great difference he sees between the works of his after-life and those of his youth. "Then," he says, all his "actions were sinful and he enjoyed the pleasures of sinful companionship."

* "*Liber Contemplationis in Deo*," ix., 257, ed. 1740.

: Birthplace and Early Life

Raymund Lull was gifted with great mental accomplishments and enthusiasm. He had the soul of a poet, but at first his genius groveled in the mire of sensual pleasures, like that of other poets whose passions were not under the control of religion. We do Lull injustice, however, if we judge his court life by the standards of our Christian century. His whole environment was that of medieval darkness, and he was a gay knight at the banquets of James II. before he became a scholastic philosopher and a missionary. As knight he knew warfare and horsemanship so well that among his books there are several treatises on these sciences,* first written in Catalan, and afterward put into Latin. Undoubtedly these were written, as was most of his poetry, before he was thirty years old. He was the most popular poet of his age in Spain, and his influence on

* For a list of these works see Helfferich, p. 74, note.

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Catalonian poetry is acknowledged in such terms of praise by students of Spanish literature that he might be called the founder of the Catalonian school of poets. The philological importance of Lull's Catalonian writings, especially his poems, was shown by Adolph Helfferich in his book on "Lull and the Origin of Catalan Literature." In this volume specimens of his poetry and proverbs are given. A writer in the "Encyclopedia Britannica" speaks of one of his poems, "Lo Desconort" (Despair) as eminently fine and composite in its diction. This poem, if it was written before his conversion, as is probable, would already show that Lull himself was dissatisfied at heart with his life of worldly pleasure. Already, perhaps, there arose within him a mighty struggle between the spirit and the flesh. Sensual pleasures never satisfy, and his lower and higher natures strove one with the other.

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It seems that at about his thirty-second year he returned to Palma, altho there is little certainty of date among his biographers. At any rate it was at the place of his birth that Lull was born again. It was in the Franciscan church, and not at the court of Aragon, that he received his final call and made his decision to forsake all and become a preacher of righteousness. The prodigal son came to himself amid the swine, and his feet were already toward home when he saw his Father, and his Father ran out to meet him. The story of St. Augustine under the fig-tree at Milan . was reenacted at Palma.

CHAPTER III

THE VISION AND CALL TO SERVICE

(A.D. 1266-1267)

"I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh, . . . and your young men shall see visions."—*Joel ii. 28.*

WHEN St. Paul told King Agrippa the story of his life, the key of it lay in the words, "I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision." The angel had come to him and called him straight away from his career as arch-persecutor. All that he had done or meant to do was now of the past. He arose from the ground and took up his life again as one who could not be disobedient to his vision. It was a vision of Christ that made Pål a missionary. And his was not the last instance of the ful-

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filment of Joel's great prophecy. The twentieth century, even, dares not mock at the supernatural; and materialistic philosophy can not explain the phenomena of the spirit world. The Christians of the thirteenth century believed in visions and saw visions. Altho an age of visions is apt to be a visionary age, this was not altogether true of the thirteenth century. The visions of Francis of Assisi, of Catherine the Saint, of Peter Nolasco, and of others in this age, had a tremendous effect on their lives and influence. We may doubt the vision, but we can not doubt its result in the lives of those who profess to have seen it. Call it religious hallucination or pious imagination if you will, but even then it has power. Ruskin says that "such imagination is given us that we may be able to vision forth the ministry of angels beside us and see the chariots of fire on the mountains that gird us round." In that age of Mariol-

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atry and angel-worship and imitation of saints, it was not *such* a vision that arrested Lull, but a vision of Jesus Himself. The story, as told in a *Life** written with his consent during his lifetime, is as follows:

One evening the seneschal was sitting on a couch, with his cithern on his knees, composing a song in praise of a noble married lady who had fascinated him but who was insensible to his passion. Suddenly, in the midst of the erotic song, he saw on his right hand the Savior hanging on His cross, the blood trickling from His hands and feet and brow, look reproachfully at him. Raymund, conscience-struck, started up; he could sing no more; he laid aside his cithern and, deeply moved, retired to bed. Eight days after, he again attempted to finish the song and again took

* S. Baring-Gould: "Lives of the Saints," vol. vi., p. 489.
Maclear: "History of Christian Missions in the Middle Ages," pp. 355, 356.

The Vision and Call to Service

up the plea of an unrequited lover. But now again, as before, the image of Divine Love incarnate appeared—the agonized form of the Man of Sorrows. The dying eyes of the Savior were fixed on him mournfully, pleadingly:

"See from His head, His hands, His feet
Sorrow and love flow mingling down :
Did ere such love and sorrow meet,
Or thorns compose so rich a crown ?"

Lull cast his lute aside, and threw himself on his bed, a prey to remorse. He had seen the highest and deepest unrequited love. But the thought that

"Love so amazing, so divine,
Demands my soul, my life, my all,"

had not yet reached him. The effect of the vision was so transitory that he was not ready to yield until it again repeated itself.* Then Lull could not resist the

*"Tertio et quarto successivo diebus interpositis aliquibus, Salvator, in forma semper quā primitus, apparet."—"Acta Sanctorum," p. 669.

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thought that this was a special message for himself to conquer his lower passions and to devote himself entirely to Christ's service. He felt engraved on his heart, as it were, the great spectacle of divine Self-sacrifice. Henceforth he had only one passion, to love and serve Christ. But there arose the doubt, How can I, defiled with impurity, rise and enter on a holier life? Night after night, we are told, he lay awake, a prey to despondency and doubt. He wept like Mary Magdalen, remembering how much and how deeply he had sinned. At length the thought occurred: Christ is meek and full of compassion; He invites all to come to Him; He will not cast me out. With that thought came consolation. Because he was forgiven so much he loved the more, and concluded that he would forsake the world and give up all for his Saviour. How he was confirmed in this resolve we shall see shortly.

The Vision and Call to Service

By way of parenthesis it is necessary to give another account of Lull's conversion which the author of "Acta Sanctorum" relates, and says he deems "improbable but not impossible." According to this story Lull was one day passing the window of the house of Signora Ambrosia, the married lady whose love he vainly sought to gain. He caught a glimpse of her ivory throat and bosom. On the spot he composed and sang a song to her beauty. The lady sent for him and showed him the bosom he so much admired, eaten with hideous cancers! She then besought him, to lead a better life. On his return home Christ appeared to him and said, "Raymund, follow Me." He gave up his court position, sold all his property, and withdrew to the retirement of a cell on Mount Roda. This was about the year 1266. When he had spent nine years in retirement he came to the conclusion that he was called

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of God to preach the Gospel to the Mohammedans.*

Some biographers know nothing of this nine years' retirement in a cell at Mount Roda near Barcelona, altho all of them agree that his conversion took place in July, 1266. The visions and spiritual conflicts and experiences at Mount Roda gained for Lull the title of "Doctor Illuminatus," the scholar enlightened from heaven. And if we look at the life that was the result of these visions, we can not deny that, in this dark age, heaven did indeed enlighten Lull to know the love of God and to do the will of God as no other in his day and generation.

Let us go back to the story of his conversion as told by Lull himself in that work, "On Divine Contemplation," which may

* See article by Rev. Edwin Wallace, of Oxford University, in the Encyclopedia Britannica, where Mount Roda is wrongly spelled Randa.

The Vision and Call to Service

be put side by side with Bunyan's "Grace Abounding" and Augustine's "Confessions" as the biography of a penitent soul.


After the visions he came to the conclusion that he could devote his energies to no higher work than that of proclaiming the Message of the Cross to the Saracens. His thoughts would naturally take this direction. The islands of Majorca and Minorca had only recently been in the hands of the Saracens. His father had wielded the sword of the king of Aragon against these enemies of the Gospel; why should not the son now take up the sword of the Spirit against them? If the carnal weapons of the crusading knights had failed to conquer Jerusalem, was it not time to sound the bugle for a spiritual crusade for the conversion of the Saracen? Such were the thoughts that filled his mind. But then, he says, a difficulty arose. How could he, a layman, in an age when

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
the Church and the clergy were supreme, enter on such a work? Thereupon it occurred to him that at least a beginning might be made by composing a volume which should demonstrate the truth of Christianity and convince the warriors of the Crescent of their errors. This book, however, would not be understood by them unless it were in Arabic, and of this language he was ignorant; other difficulties presented themselves and almost drove him to despair. Full of such thoughts, he one day repaired to a neighboring church and poured forth his whole soul to God, beseeching Him if He did inspire these thoughts to enable him to carry them out.*

This was in the month of July. But, al-

* "Vita Prima," p. 662. "Dominum Jesum Christum devote, fleus largiter exoravit, quatenus hæc prædicta tua quæ ipse misericorditer inspiraverat cordi suo, ad effectum sibi placitum perducere dignaretur." Several authorities put a period of short backsliding between his conversion and the account of the sermon by the friar that follows in our text.



THE CLOISTERS OF THE CHURCH OF SAN
FRANCISCO.



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the old desires and the old life were passing away, all things had not yet become new. For three months his great design was laid aside and he struggled with old passions for the mastery. On the fourth of October, the festival of St. Francis of Assisi, Lull went to the Franciscan church at Palma and heard from the lips of the friar-preacher the tale of the "Spouse of Poverty." He learned how this son of Pietro Bernadone di Mericoni, once foremost in deeds of war and a gay worldling, was taken prisoner at Perugia and brought by disease to the very gates of death; how he saw visions of the Christ and of the world to come; how, when he emerged from his dungeon, he exchanged his gay apparel for the garb of the mendicant, visiting the sick, tending the lepro^us, and preaching the Gospel; how in 1219, before the walls of Damietta, this missionary-monk crossed over to the infidels and wit-

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nessed for Christ before the Sultan, declaring, "I am not sent of man, but of God, to show thee the way of salvation."

The words of the preacher rekindled the fires of love half-smothered in the heart of Lull. He now made up his mind once and forever. He sold all his property, which was considerable, gave the money to the poor, and reserved only a scanty allowance for his wife and children. This was the vow of his consecration in his own words: "To Thee, Lord God, do I now offer myself and my wife and my children and all that I possess; and since I approach Thee humbly with this gift and sacrifice, may it please Thee to condescend to accept all what I give and offer up now for Thee, that I and my wife and my children may be Thy humble slaves." * It was a covenant of complete surrender, and the repeated reference to his wife and children shows that Ray-

* "Liber Contemplationis in Deo," xci., 27.

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mund Lull's wandering passions had found rest at last. It was a *family* covenant, and by this token we know that Lull had forever said farewell to his former companions and his life of sin.

He assumed the coarse garb of a mendicant, made pilgrimages to various churches in the island, and prayed for grace and assistance in the work he had resolved to undertake. The mantle of apostolic succession fell from Francis of Assisi, forty years dead, upon the layman of Palma, now in his thirtieth year. From the mendicant orders of the Middle Ages, their precepts, and their example, Lull in part drew his passionate, ascetic, and unselfish devotion. Most of his biographers assert that he became a Franciscan, but that is doubtful, especially since some of the earliest biographers were themselves of that order and would naturally seek glory in his memory.*

* See Noble : " The Redemption of Africa," vol. i., p. 110.

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Eymeric, a Catalonian Dominican in 1334 and the inquisitor of Aragon after 1356, expressly states that Lull was a lay merchant and a heretic. In 1371 the same Eymeric pointed out five hundred heresies in Lull's works, and in consequence Gregory XI. forbade some of the books. The Franciscans, Antonio Wadding and others, afterward warmly defended Lull and his writings, but the Jesuits have always been hostile to his memory.) Therefore the Roman Catholic Church long hesitated whether to condemn Lull as a heretic or to recognize him as a martyr and a saint. He was never canonized by any pope, but in Spain and Majorca all good Catholics regard him as a saintly Franciscan. In a letter I have received from the present bishop of Majorca he speaks of Raymund Lull as "an extraordinary man with apostolic virtues, and worthy of all admiration."

Frederic Perry Noble, in speaking of

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Lull's conversion, says: "His new birth, be it noted, sprang from a passion for Jesus. Lull's faith was not sacramental, but personal and vital, more Catholic than Roman." Even as the Catalonians first arose in protest and revolution against the tyranny of the state in the Middle Ages, so their countryman is distinguished for daring to act apart from the tyranny of the Church and to inaugurate the rights of laymen. The inner life of Lull finds its key in the story of his conversion. Incarnate Love overcame carnal love, and all of the passion and the poetry of Lull's genius bowed in submission to the cross. The vision of his youth explains the motto of his old age: "He who loves not lives not; he who lives by the Life can not die." The image of the suffering Savior remained for fifty years the mainspring of his being. Love for the personal Christ filled his heart, molded his mind, inspired his pen, and

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made his soul long for the crown of martyrdom. Long years afterward, when he sought for a reasonable proof of that greatest mystery of revelation and the greatest stumbling-block for Moslems—the doctrine of the Trinity—he once more recalled the vision. His proof for the Trinity was the love of God in Christ as revealed to us by the Holy Spirit.

CHAPTER IV

PREPARATION FOR THE CON- FLICT

(A.D. 1267-1274)

"Sive ergo Mahometicus error hæretico nomine deturpetur; cive gentili aut pagano infametur; agendum contra eum est, scribendum est."—*Petrus Venerabilis*, † 1157.

"Aggredior vos, non ut nostri sæpe faciunt, armis, sed verbis, non vi sed ratione, non odio sed amore."—*Ibid.*

By his bold decision to attack Islam with the weapons of Christian philosophy, and in his lifelong conflict with this gigantic heresy, Lull proved himself the Athanasius of the thirteenth century. The Moham-
medan missionary problem at the dawn of the twentieth century is not greater than it was then. True, Islam was not so extensive, but it was equally aggressive, and,

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if possible, more arrogant. The Moham-
medan world was more of a unit, and from
Bagdad to Morocco Moslems felt that the
Crusades had been a defeat for Christen-
dom. One-half of Spain was under Mos-
lem rule. In all Northern Africa Saracen
power was in the ascendant. Many con-
versions to Islam took place in Georgia,
and thousands of the Christian Copts in
Egypt were saying farewell to the religion
of their fathers and embracing the faith of
the Mameluke conquerors. It was just
at this time that Islam began to spread
among the Mongols. In India, Moslem
preachers were extending the faith in
Ajmir and the Punjab. The Malay
archipelago first heard of Mohammed
about the time when Lull was born.* Bey-
bars I., the first and greatest of the Mame-
luke Sultans, sat on the throne of Egypt.

* Arnold: "Preaching of Islam," synchronological table,
p. 389, 1896.

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A man of grand achievements, unceasing activity, and stern orthodoxy, he used every endeavor to extend and strengthen the religion of the state.* Islam had political power and prestige. She was mistress of philosophy and science. In the beginning of the thirteenth century the scientific works of Aristotle were translated from the Arabic into Latin. Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus were so learned that the clergy accused them of being in league with the Saracens!

Such was the Mohammedan world which Lull dared to defy, and planned to attack with the new weapons of love and learning instead of the Crusaders' weapons of fanaticism and the sword. The Christian world did not love Moslems in the thirteenth century, nor did they understand their religion. Marco Polo, a contempo-

† Muir: "The Mameluke Dynasty of Egypt," p. 31, London, 1896.

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rary of Lull, wrote: "Marvel not that the Saracens hate the Christians; for the accursed law which Mohammed gave them commands them to do all the mischief in their power to all other descriptions of people, and especially to Christians; to strip such of their goods and do them all manner of evil. In such fashion the Saracens act throughout the world." *

Dante voices the common opinion of this age when he puts Mohammed in the deepest hell of his *Inferno* and describes his fate in such dreadful language as offends polite ears. † But even worse things were said of the Arabian prophet in prose by other of Lull's contemporaries. Gross ignorance and great hatred were joined in nearly all who made any attempt to describe Mohammedanism.

* "Marco Polo's Travels," Colonel Yule's edition, vol. i., p. 69.

† "Hell," canto xxviii., 20-39, in Dante's "Vision," Cary's edition.

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Alanus de Insulis (1114-1200) was one of the first to write a book on Islam in Latin, and the title shows his ignorance: "*Contra paganos seu Mahometanos*." He classed Moslems with Jews and Waldenses! Western Europe, according to Keller, was ignorant even of the century in which Mohammed was born; and Hildebert, the archbishop of Tours, wrote a poem on Mohammed in which he is represented as an apostate from the Christian Church! Petrus Venerabilis, whose pregnant words stand at the head of this chapter, was the first to translate the Koran and to study Islam with sympathy and scholarship. He made a plea for translating portions of the Scripture into the language of the Saracens, and affirmed that the Koran itself had weapons with which to attack the citadel of Islam. But, alas! he added the plea of the scholar at his books: "I myself have no time to enter into the conflict." He

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first distinguished the true and the false in the teaching of Mohammed, and with keen judgment pointed out the pagan and Christian elements in Islam.* Petrus Venerabilis took up the pen of controversy and approached the Moslem, as he says, "Not with arms but with words, not by force but by reason, not in hatred but in love"; and in so far he was the first to breathe the true missionary spirit toward the Saracens. But he did not go out to them. It was reserved for the Spanish knight to take up the challenge and go out single-handed against the Saracens, "not by force but by reason, not in hatred but in love." It was Raymund Lull who wrote: "*I see many knights going to the Holy Land beyond the seas and thinking that they can acquire it by force of arms; but in the end all are destroyed before they*

* A. Keller's "Geisteskampf des Christentums gegen den Islam bis zur Zeit der Kreuzzüge," pp. 41, 43, Leipsic, 1896.

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attain that which they think to have. Whence it seems to me that the conquest of the Holy Land ought not to be attempted except in the way in which Thou and Thine apostles acquired it, namely, by love and prayers, and the pouring out of tears and of blood."

Lull was ready to pour out this sacrifice on the altar. The vision remained with him, and his love to God demanded exercise in showing forth that love to men.

He was not in doubt that God had chosen him to preach to the Saracens and win them to Christ. He only hesitated as to the best method to pursue. All the past history of his native land and the struggle yet going on in Spain emphasized for him the greatness of the task before him.

The knight of Christ felt that he could not venture into the arena unless he had good armor. The sort of the soldier who had fought the Moors on many a bloody

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battle-field felt that the Saracens were worthy foemen. The educated seneschal knew that the Arabian schools of Cordova were the center of European learning, and that it was not so easy to convince a Saracen as a barbarian of Northern Europe.

At one time, we read, Lull thought of repairing to Paris, and there by close and diligent scientific study to train himself for controversy with Moslems. At Paris in the thirteenth century was the most famous university of Christendom. And under St. Louis, Robert de Sorbon, a common priest, founded in 1253 an unpretending theological college which afterward became the celebrated faculty of the Sorbonne with authority wellnigh as great as that of Rome.

But the advice of his kinsman, the Dominican Raymund de Pennaforte, dissuaded him, and he decided to remain at Majorca and pursue his studies and prepa-

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ration privately. First he laid plans for a thorough mastery of the Arabic language. To secure a teacher was not an easy matter, as Majorca had years ago passed from Saracen into Christian hands, and as no earnest Moslem would teach the Koran language to one whose professed purpose was to assail Islam with the weapons of philosophy.

He therefore decided to purchase a Saracen slave, and with this teacher his biographers tell us that Lull was occupied in Arabic study for a period of more than *nine* years. Could anything prove more clearly that Lull was the greatest as well as the first missionary to Moslems?

After this long, and we may believe successful, apprenticeship with the Saracen slave, a tragic incident interrupted his studies. Lull had learned the language of the Moslem, but the Moslem slave had not yet learned the love of Christ; nor had his

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pupil. In the midst of their studies, on one occasion the Saracen blasphemed Christ. How, we are not told; but those who work among Moslems know what cruel, vulgar words can come from Moslem lips against the Son of God. When Lull heard the blasphemy, he struck his slave violently on the face in his strong indignation. The Moslem, stung to the quick, drew a weapon, attempted Lull's life, and wounded him severely. He was seized and imprisoned. Perhaps fearing the death-penalty for attempted murder, the Saracen slave committed suicide. It was a sad beginning for Lull in his work of preparation. Patience had not yet had its perfect work. Lull felt more than ever before, "He that loves not lives not." The vision of the thorn-crowned Head came back to him; he could not forget his covenant.

Altho he retired for eight days to a mountain to engage in prayer and medita-

Preparation for the Conflict

tion, he did not falter, but persevered in his resolution. Even as in the case of Henry Martyn with his munshi, Sabat, who made life a burden to him, so Lull's experience with his Saracen slave was a school of faith and patience.

Besides his Arabic studies, Lull spent these nine years in spiritual meditation, in what he calls contemplating God.

"The awakened gaze
Turned wholly from the earth, on things of heaven
He dwelt both day and night. The thought of God
Filled him with infinite joy ; his craving soul
Dwelt on Him as a feast ; as did the soul
Of rapt Francesco in his holy cell
In blest Assisi ; and he knew the pain,
The deep despondence of the saint, the doubt,
The consciousness of dark offense, the joy
Of full assurance last, when heaven itself
Stands open to the ecstasy of faith."

While thus employed the idea occurred to him of composing a work which should contain a strict and formal demonstration of all the Christian doctrines, of such co-

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gency that the Moslems could not fail to acknowledge its logic and in consequence embrace the truth. Perhaps the idea was suggested to him by Raymund de Pennaforte, for he it was who, a few years previous, had persuaded Thomas Aquinas to compose his work in four volumes, "On the Catholic Faith, or Summary against the Gentiles."*

In Lull's introduction to his "*Necessaria Demonstratio Articulorum Fidei*" he refers to the time when the idea of a controversial book for Moslems first took possession of him, and asks "the clergy and the wise men of the laity to examine his arguments against the Saracens in commending the Christian faith." He pleads earnestly that any weak points in his attempt to convince the Moslem be pointed out to him before the book is sent on its errand.

* Maclear: "History of Missions," p. 358, where authorities are cited.

Preparation for the Conflict

With such power did this one idea take possession of his mind that at last he regarded it in the light of a divine revelation, and, having traced the outline of such a work, he called it the "*Ars Major sive Generalis*." This universal system of logic and philosophy was to be the weapon of God against all error, and more especially against the errors of Islam.


Lull was now in his forty-first year. All his intellectual powers were matured. He retired to the spot near Palma where the idea had first burst upon him, and remained there for four months, writing the book and praying for divine blessing on its arguments. According to one biographer,* it was at this time that Lull held interviews with a certain mysterious shepherd, "*quem ipse nunquam viderat alias, neque de ipso audiverat quenquam loqui*." Is it possible that this refers only to the Great Shepherd

* "*Vita Prima*," in "*Acta Sanctorum*," 663.

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and to Lull's spiritual experiences, far away from his friends and family, in some lonely spot near Palma?

The "Ars Major" was finally completed in the year 1275. Lull had an interview with the king of Majorca, and under his patronage the first book of his new "Method" was published. Lull also began to lecture upon it in public. This remarkable treatise, while in one sense intended for the special work of convincing Moslems, was to include "a universal art of acquisition, demonstration, confutation," and was meant "to cover the whole field of knowledge and to supersede the inadequate methods of previous schoolmen." For the *method* of Lull's philosophy we will wait until we reach the chapter specially devoted to an account of his teaching and his books. A few words, however, regarding the *purpose* of the Lullian *méthod* are in place.



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In the age of scholasticism, when all sorts of puerile questions were seriously debated in the schools, and philosophy was anything but practical, it was Lull who proposed to use the great weapon of this age, dialectics, in the service of the Gospel and for the practical end of converting the Saracens. Let us admit that he was a scholastic, but he was also a missionary. His scholastic philosophy is ennobled by its fiery zeal for the propagation of the Gospel, and by the love for Christ which purifies all its dross in the flame of passion for souls.

We may smile at Lull's dialectic, and his "circles and tables for finding out the different ways in which categories apply to things"; but no one can help admiring the spirit that inspired the method. "In his assertion of the place of reason in religion, in his demand that a *rational* Christianity should be presented to heathendom,

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Lull goes far beyond the ideas and the aspirations of the century in which he lived."*

In judging the character of Lull's method and his long period of preparation, one thing must not be forgotten. The strength of Islam in the age of scholasticism was its philosophy. Having thoroughly entered into the spirit of Arabian philosophical writings and seen its errors, there was nothing left for a man of Lull's intellect but to meet these Saracen philosophers on their own ground. Avicenna, Algazel, and Averroes sat on the throne of Moslem learning and ruled Moslem thought. Lull's object was to undermine their influence and so reach the Moslem heart with the message of salvation. For such a conflict and in such an age his weapons were well chosen.

* "Encyclopedia Britannica," vol. xv., p. 64.

CHAPTER V

AT MONTPELLIER, PARIS, AND ROME

(A.D. 1275-1298)

"I have but one passion and it is He — He only." —
Zinzendorf.

"In his assertion of the function of reason in religion and his demand that a rational Christianity be placed before Islam, this Don Quixote of his times belongs to our day." — *Frederic Perry Noble.*

It is difficult to follow the story of Lull's life in exact chronological order because the sources at our disposal do not always agree in their dates. However, by grouping the events of his life, order comes out of confusion. Lull's lifework was three-fold: he devised a philosophical or educational system for persuading non-Christians of the truth of Christianity; he established

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missionary colleges; and he himself went and preached to the Moslems (sealing his witness with martyrdom.) The story of his life is best told and best remembered if we follow this clue to its many years of loving service. Lull himself, when he was about sixty years old, reviews his life in these words: "I had a wife and children; I was tolerably rich; I led a secular life. All these things I cheerfully resigned for the sake of promoting the common good and diffusing abroad the holy faith. I learned Arabic. I have several times gone abroad to preach the Gospel to the Saracens. I have for the sake of the faith been cast into prison and scourged. *I have labored forty-five years to gain over the shepherds of the church and the princes of Europe to the common good of Christendom.* Now I am old and poor, but still I am intent on the same object. I will persevere in it till death, if the Lord permits it."

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The sentence italicized is the subject of this chapter: the story of Lull's effort to found missionary schools and to persuade popes and princes that *the true Crusade was to be with the pen and not with the sword.* It was a grand idea, and it was startlingly novel in the age of Lull. It was an idea that, next to his favorite scheme of philosophy, possessed his whole soul. Both ideas were thoroughly missionary and they interacted the one on the other.

No sooner had Lull completed his "Ars Major," and lectured on it in public, than he set to work to persuade the king, James II., who had heard of his zeal, to found and endow a monastery in Majorca where Franciscan monks should be instructed in the Arabic language and trained to become able disputants among the Moslems. The king welcomed the idea, and in the year 1276 such a monastery was opened and thirteen monks began to study Lull's

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method and imbibe Lull's spirit. He aimed not at a mere school of theology or philosophy: his ideal training for the foreign field was ahead of many theological colleges of our century. It included in its curriculum the geography of missions and the language of the Saracens! "Knowledge of the regions of the world," he wrote, "is strongly necessary for the republic of believers and the conversion of unbelievers, and for withstanding infidels and Antichrist. The man unacquainted with geography is not only ignorant where he walks, but whither he leads. Whether he attempts the conversion of infidels or works for other interests of the Church, it is indispensable that he know the religions and the environments of all nations." This is high-water mark for the dark ages! The pioneer for Africa, six centuries before Livingstone, felt what the latter expressed more concisely but not more forcibly:

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"The end of the geographical feat is the beginning of the missionary enterprise."

Authorities disagree whether this missionary training-school of Lull was opened under the patronage of the king, at Palma, or at Montpellier. From the fact that in 1297 Lull received letters at Montpellier from the general of the Franciscans recommending him to the superiors of all Franciscan houses, it seems that he must have formed connections with the brotherhood there at an early period.

Montpellier, now a town of considerable importance in the south of France near the Gulf of Lyons, dates its prosperity from the beginning of the twelfth century. In 1204 it became a dependency of the house of Aragon through marriage, and remained so until 1350. Several Church councils were held there during the thirteenth century, and in 1292 Pope Nicholas IV., probably at the suggestion of Lull, founded a

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university at Montpellier. Its medical school was famous in the Middle Ages, and had in its faculty learned Jews who were educated in the Moorish schools of Spain.

At Montpellier Lull spent three or four years in study and in teaching. Here, most probably, he wrote his medical works, and some of his books appealing for help to open other missionary schools. In one place he thus pleads with words of fire for consecration to this cause: "I find scarcely any one, O Lord, who out of love to Thee is ready to suffer martyrdom as Thou hast suffered for us. It appears to me agreeable to reason, if an ordinance to that effect could be obtained, that the monks should learn various languages that they might be able to go out and surrender their lives in love to Thee. . . . O Lord of glory, if that blessed day should ever be in which I might see Thy holy monks so influenced by zeal to glorify Thee as to go to foreign

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lands in order to testify of Thy holy ministry, of Thy blessed incarnation, and of Thy bitter sufferings, that would be a glorious day, a day in which that glow of devotion would return with which the holy apostles met death for their Lord Jesus Christ." *

Lull longed with all his soul for a new Pentecost and for world-wide missions. Montpellier was too small to be his parish, altho he was but a layman. His ambition was, in his own words, "to gain over the shepherds of the Church and the princes of Europe" to become missionary enthusiasts like himself. Where should he place his fulcrum to exert leverage to this end save at the very center of Christendom? Popes had inaugurated and promoted the crusades of blood; they held the keys of spiritual and temporal power; their command in the Middle Ages was as a voice from

* "Liber Contemplationis in Deo," cx., 28. Tom. ix., 246.

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heaven; their favor was the dew of blessing. Moreover, Lull's success with the king of Aragon led him to hope that the chief shepherd of Christendom might evince a similar interest in his plans.

He therefore undertook a journey to Rome in 1286, hoping to obtain from Honorius IV. the approbation of his treatise and aid in founding missionary schools in various parts of Europe. Honorius was distinguished during his brief pontificate for zeal and love of learning. He cleared the Papal States of bands of robbers, and attempted, in favor of learning, to found a school of Oriental languages at Paris. Had he lived it is possible that Lull would have succeeded in his quest. Honorius died April 3, 1287.

Raymund Lull came to Rome, but found the papal chair vacant and all men busy with one thing, the election of a successor. He waited for calmer times, but impedi-

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ments were always thrown in his way. His plans met with some ridicule and with little encouragement. The cardinals cared for their own ambitions more than for the conversion of the world.

Nicholas IV. succeeded to the papal throne, and his character was such that we do not wonder that Lull gave up the idea of persuading him to become a missionary. He was a man without faith; and his monstrous disregard of treaties and oaths in the controversy with the king of Aragon, Alphonso, struck at the root of all honor.* He believed in fighting the Saracens with the sword only, and sought actively but vainly to organize another Crusade. Not until ten years after did Lull again venture to appeal to a pope.

Disappointed at Rome, Lull repaired to Paris, and there lectured in the university on his "Ars Generalis," composing other

* Milman : " History of Latin Christianity," vi., 175.

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works on various sciences, but most of all preparing his works of controversy and seeking to propagate his ideas of world-conquest. In one of his books he prays fervently that "*monks of holy lives and great wisdom should form institutions in order to learn various languages and to be able to preach to unbelievers.*" The times were not ripe.

At length, tired of seeking aid for his plans in which no one took interest, he determined to test the power of example. Altho in his fifty-sixth year, he determined to set out alone and single-handed and preach Christ in North Africa. Of this first missionary voyage our next chapter contains an account.

On his return from Tunis, 1292, Lull found his way to Naples. Here a new influence was brought to bear on his character. He made the acquaintance of the alchemist and pious nobleman, Arnaud

At Montpellier, Paris, and Rome

de Villeneuve. Whether Lull actually acquired skill in transmuting metals and wrote some of the many works on alchemy that are attributed to him, will perhaps never be decided. I rather think this part of the story is medieval legend. But surely a man of Lull's affections imbibed a great deal of that spirit which brought down on Arnold of Villeneuve the censure of the Church for holding that "medicine and charity were more pleasing to God than religious services." Arnold taught that the monks had corrupted the doctrine of Christ, and that saying masses is useless; and that the papacy is a work of man. His writings were condemned by the Inquisition, as were also the works of Lull. Perhaps these brothers in heresy were really Protestants at heart, and their friendship was like that of the friends of God.

For the next few years the scene of Lull's labors changed continually. He first

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went back to Paris, resumed his teaching there, and wrote his "Tabula Generalis" and "Ars Expositiva." In 1298 he succeeded in establishing at Paris, under the protection of King Louis Philippe le Bel, a college where his method was taught. But all France was in a ferment at this time because of the war against the Knights-Templars and the struggle with Pope Boniface VIII. There was little leisure to study philosophy and no inclination to become propagandists among the Saracens.

Lull's thoughts again turned to Rome. But, alas! Rome in the thirteenth century was the last place of all Europe in which to find the spirit of self-sacrifice or the spirit of Christian missions. About the year 1274 the cessation of Church miracles was urged by an upholder of the crusade spirit as compelling the Church to resort to arms. Pope Clement IV. (1265-68) advised fighting Islam by force of arms. As a rule, the

At Montpellier, Paris, and Rome

popes clung to the crusade idea as the ideal of missions.

Lull visited Rome the second time between 1294 and 1296. He had heard of the elevation of Celestine V. to the papal chair, and with some reason hoped that this Pope would favor his cause. Celestine was a man of austerity, the founder of an order of friars, and zealous for the faith. On the fifteenth of July, 1294, he was elected, but, compelled by the machinations of his successor, resigned his office on December 13 of the same year. He was cruelly imprisoned by the new Pope, Boniface VIII., and died two years later. Boniface was bold, avaricious, and domineering. His ambitions centered in himself. He carried his schemes for self-aggrandizement to the verge of frenzy, and afterward became insane. Lull found neither sympathy nor assistance in this quarter.

From 1299 to 1306, when he made his

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second great journey to North Africa, Lull preached and taught in various places, as we shall see later.

In 1310 the veteran hero, now seventy-five years old, attempted once more to influence the heart of Christendom and to persuade the pope to make the Church true to its great mission.

Full of his old ardor, since he himself was unable to attempt the great plans of spiritual conquest that consumed his very heart, he conceived the idea of founding an order of spiritual knights who should be ready to preach to the Saracens and so recover the tomb of Christ by a crusade of love.* Pious noblemen and ladies of rank at Genoa offered to contribute for this object the sum of thirty thousand guilders. Much encouraged by this proof of interest,

* Not, as wrongly stated in some articles about Lull, a proposal to use force of arms. Cf. Noble, p. 116, and Maclear, p. 366, with footnote in latter from "Liber Contemplationis in Deo," cxii., 11.

At Montpellier, Paris, and Rome

Lull set out for Avignon to lay his scheme before the pope, Clement V. He was the first pope who fixed his residence at Avignon, thus beginning the so-called "Babylonian Captivity" of the papacy. Contemporaneous writers accuse him of licentiousness, nepotism, simony, and avarice. It is no wonder that, with such a man holding the keys of authority, Lull again knocked at the door of "the vicar of Christ" all in vain.

Once more Lull returned to Paris, and, strong in mind altho feeble in frame, attacked the Arabian philosophy of Averroes and wrote in defense of the faith and the doctrines of revelation.* At Paris he heard that a general conference was to be

* See the bibliography and consult Renan's "Averrhoes et l'Averrhoisme" for particulars of his method and success. The Averroists from the thirteenth century onward opposed reason to faith. Lull's great task was to show that they were not irreconcilable, but mutually related and in harmony. It was, in fact, the battle of faith against agnosticism.

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summoned at Vienne, three hundred miles away in the south of France, on October 16, 1311. A general council might favor what popes had scarcely deigned to notice. So he retraced the long journey he had just taken. Nearly three hundred prelates were present at the council. The combat of heresies, the abrogation of the order of Templars, proposals for new crusades, and discussions as to the legitimacy of Boniface VIII. occupied the most attention. Nevertheless the council gave heed to at least one of Lull's proposals, and passed a decree that professorships of the Oriental languages should be endowed in the universities of Paris, Salamanca, and Oxford, and in all cities where the papal court resided.

Thus, at last, he had lived to see one portion of his lifelong pleadings brought to fruition. Who is able to follow out the result for missions of these first Oriental language chairs in European universities

At Montpellier, Paris, and Rome

even as far as saintly Martyn and Ion Keith Falconer, Arabic professor at Cambridge? For this great idea of missionary preparation in the schools Lull fought single-handed from early manhood to old age, until he stood on the threshold of success. He anticipated Loyola, Zinzendorf, and Duff in linking schools to missions; and his fire of passion for this object equaled, if not surpassed their zeal.

CHAPTER VI

HIS FIRST MISSIONARY JOURNEY TO TUNIS

(A.D. 1291-1292)

"In that bright sunny land
Across the tideless sea, where long ago
Proud Carthage reared its walls, beauteous and fair,
And large Phenician galleys laden deep
With richest stores, sailed bravely to and fro—
Where Gospel light in measure not unmixed
With superstitions vain, burned for a time,
And spread her peaceful conquests far and wide,
And gave her martyrs to the scorching fire—
There dwells to-day a darkness to be felt ;
Each ray of that once rising, growing light
Faded and gone."

—Anon.

WHEN Raymund Lull met with disappointment on his first visit to Rome, he returned for a short time to Paris, as we have seen, and then determined to set out as a missionary, indeed to propagate the faith

First Missionary Journey to Tunis

among the Moslems of Africa. Lull was at this time fifty-six years old, and travel in those days was full of hardship by land and by sea. The very year in which Lull set out, news reached Europe of the fall of Acre and the end of Christian power in Palestine. All Northern Africa was in the hands of the Saracens, and they were at once elated at the capture of Acre and driven to the height of fanaticism by the persecution of the Moors in Spain. It was a bold step that Lull undertook. But he counted not his life dear in the project, and was ready, so he thought, to venture all on the issue. He expected to win by love and persuasion; at least, in his own words, he would "experiment whether he himself could not persuade some of them by conference with their wise men and by manifesting to them, according to the divinely given Method, the Incarnation of the Son of God and the three Persons

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of the Blessed Trinity in the Divine Unity of Essence." * Lull proposed a parliament of religions, and desired to meet the bald monotheism of Islam face to face with the revelation of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Lull left Paris for Genoa, which was then the rival of Venice and contended with her for the supremacy of the Mediterranean. In the thirteenth century Genoa was at the height of its prosperity, and the superb palaces of that date still witness to the genius of her artists and the wealth of her merchant princes.

At Genoa the story of Lull's life was not unknown. Men had heard with wonder of the miraculous conversion of the gay and dissolute seneschal; and now it was whispered that he had devised a new and certain method for converting the "infidel" and was setting out all alone for the shores

* "Vita Prima," in "Acta Sanctorum," p. 633.

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of Africa. The expectations of the people were raised to a high pitch. A vessel was found ready to sail for Africa and Lull's passage was engaged. The ship was lying in the harbor; the missionary's books, even, had been conveyed on board. All was ready for the voyage and the venture.

But at this juncture a change came over him. Lull says that he was "overwhelmed with terror at the thought of what might befall him in the country whither he was going. The idea of enduring torture or lifelong imprisonment presented itself with such force that he could not control his emotions." * Such a strong reaction after his act of faith in leaving Paris must not surprise us. Similar experiences are not rare in the lives of missionaries. Henry Martyn wrote in his journal as the shores of Cornwall were disappearing: "Would I go back? Oh, no. But how can I be sup-

* "Vita Prima," in "Acta Sanctorum," p. 664.

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ported? My faith fails. I find, by experience, I am as weak as water. O my dear friends in England, when we spoke with exaltation of the missions to the heathen, what an imperfect idea did we form of the sufferings by which it must be accomplished!" Lull had to face a darker and more uncertain future than did Martyn. His faith failed. His books were taken back on shore and the ship sailed without him.

However, no sooner did he receive tidings of the vessel's departure than he was seized with bitter remorse. His passionate love for Christ could not bear the thought that he had proved a traitor to the cause for which God had specially fitted and called him. He felt that he had given opportunity for those who scoff at Christ's religion to mock Him and His great mission. So keen was his sorrow that he was thrown into a violent fever. While yet suffering

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from weakness of body and prostration of mind, he heard that another ship was ready in the harbor and loaded to sail for the port of Tunis. Weak tho he was, he begged his friends to put his books on board and asked them to permit him to attempt the voyage. He was taken to the ship, but his friends, convinced that he could not outlive the voyage, insisted on his being again landed. Lull returned to his bed, but did not find rest or recuperation. His old passion consumed him; he felt the contrition of Jonah and cried with Paul, "Wo is me if I preach not." Another ship offering fit opportunity, he determined at all risks to be put on board.

It is heroic reading to follow Lull in his autobiography as he tells how "from this moment he was a new man." The vessel had hardly lost sight of land before all fever left him; his conscience no more rebuked him for cowardice, peace of mind returned,

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and he seemed to have regained perfect health. Lull reached Tunis at the end of the year 1291 or early in 1292.*

Why did the philosophic missionary choose Tunis as his first point of attack on the citadel of Islam? The answer is not far to seek.

Tunis, the present capital of the country of the same name, was founded by the Carthaginians, but first rose to importance under the Arab conquerors of North Africa, who gave it its present name; this comes from an Arabic root which signifies "to enjoy oneself."† Tunis was the usual port for those going from Kairwan (that Mecca of all North Africa) to Spain. In 1236, when the Hafsites displaced the Almohade dynasty, Abu Zakariyah made it his capital. When the fall of Bagdad left

* "Vita Prima," in "Acta Sanctorum," p. 664. Neander's "Memorials," p. 527, and Maclear, p. 361.

† *Al Mukhtataf*, February number, 1901, p. 79.

First Missionary Journey to Tunis


Islam without a titular head (1258) the Hafsites assumed the title of Prince of the Faithful and extended their rule from Tlemçen to Tripoli. The dignity of the Tunisian rulers was acknowledged even in Cairo and Mecca, and so strong were they in their government that, unaided, they held their own against repeated Frankish invasions. The Seventh Crusade ended disastrously before Tunis. Tunis was in fact the western center of the Moslem world in the thirteenth century. Where St. Louis failed as a king with his great army, Raymund Lull ventured on his spiritual crusade single-handed.

Tunis is on an isthmus between two salt lakes and is connected with the port of Goletta by an ancient canal. Two buildings still remain from the days of Lull: the mosque of Abu Zakariyah in the citadel, and the great Mosque of the Olive Tree in the center of the town. The ruins of


Biography of Raymund Lull

Carthage, famous center of early Latin Christianity, lie a few miles north of Goletta. Even now Tunis has a population of more than 125,000; it was much larger at the period of which we write.

Lull must have arrived at Goletta and thence proceeded to Tunis. His first step was to invite the Moslem *ulema* or literati to a conference, just as did Ziegenbalg in South India and John Wilson at Bombay. He announced that he had studied the arguments on both sides of the question and was willing to submit the evidences for Christianity and for Islam to a fair comparison. He even promised that, if *he* was convinced, he would embrace Islam. The Moslem leaders willingly responded to the challenge, and coming in great numbers to the conference set forth with much show of learning the miracle of the Koran and the doctrine of God's unity. "After long, tho fruitless discussion, Lull advanced the



THE OLD CANAL BETWEEN GOLETTA AND TUNIS, NORTH AFRICA.



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following propositions,* which are well calculated to strike the two weak points of Mohammedan monotheism: *lack of love in the being of Allah, and lack of harmony in His attributes*. "Every wise man must acknowledge that to be the true religion, which ascribed the greatest perfection to the Supreme Being, and not only conveyed the worthiest conception of all His attributes, His goodness, power, wisdom, and glory, but demonstrated the harmony and equality existing between them. Now *their* religion was defective in acknowledging only two active principles in the Deity, His will and His wisdom, while it left His goodness and greatness inoperative as tho they were indolent qualities and not called forth into active exercise. But the Christian faith could not be charged with this

* See them in full in "Vita Prima," p. 665, and "Liber Contemplationis in Deo," liv., 25-28, etc. Maclear gives the summary as quoted above, pp. 362, 363.

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defect. In its doctrine of the Trinity it conveys the highest conception of the Deity, as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in one simple essence and nature. In the Incarnation of the Son it evinces the harmony that exists between God's goodness and His greatness; and in the person of Christ displays the true union of the Creator and the creature; while in His Passion which He underwent out of His great love for man, it sets forth the divine harmony of infinite goodness and condescension, even the condescension of Him who for us men, and our salvation, and restitution to our primeval state of perfection, underwent those sufferings and lived and died for man."

This style of argument, whatever else may be thought of it, is orthodox and evangelical to the core. It surprises one continually to see how little mediæval theology and how very few Romish ideas there

First Missionary Journey to Tunis

are in Lull's writings. The offense of the cross is met everywhere in Lull's argument with Moslems. He never built a rickety bridge out of planks of compromise. His early Parliament of Religions was not built on the Chicago platform. The result proved it when persecution followed. There were some who accepted the truth * and others who turned fanatics. One Imam pointed out to the Sultan the danger likely to beset the law of Mohammed if such a zealous teacher were allowed freely to expose the errors of Islam, and suggested that Lull be imprisoned and put to death. He was cast into a dungeon, and was only saved from a worse fate by the intercession of a less prejudiced leader. This man praised his intellectual ability and reminded the ruler that a Moslem who

* "Disposuerat viros famosæ reputationis et alios quam plurimos ad baptismum quos toto animo affectabat deducere ad perfectum lumen fidei orthodoxæ."—"Vita S. Lulli."

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imitated the self-devotion of the prisoner in preaching Islam would be highly honored. The spectacle of a learned and aged Christian philosopher freely disputing the truth of the Koran in the midst of Tunis was indeed a striking example of moral courage in the dark ages. "This," says Dr. Smith, "was no careless Crusader cheered by martial glory or worldly pleasure. His was not even such a task as that which had called forth all the courage of the men who first won over Goth and Frank, Saxon and Slav. Raymund Lull preached Christ to a people with whom apostasy is death and who had made Christendom feel their prowess for centuries." Even his enemies were amazed at such boldness of devotion.

The death-sentence was changed to banishment from the country. Well might Lull rejoice that escape was possible, since the death-penalty on Christians was often

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applied with barbarous cruelty.* Yet Lull was not ready to submit even to the sentence of banishment, and so leave his little group of converts to themselves without instruction or leadership.

The ship which had conveyed him to Tunis was on the point of returning to Genoa; he was placed on board and warned that if he ever made his way into the country again he would assuredly be stoned to death. Raymund Lull, however, felt that, with the apostles, it was not for him to obey their "threatening that he should speak henceforth to no man in this Name." Perhaps also he felt that his cowardice at Genoa when setting out demanded atonement. At any rate he managed to escape from the ship by strategy and to return unawares to the harbor town of Goletta in defiance of the edict of banishment. For

*See instances given in Muir's "Mameluke Dynasty," pp. 41, 48, 75, etc.

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three long months the zealous missionary concealed himself like a wharf-rat and witnessed quietly for his Master. Such was the character of his versatile genius that we read how at this time, even, he composed a new scientific work!

But since his favorite missionary method of public discussion was entirely impossible, he finally embarked for Naples, where for several years he taught and lectured on his New Method. And later, as we have already seen, he revisited Rome.

It is evident from all of Lull's writings, as well as from the writings of his biographers, that his preaching to the Moslems was not so much polemical as apologetic. He always speaks of their philosophy and learning with respect. The very titles of his controversial writings prove the tact and love of his method. It was weak only in that it placed philosophy ahead of re-

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velation, and therefore at times attempted to explain what must ever remain a mystery of faith.

As a theologian, we should remember, Lull was not a schoolman, nor did he ever receive instruction from the great teachers of his time. He was a self-taught man. The speculative and the practical were blended in his character and also in his system. "His speculative turn entered even into his enthusiasm for the cause of missions and his zeal as an apologist. His contests with the school of Averroes, and with the sect of that school which affirmed the irreconcilable opposition between faith and knowledge, would naturally lead him to make the relation subsisting between these two a matter of special investigation." *

Lull did not go to Naples because he had given up the battle. He went to bur-

* Neander : "Church History," iv., p. 426.

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nish his weapons and to win recruits and to appeal to the popes to arm for a spiritual crusade against the strongest enemy of the kingdom of Christ. When, as we have seen in a previous chapter, these efforts proved nearly fruitless, he made other missionary journeys, and in 1307 was again on the shores of North Africa, fifteen years after his first banishment.

CHAPTER VII

OTHER MISSIONARY JOURNEYS

(A.D. 1301-1309)

"In an age of violence and faithlessness he was the apostle of heavenly love."—*George Smith.*

"Yea, so have I strived to preach the Gospel not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man's foundation."—*Paul.*


FROM 1301 to 1309 Lull made several missionary journeys which are the more remarkable if we consider that he was now sixty-six years old and if we think of the conditions of travel in the Middle Ages. The Mediterranean was beset with pirates and the Catalan Grand Company were fighting the Byzantines, while Genoa and Venice waged a war of commercial rivalry. The Knights of St. John were fighting for Rhodes and the rival popes were quarreling.

Biography of Raymund Lull


Travel by sea was dangerous and by land was full of hardship. In the Middle Ages the use of carriages was prohibited as tending to render vassals less fit for military service. As late as the sixteenth century it was accounted a reproach for men to ride in them, and only ladies of rank used such conveyances. Men of all grades and professions rode on horses or mules, and sometimes the monks and women on she-asses. Highway robbers infested the forests, and the danger from wild animals had not yet ceased even in the south of Europe.

In spite of all obstacles, however, we read that Lull "resolved to travel from place to place and preach wherever he might have opportunity." His purpose seems to have been to reach Jews and Christian heretics as well as Saracens.* After laboring for

* "Accessit ad regem Cypri affectu multo supplicans ei, quatenus quosdam infideles atque schismaticos videlicet Jacobinos, Nestorinos, Maronites, ad suam prædicationem necnon disputationem coarctaret venire."—*Maclear*, p. 364 n.



A VENETIAN GALLEY OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY.
(Copied from an Old Print.)



Other Missionary Journeys

some time with the Jews in Majorca he sailed for Cyprus, landing at Famagosta, the chief port and fortress during the Genoese occupancy of the island. Cyprus at that time had a large population of Jews as well as of Christians and Moslems. Lull's preaching probably did not meet with success, for he soon left the island and, attended only by a single companion, crossed over to Syria and penetrated into Armenia, striving to reclaim the various Oriental sects to the orthodox faith.

Armenia, in the thirteenth century, was the name of a small principality to the north of Cilicia, under a native dynasty. With Cyprus it formed the last bulwark of Christianity against Islam in the East. For fear of being crushed by the Moslem powers the Armenians formed alliances with the Mongolian hordes that overran Asia and shared in the hostility and vengeance of the Mamelukes. Among this

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brave remnant and bulwark of the faith that even to our own day has resisted unto blood the aggressive spirit of Islam, Lull labored for more than a year. It was in Armenia that he wrote his book entitled, "The things which a man ought to believe concerning God." Written in Latin, it was afterward translated for his Spanish countrymen into Catalan.*

From Cyprus Lull returned once more to Italy and France, where from 1302 to 1305 he traveled about lecturing in the universities and writing more books. Before we speak of his second journey to North Africa, a few words should set forth the character of his love and labors for the despised Jew.

Scattered throughout every kingdom and island of Europe, the Jews had attained in many lands power and influence both because of their learning and their wealth. In Spain under the Saracen

* See Helfferich, p. 86, note, and No. 225 in Bibliography A.

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supremacy they enjoyed ample toleration, but, in proportion as the Moors were driven out and the Christians became powerful, the Jews suffered. As early as 1108 a riot broke out in Toledo against the Jews and the streets streamed with their blood. All through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries dark stories were told of the hostility of the Jews. It was said that they poisoned wells, stole the consecrated wafers to pierce them with a needle, and crucified infants at their Passover festivals and used their entrails for magic and secret rites! In 1253 the Jews were expelled from France and in 1290 from England. Many were put to death by the Inquisition, and there were very few Christians who dared to defend a Jew in court. A child could not be missed without some foul play being suspected on the part of a Jew. In vain a few pious monks protested against such accusations, and tried

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to befriend the outcast race. The whole spirit of the times was to class Jews and Moslems as infidels and as worthy of hatred and contempt. If possible, the hatred against the Jews was stronger in Spain than elsewhere. During the closing years of Lull's life there were already kindled in Spain the fires of bitter, cruel persecution which at last, under Torquemada, consumed the entire race of the Jews in that country.*

In the thirteenth century, in almost all lands, the Jews were compelled to wear an insulting badge, the so-called "Jew's hat," a yellow, funnel-shaped covering on the head, and a ring of red cloth on the breast. They were also compelled to herd together in the cities in the ghetto or Jewish quarter, which was often surrounded by a special wall.†

* Maclear, p. 381 *et seq.*

† Kurfiz: "Church History," vol. ii., p. 23.

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This despised, race however, was not outside the circle of Lull's love and interest. He wrote many books to prove to them the truth of the Christian religion.* He showed them that their expected Messiah was none other than Jesus of Nazareth. His great mission to the Saracens in Africa did not blind him to the needs of missions at home, and we read how, in 1305 and even earlier, he labored to convince the Jews in Majorca of their errors. In an age when violence and faithlessness were the only treatment which Jews expected from Christians, Raymund Lull was the apostle of love to them also.


Biography of Raymund Lull

at St. Catharine's Hospital in London.* But we have no good testimony for this event, and the legend probably arose from confounding Lull the missionary with another Lull who was celebrated for his knowledge of alchemy. In the "Acta Sanctorum" a special article is devoted to prove that Lull never taught or practised the arts of medieval alchemy.


We now come to his journey to North Africa, on which he set out in 1307, probably from some port in France or from Genoa. This time he did not go to Tunis, but to Bugia. Some say he visited Hippone and Algiers as well. A special interest attaches to the town of Bugia in the story of Lull's life as it was here he preached to Moslems in his old age and here was the scene of his death.

Bugia, or Bougiah, is a fortified seaport

* See Maclear, p. 367, note, who quotes authorities for the legend.



THE HARBOR OF BUGIA, NORTH AFRICA.



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in Algeria between Cape Carbon and Wady Sahil. Its most important buildings at present are the French Roman Catholic church, the hospital, the barracks, and the old Abdul Kadir fort, now used as a prison. At present it has but a small population, yet conducts a considerable trade in wax, grain, oranges, oil, and wine.

Bugia is a town of great antiquity; it is the Salda of the Romans and was first built by the Carthaginians. Genseric the Vandal surrounded it with walls. In the tenth century it became the chief commercial city of all North Africa under the Beni Hammad sultans. The Italian merchants of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had numerous buildings of their own in the city, such as warehouses, baths, and churches. In the fifteenth century Bugia became a haunt for pirates; after that time it lost its prosperity and importance.

Our photograph shows the ruins of the

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old gateway from the harbor, which dates from the eleventh century, and through which Lull must have entered the town.*

Altho there were Christian merchants in Bugia, they were a small minority, and were able to secure commercial freedom and favor only by avoiding all religious controversy and keeping their light carefully under a bushel. One can read in the history of the Mameluke dynasty, which ruled Egypt at this period, how Christians were regarded and treated by the Saracens. So far as possible the odious edict of Omar II. was reimposed and its intolerant rules enforced.

The Mameluke sultan Nasir, "a jealous, cruel, suspicious, and avaricious tyrant," extended his power over Tunis and Bugia from 1308-1320. He was fanatical as well as cruel, and one has only to read how Christian churches were destroyed, Christians burned or mutilated, and their prop-

* See page 140.

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erty confiscated in the capital, to know what must have been the state of the provinces.*

Raymund Lull no sooner came to Bugia than he found his way to a public place, stood up boldly, and proclaimed in the Arabic language that Christianity was the only true faith, and expressed his willingness to prove this to the satisfaction of all. We know not what the exact nature of his argument was on this occasion, but it touched the character of Mohammed. A commotion ensued and many hands were lifted to do him violence.

The mufti, or chief of the Moslem clergy, rescued him and expostulated with him on his madness in thus exposing himself to peril.

"Death," Lull replied, "has no terrors whatever for a sincere servant of Christ who is laboring to bring souls to a knowl-

* Sir William Muir : " The Mameluke Dynasty," pp. 67-87.

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edge of the truth." After this the mufti, who must have been well versed in Arabian philosophy, challenged Lull for proofs of the superiority of Christ's religion over that of Mohammed.

One of Lull's arguments, given in his controversial books, consists in presenting to the Saracens the Ten Commandments as the perfect law of God, and then showing from their own books that Mohammed violated every one of these divine precepts. Another favorite argument of Lull with Moslems was to portray the seven cardinal virtues and the seven deadly sins, only to show subsequently how bare Islam was of the former and how full of the latter! Such arguments are to be used with care even in the twentieth century; we can imagine their effect on the Moslems in the north of Africa in Lull's day.

Persecution followed. He was flung

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into a dungeon and for half a year remained a close prisoner, befriended only by some merchants of Genoa and Spain, who took pity on the aged champion of their common faith.

Meanwhile riches, wives, high place, and power were offered the Christian philosopher if only he would abjure his faith and turn Moslem. This was Lull's reply, from the depth of his dungeon, to all their enticements: "Ye have for me wives and all sorts of worldly pleasure if I accept the law of Mohammed? Alas! ye offer a poor prize, as all your earthly goods can not purchase eternal glory. I, however, promise you, if ye will forsake your false and devilish law, which was spread by sword and force alone, and if ye accept my belief, Eternal Life, for the Christian faith was propagated by preaching and by the blood of holy martyrs. Therefore I advise you to become Christians even now, and so

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obtain everlasting glory and escape the pains of hell." * Such words, from the lips of a man seventy-three years old, in perfect command of the Arabic tongue, learned in the wisdom of the Arabian philosophy, and from whose eyes flashed earnest zeal for the truth, must have come with tremendous force.

While he tarried in prison, Lull proposed that both parties should write a defense of their faith. He was busy fulfilling his part of the agreement when a sudden command of the governor of Bugia directed that he be deported. Whether the reason of this command was the *results* that followed Lull's preaching, we know not. His biographers indicate that Lull was visited in prison by Moslems who again and again urged him to apostatize. "During his imprisonment they plied him for six months

* Keller: "Geisteskampf u. z. w.," pp. 59, 60. Maclear, p. 365.

Other Missionary Journeys

with all the sensual temptations of Islam." *

This must have been a bitter experience for the missionary in recalling the sins of his youth and the vision of his early manhood.

"But I amid the torture and the taunting—

I have had Thee !

Thy hand was holding my hand fast and faster,

Thy voice was close to me ;

And glorious eyes said, ' Follow Me, thy Master,

Smile, as I smile thy faithfulness to see.' "

Raymund Lull left Bugia practically a prisoner, since the Moslems did not wish to have repeated the incident that followed his embarking at Tunis. During the voyage, however, a storm arose and the vessel was almost wrecked off the Italian coast near Pisa. Here he was rescued and received with all respect by those who had heard of his fame as a philosopher and

* " Promittebant ei uxores, honores, domum, et pecuniam copiosam. " — "*Vita Prima*," chap. iv.

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missionary. From Pisa, Lull went by way of Genoa to Paris; of his work there and at the Council of Vienne we have already given an account.

The prologue of John's Gospel in Catalan, the language of Lull:

LO EVANGELI DE JESU-CHRIST

REGONS

SANT JOAN.

CAP. 1.

Existencia eterna y divinitat del Verb: sa encarnació: testimoni de Joan Baptista; vocació dels primers deixebles.

EN lo principi era lo Verb, y lo Verb era ab Deu, y lo Verb era Deu.

2 Ell era en lo principi ab Deu.

3 Per ell foren fetas totas las cosas, y sens ell ninguna cosa fou feta de lo que ha estat fet.

4 En ell era la vida, y la vida era la llum dels homes.


5 Y la llum resplandeix en las tenebras, y las tenebras no la comprendueren.

6 Hi hagué un home enviat de Deu que s'anomenava Joan.


7 Est vingué a servir de testimoni, pera testificar de la llum, a fi de que tots creguessen per medi d'ell.

8 No era ell la llum, sinó enviat pera donar testimoni de la llum.

9 Aquell era la verdadera llum.



THE TOWER AND TOWN OF BUGIA, NORTH AFRICA.



CHAPTER VIII

RAYMUND LULL AS PHILOSOPHER AND AUTHOR

"He was at once a philosophical systematizer and an analytic chemist, a skilful mariner and a successful propagator of Christianity,"—*Humboldt's "Cosmos,"* ii., 629.

"Of making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh."—*Ecclesiastes.*

It will be difficult in one short chapter to crowd an account of Lull's philosophy, which for two centuries after his death perplexed the genius of Europe, and to enumerate even a small number of the vast library of books which have Lull for their author. One does not know which to admire most—the versatile character of the genius, or the prodigious industry of the author.

Raymund Lull was from his youth a

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master of Catalan and wrote in it long before his conversion. Of his works in that language there exists no complete catalog. One of Lull's biographers states that the books written by Lull number four thousand! In the first published edition of his works (1721), two hundred and eighty-two titles are given; yet only forty-five of these, when printed, took up ten large folio volumes. To understand something of the scope and ambition of this genius-intellect, one must read the partial list of his books given in the bibliography at the close of this volume. Lull was a philosopher, a poet, a novelist, a writer of proverbs, a keen logician, a deep theologian, and a fiery controversialist. There was not a science cultivated in his age to which he did not add. The critical historian Winsor states that in 1295 Lull wrote a handbook on navigation which was not superseded by a better until after Colum-

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bus. Dr. George Smith credits Lull with the independent invention of the mariner's compass; and not without reason, for we find repeated references to the magnetic needle in his devotional books.* He wrote a treatise on "the weight of the elements" and their shape; on the sense of smell; on astronomy, astrology, arithmetic, and geometry. One of his books is entitled, "On the squaring and triangulation of the circle." In medieval medicine, jurisprudence, and metaphysics he was equally at home. His seven volumes on medicine include one book on the use of the mind in curing the sick! And another on the effect of climate on diseases.

* See "Liber de Miraculis Cœli et Mundi," part vi., on Iman. Calamita.

"As the needle naturally turns to the north when it is touched by the magnet so it is fitting," etc.—"*Liber Contemplationis in Deo*."

In his treatise "Fenix des lez Maravillas del Orbes," published in 1286, he again alludes to the use of the mariner's compass. See Humboldt: "Cosmos," ii., 630 n.

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He was a dogmatic theologian, and wrote sixty-three volumes of theological discussion, some of which are so abstruse as to produce doubt whether their author earned the title of "Doctor Illuminatus," given him by his contemporaries. Other titles among his theological writings there are which awaken curiosity, such as: "On the Most Triune Trinity"; "On the Form of God"; "On the Language of the Angels," etc.

Among the sixty-two books of meditation and devotion which are preserved in the lists of Lull's writings, there are none on the saints, and only six treat of the Virgin Mary. This is one of the many proofs in Lull's books that he was more of a Catholic than a Romanist, and that he esteemed Christ more than all the saints of the papal calendar. One of his books of devotion is entitled, "On the One Hundred Names of God," and was evidently

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prepared for the use of Moslems who were seeking the light.*

Raymund Lull wrote or collected three books of proverbs, one of which contains six thousand popular sayings and maxims. Here are a few out of many beautiful gems to be found in this collection:

"Deum dilige, ut ipsum timeas."

"Pax est participatio sine labore."

"Deus exemplum dedit de sua unitate in natura."

"Fortitudo est vigor cordis contra maliciam."

"Divitiæ sunt copiositates voluntatis."

"Prædestinatio est scire Dei qui scit homines."

"Deus adeo magnum habet recolere quod nihil obliviscitur."

Among Lull's works there are twenty on logic and metaphysics. One of the latter has the title, "On the Greatness and the Littleness of Man." Among his sermons and books on preaching there is only one commentary. That, in accord with Lull's

* According to Moslem teaching, Allah has one hundred beautiful names. The Moslem's rosary has one hundred beads, and to count these names is a devotional exercise.

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mission and character, is a commentary on the prolog of John's Gospel.

Of making many controversial books there was no end in the days of Lull. His writings in this department, however, are not, as are those of his contemporaries, against heretics to condemn *them*, with their errors, to ecclesiastical perdition. Even the titles of his controversial writings show his irenic spirit and his desire to convert rather than to convince. All through his books there runs the spirit of earnest devotion; even his natural philosophy is full of the world to come and its glories. At the end of one of his books he bursts out with this prayer: "O Lord, my help! till this work is completed thy servant can not go to the land of the Saracens to glorify Thy glorious name, for I am so occupied with this book which I undertake for Thine honor that I can think of nothing else. For this reason I beseech Thee for that

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grace, that Thou wouldst stand by me that I may soon finish it and speedily depart to die the death of a martyr out of love to Thee, if it shall please Thee to count me worthy of it."

In 1296 he concluded a work on the logic of Christianity with this seraph-song to the key of world-wide missions: "Let Christians consumed with burning love for the cause of faith only consider that since nothing has power to withstand truth, they can by God's help and His might bring infidels back to the faith; so that the precious name of Jesus, which in most regions is still unknown to most men, may be proclaimed and adored." And again: "As my book is finished on the vigils of John the Baptist, who was the herald of the light, and pointed to Him who is the true light, may it please our Lord to kindle a new light of the world which may guide unbelievers to conversion, that with us they

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may meet Christ, to whom be honor and praise world without end." This is not the language of pious rhetoric, but the passionate outcry of a soul hungry for the coming of the Kingdom.

Lull was a popular author. He wrote not only in learned Latin, but in the vernacular of his native land. Noble calls him the Moody of the thirteenth century. He tried to reach the masses. His influence on popular religious ideas in Spain was so great, through his Catalan hymns and proverbs and catechisms, that Helfferich compares him to Luther and calls him a reformer before the Reformation.* He made the study of theology popular by putting its commonplaces into verse, so that the laity could learn by heart the summary of the Catholic faith and meet Mos-

* "Der Protestantismus in Spanien zur Zeit der Reformation." Prot. Monatsblätter v. H. Gelzer, 1856, S. 133-168. Also his "Raymund Lull, u. z. w.," pp. 152-154.

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lems and Jews with ready-made arguments. Scholasticism was for the clergy; the "Lullian method" was intended for the laity as well. Raymund Lull had become discontented with the methods of scientific inquiry commonly in use, and so set himself to construct his "Ars Major," or Greater Art, which by a series of mechanical contrivances and a system of mnemonics was adapted to answer any question on any topic. This new philosophy is the keynote of most of Lull's treatises. All his philosophical works are but different explanations and phases of the "Ars Major." In his other books he seldom fails to call attention to this universal key of knowledge which the great art supplies.

What is the method of Lull's philosophy? The most complete account and the most luminous explanation of its abstruse perplexities is given by Prantl in his "His-

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tory of Logic" (vol. iii., 145-177). This is a summary of it:

The reasonableness and demonstrability of Christianity is the real basis of his great method. Nothing, Lull held, interfered more with the spread of Christian truth than the attempt of its advocates to represent its doctrines as undemonstrable mysteries. The very difference between Christ and Antichrist lies in the fact that the former can *prove* His truth by miracles, etc., while the latter can not. The glory of Christianity, Lull argues, is that it does not maintain the undemonstrable, but simply the supersensuous. It is not *against* reason, but above unsanctified reason. The demonstration, however, which Lull seeks is not that of ordinary logic. He says that we require a method which will reason not only from effect to cause, or from cause to effect, but *per æquiparantiām*, that is, *by showing that contrary attributes can exist*

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together in one subject. This method must be real, and not altogether formal or subjective. It must deal with the things themselves, and not merely with second intentions.

Lull's great art goes beyond logic and metaphysic: it provides a universal art of discovery, and contains the formulæ to which every demonstration in every science can be reduced—being, in fact, a sort of cyclopedia of categories and syllogisms. Lull's "Ars Major" is a tabulation of the different points of view from which propositions may be framed about objects. It is a mnemonic, or, rather, a mechanical contrivance for ascertaining all possible categories that apply to any possible proposition. Just as by knowing the typical terminations or conjugations of Arabic grammar, for example, we can inflect and conjugate any word; so, Lull reasons, by a knowledge of the different types of exist-

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ence and their possible relations and combinations we should possess knowledge of the whole of nature and of all truth as a system.

"The great art, accordingly, begins by laying down an alphabet according to which the nine letters from B to K stand for the different kinds of substances and attributes. Thus in the series of substances B stands for God, C, angel, D, heaven, E, man, and so on; in the series of absolute attributes B represents goodness, D, duration, C, greatness; or, again, in the nine questions of scholastic philosophy B stands for *utrum*, C, for *quid*, D, for *de quo*, etc." By manipulating these letters in such a way as will show the relationship of different objects and predicates you exercise the "new art." This manipulation is effected by the help of certain so-called "figures" or geometrical arrangements. Their construction differs in various books of Lull's

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philosophy, but their general character is the same. Circles and other figures are divided into sections by lines or colors, and then marked by Lull's symbolical letters so as to show all the possible combinations of which the letters are capable. For example, one arrangement represents the possible combinations of the attributes of God; another, the possible conditions of the soul, and so on. These figures are further fenced about by various definitions and rules, and their use is further specified by various "*evacuations*" and "*multiplications*" which show us how to exhaust all the possible combinations and sets of questions which the terms of our proposition admit. When so "*multiplied*," the "fourth figure" is, in Lull's language, that by which other sciences can be most readily and aptly acquired; and it may accordingly be taken as no unfair specimen of Lull's method. This "fourth figure" is simply

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an arrangement of three concentric circles each divided into nine sections, B, C, D, etc., and so constructed of pasteboard that when the upper and smaller circle remains fixed the two lower and outer revolve around it. Taking the letters in the sense of the series we are then able, by revolving the outer circles, to find out the possible relationships between different conceptions and elucidate the agreement or disagreement that exists between them. Meanwhile the middle circle, in similar fashion, gives us the intermediate terms by which they are to be connected or disconnected.

This Lullian method, of a wheel within a wheel, seems at first as perplexing as the visions of Ezekiel and as puerile as the automatic book-machine in "Gulliver's Travels." But it would be unfair to say that Lull supposed "thinking could be reduced to a mere rotation of pasteboard circles," or that his art enabled men "to talk

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without judgment of that which we do not know." Lull sought to give not a compendium of knowledge but a method of investigation. He sought a more scientific method for philosophy than the dialectic of his contemporaries. In his conception of a universal method and his application of the vernacular languages to philosophy he was the herald of Bacon himself. In his demand for a *reasonable* religion he was beyond his age. And, in applying this system, weak tho it was, to the conversion of infidels, he proved himself the first missionary philosopher. He perceived the possibilities (tho not the limitations) of comparative theology and the science of logic as weapons for the missionary.

Nothing will so clearly illustrate the versatile and brilliant character of Lull's genius as to turn from his "Ars Major" to his religious novel, "Blanquerna," the great allegory of the Middle Ages, and the pred-

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ecessor of Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress." * In fact, Raymund Lull was the first European who wrote a religious story in the vernacular. The romances of the days of chivalry were doubtless well known to him before his conversion, and what was more natural than that the missionary knight should write the romance of his new crusade of love against the Saracens? "Blanquerna" is an allegory in four books. Its sub-title states that it is "a mirror of morals in all classes of society, and treats of matrimony, religion, prelates, the papacy, and the hermit's life." It is the story of the pilgrimage of Enast, the hero, who marries Aloma, the daughter of a wealthy widow. Their only child, Blanquerna, desires to be a monk, but falls in love with a beautiful and pious maiden, Doña Cana by name.

* Helfferich, pp. 111-122. He holds that the allegory was first written in Arabic and then put into Catalan. Several manuscripts of it are extant in the archives of Palma, etc. It was first printed in 1521.

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Both, however, decide to remain ascetics. Blanquerna enters a monastery and his fair sweetheart turns nun. The allegory relates the experiences of these characters in their different surroundings—the pilgrim, the monk, and the abbess. To borrow words in another book from Lull himself, “we see the pilgrim traveling away in distant lands to seek Thee, tho Thou art so near that every man, if he would, might find Thee in his own house and chamber. The pilgrims are so deceived by false men, whom they meet in taverns and churches, that many of them when they return home show themselves to be far worse than they were when they set out.” Doña Cana, the abbess, disputes with her sister nuns the authority of the priest to bind the conscience, and even draws in question some of the doctrines of the Church! The various characters bear allegorical names. When Blanquerna reaches Rome the Pope

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has a court-jester called "Raymund the Fool," who is none other than Lull himself, and who tells the cardinals some rare truths. The four cardinals bear the names, "We-give-thee-thanks," "Lord-God-heavenly-King," "We-glorify-Thee," and "Thou-only-art-Holy"! Blanquerna finally becomes Pope and uses his authority in sending out a vast army of monk-missionaries to convert Jews and Moham-medans.

In various parts of the book songs of praise and devotion occur, while the missionary idea is never absent. This remarkable allegory, as well as many other works of Lull, deserves to be rescued from oblivion. The arrival of Blanquerna before the door of the Enchanted Castle, over whose gateway the Ten Commandments are written, and, within, the solemn conclave of gray-beards who discourse on the vanity of the world, are two scenes that show a genius

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equal to that of John Bunyan. There are other resemblances between these two pilgrims rescued from the City of Destruction and describing their own experiences in allegory; but to present them here would make this chapter too lengthy. Who would know more of Lull the philosopher and the author is referred to the bibliography and to the writings themselves.

CHAPTER IX

HIS LAST MISSIONARY JOURNEY AND HIS MARTYRDOM

"As a hungry man makes despatch and takes large morsels on account of his great hunger, so Thy servant feels a great desire to die that he may glorify Thee. He hurries day and night to complete his work in order that he may give up his blood and his tears to be shed for Thee."—Lull's "*Liber Contemplationis in Deo*."

"Is not devotion always blind? That a furrow be fecund it must have blood and tears such as Augustine called the blood of the soul."—*Sabatier*.

THE scholastics of the Middle Ages taught that there were five methods of acquiring knowledge—observation, reading, listening, conversation, and meditation. But they left out the most important method, namely, that by suffering. Lull's philosophy had taught him much, but it was in the school of suffering that he grew

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into a saint. Love, not learning, is the key to his character. The philosopher was absorbed in the missionary. The last scene of Lull's checkered life is not at Rome nor Paris nor Naples in the midst of his pupils, but in Africa, on the very shores from which he was twice banished.

At the council of Vienne (as we saw in Chapter V.) Lull had rejoiced to see some portion of the labors of his life brought to fruition. When the deliberations of the council were over and the battle for instruction in Oriental languages in the universities of Europe had been won, it might have been thought that he would have been willing to enjoy the rest he had so well deserved. Raymund Lull was now seventy-nine years old, and the last few years of his life must have told heavily even on so strong a frame and so brave a spirit as he possessed. His pupils and friends naturally desired that he should end his days

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in the peaceful pursuit of learning and the comfort of companionship.

Such, however, was not Lull's wish. His ambition was to die as a missionary and not as a teacher of philosophy. Even his favorite "Ars Major" had to give way to that *ars maxima* expressed in Lull's own motto, "He that lives by the life can not die."

This language reminds one of Paul's Second Epistle to Timothy, where the Apostle tells us that he too was now "already being offered, and that the time of his departure was at hand." In Lull's "Contemplations" we read: "As the needle naturally turns to the north when it is touched by the magnet, so is it fitting, O Lord, that Thy servant should turn to love and praise and serve Thee; seeing that out of love to him Thou wast willing to endure such grievous pangs and sufferings." And again: "Men are wont to die, O Lord,

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from old age, the failure of natural warmth and excess of cold; but thus, if it be Thy will, Thy servant would not wish to die; he would prefer to die in the glow of love, even as Thou wast willing to die for him." *

Other passages in Lull's writings of this period, such as the words at the head of this chapter, show that he longed for the crown of martyrdom. If we consider the age in which Lull lived and the race from which he sprang, this is not surprising. Even before the thirteenth century, thousands of Christians died as martyrs to the faith in Spain; many of them cruelly tortured by the Moors for blaspheming Mohammed.

Among the Franciscan order a mania for martyrdom prevailed. Every friar who

* "Liber Contemplationis," cxxix., 19; "Vita Secunda," cap. iv., and "Liber Contemplationis," cxxx., 27. Cf. Maclear, p. 367.

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was sent to a foreign shore craved to win the heavenly palm and wear the purple passion-flower. The spirit of the Crusades was in possession of the Church and its leaders, even after the sevenfold failure of its attempts to win by the sword. Bernard of Clairvaux wrote to the Templars: "The soldier of Christ is safe when he slays, safer when he dies. When he slays it profits Christ; when he dies it profits himself."

Much earlier than the end of the Middle Ages the doctrines of martyrdom had taken hold of the Church. Stories of the early martyrs were the popular literature to fan the flame of enthusiasm. A martyr's death was supposed, on the authority of many Scripture passages,* to cancel all sins of the past life, to supply the place of baptism,

* Luke xii. 50 ; Mark x. 38 ; Matt. x. 39, Matt. v. 10-12. Compare the teaching of Roman Catholic commentaries on these passages.

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and to secure admittance at once to Paradise without a sojourn in Purgatory. One has only to read Dante, the graphic painter of society in the Middle Ages, to see this illustrated. Above all, it was taught that martyrs had the beatific vision of the Savior (even as did St. Stephen), and that their dying prayers were sure of hastening the coming of Christ's kingdom.

But the violent passions so prevalent and the universal hatred of Jews and infidels made men forget that "not the *blood* but the cause makes the martyr."

Raymund Lull was ahead of his age in his aims and in his methods, but he was not and could not be altogether uninfluenced by his environment. The spirit of chivalry was not yet dead in the knight who forty-eight years before had seen a vision of the Crucified and had been knighted by the pierced hands for a spiritual crusade. Like Heber he felt:

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" The Son of God goes forth to war,
A kingly crown to gain ;
His blood-red banner streams afar
Who follows in His train ?

" Who best can drink His cup of wo
Triumphant over pain ;
Who patient bears His cross below
He follows in His train.

" A glorious band, the chosen few
On whom the Spirit came ;
Twelve valiant saints, their hope they knew
And mocked the cross and flame.

" They climbed the steep ascent of heaven
Through peril, toil, and pain ;
O God, to us may grace be given
To follow in their train."

The dangers and difficulties that made Lull shrink back from his journey at Genoa in 1291 only urged him forward to North Africa once more in 1314. His love had not grown cold, but burned the brighter "with the failure of natural warmth and the weakness of old age." He longed not only for the martyr's crown, but also once more to see his little band of believ-

Last Journey and Martyrdom


ers. Animated by these sentiments, he crossed over to Bugia on August 14, and for nearly a whole year labored secretly among a little circle of converts, whom on his previous visits he had won over to the Christian faith.

Both to these converts, and to any others who had boldness to come and join them in religious conversation, Lull continued to expatiate on the one theme of which he never seemed to tire, the inherent superiority of Christianity to Islam. He saw that the real strength of Islam is not in the second clause of its all too brief creed, but in its first clause. The Mohammedan conception of the unity and the attributes of God is a great half-truth. Their whole philosophy of religion finds its pivot in their wrong idea of absolute monism in the Deity. We do not find Lull wasting arguments to disprove Mohammed's mission, but presenting facts to show that Mo-

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hammed's conception of God was deficient and untrue. If for nothing else he deserves the honor, yet this great principle of apologetics in the controversy with Islam, as first stated by Lull, marks him the great missionary to Moslems.

"If Moslems," he argued, "according to their law affirm that God loved man because He created him, endowed him with noble faculties, and pours His benefits upon him, then the Christians according to their law affirm the same. But inasmuch as the Christians believe more than this, and affirm that God so loved man that He was willing to become man, to endure poverty, ignominy, torture, and death for his sake, which the Jews and Saracens do not teach concerning Him; therefore is the religion of the Christians, which thus reveals a Love beyond all other love, superior to that of those which reveals it only in an inferior degree." Islam is a



THE OLD GATEWAY OF BUGIA.
(Eleventh Century.)

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loveless religion. Raymund Lull believed and proved that Love could conquer it. The Koran denies the Incarnation, and so remains ignorant of the true character not only of the Godhead, but of God (Matt. xi. 27).

At the time when Lull visited Bugia and was imprisoned, the Moslems were already replying to his treatises and were winning converts from among Christians. He says: "The Saracens write books for the destruction of Christianity; I have myself seen such when I was in prison. . . . For one Saracen who becomes a Christian, ten Christians and more become Mohammedans. It becomes those who are in power to consider what the end will be of such a state of things. God will not be mocked." *

Lull did not think, apparently, that lack of speedy results was an argument for

* Smith: "Short History of Christian Missions," pp. 107, 108.

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abandoning the work of preaching to Moslems the unsearchable riches of Christ.

“ High failure, towering far o’er low success,
Firm faith, unwarped by others’ faithlessness,
Which, like a day brightest at eventide,
Seemed never half so deathless, till he died.”

For over ten months the aged missionary dwelt in hiding, talking and praying with his converts and trying to influence those who were not yet persuaded. His one weapon was the argument of God’s love in Christ, and his “shield of faith” was that of medieval art which so aptly symbolizes the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. So lovingly and so unceasingly did Lull urge the importance of this doctrine that we have put the *scutum fidei* on the cover of this biography.*

Of the length, breadth, depth, and height of the love of Christ, all Lull’s devotional writings are full.

* Copied from an old woodcut of the *scutum fidei* in the south transept of Thame Church, Oxfordshire.

Last Journey and Martyrdom

At length, weary of seclusion, and longing for martyrdom, he came forth into the open market and presented himself to the people as the same man whom they had once expelled from their town. It was Elijah showing himself to a mob of Ahabs! Lull stood before them and threatened them with divine wrath if they still persisted in their errors. He pleaded with love, but spoke plainly the whole truth. The consequences can be easily anticipated. Filled with fanatic fury at his boldness, and unable to reply to his arguments, the populace seized him, and dragged him out of the town; there by the command, or at least the connivance, of the king, he was stoned on the 30th of June, 1315.


Whether Raymund Lull died on that day or whether, still alive, he was rescued by a few of his friends, is disputed by his biographers. According to the latter idea his friends carried the wounded saint to

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
the beach and he was conveyed in a vessel to Majorca, his birthplace, only to die ere he reached Palma. According to other accounts, which seem to me to carry more authority, Lull did not survive the stoning by the mob, but died, like Stephen, outside the city. Also in this case, devout men carried Lull to his burial and brought the body to Palma, Majorca, where it was laid to rest in the church of San Francisco.

An elaborate tomb was afterward built in this church as a memorial to Lull. Its date is uncertain, but it is probably of the fourteenth century. Above the elaborately carved panels of marble are the shields or coat-of-arms of Raymund Lull; on either side are brackets of metal work to hold candles. The upper horizontal panel shows Lull in repose, in the garb of a Franciscan, with a rosary on his girdle, and his hands in the attitude of prayer.

May we not believe that this was his



TOMB OF RAYMUND LULL IN CHURCH OF SAN
FRANCISCO, PALMA, MAJORCA.



Last Journey and Martyrdom

attitude when the angry mob caught up stones, and crash followed crash against the body of the aged missionary? Perhaps not only the manner of his death but his last prayer was like that of Stephen the first martyr.

It was the teaching of the medieval Church that there are three kinds of martyrdom: The first both in will and in deed, which is the highest; the second, in will but not in deed; the third, in deed but not in will. St. Stephen and the whole army of those who were martyred by fire or sword for their testimony are examples of the first kind of martyrdom. St. John the Evangelist and others like him who died in exile or old age as witnesses to the truth but without violence, are examples of the second kind. The Holy Innocents, slain by Herod, are an example of the third kind. Lull verily was a martyr in will and in deed. Not only at Bugia, when he

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fell asleep, but for all the years of his long life after his conversion, he was a witness to the Truth, ever ready "to fill up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ" in his flesh "for His body's sake which is the Church."

To be stoned to death while preaching the love of Christ to Moslems—that was the fitting end for such a life. "Lull," says Noble, "was the greatest of medieval missionaries, perhaps the grandest of all missionaries from Paul to Carey and Livingstone. His career suggests those of Jonah the prophet, Paul the missionary, and Stephen the martyr. Tho his death was virtually self-murder, its heinousness is lessened by his homesickness for heaven, his longing to be with Christ, and the sublimity of his character and career."

CHAPTER X

"WHO BEING DEAD YET SPEAKETH"

"He who loves not lives not; he who lives by the Life can not die."—Raymund Lull.

"One step farther, but some slight response from his church or his age, and Raymund Lull would have anticipated William Carey by exactly seven centuries."—George Smith.

NEANDER does not hesitate to compare Raymund Lull with Anselm, whom he resembled in possessing the threefold talents uncommon among men and so seldom found in one character: namely, a powerful intellect, a loving heart, and efficiency in practical things. If we acknowledge that Lull possessed these three divine gifts, we at once place him at the front as the true type of what a missionary to Moslems should be to-day.

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He, whom Helfferich calls "the 'most remarkable figure of the Middle Ages,' being dead yet speaketh. The task which he first undertook is still before the Church unaccomplished. The modern missionary to Islam can see a reflection of his own trials of faith, difficulties, temptations, hopes, and aspirations in the story of Lull. Only with his spirit of self-sacrifice and enthusiasm can one gird for the conflict with this Goliath of the Philistines, who for thirteen centuries has defied the armies of the Living God.

Lull's writings contain glorious watchwords for the spiritual crusade against Islam in the twentieth century. How up-to-date is this prayer which we find at the close of one of his books: "Lord of heaven, Father of all times, when Thou didst send Thy Son to take upon Him human nature, He and His apostles lived in outward peace with Jews, Pharisees, and other men; for

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never by outward violence did they capture or slay any of the unbelievers, or of those who persecuted them. Of this outward peace they availed themselves to bring the erring to the knowledge of the truth and to a communion of spirit with themselves. *And so after Thy example should Christians conduct themselves toward Moslems; but since that ardor of devotion which glowed in apostles and holy men of old no longer inspires us, love and devotion through almost all the world have grown cold, and therefore do Christians expend their efforts far more in the outward than in the spiritual conflict."*

England's war in the Sudan cost more in men and money a hundred times than all missions to Moslems in the past century! Yet the former was only to put down a Moslem usurper by fire and sword; the latter represents the effort of Christendom to convert over two hundred mil-

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lions of those who are in the darkness of Islam.

There was a thousandfold more enthusiasm in the dark ages to wrest an empty sepulcher from the Saracens than there is in our day to bring them the knowledge of a living Savior. Six hundred years after Raymund Lull we are still "playing at missions" as far as Mohammedanism is concerned. For there are more mosques in Jerusalem than there are missionaries in all Arabia; and more *millions* of Moslems unreached in China than the number of missionary societies that work for Moslems in the whole world!

In North Africa, where Lull witnessed to the truth, missions to Moslems were not begun again until 1884. Now there is again daybreak in Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Egypt. Yet how feeble are the efforts in all Moslem lands compared with the glorious opportunities! How

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vast is the work still before us, six hundred years after Lull!

According to recent and exhaustive statistics, the population of the Moham-medan world is placed at 259,680,672.* Of these 11,515,402 are in Europe, 171,278,008 are in Asia, 19,446 are in Australasia, 76,818,253 are in Africa, and 49,563 are in North and South America. Three per cent. of Europe's population is Moslem; Asia has 18 per cent., and Africa 37 per cent. Out of every 100 souls in the world 16 are followers of Mohammed. Islam's power extends in many lands, from Canton to Sierra Leone, and from Zanzibar to the Caspian Sea.

Islam is growing to-day even faster in some lands than it did in the days of Lull. And yet in other lands, such as European Turkey, Caucasia, Syria, Palestine, and

* Dr. Hubert Jansen's "Verbreitung des Islams," Berlin, 1897; a marvel of research and accuracy.

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Turkestan, the number of Moslems is decreasing. In Lull's day the empire of Moslem faith and Moslem politics nearly coincided. Nowhere was there real liberty, and all the doors of access seemed barred. Now five-sixths of the Moslem world are accessible to foreigners and missionaries; but not one-sixtieth has ever been occupied by missions. There are no missions to the Moslems of all Afghanistan, Western Turkestan, Western, Central, and Southern Arabia, Southern Persia, and vast regions in North Central Africa.

Mission statistics of direct work for Moslems are an apology for apathy rather than an index of enterprise. The Church forgot its heritage of Lull's great example and was ages behind time. To Persia, one thousand years after Islam, the first missionary came; Arabia waited twelve centuries; in China Islam has eleven hundred years the start. This neglect appears the

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more inexcusable if we consider the great opportunities of to-day. More than 125,000,000 Moslems are now under Christian rulers. The keys to every gateway in the Moslem world are to-day in the political grasp of Christian Powers, with the exception of Mecca and Constantinople. Think only, for example, of Gibraltar, Algiers, Cairo, Tunis, Khartum, Batoum, Aden, and Muskat, not to speak of India and the farther East. It is impossible to enforce the laws relating to renegades from Islam under the flag of the "infidel." One could almost visit Mecca as easily as Lull did Tunis were the same spirit of martyrdom alive among us that inspired the pioneer of Palma. The journey from London to Bagdad can now be accomplished with less hardship and in less time than it must have taken Lull to go from Paris to Bugia.

How much more promising too is the

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condition of Islam to-day! The philosophical disintegration of the system began very early, but has grown more rapidly in the past century than in all the twelve that preceded. The strength of Islam is to sit still, to forbid thought, to gag reformers, to abominate progress. But the Wahabis "drew a bow at a venture" and smote their king "between the joints of the harness." Their exposure of the unorthodoxy of Turkish Mohammedanism set all the world thinking. Abd-ul-Wahâb meant to reform Islam by digging for the original foundations. The result was that they now must prop up the house! In India they are apologizing for Mohammed's morals and subjecting the Koran to higher criticism. In Egypt prominent Moslems advocate abolishing the veil. In Persia the Babi movement has undermined Islam everywhere. In Constantinople they are trying to put new wine into the old skins

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by carefully diluting the wine; the New Turkish party is making the rent of the old garment worse by its patchwork politics.

In addition to all this, the Bible now speaks the languages of Islam, and is everywhere preparing the way for the conquest of the cross. Even in the Moslem world, and in spite of all hindrances, "it is daybreak everywhere." The great lesson of Lull's life is that our weapons against Islam should never be carnal. Love, and love alone, will conquer. But it must be an all-sacrificing, an all-consuming love—a love that is faithful unto death.

"Taking him all in all," says Noble, "Lull's myriad gifts and graces make him the evening and the morning star of missions." He presaged the setting of medieval missions and heralded the dawn of the Reformation. The story of his life and labors for Moslems in the dark ages is a

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challenge of faith to us who live in the light of the twentieth century to follow in the footsteps of Raymund Lull and win the whole Mohammedan world for Christ.

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A. Books Written by Raymund Lull

[One of Lull's biographers states that the works of Lull numbered four thousand. Many of these have been lost. Of his writings in Latin, Catalanian, and Arabic it is said that one thousand were extant in the fifteenth century. Only two hundred and eighty-two were known in 1721 to Salzinger of Mainz, and yet he included only forty-five of these in his collected edition of Lull's works in ten volumes. It is disputed whether volumes seven and eight actually appeared. Some of Lull's unpublished works are to be found in the Imperial Library, the libraries of the Arsenal and Ste. Genevieve at Paris, also in the libraries of Angers, Amiens, the Escorial, etc. Most of his books were written in Latin; some first in Catalanian and then translated by his pupils, others only in the Catalanian or in Arabic. In the "Acta Sanctorum," vol. xxvii., page 640 *et seq.*, we find the following classified catalog of *three hundred and twenty-one books* by Raymund Lull.]

§ I. *Books on General Arts.*

1. *Ars generalis.*
2. *Ars brevis*
3. *Ars generalis ultima.*

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4. Ars demonstrativa veritatis.
5. Ars altera demonstrativa veritatis.
6. Compendium artis demonstrativæ.
7. Lectura super artem demonstrativæ.
8. Liber correlativorum innatorum.
9. Ars inventiva veritatis.
10. Tabula generalis ad omnes scientias applicabilis.
11. Ars expositiva.
12. Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem.
13. Ars alia compendiosa.
14. Ars inquirendi particularia in universalibus.
15. Liber propositionum secundum, etc.
16. Liber de descensu intellectus.
17. Ars penultima.
18. Ars scientiæ generalis.
19. Lectura alia super artem inventivam veritatis.
20. De conditionibus artis inventivæ.
21. Liber de declaratione scientiæ inventivæ.
22. Practica brevis super artem brevem.
23. Liber de experientia realitatis artis.
24. Liber de mixtione principiorum.
25. Liber de formatione tabularum.
26. Lectura super tabulam generalem.
27. Practica brevis super eandem.
28. Lectura super tertiani figuram tabulæ generalis.
29. Liber facilis scientiæ.
30. De quæstionibus super eo motis.
31. Liber de significatione.
32. Liber magnus demonstrationis.
33. Liber de lumine.
34. Liber de inquisitione veri et boni in omnia materia.
35. Liber de punctis transcendentibus.

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36. Ars intellectus.
37. De modo naturali intelligendi in omni scientia.
38. De inventione intellectus.
39. De refugio intellectus.
40. Ars voluntatis.
41. Ars amativa boni.
42. Ars alia amativa (it begins Ad recognoscendum).
43. Ars alia amativa (it begins Deus benedictus).
44. Ars memorativa.
45. De quæstionibus super ea motis.
46. Ars alia memorativa.
47. De principio, medio et fine.
48. De differentia, concordantia, et contrarietate.
49. De equalitate, majoritate, et minoritate.
50. De fine et majoritate.
51. Ars consilii.
52. Liber alius de consilio.
53. Liber de excusatione Raymundi.
54. Liber ad intelligendum doctores antiquos.
55. Ars infusa.
56. Art de fer y soltar questions (Catalan).
57. Fundamentum artis generalis.
58. Supplicatio Raymundi ad Parienses.
59. Liber ad memoriam confirmandam.
60. Liber de potentia objecta et actu.
61. Ars generalis rhythmica.

§ II. *Books on Grammar and Rhetoric.*

62. Ars grammaticæ speculativæ completissima.
63. Ars grammaticæ brevis.
64. Ars rhetoricæ.
65. Rhetorica Lulli.

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§ III. *Books on Logic and Dialectics.*

66. Liber qui vocatur logica de Grozell (versu vulgari).
67. Logica parva.
68. Logica nova.
69. Dialecticam seu logicam novam.
70. Liber de novo modo demonstrandi.
71. Liber de fallaciis.
72. Logica alia de quinque arboribus.
73. Liber de subjecto et prædicato.
74. Liber de conversione subjecti et prædicati, etc.
75. Liber de syllogismis.
76. Liber de novis fallaciis.
77. Liber de modo naturali et syllogistico.
78. Liber de affirmatione et negatione et causa earum.
79. Liber de quinque prædicabilibus.
80. Liber qui dicitur fallacia Raymundi.

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81. Liber lamentationes duodecim princip. philosoph.
82. Liber de principiis philosophiæ.
83. Liber de ponderositate et levitate elementorum.
84. Liber de anima rationali.
85. Liber de reprobatione errorum Averrois.
86. Liber contra ponentes æternitatem mundi.
87. Liber de quæstionibus.
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- 96. Liber super figura elementari.
- 97. Liber de qualitativibus, etc., elementorum.
- 98. Liber de olfactu.
- 99. Liber de possibili et impossibili.
- 100. Ars compendiosa principiorum philosophiæ.
- 101. Liber de intensitate et extensitate.

§ V. *Books on Metaphysics.*

- 102. Metaphysica nova.
- 103. Liber de ente reali et rationis.
- 104. De proprietatibus rerum.
- 105. Liber de homine.
- 106. De magnitudine et parvitate hominis.

§ VI. *Books on Various Arts and Sciences.*

- 107. Ars politica.
- 108. Liber militiæ secularis.
- 109. Liber de militia clericali.
- 110. Ars de Cavalleria.
- 111. Tractatus de astronomia.
- 112. Ars astrologiæ.
- 113. Liber de planetis.
- 114. Geometria nova.
- 115. Geometria magna.
- 116. De quadrangulatura et triangulatura circuli.
- 117. Ars cognoscendi Deum per gratiam.
- 118. Ars arithmetica.
- 119. Ars divina.

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§ VII. *Books on Medicine.*

- 120. Ars de principiis et gradibus medicinæ.
- 121. Liber de regionibus infirmitatis et sanitatis.
- 122. Liber de arte medicinæ compendiosa.
- 123. Liber de pulsibus et urinis.
- 124. Liber de aquis et oleis.
- 125. Liber de medicina theorica et practica.
- 126. Liber de instrumento intellectus in medicina.

§ VIII. *Books on Jurisprudence.*

- 127. Ars utriusque juris.
- 128. Ars juris particularis.
- 129. Ars principiorum juris.
- 130. Ars de jure.

§ IX. *Books of Devotion and Contemplation.*

- 131. Liber natalis pueri Jesu.
- 132. Liber de decem modis contemplandi Deum.
- 133. Liber de raptu.
- 134. Liber contemplationis in Deo.
- 135. *Liber Blancherna* (also written, Blanquerna).
- 136. Liber de orationibus et contemplationibus.
- 137. Liber de meditationibus, etc.
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- 142. Liber de orationibus.
- 143. Philosophia amoris.
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147. Horæ Deiparæ Virginis, etc.
148. Elegiacus Virginis planctus.
149. Lamentatio, seu querimonia Raymundi.
150. Carmina Raymundi consolatoria.
151. Mille proverbia vulgaria.
152. Versus vulgares ad regem Balearium.
153. Tractatus vulgaris metricus septem articulos fidei demonstrans.
154. Liber continens confessionem.
155. Primum volumen contemplationum.
156. Secundum volumen contemplationum.
157. Tertium volumen contemplationum.
158. Quartum volumen contemplationum.
159. De centum signis Dei.
160. De centum dignitatibus Dei.
161. Liber de expositione rationis Dominicæ.
162. Liber alius de eodem.
163. Liber de Ave Maria.
164. Liber dictus, Parvum contemplatorium.
165. Liber de præceptis legis . . . et sacramentis, etc.
166. Liber de virtutibus et peccatis.
167. Liber de compendiosa contemplatione.
168. Liber Orationum.
169. Liber de Orationibus per decem regulas.
170. Liber de viis Paradisi et viis Inferni.
171. Liber de orationibus et contemplationibus.
172. Liber dictus, Opus bonum.
173. Liber de conscientia.
174. Liber de gaudiis Virginis.
175. Liber de septem horis officii Virginis.
176. Liber alius ejusdem argumenti.

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177. Planctus dolorosus Dominæ nostræ, etc.
178. Ars philosophiæ desideratæ (ad suum filium).
179. Ars contitendi.
180. Liber de doctrina puerili.
181. Doctrina alia puerilis parva.
182. Liber de prima et secunda intentionibus.
183. Blancherna magnus.
184. Liber de placida visione.
185. Liber de consolatione eremitica.
186. Ars ut ad Deum cognoscendum, etc.
187. Liber ducentorum carminum.
188. Liber de vita divina.
189. Liber de definitionibus Dei.
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192. Liber sex mille proverbiorum in omnia materia.

§ X. *Books of Sermons, or on Preaching.*

193. Ars prædicabilis.
194. Liber super quatuor sensus S. Scripturæ.
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196. Ars prædicandi minor.
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- 208. Liber de civitate mundi.
- 209. Liber variarum quæstionum.
- 210. Liber de gradu superlativo.
- 211. Liber de virtute veniali et mortali.

§ XII. *Books of Disputation and Controversy.*

- 212. Liber de gentili et tribus sapientibus.
- 213. Tractatus de articulis fidei.
- 214. De Deo ignoto et de mundo ignoto.
- 215. Liber de efficiente et effectū.
- 216. Disputatio Raymundi et Averroistæ de quinque quæstionibus.
- 217. Liber contradictiones inter Raymund et Averroistam, de mysterio trinitatis.
- 218. Liber alius de eodem.
- 219. Liber de forma Dei.
- 220. Liber utrum fidelis possit solvere objectiones, etc.
- 221. Liber disputationis intellectus et fidei.
- 222. Liber appellatus apostrophe.
- 223. Liber de demonstratione per æquiparantiam.
- 224. Liber de convenientia quam habent fides et intellectus.
- 225. Liber de iis quæ homo de Deo debet credere.
- 226. Liber de substantia et accidente.
- 227. Liber de Trinitate in Unitate.
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- 229. Disputatio quinque hominum sapientum.

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231. Declaratio Raymundi Lulli, etc.
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236. De non multitudine esse divini.
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239. De perversione entis removenda.
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241. De concordantia et contrarietate.
242. De probatione unitatis Dei, Trinitatis, etc.
243. De quæstione quadam valde alta et profunda.
244. Disputatio trium sapientum.
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246. Liber de meliore lege.
247. Liber contra Judæos.
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- 266. Liber de Trinitate.
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- 268. De inventione Trinitatis.
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- 270. De investigatione vestigiorum, etc.
- 271. De divinis dignitatibus.
- 272. De propriis rationibus divinis.
- 273. De potestate divinarum rationum.
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- 278. De (—?) Dei.
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- 280. De vita Dei.
- 281. De est Dei.
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- 283. De essentia et esse Dei.
- 284. De forma Dei.
- 285. De inventione Dei.
- 286. De memoria Dei.
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290. De potestate pura.
291. De potestate Dei infinita et ordinaria.
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298. De perfecto Esse.
299. De ente infinito.
300. De ente absoluto.
301. De objecto infinito.
302. De inveniando Deo.
303. Liber de Deo.
304. De Deo majori et minori.
305. De Deo et mundo et convenientia eorum in Jesu Christo.
306. Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo.
307. De Incarnatione.
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313. Liber de locutione angelorum.
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George Smith, etc.]
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* Consulted in the preparation of this biography.

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- * "Acta Sanctorum," vol. xxvii., pp. 581-676, 1695-1867.†
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
* Consulted in the preparation of this biography.

† Translation of the titles of the chief articles on Raymund Lull in "Acta Sanctorum." (On character and origin of this stupendous work see McClintock and Strong, vol. i., p. 57) :

1. Brief notice of the Saint.
2. The Cult sacred to Lull with ceremonies and mass.
3. The remarkable mausoleum, epitaphs, etc.
4. On those who wrote the Life of St. Raymund from an earlier one after the year 1400. (Waddington's is based on this, but it contains fables.)
5. Letters of Custererius proving authenticity of the old "Life."
6. On the lineage, birth, and wanderings of Lull up to the end of the Thirteenth Century.
7. Works and journeys of Lull in the Fourteenth Century, with a chronology.
8. On the office of Seneschal which Lull held.
9. Some difficulties met in the acts of Lull which must be reconciled by authors in the future.
10. On the money presented by R. Jacobus to the endowed missionary colleges which Lull founded and on leaves of the mastic tree marked with letters in Mt. Randa (Roda).
11. St. Raymund is shown to have investigated nothing by chemical experiment, *i.e.*, he was not an alchemist.
12. "Life Number One"—by an anonymous contemporary while Lull was still alive. From a manuscript.

Biography of Raymund Lull

13. "Life Number Two"—by Carolus Bovillus Samarobrinus. Edition Benedictus Gononus. Four chapters.
14. Eulogy of the divine Raymund Lull, Doctor Illuminatus and martyr, by Nicholas de Pax; from Complutensian edition, 1519.
15. Miracles selected from the ceremonies of canonization described in the Majorcan tongue and translated into Latin. Five chapters.
16. Historical dissertation on the orthodoxy and the books genuine and suppositious of St. Raymund by Joannis Baptistæ Sollerii.
17. Conclusion of the acts of Lull giving examples of his heroic courage by J. B. S.



A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

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
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FOREWORD

MUCH has been written on political science and on the great thinkers on politics throughout the ages. Historians of late have become increasingly interested in the subject of political theory, and there are many monographs written on important aspects of this subject. There are also outlines available, linking the various theories together and attempting to show some sequence and continuity between the theories. But no one has as yet undertaken the onerous task of writing the history of political thought as distinct from political theory. Political thought covers a wider field than political theory as it embraces the intellectual background as well as the theories propounded as the outcome of this background. Historians have sadly neglected the background partly because it is difficult to discover and partly because the history of thought is a relatively new departure in the history schools.

This book is an attempt to trace the main outlines of the history of political thought, to show the main problems which agitated men's minds in certain important periods and to introduce as a comment on these practical difficulties the theories or suggestions which contemporaries offered as solutions of these problems. I have especially concentrated on the historical background because this side is so neglected by other writers on political theory. This book is intended mainly for the use of students who in many cases have no historical training and find when faced with the necessity to grasp the evolution of political thought that the available books deal almost entirely with the theories and give no indication of the environment which has produced them and essentially created their significance. They are given theories unrelated to the facts on which the theorists originally worked. They are expected to comment on the significance of these theories without any knowledge of the background which was the mainspring of the theories.

The subject is too vast for so small a book. I emphasize again that this is merely an attempt to set out the most important phases in the development of political thought. My selection has been arbitrary

FOREWORD

and my grouping of material will be found to be very different from the usual textbooks. But the subject is different and calls for very different treatment. If I can have indicated the main issues which have from time to time troubled those interested in the problems of government, if I can have shown the ebb and flow of men's interest in certain fundamental problems of the state, I shall have done more than I hoped to do: I may have introduced my readers to a fascinating subject well worth the effort of further study.

My thanks are due to all those of my friends who have helped and encouraged me in the production of this work, particularly Sir Theodore and the late Lady Morison who together first inspired me with the idea. I should like here to express my gratitude to those who have specifically given me their valuable assistance in preparing the book for publication. Amongst these I should like to thank particularly Professor H. J. Laski for contributing the entire bibliography; Miss Emmeline Cohen for much needed advice and criticism; Miss Cotter-Ludby for her great assistance in typing. Without this support and kindness which I have received from these and many others, the book would never have been published.

P. D.

Hampstead
July 1932

PREFACE TO REVISED EDITION

GREAT changes have occurred in political institutions and attitudes since this book was first published in 1933. It seemed advisable therefore to indicate some of these changes in the concluding epilogue which has been expanded accordingly. But in a work of this size only pointers can be given as to the main problems of the twentieth century; no attempt has been made to analyse even the leading solutions of those problems. Such an analysis would have meant another large book.

The main body of the work has remained the same. I have ventured to add a short booklist to the original as an aid for further reading on some of the questions of today. But this addition is in no way exhaustive.

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CHAPTER I

THE SCOPE OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

POLITICAL speculation is concerned with many problems. Some can be taken as central around which the others group themselves in greater or less importance. Three main subjects constitute the pith of political thought. The nature and functions of man; his relation to the rest of the universe which involves a consideration of the meaning of life as a whole; emerging from the interaction of these two the problem of the relation of man to his fellowmen. The latter is the main concern of political theory in its narrowest sense and involves a discussion on the nature, purpose and functions of the state. The three factors — man, his ultimate goal, his social activities — are in constant reaction to each other. They create from their contact the complexity of material which it is the object of political thinkers and statesmen to disentangle and manipulate.

Political thinkers may be divided into two groups according to their method of attacking their subject. The first group constructs an ideal state of affairs, and using that as a model, criticizes existing conditions. The ideal is based on fundamental assumptions taken from actual experience. The result of this form of inquiry is that the thinkers concern themselves largely with the general principles underlying individual and social action. It is abstract in its nature and only uses concrete instances to illustrate its theoretical arguments. Plato chronologically and essentially leads the way in this deductive method of approach. His *Republic* is the first of a long series of treatises dealing with the utopian conception of politics.

The second group, whose first leading exponent was Aristotle, use the inductive method of reasoning in their attack on political problems. Aristotle and the disciples of his method analyse existing states and their constitutions in great detail. Their concern is consequently more with the forms of government, their workings and their limitations than with the abstract principles upon which they are based. From the outset the mode of attack on political problems determines the line which the discussion will take. Either the thinker is an idealist

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and concerned with first principles to the neglect of practical detail; or he is a realist and eager to induce from actual experience some rules which may be of use to the practical politician. Though it is not always possible to place every treatise on politics into one of these main groups, yet such a division for general purposes explains to some extent the difference in emphasis and subject matter found in writers of the same age, interested in the same situation. The idealist and the realist look at the same problem from quite different angles; their conclusions necessarily differ, but are not therefore contradictory.

Just as political thinkers fall into two groups according to their treatment of their subject, so the student can for clarity's sake divide his subject into two main groups. The first will deal with the fundamental questions involving the first principles of political philosophy, the second will deal with particulars of government, as vital to a comprehension of politics as the first inquiry, but of more practical import.

In the first group the inquiry is into the nature of man. In the history of political thought each age differs sometimes radically, sometimes slightly, from its predecessor in its answer to this question. Some deem man sinful; others give him no moral freedom of choice and reduce him to an automaton. Again one age will consider him the epitome of reason, and the next will condemn him as a creature of irrational impulse and passion. As each era shifts its ground on this basic assumption, so the trend of political speculation is modified and adjusted to this radical change in outlook. If man is irrational, force alone will constrain him, and an orgy of intolerance is justified. If he is rational, then persuasion will win his ear and a sweet reasonableness will be suggested as the proper means whereby to assert the authority of the community over its erring members.

But the philosophic inquirer will not be content with seeking to know the nature of man alone. A discussion on human nature is associated with the purpose for which man exists in life. And so the next inquiry follows: what is man's purpose in life? This is again linked up with politics by the pertinent inquiry how far, if at all, can or does man achieve this purpose through the action of the state? The purpose of the state next comes into the focus of attention. If the aim of man is said to be the salvation of his soul, the purpose of society as a whole (comprising as it does individuals who all seek salvation) will be

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to promote this object: the state is then endowed with a religious purpose. If possession of much wealth is considered by man to be the chief aim of his life, in order that he may fulfil some individual ambition, then the protection of that wealth and security of person and property is the object of the society in which such a man lives. Again the conception of the state is seen to vary with the conception of man, his needs and ambitions.

A discussion on the possible ends of the state leads easily to an inquiry into the nature of the state. The state by some ages has been conceived as a conventional mechanism, created by man or by God to achieve a purpose which is considered to be contrary to the natural order of things. Man is shown to be in some particulars at war with nature, and so the society in which he lives and moves is held to be at war with nature too. Some thinkers in direct contradiction to this view have held that the state is not an artificial product, but a natural growth resulting from a living impulse which resides in the social activities of man. The state is then conceived as essentially organic and dynamic in character.

Immediately the purpose and nature of the state is under discussion the authority which the state may claim to exercise over its members becomes a relevant and important question. Involved in this are the complementary problems of the nature of sovereignty or absolute power which may be said to reside in any state and the entire inquiry concerned with the nature of political obligation. Why and how far should a man obey the dictates of the society in which he lives? Is it a moral or conventional duty to be obedient? Such questions probe to the root of political philosophy.

Underlying political obligation is the subject of law. When a man queries his duty to obey, he automatically is criticizing the law he is called upon to obey. He inquires into the nature of law; whether it is fundamental and unchangeable by any endeavour of man; whether it is conventionally established by man and so fallible and mutable. The nature of authority, the nature of political obligation, and the nature of law are interdependent questions.

Political thinkers are not occupied with fundamental problems of philosophy to the exclusion of all interest in practical politics. Some thinkers are concerned only with the practice of government. They

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discuss details of government relevant in many cases only to the peculiar circumstances of their own era and environment. Nevertheless in these analyses of actual states, the political thinkers of any importance establish certain maxims and rules of conducting politics which are of value to other ages besides their own. They discuss at length the forms of government which are established and seek to find which of these may be considered the best. They criticize the relationship of the executive to the legislative bodies in the state. They inquire whether and how far political representation is of value to the state. They seek to know the exact functions of each of the component parts of the state: the central authority, the local bodies, if any, the administration as a whole. They endeavour to estimate the exact status of the citizen of a given state. These and kindred problems of a more detailed character are the concern of practical political thinkers. They may be taken as the main interest of men who deal with political science rather than political philosophy.

From the above analysis political philosophy used as a general term to cover both philosophic and scientific inquiries about the state will be seen to embrace a number of subjects, sometimes related to each other, sometimes wholly isolated. No one thinker is ever equally interested in all these subjects. Environment and individual taste will determine the aspect of political philosophy which the speculator will make his special concern. But the student of the evolution of political philosophy must be aware of the entire range of subjects if he is to have any basis from which to criticize. He must be able to distinguish between an essential and a trivial problem. To do this he must have a conception of the nature of political philosophy as a whole and of the type of subjects with which it is concerned.

Not only does one thinker concern himself with certain aspects of his subject to the exclusion of all others, but a whole age will be found vitally and exclusively interested in one aspect of political and social problems, and totally indifferent to other aspects. Sometimes the nature of man, as in the renaissance period; sometimes theology, as in the Middle Ages; or the nature of the state as amongst the Greeks of Plato's time will be the supreme preoccupation of the moment. The significance of a thinker must be considered in relation to his

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times. Other factors play their part too: his innate ability; his comprehension of the problem which is his main concern; his grasp of its relation to contemporary facts; and finally his contribution to the general trend of thought as a whole.

An intimate knowledge of the environment of the thinkers is of inestimable importance in the endeavour to understand and evaluate the theories enunciated. It determines the subject to be discussed and its scope. Environment is here used in a very wide sense. It includes the actual condition of the political institutions which set the problems urgently to be considered. It covers the intellectual and social background of the period isolated for consideration. The way a man has lived; the way in which his contemporaries lived; the practical issues at stake which stimulated his interests and formed the core of his thought; the opportunity he has had to observe these conditions; these are the concern of the student as much as the actual theories conceived. The value of the theories are relative to the circumstances they intend to analyse and comprehend. If those circumstances comprise factors that are of universal interest, then the theories propounded will be of value to many ages besides the one in which they were actually enunciated. If not, though the theory will be of significance in the development of political thought as a whole, it will only be so as a link in the chain which binds together more essential parts.

The plan of this book is based on the lines indicated above. Each age has been analysed to see which were the aspects of politics that were its most vital concern. Thinkers have been cited who have dealt adequately or significantly with these problems. Details are naturally prohibited by the size of the subject in comparison to the size of the book. But the object of the book is to show not the details of theories, but the history of the change and growth of political thought. Sometimes one idea in vogue in one age disappears for centuries, until a change in circumstances brings back the idea as relevant. Sometimes old theories fall by the way, never as yet to be revived. The history of political thought is the history of the changing emphasis of man's interests in his political relations, rather than the evolution of a set form of theories from a simpler to a more complex state.

CHAPTER II

THE GREEK IDEAL: MAN AS A POLITICAL ANIMAL

THE city-state was the highest form of social and political life known to the Greeks. Its most striking features to the modern eye are its smallness and its isolation. These were due partly to geographical, partly to other causes.

Geographically, Greece as a land of mountains tends to develop isolated communities. But the unification of Greece into a kingdom in the nineteenth century shows that given other factors, geographical conditions do not prove an insurmountable barrier to the growth of a nation. What then were the other factors at work in early times which maintained the divisions already imposed by the physical contour of the land?

No common religion formed a bond of union in pagan Greece. The essential characteristic of Greek religion was its localization. Originating in an effort to reduce to tangible form the mysteries of the universe, Greek religion tended to personify and deify local characteristics; the disappearance of a river in one spot would suggest a type of god very different from the one inhabiting a locality where springs abounded. So each feature of the land gave rise to its different god: local climatic differences were made greater by deification. In this way each locality was strongly individual, and the community living therein felt itself cut off from its neighbours not only by tribal customs and difference of occupation, but more forcibly by an allegiance to its peculiar gods. Each city-state had its patron god or goddess accompanied by a host of lesser deities. Even the recognition of Zeus as father of all gods, and of the Delphian oracle as the central mouthpiece of the gods for all Greece, were not sufficiently strong beliefs to override the potency of the local deities under whose auspices each community lived; under whose caprices each community suffered. The religious outlook of the Greeks was not universal: it was individual, concentric.

The effect of these beliefs on political life was an accentuation of

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the isolation already imposed by geographical conditions. It went further. In some plains where no geographical barriers would have interrupted an alliance or amalgamation of several cities, the cities yet preferred to remain independent. In some districts as many as four city-states existed within an area eight miles long by twelve miles broad, and still each retained its own form of government and refused any form of alliance with its neighbour. When the Greek religion became more universal just before the fall of the city-states, leagues sprang up between the cities, but by that time it was too late. Disruption had set in too long for a delayed treatment to prove effective.

Nor did the Greek economy of life offer any means to draw together the states in a common interest. The Greeks existed by a slave economy. In Sparta more than half the population were unfree citizens; in Athens, the most cultured and intellectual of the city-states, the proportion of free citizens to slaves was even less. The effect on social life was to depreciate the value of all manual labour and all work connected with trade and commerce. The merchant and his activities were scorned in Athens. A political career or a leisured life were considered the highest ambition of a citizen. Though trade might be the cause of friction between states, as between Athens and Thebes, yet trade and the common interests arising therefrom would not have been considered a sufficiently binding force to justify a permanent union between two states. Trading interests already stigmatized by their association with labour, which was slave's work, were not as today ranked high amongst the forces potent in the determination of political alliances and hostilities.

Nor did a national consciousness exist to cement together the body politic. The Greeks it is true, felt themselves superior to all barbarians; only men of Hellenic blood could take part in the great four-yearly races in the plains of Olympia. But the sense of difference between Greeks and barbarians did not draw the Greeks closer together. ✓ Plato, aware of the novelty of his suggestion, asserted somewhat aggressively, 'I affirm that all the members of the Greek race are brethren and kinsmen to one another, but aliens and foreigners to the barbarian world', and he urged that the term sedition

Plato's - 8/2/19

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used commonly to describe treachery to one's own city, might be extended to cover that type of hostility which existed when a conflict arose between independent city-states. But his suggestions were considered unusual by his contemporaries. The course of the Persian war was ample evidence of the difficulty which the city-states encountered in attempting to sink their local antagonisms in the face of a common enemy. The jealousies aroused during this war of the sixth and fifth centuries were the main cause of the civil wars between the states in the fourth century.

Many of the factors which contribute to the formation of a state today were either dismissed as irrelevant, or not recognized at all by the Greeks. Religion was local and in its popular form non-ethical; economic interests were despised; a consciousness of nationality was not yet born. Yet something remained.

Not the relation of the state to the church; nor to industry; nor to international problems; but the nature of the state itself was the topic which absorbed the energies of Greek thinkers. Man to them seemed of interest, not as an isolated unit, but essentially as part of the society in which he was born, reared and given opportunities to attain to the best life. Men realized themselves in and through the state; man was a political animal. This was the theme of the Greeks; this their discovery and their contribution to political thought.

Speculation on the nature of the state and man as a political animal gave rise in the fourth century to questions which are as vital today as then. It has further interest. The Greeks began their inquiry into political philosophy with no previous speculations to aid them. Terminology itself had to be created. The whole subject was approached in the scientific spirit with which the Greeks were investigating other spheres of knowledge. They realized that before particular states could be discussed some general laws which applied to political life as a whole must be postulated. They must discover the essential characteristics of the state. Their work was thus a revelation of what are now recognized as truisms; and in this very definition of truisms, it was a contribution to knowledge. It was a creation simultaneously of a science and a philosophy of the state.

This emphasis on the essence of the state makes the speculations

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of Greek thinkers of universal interest. It enlists the sympathy of the twentieth century as much as it did that of the fourth. The Greeks discussed the purpose of social life, the nature and powers of the state, its relation to its citizens. They gave names to the different types of states. Democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, aristocracy and monarchy are Greek words, without which modern thought on the state would flounder in a quagmire of indefiniteness. The Greeks characterized some states as bad, some as good, throwing out suggestions by which some criterion of judgment on this difficult problem might be attained. They analysed political life until they found they could suggest some fundamental laws governing its behaviour. They discovered that forms of government are subject to a cyclical law, beginning with monarchy they flow by natural sequence through the changes of aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy to tyranny. Subsequent investigation has modified this concept; but the basic truth that political institutions are subject to change is so vital to an understanding of political life that epochs where it has been ignored have found themselves faced with the danger of revolution. England in the seventeenth century, France in the eighteenth, were both firm adherents of the doctrine that society was static not dynamic. Only through violence could the state be changed; revolution was inevitable. The Greeks wondered how far the liberty of the individual citizen was curtailed by his life within the state; they entered at length into the problem of the relation of education to the state. They speculated tentatively on the subject of political obligation; they strove to find in natural law the reason why some were rulers, others condemned to be ruled. They were profoundly disturbed by the lack of stability in forms of government and examined at length different types of constitution to remedy this defect. Forms of government; education; freedom and slavery; arbitrary control and good rule; the ultimate purpose of the state; and, through a conviction that only in the state could man fully realize himself, an emphasis on the profound importance of political life in the development of the individual: these were the aspects of political life which interested the Greeks.

From the fifth to the fourth centuries B.C. the Greek city-states were subjected to external and internal friction which revealed to

them their inherent weaknesses. The Persian war showed clearly the great divergence which existed between the city-states. For a hundred years Greece strove to unite against attacks from the east, and found herself every time defeated by some bitter rivalry between her own members. The war dragged out owing to these internal conflicts; Greece was only saved from destruction by the sudden rise to power of Athens and Sparta. The momentary pre-eminence of these two cities averted the Persian danger, and finally destroyed it. But no sooner were the Persians defeated than civil war, long pending, broke out between the rival states.

The main obstacle to alliance during the Persian war had been the difference in ideals which activated each state. It was impossible for Sparta with her firm belief in the rule of oligarchy, to ally easily with Athens which was becoming every year more rigidly democratic. What was so apparent of the two outstanding cities was true of all the smaller ones. Greece was a mass of conflicting political ideals. The individualistic outlook of the city-states which became so evident during the Persian wars, was carried to a further degree during the century of civil wars. Not only did each city seek its own end with assertive independence regardless of the well-being of any other city, but within each *polis* itself, each faction regarded its own success as more important than the welfare of the city as a whole. Sedition, treachery and spite became the normal characteristics of the internal political life of each city-state in the years preceding and contemporaneous with the lives of Plato and Aristotle. These two men looking about them in their youth would see nothing but intestinal warfare, and violent rapid changes in the constitutions of states when the ultimate authority in the state shifted now to this family, now to that, now to one faction, now to another. There was one dominating peculiarity in these civil wars. City-state seldom allied with city-state; rather the democratic faction in one city would find support in the democratic faction in another; and similarly the oligarchic faction sought and found its allies. As Thucydides wrote at the time of the conflict, 'the whole Hellenic world was in commotion; in every city the chiefs of the democracy and the oligarchy were struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedaemonians'. Every city was rent asunder; the main line of demarca-

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tion was wealth. Everywhere in Greece rich and poor strove against each other. Everywhere political instability was the order of the day. No wonder then that Plato and Aristotle sought to find, if any, the rules which governed the life of the state; to disentangle if possible the ultimate end of all these warring factions; to discover should it be there, the quality which was necessary in political life to stem the forces of disruption which were creating such havoc about them, threatening the very foundation of their civilization.

The reconciliation of the differing ideals of the state and the removal of political instability were the two main problems on which Greek thinkers concentrated. Practical difficulties were great. Not only were the city-states isolated geographically, religiously and economically from each other; but within the states themselves the customary methods of government made it an almost impossible task to find a common bond either between states or between the factions within the states. There was no conception amongst the Greeks of representation. Government was carried on entirely by the actual services of each citizen who had to register his vote personally on any matter of importance; or had himself to take such office as was drawn to him by lot. His share in the government could not as today be dismissed by the election of a representative or delegate. Each citizen had to give his opinion himself on any matter of importance. The size of a city-state was strictly kept in check both in numbers and area. It had not to be so great that all its citizens could not easily meet within its centre for casting their votes; or to be so numerous that discussion would become hopelessly unwieldy. The idea of incorporating one city-state with another was thus at the very outset, inconceivable. Leagues between the states were the only possible bond of union. Moreover the emphasis on the personal co-operation of every citizen and its resulting large gatherings of citizens, laid open the way to the development of demagogues who by their oratorical eloquence could sway the mob of citizens in any direction they chose. In short, the practical constitution of the city-states increased the difficulties already in the way of solving the problem of political unrest. At the end of the fifth century it was becoming urgent that the situation should be analysed. Some cure must be sought for the disease which was evidently sapping the very

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foundations of society, threatening ominously the overthrow of the entire civilization.

Two men are outstanding for their contributions to this sphere of knowledge: Plato and Aristotle. Trained in the same school of thought, yet men of different temperament, they approached the problems of their day with entirely different methods of attack. Plato of an austere temperament suggestive of the approaching Stoicism, entered more profoundly into the philosophy of the state than Aristotle. The latter concentrated rather on an analysis of the states around him than on the construction of ideal politics. Plato was essentially an idealist, Aristotle a realist.

Plato's contribution to political philosophy can hardly be dissociated from the rest of his philosophic works; yet the student of political philosophy must curtail his curiosity and concentrate his attention on those works of Plato which deal essentially with politics. These are two: *The Republic* and *The Laws*. *The Republic* is a more complete work on politics in so far as it is a representation of an ideal state, whilst the *Laws* deals with more scattered aspects of politics, and is in many ways a practical modification of the theories propounded in the *Republic*.

The sub-title of the *Republic* gives the key to its main objective: 'Concerning Justice.' Plato sought to discover whether justice actually existed or could exist in a state, and what function it performed therein. Repeatedly he showed fear of the self-interest which dominated and ruined the political life of his contemporaries. The first part of the *Republic* is taken up with a refutation of current notions: that the interest of the stronger is the highest justice to be looked for in the state; that justice is merely the result of legal contract; that justice is really an unprofitable virtue practised by no one but the few, and that these for some strange reason were possessed with the divine madness of delighting in integrity. Plato saw in justice as defined by himself a possible solution to the unrest which was ruining his native city. In seeking to define this idea, he was led to propound the ideal state, thus illustrating exactly how justice would operate and check the growth of self-interest and political instability.

The basic assumption in Plato's political philosophy was his

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concept of human nature. 'No two persons', he declared, 'are born exactly alike, but each differs from each in endowments, one being suited for one occupation, and another for another.' Highly specialized from birth, man was only happy when following his innate bent. Specialization was to Plato a necessity imposed by man's nature, not a desirable quality cultivated for purposes of economy as is held today. Economy certainly followed specialization, but Plato did not attribute this to the formation of habit which reduced effort, but to the fact that a man born with certain characteristics could only function in the way dictated by those characteristics. Any other occupation would be performed by him in an inferior manner.

As every man could only do one type of work adequately, men had to congregate together to supply for each other what each lacked. 'The formation of a city is due . . . to this fact, that we are not individually independent, but have many wants . . . and because each seeks the aid of others to supply his various requirements, we gather many associates and helpers into one dwelling-place, and give to this joint dwelling the name of city.' Yet if men only satisfied their bare necessities, their life would be so full of dull contentment that it would seem merely a community of swine. To pass one's life in tranquillity and sound health, to live to an advanced age and leave one's children well provided for, seemed to the cultured Greek the epitome of stagnation. There must then be in the city some further object than the fulfilling of bare necessities. Life must also be supplied with luxuries. The city would then develop its artistic and luxurious tastes and a population to supply these wants. With the growth of population, the need for more territory would be felt, and war would ensue. A military class would be required to protect the city from aggression and enable it to be itself an aggressor. The city would now have acquired two classes of men: those concerned with the supply of the ordinary necessities of life, and those specially devoted to the art of war. These two classes were completely separated by their differing functions. There were no means as yet described which would ensure the performance of the respective duties of the classes. There was nothing to prevent either class from encroaching upon and oppressing the other. The need for men specially devoted to this task of regulation and supervision was felt.

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Plato then created his Guardian class, whose chief function was to care for the welfare of the city as a whole. With the creation of the Guardian class, the ideal republic was completed. Three classes existed in it, divided not by qualifications of wealth and birth, but by the differences due to innate capacities. Every man was naturally fitted to a particular task; every man must perform that task or be at war with his own nature. The natural specialization of individual capacities, not economic inequalities, was the basis and justification of the sharp divisions in the *Republic*.

To Plato the powers and education of the Guardians as the only possible rulers of the state, were of the utmost importance. The major part of the *Republic* was devoted to this subject.

It was comparatively easy to describe the origin and growth of an ideal city and to account for the presence of its rulers as a natural sequence of events. It was not so easy to show why the rest of the community should acquiesce in the rule of the Guardians; nor to show how this class should so govern as to eradicate any possibility of instability in political life. To insure the acceptance of the Guardians as rulers was a difficulty which defeated Plato. He passionately desired that a strong sense of political obligation should be developed. 'Do we know then,' he asked eagerly, 'of any greater evil to the state, than that which should tear it asunder, and make it into a multitude of states instead of one? Or of any higher perfection than that which should bind it together and make it one.' He set himself to find this perfection. He pointed out the necessity of wise rulers as a justification of their existence; he argued that as each man was so highly specialized, it followed that there must be a man or men who were born specialists in government, who must use their talents for the good of the community. But even then he felt he had not persuaded his hearers to accept the Guardians as the only rulers: this was the initial step before their perfect rule might bear full sway. The task of recognizing those who were born rulers and those who were not still remained. To answer this Plato took refuge in an ingenious device. He suggested that in the ideal state the recognition of the division between rulers and ruled could only come into being by instilling into the populace a fable that men had been asleep and awakened to find themselves thus conveniently classified. Plato

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evaded the whole problem of political obligation and left it in obscurity.

Once the Guardians were regarded as established rulers, the life of the state flowed on uninterruptedly. They were endowed at birth with the special faculties necessary to a governor: 'the man whose natural gifts promise to make him a perfect guardian of the state will be philosophical, high-spirited, swift-footed and strong'. The ideal state must be ruled by a man in whom 'political power and philosophy be united in the same person'. The philosopher was a necessity in a state where the innate ability of every member must be perceived at birth by the ruler; where perception of true character was an inalienable quality of the ruler-mind. He who had true knowledge would be alone adapted to the performance of this supreme task. The philosophic temperament was the most suitable to the task of governing.

The chief duty of the Guardians was to allot to each man his special task and to see that he performed it. Only in this way could a state composed of specialists hope to survive. At the birth of children the Guardians were to see whether the child possessed qualities which would place it in the governing, the artisan, or the military class. They placed it in its niche where it must remain for the rest of its life. As its real happiness lay in doing only one type of work, it would have no inclination to remove itself from the groove in which it was set. This apportioning of special tasks Plato described as 'giving to every man his due'. This was the essence of justice. Justice was thus obtained in the ideal state through the agency of the Guardians who were omniscient. They knew each man's particular bent.

Justice rested essentially on this assumption of specialization. If men were not specialized, it would be impossible to perceive what was their due. Justice was an intrinsic quality of the state, not an end to be pursued nor a criterion of judgment; it was a regulation of the activities of men living the social life, a supervision and direction of those activities into their proper and peculiar channels. Such a conception of justice eradicated at once all friction between individuals and classes. Each pursued his own end regardless of others; each end excluded every other. There could not be a conflict

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between specialists who specialized on different subjects. Their interests never clashed.

✓ The second duty of the Guardians was to supervise the education of the children destined to be future Guardians. Believing firmly in the impressionable nature of children, Plato was anxious to eradicate all harmful influence from their environment. To do so involved the strictest censorship. All poetry, all art, all literature and drama, even the subjects for tapestry working were to be purged of all non-ethical qualities. The tales of the gods were to be expurgated until only the didactic story of their dull morality remained. Music, which Plato regarded as the greatest educational factor, was to be even more severely censored. The young were only to hear martial and uplifting strains. Thus might the young men 'dwelling as it were in a healthful region . . . drink in good from every quarter, whence any emanation from noble works may strike upon their eye or ear, like a gale wafting health from salubrious lands, and win them imperceptibly from their earliest childhood into resemblance, love and harmony with the true beauty of reason'.

To ensure this eradication of all evil from the young involved a considerable degree of authority being placed in the hands of the Guardians. The censorship of poetry, art and music was much more far reaching in its effect in Greek civilization than today. To purge the ancient lays of the gods of all immoral episodes was in fact nothing less than to control all religious beliefs. Plato recognized this. His Guardians were to control theology and were to draw up certain articles of belief for their community. Plato suggested that this authority within the state was unlimited. But he did not proceed far enough into the problem of political authority to give a definite impression of his views on this subject. With power to legislate the Guardians controlled education, theology, art and culture; they even dictated to each individual his life-work. But they were not to concern themselves with such trivial matters as trade and industry. ✓
✓ Plato specifically stated that all economic problems were either beneath the dignity of the legislator or so easy of solution that they did not require legislation. 'It is not worth while,' he said, 'to give directions on these points to good and cultivated men: for in most cases they will have little difficulty in discovering all the legislation

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required.' These then were the powers and duties of the Guardians. Subject themselves to the law of specialization, they alone must bear the burden of government upon their shoulders.

What type of man would be properly fitted for this task upon whose performance the life of the whole community depended? The life of the Guardians was the topic in which Plato was supremely interested. Much of the book is taken up with this. Much that is valuable in Plato's writings on the state is recorded in this digression.

The task of ruling was no easy one. Men had to have a severe training for it. It did not matter to Plato whether one man or several men ruled; so long as the wise ruled. The Guardians were to be trained rather on the model of the Spartans. They were to be set in a camp apart where they were to eat at common messes; to possess no private property; to be trained in physical exercises to stand great strain; above all to be deprived of all family life. Plato saw in private property and family affection the root of all hatred and ambition; the overthrow of all civic and altruistic motives of conduct. When men have private property, he declared, 'they will spend their whole lives, hating and being hated, plotting and plotted against, standing in more frequent and intense alarm of their enemies at home than of their enemies abroad; by which time they and the rest of the city will be running on the very brink of ruin'.

In family life Plato saw the nucleus of private ambition, and to eradicate this from the state he postulated a community of wives and children which amazed not only his contemporaries but subsequent generations. Women, he thought, were as specialized as men intellectually, though they were altogether on a lower level of intelligence. They too must join in the task of government. Like men they must be trained to perform this duty. They must have severe gymnastic exercises and mix freely with men. They must have no home ties but live a communal life. When their children were born, they were immediately to be taken from them and reared by special nurses appointed by the state, until they were of age to pass into the hands of the Guardians.

Such was Plato's ideal city, based on justice, and giving 'to each his due'. It was fitted 'rather for gods or the children of gods than for men'. Plato gave many details as to the methods of carrying out

these ideas, but they were not convincing to contemporaries. The objections raised in the Socratic discourses of the *Republic* were taken by Plato's disciple, Aristotle, and formed the starting point of his speculations on the state.

Aristotle ✓ Aristotle's political theories were embodied in two complementary works: the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. The *Ethics* dealt more specifically with the moral nature of man; the *Politics* with the expression of that nature in social life. A study of both is necessary to a full grasp of his political ideas, though the interest of the student of politics naturally centres more in the second book.

✓ Aristotle described the *Politics* as a treatise on government. He approached his subject from a quite different angle from Plato. He determined to examine existing constitutions of states and to deduce therefrom the laws which governed their behaviour. The first part of his work was taken up with a criticism not only of actual constitutions but of proposed models for states. In this group he attacked the ideal state suggested by Plato.

✓ He pointed out that Plato having divided his republic into three parts, had neglected entirely the life of the majority of the citizens and concentrated only on the life of the Guardian class. How then could he ever hope for stability if he left vague the rules which should govern the adjustments between the three different classes? Nor did he agree with Plato's community of wives, children and property; for to Aristotle the basis of the state was the family, and private property was necessary to it. Destroy the family and private property and the chief motives for human industry were, in Aristotle's eyes, removed. Aristotle objected still more profoundly to Plato's statement that the Guardians would work for the state from motives of the highest altruism. Such work might incidentally deprive them of all personal happiness. To Aristotle if part of the state was deprived of happiness, then the whole state could not attain to happiness, for the whole consisted of the parts and partook of the nature of those parts.

These three objections to the *Republic* indicate the fundamental difference between the two thinkers. Aristotle's conceptions of human nature and the origin and purpose of social life were essentially though not entirely different from his master's.

Human nature to Aristotle was instinct with variety. Man was no

specialized animal, but 'it is the nature of our desires to be boundless'. These desires largely govern men and when uncontrolled lead to vice. As the desires are boundless, so is the attendant corruption: 'For the wickedness of mankind is insatiable.' Man, an impulsive creature, is led rather by his affections than by a force which drives him into a groove. Family life and friendship form the chief bonds of social intercourse. He saw in friendship the main check to the treachery he so much feared: 'Friendship,' he stated, 'is the greatest good which can happen to any city, as nothing so much prevents seditions.'

The family was the origin of political life. But Aristotle took pains to show that there was a fundamental difference between the association of the family and that of the state. The family was joined together by the natural tie of blood and existed to provide the necessities to bring the young members to maturity. There its function ceased. The greater association of the state existed because another factor came into play. Man, Aristotle declared, 'is naturally a political animal . . . he will of his own accord desire to live with others'. All men felt this urge to social life; because no man could achieve the best life in solitude. 'He that is incapable of society,' Aristotle declared scathingly, 'or so complete in himself as not to want it, makes no part of a city, as a beast or a god.' In short, men lived in society because they were naturally sociable; because they required the necessities of life which only their fellows could supply ✓ to them when they were immature or attacked; above all because they sought not only to live, but to live well.

Human nature operated of its own accord to draw men together to form themselves into states. But the actual fact of slavery forced Aristotle to indicate that assertions on man must be considered applicable only to one class of men, the Greeks. The problem of slavery was directly linked in his mind with the two cognate problems of property and government. The slave was a man in subjection; the citizens of the state were in subjection to their rulers. What then justified this subjection? Repeatedly Aristotle strove to find an appropriate answer to this question; repeatedly he was defeated in his attempt. Men, he declared, were by nature roughly divided into two groups, in whose souls nature 'has implanted the governing and submitting principle'. The man who then is born to submit 'is a

slave by nature' and such men are justly kept subordinate. But even so Aristotle could not help feeling uneasy in his mind over this conclusion. How could he account for the fact that some men of noble character who had ruled over others, through the accident of war, came to be made slaves by their enemies? This was obviously an act contrary to nature and not justifiable. It existed and provided much room for doubt in Aristotle's mind. He was bound to admit that some slavery was legal and conventional; whilst he clung tenaciously to the general assertion that wholesale slavery was the result of a natural difference in men. 'He then,' he concluded rather lamely, 'is by nature formed a slave who is qualified to become the chattel of another person, and on that account is so, and who has just reason enough to know that there is such a faculty, without being endowed with the use of it . . . Since then some men are slaves by nature, and others are freemen, it is clear that where slavery is advantageous to anyone, then it is just to make him a slave.'

Aristotle on Property
 Turning to a discussion on the nature of property in general, Aristotle declared that there was one type of property which was held by natural right; another type which was conventionally created. The first was the gift of nature to man, granted for his sustenance, and included all things gained in war. The second was all property obtained by trade or other inventions of man. 'One of these is natural, the other is not, but rather owing to some art and skill.' Aristotle then condemned arbitrarily the system of usury. This seemed to him a most unnatural method of acquiring wealth. The essential purpose of riches was to support the life of the family or the state. Those who saw in money-making a means merely of increasing their own possessions at the expense of their fellow men were justly censurable. Retail trade was one means by which this was done, 'for it has not its origin in nature, but by it men gain from each other'. The supreme example of this evil was usury, 'for usury is most reasonably detested, as it is increasing our fortune by money itself, and not employing it for the purpose it was originally intended, namely exchange'. Thus did Aristotle sweepingly reject usury in maxims which at their rediscovery in the thirteenth century dominated medieval economic life.

Aristotle approved of private property as essential to the state.

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Property, especially slaves, was necessary for the maintenance of a family. It was an inherent part of the family unit. Destroy private property and the family dispersed into separate individuals. But the family was the essential unit of the state; so private property became indirectly necessary to the state. Aristotle saw in its possession the motive of many virtues, such as generosity and industry. No man would work so hard or so carefully for property which was not his own. Yet though property was better held by private owners, Aristotle preferred that the distribution of goods should be made to the whole community. In this way individual industry would be stimulated by the motive of pride in private possessions, and the community would be benefited when these increasing sources of wealth were generously given to it. Aristotle did not enter into a discussion on how this happy solution between private greed and public welfare should be attained. He merely left this to the discretion of the legislator to be dealt with according to the expediency of the time.

Having disposed of property and slavery to his own satisfaction, Aristotle proceeded to discuss the nature of government and the state more fully. Political obligation was based on natural law; the state was the result of natural inclination to sociability in man; similarly the state itself was a natural organism. What constituted this organism? Aristotle replied: its individual parts, its citizens. He then defined a citizen. 'There is nothing that more characterizes a complete citizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the government.' 'And a city . . . is a collective body of such persons sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life.' All those therefore who did not take an active part in government did not belong to the state; of these slaves were the most numerous; artisans also ought not to be permitted to become citizens, except in rare circumstances.

Aristotle proceeded to inquire into the nature and the form of government of a city. The nature of a city was determined by its end. All things were determined by their end as only in their end could their perfect form be perceived. Cities were bad or good according to the end they set themselves. If they sought the welfare of the whole, they were good; if the welfare of only a part, they were bad.

Then arose a difficulty. If the quality of a state could be judged by the end it set itself, by what criterion were its citizens to be judged? What indeed constituted a good citizen? To this Aristotle replied that a good citizen was he who was truly in harmony with the object activating the whole community. The good citizen was not identified with the good man; if the object of the state was bad, then the citizen who fulfilled that object was a bad man but a good citizen. But in the good state, the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the good citizen coincided; and conflict was removed.

But the conflict between the good man and the good citizen did not vitally concern Aristotle in the *Politics*. He discussed this fully in the *Ethics* and concentrated in the *Politics* rather on analysing the constitution of actual states in order to discover the cause of their decay, and the possibilities of cure. He proceeded to divide types of constitutions under the two headings good and bad. The good states were monarchy, aristocracy and a polity consisting of a mixed government; the bad tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. Aristotle examined these different forms of government at great length and came to some interesting conclusions about the essential nature of a state.

The form of government was determined, he saw, by the place where political authority resided. Governments were classified accordingly. If all the power was in the hands of one man, then the state took the shape of a monarchy if good, a tyranny if bad. When it resided in the hands of the few, it was either an aristocracy or an oligarchy; in the hands of the many, it was either a true polity or a hateful democracy.

✓ The functions of government were not, as in Plato's *Republic*, confined to education and justice, but were multifarious. The government was established that the citizens might live and live well. Therefore the government must concern itself with political economy; protection of property was also its duty. But its duties did not cease there. Aristotle was careful to show that security of property would never be a sufficient motive for keeping men together in the best commonwealth. Such protection he asserted would result in a destruction of equality amongst the citizens and so vitiate their political life. For, he argued, if property was the main concern

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of the state, then civic rights must depend on the amount of property each had. He who was rich was thus more of a citizen than he who was poor. Inequality would be the inevitable result; and the best commonwealth, which consisted of government by equals of equals, would cease to exist. Security of property as the chief end of the state was deprecated by Aristotle. The state sought essentially for the best life of its citizens. Nor was education a sufficient means to this end: 'Whosoever,' he declared, 'shall introduce any education, and think thereby to make his city excellent and respectable, will be absurd, while he expects to form it by such regulations, and not by manners, philosophy, and laws.' Turning away from Plato's repulsive negations, he believed rather in the presentation of positive good in order to bring his citizens to the best life. But it must not be imagined that Aristotle denied moral control to the state. Its function to attain the best life for its citizens gave it immediately powers to suppress the worst sides, and encourage the best. Aristotle's state was essentially moral as would be expected from his introductory study of ethics as the natural precedent to politics.

The rest of the book was taken up with an acute analysis of the best form of government. Intensely aware that the chief cause of friction in the city-states was due to the presence of factions, Aristotle suggested that a mixed form of government where political authority was distributed through the different sections of the state would be the best form of government to check unrest and revolution. This was his ideal polity. It partook of the nature of both aristocracy and democracy, if the latter were held to mean government by the many rather than government by the poor. The executive should in this case be in the hands of an aristocracy of ability who should not be open to censure from an ignorant populace. On the other hand the majority of citizens were capable of supervising jurisdiction; such should be their share in the government. Aristotle did not entertain the idea that legislation should be a function of government easily exercised. He saw constant change of laws only as destructive eventually of the habit of obedience; for he maintained that the nature of law was mainly customary. He would prefer then that the laws of a state should remain more or less unaltered and should preferably be written. Written laws were a guarantee against the instability of


men who were easily swayed by passion. Better then to keep the power of legislation out of the hands of men and restrain it under the rigidity of a written body of law. The magistrates might, however, have the power to interpret the law; thus flexibility would be introduced into an otherwise too rigid system. Nor was Aristotle in favour of open elections for the executive offices. He saw in this again a chance for the control of the government by the ignorant mass of citizens, and he preferred to eliminate such an opportunity for instability by advocating the selection of magistrates by lot or vote or by both, from amongst the recognized aristocracy of ability.

In this polity Aristotle hoped to eradicate the possibilities of revolution. If all the citizens had some share in the government, their interests were identified with its stability. If all recognized that some men were born superior and others inferior, where would be the point of rebelling against one's natural incapacity? If the small group of aristocrats knew that each in turn would come into office by the casting of lots, what need had the most ambitious of anything save patience till his turn should bring him into power? Thus in this happy mean so dear to the Greek soul, did Aristotle suggest the removal of the disease which was corroding the political life of the city-states. Insisting on the instability of human ambition, but at the same time recognizing the pliability of man when led by his emotions, Aristotle sought to find an outlet for these ambitions and a resolution of these emotions in the life of the state. Give men their share in government, retain and utilize for the welfare of the whole community man's love of his own property, his passion for his family and his friends, and inevitably the state would be bound together not by alien ties but by the strongest and most natural emotions of which men were capable. Man, said Aristotle, is pre-eminently a political animal.

The remedies suggested by Plato and Aristotle came too late to save the city-states from the destruction which threatened them. Aristotle lived to see the expansion of Macedon into an eastern empire, and the final subordination of the city-states whose individuality he so valued. Plato was called upon to act as lawgiver to one state where his suggestion of a philosopher-king failed to prove adequate in the absence of the philosopher. But the repercussions on

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the actual world of contemporary politics of these two treatises was nothing in comparison to the effect they had in moulding the thought of subsequent generations. Plato had set up an ideal state showing forcibly the necessity for absolute control if the end in view was considered worthy of attainment. He showed how much must be eradicated if unity was set as the ideal object of political life. Family ties, home life, even individual happiness, were not too great a sacrifice to be demanded in the name of the welfare of the body politic. Aristotle gave to the world definitions of political terms which it has not yet had to supersede. Moreover, his ideal of mixed government and his acute analysis of the adjustments necessary between the component parts of the body politic were models to succeeding generations. Plato showed the necessity of considering the purpose of not only the state, but of man, before political life could hope to obtain any proper adjustment; Aristotle propounded scientifically with fruitful illustrations from contemporary sources the nature of government, its forms and variations; the essential laws controlling its corporate life. On the foundations laid by these two thinkers many subsequent generations have built and rebuilt their theories of politics.



CHAPTER III

THE REIGN OF LAW: STOICISM AND ROMAN JURISPRUDENCE

THE political life of the Greek city-states collapsed completely in the third century B.C. Aristotle's pupil Alexander the Great extended the political unit of the city into an empire; the compact individual character of the cities was lost; the core of Greek cultural life decayed. The distinction between Greek and barbarian which had isolated Greek culture from contaminating influences, disappeared; the pure currents of Greek thought were mingled with eastern and western streams which vastly changed their character and direction. In the second century B.C. Greece became a Roman province; her political independence was finally lost; she became incorporated in a political system which emphasized forcibly the commingling of various nations and races. Greek thinkers ceased to speculate on the city-state as a political unit, and concentrated rather on pure philosophy or religion. The intellectual life of Greece was diverted from political channels into Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism.

In every sphere of life a profound change was manifest. Drama in the fourth century had taken as its theme subjects of civic interest; the presiding deities of the city-states always played a prominent part. In the third century, the dramatists delighted their audiences with themes connected with personal or family life; the city-state was no longer a rallying point of Greek enthusiasm: interest in civic life had vanished. The religious outlook of the Greeks altered in the fourth and third centuries. Influenced partly by the dramatists, partly by political thinkers and philosophers, the people recognized in Zeus a supreme god over all other gods. At the same time the scientific study of natural phenomena was both the cause and effect of a belief in the possibility that nature was no longer capricious but obeyed certain definite and ascertainable laws. The conviction arose that a single law governed the universe. The assumptions which had

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supported a belief in the supremacy of the city-state had disappeared. Internally and externally the pristine aristocratic isolation of the Greek city-states which had been such an important factor in the development of their political thought was undermined and finally swept away.

No definite treatises on politics have survived from these centuries. Thinkers occupied themselves with an inquiry into the fundamentals of philosophy, and made an effort to obtain some stable standard of morality in the rapidly changing conditions about them. Though there are no political treatises extant yet implicit in some of the philosophies were notions on the universe and the nature of man so radically different from previous ideas as to construct a new basis of thought, on which later speculators on the state built their systems.

Of these philosophies, the influence of Stoicism was by far the most important. The Greek Stoics, viewing the collapse of familiar forms of government representative of a unique civilization, turned their energies to the discovery of something which would offer them a bulwark against the ubiquitous disintegration of their society. They centred their philosophy in nature, and sought consolation for the uncertainty of human institutions in the stability of natural laws. Nature became their god; the source of all their activities; the object of all their aspirations. To become one with nature was the supreme object of man. Convinced that a unifying spirit infused all matter whether organic or inorganic, the Stoics argued that the nature of man was identical with the nature of the universe; man was but a part of the whole. Since man possessed will, nature too must possess will; since man possessed reason, so too must nature. The laws emanating from nature must be rational. As everywhere man was accustomed to subordinate means to an end, so nature subordinated means to an end and was essentially rational.

Stoic morals and incidentally their attitude to men's social relations were drawn from this fundamental belief in nature. To live the best life man must be at one with nature. Knowledge of nature was the primary and essential condition of the best life. The Stoics emphasized the accepted Greek idea that virtue depended on knowledge; whilst ignorance must inevitably result in vice: nay, ignorance was vice, whilst knowledge was virtue. Morality was thus bound up with

reason, because knowledge was impossible without the use of reason. The law by which men sought to live and to which they conformed their beings was a rational law. Irrational impulses resulting from emotions were to be suppressed rigorously. The Stoic despised all show of love, hatred, sorrow or joy. 'Banish joys, banish fear, put hope also to flight, and let not grief be present.' Fear above all was to be eradicated. Natural disorders emanating as they did from the same source of life from which human beings sprang were only apparently disastrous to human beings. Death being natural should be met fearlessly and imperturbably. Self-control was the highest virtue in the Stoic list.

In Stoicism no room seemed left for social life. The object of the individual was to cut himself off from making any response to his fellow men; to do without political life entirely; to live in accordance with natural law which was sufficient to regulate his actions without reference to external pressure from other human beings. Ethics and not politics was the controlling force between men. And ethics were essentially the concern of the individual, not of the group.

Yet in the Stoic philosophy certain conceptions were present which exercised a profound influence on the future development of political thought. A negative conclusion may be first cited. The emphasis on ethics and the neglect of politics effected at once a separation between ethics and politics only previously suggested but not clearly distinguished in Greek political thought. An ethical standard separate and distinct from any set up by society was held to be the supreme ideal for the individual. The life of the individual transcended the narrow limits imposed upon him by the state. The good man of Aristotle's conception was something quite distinct from and superior to the good citizen. The state no longer was the only means by which man could attain to the best life. Rather man belonged to the general species of humanity, and in obeying the law of nature, which governed all men, found himself in the greater society of humanity. The phrase 'citizen of the world' was coined by the Stoics to express this kinship between all men of whatsoever nation or race.

Arising from this conception that all men were under the same fundamental law of nature, the Stoics enunciated their belief that all men were equal, seeking the same law in order to conform themselves

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to its uniform pattern. The Stoics vigorously denied the Platonic and Aristotelean view of the natural inequality of man; they substituted the idea of the equality of man. This was a tenet of faith essential to the general structure of their philosophy.

Yet differences between men were apparent, for which it was difficult to account. The Stoics propounded as an explanation that at one time all men were actually equal: this was the golden age. The early Greek Stoics did not elaborate details for its disappearance or actual existence. This was left to the later Roman Stoics. It was enough to assert that an ideal perfect society had once existed which would serve as a standard from which to criticize existing imperfections.

Above all, the early Stoics' main contribution lay in their insistence that all phenomena whether human or non-human were not chaotic but essentially orderly. Their conception of natural law as a rational system controlling men and the universe linked up the pettiness of human activities with the general scheme of the universe. Human action became more profoundly significant whilst it was placed in a just proportion to the rest of nature. Natural law united all men together in one great community, the city of the world. In this great family all men were brothers and equals; all sought to harmonize their several individual lives with the one sustaining law of nature. This law was transcendent above man's desires; it was immutable. Man could not influence it any more than he could change the course of the stars. He sought to discover it because it was the pivot of his existence; unless he knew it he jarred against the very essence of life and would eventually break to pieces. Immutable rational law pervading the whole universe: such was the conception of natural law elaborated by the early Greek Stoics as their final word on the force which controlled man's every action. But the Greek Stoics did not seek to apply any of these notions definitely to political life. They left this task to the Romans.

The Romans previous to their contact with the Greeks, had speculated little on philosophy or politics. Of their unaided genius they had but one contribution to offer to political thought. This was the idea of sovereignty. From the earliest stages of their development the Romans were convinced that each community possessed an inalienable and unlimited authority to command. Each community had an

inherent power to exact unlimited obedience from its members. To this notion of absolute sovereignty they gave the name *imperium*. *Imperium* was the characteristic mark of a community. The early Romans made no attempt to develop this notion into a system of political philosophy. They were content to accept it on its face value and to proceed to express in practical activities this conviction that every community possessed supreme authority over its members: they developed an intricate and magnificent system of laws. Whilst Greece was theorizing on the nature of universal law, Rome was developing a network of jurisdiction over the then known world. The Romans were the law-makers of western Europe.

Throughout the imperial era a twofold movement was taking place within the development of this system of law. On the one hand the Roman status of citizenship was gradually granted to an increasing number of citizens outside the walls of the imperial city. This right of citizenship implied privileges of all sorts including particularly the right to be tried by the same law as the original citizens. So great a reputation had this law gained that the privilege of becoming a Roman citizen was much prized. So St. Paul preferred to seek justice before Caesar to being left to the mercy and prejudice of the local governors of Asia Minor. At the same time Roman officials were making an effort to unify the system of law which originated in the colonies outside Rome. Instead of leaving, as in the early colonies, the laws of the natives to exist separately from the laws of the colonizers, a process of amalgamation had set in; until Rome was able to appoint one central authority to supervise all the courts in the different provinces. Sufficient unity had been attained to warrant the possibility that such supervision would be effective. Two unifying processes thus dominated the growth of Roman law: the one flowing outwards from the centre, the other flowing inwards from the provinces; until finally they coalesced. At the height of Roman power all members of the empire were simultaneously citizens of Rome; all provincial courts were under the control of the central authority which supervised the officials administering the one body of law which had evolved.

The development of this legal system would in any case have concentrated the attention of the Romans on the subject of law. Their contact with the conquered Greeks from the second century B.C.

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onwards emphasized this interest. Lacking in the philosophic temperament, without the fertile imagination of the Greeks, the Romans through contact with their subtle neighbours, became the unsurpassed masters of the theory as well as the practice of law.

Greek thought took some time to penetrate into Rome. Its full effect was not felt until the second century A.D. Before that two men did more than any others to introduce Greek Stoic ideals to the Roman world. The ease and grace with which Cicero speculated on the meaning of Stoic philosophy was only rivalled by the rhetorical flourishes with which Seneca proclaimed sententiously his belief in such few phrases of the same philosophy as he could comprehend.

Cicero's views on politics are known only in fragmentary form. Many have come down to us only through the doubtful medium of quotations in early Christian writings. It is difficult to piece together his conceptions of the state from these fragments; sometimes indeed his sayings are contradictory, due no doubt in some places to the loss of the intermediary reasoning. But it is possible even in this confusion to see Cicero as the Roman lawyer and the disciple of Stoicism combining his ideas to form some valuable contributions to political thought.

Cicero was interested in the Stoic idea of natural law. But he did not see it as a universal law governing all matter; rather he conceived of it in a delimited form, as a system of morals applicable only to human society. He saw it constituting a standard of justice to society; he declared that law and justice were synonymous. From this he deduced that some things recognized by society were contradictory to the law of nature and hence unjust. In this category he placed slavery. He argued that by the law of nature all men were equal; that therefore the subordination of one man to another was unnatural and unjust. But he did not condemn slavery outright. In some of his writings he seemed to condone a practice recognized in Roman law and essential to Roman economy and Cicero's personal ease. The Roman lawyer was at conflict with the Stoic.

Turning to the nature of man and his relation to the state, Cicero repeated Aristotle's dictum that man was naturally sociable. But he added that men were naturally inclined to love each other. Where Aristotle emphasized the differences between men and insisted on

their variety, Cicero emphasized their similarities and minimized their differences. To him as a Stoic all men were born equal and sought the same end in life: conformation to the law of nature.

As Cicero strove to set out in Latin form the ideas he had culled from his Greek masters, he simultaneously accomplished two things. He modified the meaning the Greeks had attached to their phrases, and in his use of Latin words for translation he gave new content and significance to familiar terms. Thus the Latin word *libertas* was introduced with an entirely new meaning to the vocabulary of political thought. Cicero used it to translate Aristotle's conception of the privilege of citizenship. It did not connote freedom from restraint, but specifically a right to share in the government of the state. But the state did not mean the same thing to Cicero as it did to the Greeks. Cicero, as a member of the expanding Roman empire, distinguished between the state and the city. He separated city politics from the concerns of the greater community which existed beyond the territorial limits of any one Roman municipality. He defined the state anew as a community united by a common law for the common well-being. Thus the Latin word *libertas* meant to Cicero and his fellow citizens something far different from the Aristotelean right of citizenship.

Seneca repeated much of that which Cicero had already treated, but with greater emphasis. His writings were even more quoted by the Christian fathers than Cicero's. In this lay their importance. One particular aspect of Greek Stoic thought which Cicero had left untouched was amplified significantly by Seneca. He elaborated the conception of the golden age. He declared that it had actually existed at one time, but had been destroyed by the lust for personal possession. He asserted that political society had grown up to restrain this lust; he concluded that political society existed as the result of the corruption of human nature. Seneca seemed to be implying that society was a conventional structure superimposed upon man in consequence of certain jarring elements in his nature. It was an unnatural product. This conception of the state as a superimposition subsequently played a large part in the development of Christian theories of the state. Its influence can be seen even as late as in the works of Rousseau.

Whilst Cicero and Seneca showed signs of being definitely in-

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fluenced by their contact with the Greeks, the mass of Romans remained for some time impervious to any impression from their more cultured neighbours. It was not until the end of the second century A.D. when the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius stood out as an effective example of Stoic teachings, that Roman thought really seemed at last to be yielding to the greater subtlety of the Greek mind. The Romans, essentially practical in outlook, saw in Stoicism a religion rather than a philosophy. They sought to express in concrete form the abstractions becoming increasingly familiar to them. They tried to adjust their practice of law to the new theories of law developed by the Stoics. Their legal precepts passed through the crucible of Stoicism as understood by its Roman adherents; they were radically modified; they finally emerged at the end of the empire as the famous body of Roman law.

The Romans did not write treatises on the nature of law; they produced rather practical handbooks for lawyers. From these institutes their political theory has to be deduced. The task is made even more difficult by the fact that only fragments of some of the works remain. Still a few such as Gaius' *Institutes* are fairly complete; and Justinian's codification at the end of the empire is a reliable source of information both for its own and the previous periods. Such then are the sources from which the political theory of the Romans is deduced. Fragmentary and incorrect, yet certain definitions stand out as essentially Roman; certain explicit conclusions can be drawn from the ideas implicit in this mass of practical jurisprudence.

To the Roman the natural law of the Stoics seemed at first identical with the law of nations known to him already as a practical body of law. This system operated for foreigners and represented a mixture of Roman and foreign law. To Gaius writing in the third century the law of nations was a set of ideas common to all mankind and based on natural reason. Unlike the Stoic notion it was confined entirely to humanity, and was limited to men's expressed ideas as found in their codes of law or customs. It would seem, as with Cicero, as though existing systems of law and the idea of justice were identified. The later Roman lawyers, however, made a further distinction. They separated natural law from the law of nations; they seemed to see in natural law a body of principles known to man in his heart, sometimes

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at variance with the law of nations. A separation between justice and a system of laws was tacitly made. Thus slavery to Gaius was a natural result of war to which he had no moral objections; whilst to Ulpian and the later jurists slavery was distinctly contrary to the law of nature which declared all men equal; yet it was part of the law of nations as it was found as a recognized custom throughout all known society. The later Roman jurists affected by Stoic ideas could not justify slavery by the law of nature. Some things they recognized were conventional, unnatural and hence difficult to justify. The earlier complacent identification of the system of law and the idea of justice was giving way to a dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs.

Besides these two general forms of law, the lawyers recognized a third: municipal law relating specifically to special communities or states. This law, too, might be at variance with either the law of nations or the law of nature. Cicero had perceived this previously, and had distinctly asserted that no law in the state could be binding unless it was recognized by the individual as part of the law of nature. But no general effort was made amongst the lawyers to reconcile the three ideas into one comprehensive system. The Roman jurists were content to make these distinctions for their own practical use, and leave their philosophic justification to later ages.

Turning to the question of property, the Roman lawyers unlike the Greeks dissociated it entirely from slavery. Property was declared emphatically to be a natural institution. It was inherent in the nature of things and hence inviolable. Neither the early nor the later jurists offered any criticism on this important aspect of political life. The institution of property was sacred and above criticism.

The family on the other hand was accorded no natural rights nor importance in the political system such as Aristotle had attached to it. Marriage was considered to be merely a contract. The family was a conventional group dependent on this legal contract, which was dissoluble at the will of the participants. The family unit was rendered unstable and insignificant. In such a system it could not be and was not regarded as in any sense the basis of the state.

In dealing with the important subject of government, its nature and origin, the Roman jurists developed their theme on their own peculiar

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lines. Unlike the Greeks they associated it neither with slavery nor with the family. It was entirely the product of their original conception of *imperium*. This conception was elaborated in different ways throughout the history of classical Rome. At first it was held that the community could always delegate this power to its rulers. Hence when the senate ruled under the republic, the power had merely been delegated for a time into their hands. In a crisis the people had the right to transfer this authority to the hands of a dictator. Always the power resided in the community; and, wherever it was momentarily placed, the community as its controller could always shift it backwards and forwards, now to this body of citizens, now to that. The early conception of *imperium* was essentially democratic. The will of the people as a whole was the real source of all political authority.

With the rise of the empire, a new interpretation was given by the lawyers to the word *imperium*. They elaborated a great legal fiction. They declared that at one specific time, never actually stated, the people had transferred their inherent right to command to the emperor, not for a transient occasion but for all time, irrevocably. The absolute right to command (and its corollary, the right to demand unlimited obedience from every citizen) was thus placed for ever in the hands of the emperor; he was a perpetual dictator. The conclusions from this statement were important. The emperor was responsible to no one; he alone had the right to command and exact obedience, he was above the law as he made the law. For the right to command obedience to a law implied the right to make that law. Municipal or civil law, that is the civil law of the state, depended then on the will of the emperor. The Roman lawyers by a clever manipulation had erected an absolute monarch whose will was law. Irresponsible and non-moral the emperor stood above the people whose welfare was no longer his duty but merely his pleasure. The democratic side of the idea of *imperium* was completely eclipsed by the glory of the imperial majesty. In Justinian's codification the emperor was said to have the law of God (which was the law of nature) written in his heart. The emperor therefore had been granted from the people the supreme control not only over their community, but also over their consciences. He was the only source of political authority; he was the supreme

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fountain-head of the law which immutably and irrevocably bound the wills of his subjects into subjection. Government originating in the community's will to command, became under the manipulations of the imperialistic lawyers, a machine pivoting on the arbitrary will of the emperor. The people had no rights nor share in it; they had no political duties save to obey implicitly. They might prize the right of citizenship of the empire because of the benefits they received therefrom in the courts of law; but they had no right to change the law administered therein: it was written in the heart of the emperor.

Paradoxically the Roman lawyers maintained two irreconcilable theories: they insisted that the highest authority in the state was above all law and entirely irresponsible; yet they asserted that all human activities were governed by the law of nature and, to be at all justifiable, must be in accordance with this law. They seemed to be making a fundamental distinction between society, which was governed by either natural law or the law of nations, and the state which had its specific law emanating from the will of the sovereign: within the state they seemed to make a further important distinction between the state and its government.

These distinctions were implicit in their statements. They were not elaborated. The Roman lawyers were not profoundly interested in the nature of the state as were the Greeks. In fact the isolated Greek city-state had been superseded by the Roman empire; in theory man as a political animal was transformed into a citizen of the world governed by a multifarious system of laws. Law and its manifestations were the chief concern of Greek Stoics and Roman lawyers alike. They saw man transcending the narrow limits of his municipal interests and realizing his communion with other nations and other races. They emphasized as a common bond between this concourse of peoples the supremacy of law as uniting all social and individual effort to a single end: harmony with the law of nature.

Greek Stoicism and Roman legal theories played an important part in the development of political thought. Stoic ideas penetrated into Christianity both before and after its establishment as the state religion of the Roman empire in the fourth century. Early Christian thought born in the east and later formulated into creeds by eastern thinkers came sharply into contact with Stoic philosophy from which

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it gained much. Later the Christian system was grafted into the Roman, and again was subjected to the modifying influence of Stoicism.

Much more directly Graeco-Roman concepts of law helped to formulate political thought in western Europe. When in the twelfth century the study of Roman law was revived in Italy, special schools of law were established to educate men who were subsequently to become the chief statesmen of the newly developing nation-states of Europe. The Roman body of law incorporated in its codes and institutes became the handbook of these eager law students and the model on which the European kings in some cases sought to establish their newly consolidated kingdoms. The development of Roman jurisprudence was the development not only of Roman political thought but of the foundations of the modern state.

The universality of one immutable law; the idea that the state was not the final goal of life, but was a convention established by men and existing by their will, yet in some undefined sense bound to move in harmony with fundamental law and to be subservient to it; the assertion that the individual had an end transcendent to that of the state and possibly in conflict with it; the differentiation between society and the state arising from the definitions of the different types of law; the precious distinction between legal systems and the principle of justice; above all the unique idea of *imperium*, an absolute irresponsible power resident in every community, a non-moral sovereignty — these were the ideas formulated or implied by the Roman jurists during their constructive efforts to establish their empire in the west.

CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCE OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY ON POLITICAL THOUGHT

THE political concepts of the Christian thinkers did not become an important factor in political thought until Christianity was accepted as the official religion of the Roman empire in the fourth century. By that time Christian thought had been formulated to some extent. It had had over three hundred years of growth and adaptation to its environment before its official recognition. During that long period it had developed an organization of such a character that it was bound inevitably to come into conflict with the existing machinery of government, and in that conflict to modify current conceptions and itself be modified. Early Christian thought can be conveniently classified into three groups: the first period of internal development and formulation lasting to the fourth century; the second period of modification when the religion became official for the whole Roman empire lasting to the fall of the empire; the third period of adaptation and struggle when the church was left as the sole guardian of western civilization against the barbarian influx. This period passed imperceptibly away when Christianity itself was no longer the dominant force but was yielding and changing its character under pressure of barbarian notions. Early Christian thought then merged into the medieval synthesis.

In the first period the main sources of Christian thought are embodied in the epistles of the early apostles and fathers of the church. The gospels as second-hand records obscured by religious sentiment admit of too many interpretations to be treated as reliable sources of political theory. St. Augustine's masterpiece, *The City of God*, was typical of the second period. It showed the reactions of a devout Christian and clear thinker to the fall of a long-standing civilization. The last period had its opinions incorporated in a kind of compendium of current ideas compiled by the Spanish Christian St. Isidore of Seville. From these three groups of writings, supplemented by a

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thorough knowledge of the actual environmental conditions, some idea of the effect of early Christianity on the development of political thought can be obtained.

Though many of the Christian concepts can be seen to be similar to and almost identical with the pervading Stoic ideas, yet one great difference existed between these two systems of thought. Whereas the Stoics were concerned with philosophically adjusting themselves to the reality of natural law; and the Roman lawyers attempted to interpret this philosophy into a practical system of jurisprudence; the early Christians began by postulating an entirely new society not at all ephemeral but concretely embodied in the growing intricacy of ecclesiastical organization. The Christians defied the Roman state by the actual establishment in its very centre of another state: the divinely appointed church. The defence of this new society constituted a biting criticism of the existing political order, wherein lay the pith of the influence of Christian thought on politics. Moreover, not only did the desire to maintain the newly founded church activate criticism amongst the Christians, but the very concept of a church was an innovation to western thought. Neither Greek nor Roman had separated spiritual and temporal powers. The early Christians created this separation and attempted to justify it. The concept of a church (whatever may be the definition given to this term) as a separate society from the state must be admitted to be the most original and most important contribution of Christianity to political thought. What meaning did the early Christians give to this new corrosive concept? And how did they achieve its formulation?

Religious zeal stirred the early Christians until all familiar institutions seemed imbued with new meaning and fresh significance. Everywhere they perceived the guiding spirit of the Almighty Creator who in his solicitude for man had in their own times deigned to achieve the redemption of the world. God was very present in the first centuries of the Christian era. The effect of this overwhelming consciousness of the divine was far-reaching in the realm of social relations.

The main theme of the Christian message was the salvation of the soul through the redemption offered by Christ. This deeply affected the conception of human nature. The Stoics and Greeks had hardly

stressed though they had recognized warring elements in human nature. To Christians a cleavage was necessary if salvation was to be effective. Sin was the logical postulate to a doctrine of grace. St. Paul, aware of his own weaknesses, overwhelmed by the dazzling brilliance of a very real religious experience, found in his own life recalcitrant desires which would not conform to his rational aim to live according to the divine will. He asserted as an explanation that man was a dualistic being consisting of two antagonistic elements, body and soul. 'I find another law in my members, and what I would not, that I do.' The body was the inferior animal mortal side, the soul the superior element of immortality worthy to be saved. The presence of this dualistic nature in man was explained by the story of the fall. Both Stoics and Christians held that man, once perfect, had fallen from this state. But the Christians added that this fall was due to the temptation of Satan leading to sin. In sinning man lost the power to do good, and since then struggled ineffectually to live according to the divine will. God had sent prophets and martyrs to point the way to salvation; had laid down the principles of morality in the Mosaic law; man was still too weakened to attempt to follow successfully these precepts. Moral strength was lacking. This was now forthcoming through the agency of Christ who had released the fount of grace to the world. All the precepts given by God from the fall of man to the coming of Christ were called indiscriminately the law of nature or the moral law. The Stoic conception of natural law as pervading the whole universe and being in a sense non-moral had been delimited by the Christians to the sphere of morality alone. Natural law was now conceived as a moral code. St. Paul argued that this morality was known to all men and written in their hearts. Conscience was its voice. Right and wrong were known to all through this law. But to effect the right was the fundamental difficulty. For that grace and redemption were required, which should take away the burden of sin inhibiting men from their performance of the law of God. The defence of the necessity of salvation led St. Paul to his assertion of the dualistic nature of man; from that he proceeded to its explanation by means of the Stoic conception of a golden age embellished by the Hebrew legend of a moral lapse. Then came the Hebraic conception of natural law and a profound conviction that all man's activities were

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leading on to the final revelation offered by Christ. God, to St. Paul and his contemporaries, was obsessed with the desire to save man. That was the ultimate goal of the divine will. But there were some awkward difficulties in achieving salvation.

The early Christians imbued with a sense of the stupendous change which their new religion had made in their lives were liable to outbursts of enthusiasm. As a result, a charge of anarchy was constantly hurled at them, and a fear arose amongst the leaders that the faith would be brought into disrepute by the uncontrolled zeal of its fiery partisans. Evidently in the early days of the church emotional excesses occurred frequently enough to cause anxiety amongst the more sober minded. But it was difficult to restrain men from headlong defiance of the existing order, when the doctrine was preached to them that now that they were saved all the old laws were contravened by the new dispensation. The problem arose of reconciling the firm religious conviction that God had in fact saved his people from bondage to sin, released them from oppressive restraints in order to fulfil his divine will and to bring them to salvation and the necessity to instil into the zealots a respect for the contemporary social order. If God had willed a release from bondage, and had pointed the way to salvation by indicating a new method of life, how then could the apostles expect men to bow down to the old order and obey the old authorities whose commands were sometimes obviously contrary to the law of God as newly revealed to the faithful?

To meet this real difficulty St. Paul and his associates elaborated a conception of the origin and nature of government which formed the bedrock of Christian political thought for centuries. St. Paul urged obedience to the existing political authorities on the grounds that all government was established by God. 'The powers that be are ordained of God', he wrote to his recalcitrant Roman disciples. And obedience was due to them by the law of God. Political obedience was thus enjoined as a religious duty; to disobey the existing magistrates was to disobey an ordinance of God; to do this was not only a crime against society but a sin against God who maintained the foundations of the social order. Sinful man must be restrained in the way he should go; God had set up government for this purpose. According to Hebraic authorities with whom St. Paul was thoroughly familiar,

government existed to restrain sin. Yet, though it resulted from the presence of sin it was not itself sinful as it was constituted by God who had given the power of the sword (that is, the use of force) to magistrates, whether kings, emperors or their subordinates, to punish the evil-doer and reward the good man. This was for St. Paul the essence of justice. Justice was the maintenance of the law of God which was a system of rewards and punishments based on a clear conception of good and evil. The will of God was the maintenance of good and the suppression of evil: this was his fundamental law. He instituted governors to enforce this, who must be obeyed without demur. St. Paul did not explicitly enter into the possibility of a clash between the behests of the divinely ordained governors and the dictates of the law of God written in the hearts of men. Yet implicit in some of his remarks lay a realization of this possibility, and suggestions how to deal with it.

Slavery, St. Paul maintained, was contrary to natural law. In the first instance all men were created equal and free. There were neither bond nor free, Jew nor Gentile. But sin crept in and destroyed the equilibrium of man's life. By sin men were enslaved to the lower part of their nature, to the lusts and desires of the flesh; this was real slavery and constituted a tyrannical bondage of the real man. Salvation was a release from this condition. When a man was saved, his soul was freed. How then explain actual slavery? St. Paul replied that actual slavery existed for two reasons. Like government it was a means of restraining evil. The true slave who was in the bondage of sin must be kept in check by a master whose function was to punish the evil in his slave. If on the other hand a man was free in his soul, his external condition of slavery was immaterial and must be regarded as a discipline imposed by God for the good of his soul. So St. Paul urged runaway slaves who saw in the Christian message of equality a justification to escape their odious condition, to return peaceably to their masters and live under their tutelage, to show in their humility and obedience their real submission to the will of an almighty God. In this way slavery, which seemed the antithesis of the Christian message of redemption from bondage, was justified in the early Christian era and was tolerated for centuries by the early church.

But whilst the anarchical elements in the early church were

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rigorously suppressed by St. Paul and the other leaders by an admonition to obey the all pervading law of God as manifested in the existing social institutions which stood for order, there were certain revolutionary tendencies in the newly growing society which were encouraged by these same men despite their subversive effects on contemporary customs and institutions. Whereas in republican Rome of the third century B.C. the family had been considered the foundation of the state, in the Roman empire marriage had come to be regarded as a legal contract dissoluble at the will of the parties concerned. This change in attitude towards marriage had resulted in a redistribution of authority. Parental control which had been of an almost absolute nature in early Roman history gradually yielded before the pressure of the state until with the growth of divorce under the Empire family life so decayed that very little parental authority existed. The early Christians made a successful attempt to reconstruct the family unit. By reviving the family and parental authority they laid a firm foundation for their new social order. Marriage in Christian ethics ceased to be regarded as a contract and was looked upon as a sacrament. The bond between the parties could not be dissolved. 'What God hath joined, let no man put asunder'; divorce in this system was entirely wiped away. Having declared marriage to be indissoluble the Christians proceeded to assert that within the family the father was to be regarded as the only head; wife and children were subordinate to him even as all the children of men were subordinate to God the father. Bound up with the very bedrock of Christian theology, the family under these influences was restored to something of its pristine authority under the old Roman system. The father as head was more easily dealt with than independent members of his household, and as his position of authority depended largely on his union with the church, so he was likely to form a willing co-operator with the ecclesiastical authorities. In this way Christian organization was able to persist in spite of persecution. The family under Christian influence became an important element as in early times. An authority was exercised in it which was of greater weight than purely domestic matters warranted. The Christian conception of marriage was not only a criticism of the existing social conditions of the empire; it was a threat to its political authority, for in the family

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a rival claimant to the authority of the state appeared in the pater-familias whose duty and inclination bound him to an observance of Christian rather than imperial law. Political authority was being challenged by every Christian man who, firmly convinced that his marriage was a holy sacrament, knew himself to be placed at the head of his family by the will of God, and regarding himself as divinely appointed to this position could not brook interference from the pagan authority of imperial officials. The revival of the family unit by the early Christians was one of their first significant moves towards the constitution of a new order of political society.

Simultaneously another process of as great importance was taking place within the organization of this religious sect. From the very beginning of Christianity there was a firm conviction that the new way of living must inevitably clash with the accepted customs of the day. St. Paul was acutely conscious of this possibility. He urged acceptance of the established authorities but at the same time he vehemently asserted that Christians should not seek satisfaction in a dispute before a pagan court. Any dispute between Christians, he asserted, ought to be brought before other Christians, particularly those with some semblance of spiritual authority. This was nothing less than a suggestion to set up courts composed of Christians to try Christian disputes, according to the new revelation of God's law. In short, St. Paul was advocating the establishment of a system of courts and laws as a rival to the imperial. Such, in fact, his suggestion proved to be. Within the first three centuries of Christianity there was no doubt that the new sect was nothing less than a state within a state, existing according to its own laws, judged by its own members, and above all refusing to acknowledge the authority of the emperor over its actions. This final assertion was calculated to make the Christian faith a difficult proposition to Roman authorities.

The policy of the Roman government towards religion was one of toleration, provided the sects were willing to recognize the emperor as head of the state and to submit to the rite of emperor worship. The Christians could not in view of their faith that God was the only ruler of the world acknowledge the pagan emperors of Rome as worthy of worship. This was due to God alone. The absolute power of the emperor was always limited in the mind of a Christian by the law of

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God whose interpreter was the inspired church, not the emperor. Despite the belief that all authority emanated from God and obedience was due to the emperor as a religious duty, yet when the dilemma of obedience to the emperor or God presented itself to the members of the early church, without hesitation they denied the emperor recognition. In the first three hundred years of its existence Christianity therefore was intermittently persecuted by the Roman authorities. If the Christian danger seemed quiescent their treatment was lenient; when unrest created fear then persecution followed as a matter of course. The Christians, unlike any other sect, refused the grant of toleration from a source which their faith compelled them to believe had not the right to tolerate. So matters stood until the fourth century. The Christian church by then had a definite organization; had established a new attitude towards marriage; had revived the family unit: everything suggested that a new type of society had arisen in the midst of the old. So long as it remained confined to the outcasts and the poor; so long as its numbers were negligible; so long was there little to fear from Christianity as a rival political system to the Roman empire.

But in the fourth century conversions in the Roman army spread rapidly. A large proportion of the imperial soldiers became Christian, and their consciences became troubled about their allegiance to the emperor. Under pressure of this danger, the emperor had no alternative but to accept the new faith as his own. In the middle of the fourth century A.D. Constantine became the first Christian emperor, and Christianity was recognized as the official religion of the empire. Christianity had entered on its second phase of development.

The immediate practical result of this exaltation of Christianity was the dilution of its enthusiasm. The new official religion of the state drew to itself not only sincere believers but a mass of members who for various non-religious motives joined its ranks. Secondly the policy of the Roman empire towards other cults changed. Christianity refused to tolerate any other religion within the confines of the empire. Religious persecution of all non-Christian cults ensued. The character of intolerance changed as a direct result of Christianity. Persecution was no longer sporadic, arising from political motives which varied with the exigencies of the time, as in the early days of

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the Roman empire. The Christians maintained on the contrary that there was only one true religion; that all governments were established by God to carry out his divine will to bring all men to salvation by establishing this true religion; that all other faiths must be suppressed by the authority of the emperor in his function of maintaining the law of God. Persecution became in Christian political theory an inescapable duty continuously incumbent on the state.

The civil authorities for their part were trying to control this new ecclesiastical power which seemed to bid fair to become the dominant force in the state. The emperors throughout the brief period before the fall of Rome struggled to obtain control over the appointments of bishops; over the calling of church assemblies; over the formulation of doctrines and creeds which were to constitute the law of the church. After the fall of Rome when the centre of imperial government was shifted to Constantinople, Justinian in the fifth century succeeded where his predecessors had failed. He established himself as the chief authority in the church to whom the highest bishop was subordinate. But whilst Caesar-papism was destined to succeed in the east, another theory developed in the west to fit the more complicated facts. The direct result of the clash between the two powers, and the most important theoretically, was the formulation in the fifth and sixth centuries of the theory of the two swords. This was the main contribution of Christianity in its second phase to political theory, and marked an important step in the development of political thought.

The theory of the two swords was taken from the episode of St. Peter showing Christ two swords when in the garden of Gethsemane. From this simple action the Christians of the fifth century deduced that Christ had meant two spheres of authority to exist in the government of the world. Relying on the already firmly accepted conviction that man was dualistic in nature, they argued that he had two types of life, the spiritual and temporal, over which God had placed two separate authorities, the church and the emperor. There was no need for these two spheres of influence to clash as both had separate functions to perform. The emperor cared for the temporal welfare of his subjects and saw that justice was maintained and order enforced; the church exhorted to obedience to God's law and saved souls by

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means of persuasion and the discipline necessary to this end. The church must formulate its creeds, appoint its judges, control its jurisdiction. Both authorities were equal and neither was subordinate to the other. In theory at least, it was maintained that the line between spiritual and temporal matters was clear, despite the contrary evidence of the facts.

The finest exponent of the theory of the separation⁸ of the two kingdoms was St. Augustine. His *City of God* written as the outcome of the fall of Rome, showed the reaction of a sincere believer to the establishment of Christianity as an official religion. St. Augustine rejoiced in the fall of Rome; he saw in this event the beginning of the era when the kingdom of God would be established on earth. To him the history of the human race had been characterized by a struggle between the temporal kingdoms and the city of God typified in the first instance by the quarrel between Cain and Abel. Cain's descendants represented the evil element, Abel's the good; and the rise and fall of the great empires of the world were the fluctuations brought about by the evil actions of Cain's posterity. The downfall of the Roman empire he saw as their final catastrophe. In its place was to be erected the spiritual kingdom of heavenly Jerusalem which should have dominion over the whole world. St. Augustine did not envisage the destruction of all political life; he saw rather the subordination of all temporal kings and princes to the one authority residing in the Heavenly Jerusalem. Kings and princes were to be the servants of the ecclesiastical authorities.

Unlike his fellow Christians St. Augustine emphatically denied the dualistic conception of man's nature. Sin, he asserted, was the result not of a defect in nature but of a defect in man's will. Denying that the conflict between good and evil was confined within the narrow sphere of the individual soul, St. Augustine saw this conflict on the vaster scale of all history, nay, of the whole universe. He maintained that the angels themselves had been divided by the satanic rebellion into two groups representing the powers of good and evil. Similarly he asserted that mankind was divided into the two types, those who were predestined to sin and those who were predestined to salvation, the ones the sons of Cain, the others of Abel. St. Augustine was suggesting a theory of historical evolution. This brought him to the

conclusion that Europe was destined eventually to be a single entity, politically separate, but spiritually and hence basically united.

This vision at the time of its conception was stupendous. From the chaos of the collapsing Roman empire the saint envisaged an achieved unity. He presented in pictorial and vivid language the theory of the two spheres of influence already implicit in the relations between the early church and the Roman state. The *City of God* lay between two worlds, the classical and the medieval: it was the closing chapter of the one and the opening of the other. St. Augustine insisted that the conflict between church and state was not merely a temporary incident but was perpetually true of the whole course of history; he foresaw in the near future a resolution of this conflict in terms of the triumph of the spiritual kingdom.

In the early years of Christianity little was said about property, and that little was vague. This indefiniteness persisted until the end of the second century. From that time to the time of St. Augustine's writing, the Christian authorities seemed gradually to formulate their attitude to property more definitely. By the fifth century the once despised sect had acquired sufficient property and power to make important the question of the justness of its possessions. The early Christians had vaguely suggested that all things should be held in common amongst the faithful. But this was not elaborated and no objection seemed to be taken to the possession of private property by Christians. By the time of St. Augustine the church had already come into direct conflict with the imperial government over the question of the right of the civil authority to deprive recalcitrant members of the new faith of such property as they possessed. St. Augustine expressed on one of these occasions of conflict his views on property which were typical of the general attitude of his fellow Christians to this subject. He maintained that God had given all the fruits of the earth to man and man could make use of those fruits to satisfy his necessities. But beyond what was sufficient for his needs should be used for the benefit of all men. In short, he considered that in the state of nature property was common to all men, but that each had the right to take from the common stock for his particular use; anything over and above this quantity belonged to the common stock and should be used for the benefit of all. Some of his contemporary

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Christians even maintained that almsgiving was not charity but merely justice; it was returning to the common stock what naturally belonged to it. Community of goods was not recognized as compulsory or beneficial. All goods were originally given to man for the common use; private property was a right to acquire sufficient for one's personal wants; but private property was always limited by the recognition of the responsibility to use all goods for the common benefit. An absolute right to private property as understood by the Roman jurists was vigorously denied by the Christians. Private property like government and slavery were conventional institutions superimposed by man or God for the benefit of humanity, after the collapse of the original perfect state of nature occasioned by the fall. Private property being established by man could be removed by man at his will: the imperial government could remove the church's possessions at its own pleasure. But St. Augustine avoided this conclusion by the safeguarding clause that some property was instituted by God and only the righteous should possess it. This suggestion was later much elaborated by the medievalists. It was merely a suggestion of St. Augustine's drawn from him in a moment of controversy. Essentially the Christians were developing a new theory which emphasized the responsibility of property and denied the right of unlimited and irresponsible personal possession.

There is some controversy as to the influence of the *City of God* on medieval thought. Some authorities hold that the book was little known; others that it formed one of the chief manuals studied amongst ecclesiastics. It is safe to say that its influence can be seen clearly in the thirteenth century in the conception of Christendom as a united state. St. Augustine's definitions on property certainly formed the initial step in the formulation of medieval doctrine on this question.

With the fall of Rome in the fifth century the empire began visibly to disintegrate. The eastern empire rapidly withdrew from western politics and concentrated on its own internal problems and protection from eastern foes. In the west, the barbarians were settling in groups of various numbers and accordingly cutting up Europe into racial divisions. As they set up their own barbarized version of the Roman civilization, they introduced a far less complex

notion of society. The church remained as the sole guardian of classical culture.

The influence of the barbarians on political thought and institutions was retrograde. The standards of culture had to be adapted to the lower level of untutored minds until by the seventh century the effect on thought could be clearly seen. The period of constructive thought which produced the theory of the two swords on the political side and the great creeds on the religious, gave way to a dearth of ideas when men seemed content to con by heart the formulae of the preceding age. Fragments of thought rather than whole systems were the order of the day. Books were compiled of quotations from others rather than of the conceptions of the writer. Of such a type was the work of St. Isidore of Seville in the seventh century. It was an encyclopaedia of current conceptions. Searching for the origins of everyday phrases and words, St. Isidore gave a valuable though fragmentary picture of contemporary thought.

The chief characteristic of this later period of early Christianity was the commingling of Stoic, Roman and Christian concepts. Taken wholesale from the Stoics were the conceptions of a golden age, natural law and the natural equality of men. But under the transforming influence of Christian fervour these ideas were given new content. The golden age became a symbol of man's uncorrupted past from which he had fallen, to which he might return through the grace of Christianity. The kingdom of God had existed in previous ages; it was proclaimed as a possible future for mankind despite their sinful nature. The Christians extended the contrast between the ideal suggested by the Stoics and the actual conditions, until they evolved an elaborate theory of man as he ought to be and man as he was; in which the church pointed him the way to the ideal, and the state dealt with him as he was. In natural law a similar concreteness was given to the concepts inherited from the Stoics. In this the Christians were even more influenced by the Roman jurists than by the Stoics. St. Isidore made clear that by the seventh century the tripartite division of law recognized by the late Roman lawyers had become part of Christian thought. There was natural law, which was an innate perception of right and wrong common to all men. This was St. Paul's definition, but St. Isidore elaborated it by specifying

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the actual relations of men living by natural law: all men were free and all property was in common as God had given the fruits of the world to men for their common use. However, under the law of nations, regulations were made restricting men*to private property, curtailing their freedom by the establishment of slavery, and setting up many other minor regulations which delimited the sway of natural law. This system of law was, according to St. Isidore's definition, the common element in all societies. Finally there was the civic or municipal law referred to in terms of the definition given it by the Roman lawyers: it depicted any particular system of law of any given state. From the generalizations of the Stoics, through the precise formulations of the Roman lawyers, the concept of law had passed into the hands of the Christians to be modified by them into a composition of the two. Based on broad principles similar to the Stoics, but elaborated in detail as by the Roman lawyers, the early Christians conserved in their teaching a profound conception of law destined to form the basis of medieval philosophy and more practically the entire system of canon law.

Nothing further was added after the sixth century to the concept of the relations of church and state. As parallel authorities they existed side by side. Both received sanction from God for different ends. But there was always a suggestion, particularly in the *City of God*, that the church had the superior part to play. As yet, however, this was not elaborated. It was left to the later Christians to bridge the gaps in the system of their predecessors.

The outstanding contribution of the early Christians to the development of political thought was the postulation and elaboration of the idea of a church. No one before the Christians had definitely seen a difference or even the possibility of a difference between spiritual and temporal matters. Firmly convinced by their faith of a conflict within man between what they felt were definitely higher and lower elements; convinced also that this conflict was not only an internal moral struggle within each individual but was the conflict written in the history of mankind between the forces of good and evil, the early Christians had no alternative but to separate the higher and lower elements in this struggle into the two departments: spiritual and temporal, the one conducive to the things of the soul and immortality,

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the other leading through transient pleasures to a mortal end. Urged too by their religious fervour to interpret this conviction in terms of action, the early Christians in the first place withdrew themselves from the kingdoms of this world and concentrated in their own groups on the establishment of the kingdom of God. The church had come into being. The separation of spiritual and temporal powers, the realization of a clash of standards between natural law as the norm of justice and the actual system of jurisprudence then existing, was given concrete shape and definition by the creation of the church. In this existing tangible body the principles of justice were formulated through the living inspiration from the very fount of justice itself; God was ever present with his apostles, and had already shown his will beyond doubt through the example of his son. The Stoic might search in his heart for the natural law to which he must conform if he was to adjust himself to reality; the Roman lawyer might frankly admit that justice and the Roman system of jurisprudence were not synonymous and might even formulate characteristics peculiar to a code of righteousness; but the Christian attended frequently and fervently at his church and daily renewed within himself the conviction that his concept of the divine law was not an individual interpretation of God's will but was without shadow of doubt the actual absolute will of God, the very law which permeated the whole universe and sustained nature and the society of men. The law of God was clearly audible through the voice of the church. Criticism of existing institutions no longer vacillated but was a sustained effort, generated by the persistent attack of the new intolerant religion against all other modes of thought and life. The Christians precipitated a struggle between ideals and actualities which has persisted to this day. It is in this struggle and the progress inherent in any such perpetual criticism of the existing order of society that the early Christians made an important and lasting contribution to political thought.

CHAPTER V

THE ATTEMPTED SYNTHESIS OF THE MEDIEVAL SCHOOLMEN

IMMENSE changes took place in social and political life between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries in western Europe. These greatly stimulated speculation in the political and philosophical sphere. Men made an effort to adjust their old modes of thought to the new facts of their growing experience. As the changes were many and varied so speculations induced by these events varied and formed a complex and often irreconcilable body of political theories. The Middle Ages is thus a period difficult to summarize in one or two chapters. In point of view of chronology alone the term is used loosely to cover a period of some seven hundred years, as much as separate the twentieth century from the era of the crusades. Yet the artificial divisions, which must necessarily be made in order to reduce this chaotic mass of theorizing to comprehensible proportions, can be based on a few distinctive features which seem to split the period into definite sections sometimes chronological, sometimes according to subject-matter.

The period can be narrowed chronologically into the three hundred years extending from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. From the fall of the Roman empire until the eleventh century, European thought as a whole may be regarded as static. The brief renaissance of the Carolingian empire was a brilliant exception. But as a rule intellectual life confined itself during these years to a process of repetition. Such books as were written were mainly summaries of writers of the previous active period of thought under the Romans. Teutonic notions of society were implicit in customs and institutions; they were not yet explicitly stated in literary form. The young nations, like children, were learning their intellectual alphabets and were laboriously spelling out the works of former masters. Not until the eleventh century did they attempt any independent thought; and then, like adolescents, with a sudden spurt they blossomed into

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vigorous, creative, and sometimes original thinkers. A convergence of stimulating events and the rapidity of change forced upon them the need to seek new interpretations of life more in harmony with their surroundings. The consciousness of national separateness which became so marked in the fourteenth century in the leading states of Europe closed the medieval period. After the thirteenth century new problems emerged of a very different character from those which occupied the minds of the medieval thinkers. The newly organizing nation-states presented within themselves and in their mutual relations difficulties hitherto unknown; so the emphasis in political thought shifted after the thirteenth century to aspects of political philosophy different in nature from those relevant to the Middle Ages proper. The eleventh to the thirteenth centuries is thus a fairly well defined period; but the division is not absolute and can only be taken as a very general and somewhat artificial one.

The main concern of political thinkers within this period was the administrative system. The eleventh century marked the end of the invasions of Europe by the barbarians; and the inhabitants having settled into their new homes, began to make efforts to reorganize themselves and establish efficient governments. The Norsemen in France, England and Southern Italy were geniuses at organization, whilst in Germany a long almost unbroken line of determined emperors revived the efforts to create an efficiently run empire extending from Germany southward over Italy.

Within the church the religious revival of the eleventh century gave further impetus to this already prevalent urge. Beginning within the Abbey of Cluny, an earnest and vigorous movement to reform the monastic orders of the church seized upon the religious. Reform resulted in the creation of new orders. The religious fervour which activated the new orders resulted in the rapid spread throughout Europe of these new communities of men and women who sought a sterner discipline than they found in secular life. Discipline and hence the need for order was the keynote of the monastic movement. Outside the monasteries the ecclesiastical system was also affected by the prevalent desire to organize and settle into orderly life. So the great reforming popes of the medieval period urged new restrictions upon the bishops of the various states and carried on a copious corre-

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spondence over these many points of administrative detail. From these papal decretals and the episcopal visitational records can be deduced the main problems which interested the ecclesiastics.

Meanwhile, in Italy and France the new law schools sprang up in the eleventh century and reintroduced to Europe at a critical moment the systems of law which had made the Roman empire famous. In these schools statesmen and churchmen were educated in the art of administration and jurisprudence to fit them for the responsibilities thrust upon them by the all-pervading desire to establish good government throughout Europe.

Everywhere then experiments in administration and the difficulties arising therefrom were the main concern of kings, emperors and ecclesiastical potentates. A clash was inevitable between these rival claimants to govern the various portions of European territory. The main lines of division came between the spiritual and temporal powers: the organizing nation-state on the one hand and the fervent religious orders supported by the zealous ecclesiastics on the other. Hence political speculation in the Middle Ages was approached invariably from two different points of view, though both were concerned with the same problem of administration. The church saw one aspect of the administrative machinery, informed by its own peculiar problem of maintaining discipline within its vast mass of monasteries and the normal ecclesiastical system of priests; whilst the state in the person of kings and emperors saw another aspect, concerned with maintaining its position against the encroachments of the longer established church, and with unifying the forms of government necessary to make its authority effective within its boundaries. Medieval speculation subdivided itself into the two groups who approached the political problems of the day from very diverse angles. Both were concerned with administration as their central interest; but the motives activating them differed, and the actual particular administrative difficulties differed in accordance with the difference between the secular and ecclesiastical organizations.

The centralizing efforts of church and state alike were hindered and complicated by the decentralizing force of feudalism. The continual invasions of barbarians had left their mark on the structure of European society. The whole affected area had split up into

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innumerable self-contained units, prone by their nature to further disintegration. Feudal lords claimed the right to administer the custom of their territories for dependants sworn to obedience by the most sacred oaths of fealty. Everywhere the feudal lord tended to become a petty sovereign. He dutifully supervised the administration of the custom of his land; he was duly rewarded with the profits of the fines in the courts. The feudal lords were as deeply concerned with administration as emperor, pope or king. But feudal elements only intensified the struggle over administration. They did not dominate the situation for any length of time. Feudal tendencies were an insidious influence in medieval thought, tingeing the background on which was drawn the dominant conflict between the two centralizing bodies of church and state.

Two problems agitated the church profoundly during the Middle Ages. The first was the maintenance of the high standard set by the first enthusiasts of the eleventh century for the monastic orders, with adequate discipline amongst all ecclesiastics whether monks or priests; the second was to regulate the relations of the church to the state, that whilst the church maintained its independence it could yet rely on the state to enforce its discipline over laymen and ecclesiastics alike. The first problem involved the schoolmen in the whole question of moral and political obligation; the second evoked the long and bitter controversy between the empire and the papacy for which the Middle Ages is noted.

Great emphasis was placed in the eleventh century on spiritual values and the importance of a life beyond this world. This impressed contemporaries with the superiority of the church to the state. As the soul capable of eternal bliss was superior to the body confined to earthly enjoyment only, so the spiritual power must finally be recognized as the highest in this world and pointing the way to the next. Men inspired with religious zeal tended to see in this life only a means to the attainment of salvation. Every faculty of man, every power within the community, was instrumental to this single purpose.

The religious revival urged men to put into concrete form the ardent aspirations which were stirring their souls. Monastic life aimed at a withdrawal from this life in order to concentrate on the

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attainment of salvation in the next. Men and women voluntarily left their crude delights and joined together to help each other follow their difficult ideal. To do this adequately the monastic zealots hedged themselves round with regulations. The basic vows were three: obedience, poverty and chastity. At first enthusiasm sufficed to maintain the standards set by the idealists. In the twelfth century monastic life flowed along fairly smoothly. Monks and nuns entered the new institutions eagerly and expectantly. The more difficult the vows, the more eager were the devotees to achieve success in performing their arduous tasks.

Speculation amongst the schoolmen was much influenced by this easy accomplishment within the monasteries. The need for organization was hardly felt; the schoolmen rejected the idea that the state had any valid function to perform. The theory of the two swords, maintained during the period when the church relied on the state to help and support it in the performance of its functions, was no longer relevant to men who saw the church accomplishing its task through enthusiasm alone, without any need of the pressure of force from without. In the fierce enthusiasm of the early religious revival the state was completely swallowed up by the church; the church contained all that men needed for this life and the next. All life was dominated by religion, the church alone sufficed. Where they recognized that the state still functioned, the thinkers of the twelfth century saw in it an institution necessary only because there were still left men too evil to be touched by the ardours of religious enthusiasm and to be bound willingly and whole-heartedly by the laws of God. These recalcitrant members of society required restraint, and the function of the state was to restrain such men; but in ideal conditions it would no longer be necessary. Wherever an ecclesiastic was blinded by the enthusiasm which flamed in the church, there the necessity for the state was entirely disregarded. Gregory VII went so far as to assert emphatically that the power of princes was satanic in origin, and arose merely from the lust for domination inherent in evil men. At the height of the religious revival the state was completely eclipsed by the glory of the church.

But the crest of religious zeal began to break by the end of the twelfth century. Monasteries which had first been founded by

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enthusiasts and were composed of members voluntarily forsaking the delights of secular life for an austere ideal, had become in the course of a hundred years retreats from hardship and more desirable abodes than secular dwellings. By the thirteenth century monasteries seemed to be gradually becoming more like clubs than religious retreats. This was largely due to the vast increase in their property. So lavish had been the gifts of the religiously stirred people in the early days of foundation that the very men who had taken the vow of poverty as an essential part of their equipment for the pursuit of salvation found themselves increasingly burdened with the trammels of wealth.

The effect on monastic organization was great. The increased luxury of the monasteries attracted to the religious life men whose aim was no longer to live an austere sternly-disciplined life. The vows of the early members became to the new members ever more difficult to obey. The bonds of obedience, poverty and chastity were a continual irritation to the mass of monks who were no longer supported by fervent religious zeal. The more serious thinkers amongst the schoolmen found themselves concerned primarily with two questions: what was the nature of obedience: was it voluntary, or must authority have force behind it and gain obedience through fear? what was the nature and purpose of property? In short the general problems of moral and political obedience and the nature of property presented themselves as vital practical issues to the schoolmen of the thirteenth century. Around these two themes speculation circled.

The clearest and most profound exposition of the nature of moral and political obligation was given in the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas in his work *Summa Theologica*. Aquinas was not concerned with specific difficulties; rather he set himself the task of comprehending into one system the varied phenomena of life around him. He strove to explain in far-reaching philosophic terms the medieval dictum '*Omnis multitudo derivatur ab uno et ad unum reducitur*'. Incidentally he elaborated a conception of political obligation and threw out suggestions about the state and the nature of property.

Aquinas' conception of political obligation was based to a large

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extent upon some of the Teutonic notions which had survived in the structure of the society about him. Custom to the early invaders had the binding force of law. It was law in so far as they gave that term meaning. They had no conception of the Roman idea of law as the will of the community, nor the Christian idea of the will of God. Custom was handed down from time immemorial, sanctioned perhaps in the dim past by the gods, essentially inflexible, immutable. An all-powerful authority to enforce it was unnecessary. It carried its own sense of obligation as the tested experience of past generations sanctified by the mists of antiquity. The codes drawn up in the impact with the Romans were issued as lists of customs. They were promulgated and did not receive the force of law until the people recognized them. There was no suggestion that the rulers were attempting to make law. Law-making power did not pertain to man; the rules which bound him were ready to hand rigidly encased in well-known customs recognized by all. Recognition was an essential element in law. Throughout the Middle Ages no ruler dared arbitrarily enforce his command; all orders had to come in the semblance of a fresh enunciation of custom which would not be considered binding until the people recognized their potency.

Aquinas was influenced in his views on the nature of the state and property by his study of Aristotle. For the first time in the Middle Ages the influence of the Greeks can be seen. Until then the medievalists seem to have been totally ignorant of Greek culture and thought save through garbled versions derived from the early fathers of the church. Aquinas as the son of a Neapolitan noble of royal blood became acquainted with the Arabic translations of Aristotle's works which were well known at the neighbouring court of Frederick II in Sicily, a brilliant intellectual centre during his youth. Aristotle's works made a great impression on his mind. Aquinas commented on them extensively. Through this *Commentary*, twice reinterpreted though they were, Aristotle's ideas penetrated again into the western world.

To Aquinas the problem of obedience so manifest a difficulty in monastic life involved the whole question of the nature of law, its validity and its power to induce obedience. He began his dissertation with an acute analysis of the nature of law. He conceived of the

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universe as a building not yet finished whose plan was worked out in the mind of the divine architect God. As an architect planned his work, shaping it into form by certain rules, so God held the conception of the universe in his mind, shaped and formed by a system of eternal law. This eternal law continually manifested itself in the universe as it evolved towards the perfection set it by God; but in its entirety the eternal law remained within the mind of God and was ultimately incomprehensible to the finite mind of man. Yet, that man might follow out the divine will of God and be knit into the pattern of creation, he had been given the faculty to recognize the eternal law, glimpses of which were vouchsafed to him. Natural law was written in his heart to guide him through the agency of his reason to recognize and obey the greater law. This inward knowledge of what did or did not accord with eternal law formed the norm by which man judged what he ought or ought not to do. His reason helped him to rationalize this innate knowledge of good and evil into certain general principles. These general principles formed the body of natural law. They were the light by which man was led to fulfil the divine plan in accordance with the eternal law.

The next step in Aquinas' argument brought him to the fundamental problem of political obligation. Eternal law was hidden in the mind of God; natural law was hidden in the consciences of men; what relation did the chaotic mass of rules and regulation, customs and commands, which formed the actual fabric of the governmental machines, bear to these two closely linked systems? Why should a man obey the various orders given him by a so-called superior? Were there any superiors who had this right to command obedience? How was an individual to know that the detailed commands issued to him were in strict accord with the divine plan? These were the difficulties present in Aquinas' mind which he strove to answer in his disquisition on human laws. These were the questions agitating the minds of practical churchmen who were eager to maintain discipline over monks and priests. Unless their orders were recognized as binding in some sense the difficulty of enforcing them would be almost insurmountable, as the measure of force requisite for such a task was not forthcoming in the Middle Ages with its loose system of administration and its lack of police and military organization. A

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sense of moral obligation was an essential factor in the maintenance of discipline in the church.

Aquinas sought to develop the sense of obligation by linking up human law with the eternal and natural laws in an intimate and elaborate system. He asserted that man could never make laws; all he could do was to recognize that any command was in accordance with the principles of natural law already known to him, and the moment he perceived this he was bound to obey the command. For he was bound by his very nature to fulfil the eternal plan of God outside which nothing could exist; this plan was partially known to him through natural law; human law was merely a recognition in concrete particular terms of this law already planted in his heart by God. Man did not create his obligation to obey, it was an innate part of his being. Aquinas insisted that when human law and natural law were in accord the obligation to obey was not created; it was merely defined. No human authority could ever draw up a law inconsistent with natural law. If a human authority promulgated such a law then that authority had no right to insist on obedience; and the individual could disobey with moral impunity. Any enforcement of such a law would be an act of tyranny utterly unjustifiable by any law worthy of the name. The Teutonic custom of regarding the validity of law as dependent on recognition and consent was transmuted by Aquinas into a part of a philosophic system comprehending the whole universe. Human law must be in accordance with natural law which might be regarded as the general principles lying behind accepted customs; it must be rational in that it must be linked up with the general scheme of life; it must be possible as the obligation to obey implied the ability to do so; it must be, above all, acceptable to the individual conscience which was the final judge of its validity in accordance with the principles of natural law. Political obedience was linked up into a general system of moral obligation of the most stringent order.

Over and above human law, Aquinas believed there was a fourth type of law which consisted of direct revelation of God's purpose to man without the intermediary of his knowledge of natural law. This was called divine law and consisted of the bible and any direct visions to saints.

By natural, human and divine law, man was made to participate in

the general plan of the universe; this participation involved the grave responsibility of obedience to all these forms of law once tested by the individual conscience.

Political obligation in Aquinas' scheme as with the rest of the schoolmen rested upon a sense of moral responsibility which was essentially informed by theology. The validity of his argument depended on the acceptance of his first premise that the world was created and sustained by God whose laws upheld the whole universe. In an age of faith no argument could have been more impelling: for centuries none dared reject the authority of human law without impinging upon the majesty of the Deity; nor question the creed of the church without being accused of disparaging human laws. Aquinas gathered together in a coherent whole the disjointed statements on law with which he and his contemporaries were familiar through their knowledge of Roman law as it was incorporated in the canon law of the church or taught in its original form in the law schools. He constructed a philosophy from the fragmentary — often inconsistent — remarks of the early Christian fathers. In the realm of law Aquinas had achieved a synthesis of cogent simplicity.

On the subject of property Aquinas had little to say that was not already accepted commonplaces in the church. The medieval schoolmen repeated with slight variations and with only one important change of emphasis the views on property already enunciated by St. Augustine and the earlier Christians. The significance of the schoolmen's attitude to property lay in the fact that by the thirteenth century the ecclesiastics held a considerable proportion of the property of Europe; the views of such great landowners were necessarily important and could not be lightly ignored. They reiterated that property in general was a gift from God to man. In consideration of its origin it must be used with a sense of responsibility towards the giver. There was no conception parallel to the Romans that the right to private property was absolute. But the schoolmen felt that this was an insufficient justification of their holding so much property in contradiction to the accepted belief that the man of God must ignore the vanities of this world. They revived the suggestion made by St. Augustine that only the righteous were worthy to distribute the wealth of the common stock. Since property was a responsibility

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given to man by God, what better trustees could there be for the fruits of the world than the religious? By a clever application of the general statement made by St. Augustine the schoolmen justified their wealth, and reconciled their accumulation of property with the monastic vow of poverty. They were implying that only the church ultimately had a right to distribute property. Only through the hands of the ecclesiastics could the common stock of goods be properly administered; only they were the appropriate trustees of the gift of God to man. This was the significant implication in the medieval schoolmen's statements. It accorded well with their belief in the domination of the spiritual power.

Aquinas accepted these views with a further illustration of their significance. He asserted with his fellow schoolmen that no man should have more than sufficient to fulfil his need. As they, so he did not define a man's need. But he added should one man be in need, another could take of the abundance of a third and assuage the need of the first without having abrogated any right of the third party. Aquinas was extending the theory that all property existed for the benefit of the community as a whole in a way which might alarm any holder of much property. Aquinas' views on this point were not general. The legends surrounding St. Francis of Assisi's memory indicate that the practice of such principles created a stir and sometimes drew down the wrath of the ecclesiastical authorities on the saint's generosity. It was too much of a criticism of the rest of the ecclesiastics to be encouraged.

Aquinas repeated Aristotle's dictum that usury was a barren form of money-making, and as such was unnatural and hence unjustifiable. It was against God's will that men should make money for the sake of making it with no other end in view than the enriching of themselves at the expense of their fellows. The church in its role of guardian of the poor must fulfil their needs from the common stock by charity, and see to it that the poor were not fleeced of their few necessities by the trader out for personal profit. Thus the great philosopher of the church reinforced Aristotle's condemnation of usury with Christian ethics.

Contemporary modes of borrowing justified Aquinas' censure. The term usury was applied to all money loaned out for interest. It

embraced indiscriminately money lent as today to encourage enterprise, and the universally condemned system prevalent in the Middle Ages of small amounts lent to those who had fallen on hard times who in most cases would not be able to repay their loans. The interest charged in such cases was exorbitant, as the lender knew how small his chances were of repayment. The borrower living thus on his capital eventually found himself ruined and in the hands of his creditors. He had sold himself into subservience. Aquinas seized on Aristotle's vigorous condemnation of usury to strengthen his own objection to a pernicious system. His repetition of Aristotle's ideas on usury became incorporated into the medieval church's conception of property and reinforced its insistence that property was a trust not lightly to be thrown aside in the scramble for personal wealth. This conception of usury had little effect on the large-scale trading activities of the medieval period. Its influence was felt on a narrower scale. The church used it as a justification to warrant her interference in cases where small men were crippled by the exorbitant demands of interest from wealthier men. The church acted as the protector of the small man. Again the church was regarding herself as the legitimate distributor of the wealth of the world.

The enforcement of discipline raised the more general question of the authority and extent of the courts where this discipline was put into execution. This problem was common to the monasteries as to the whole ecclesiastical organization. It was another aspect of the difficulty of assigning to property its proper place in society. For within these courts the administration of discipline involved the deprivation of property from the offender through fines or other penalties. The right of the church to interfere with property was much in question. The powers of her courts and their relation to the other courts of law were the basis of the great controversy of the Middle Ages: the conflict between the empire and the papacy.

It was comparatively simple to assert that the church should have complete control over the actions of her immediate servants; that all clerics were under the law of the church and had bound themselves in their initiation vows to obey its authority; that therefore the church had every right to censure and penalize recalcitrant ecclesiastics. It was not so easy to determine the type of punishment which the church

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had the right to exercise. It was supremely difficult and almost impossible to decide how far the church ought to exercise discipline over the much larger number of laymen, who as members of the church came under its authority in some very real yet undefined sense.

The actual position of the church courts in the medieval system of organization obscured these problems. In the early barbaric period when the Roman empire gradually disintegrated before the onslaught of the new settlers, the courts held by the bishops and such loose administration as existed were bound together entirely by the efforts of the church. Whenever any barbarian ruler sought to emulate the Roman ideal, he immediately turned to the church in order to cajole or capture by force this organization which was the best and most efficient known to the time. From the reign of Charlemagne onwards throughout the Middle Ages every ruler intent on better organization of his domain sought to establish an intimate relation with the head of the church, thereby hoping to obtain control over the ecclesiastical courts which honeycombed his dominions, and not only were centres of purely ecclesiastical discipline, but were often the only places where any kind of justice was administered. By the eleventh century in many countries in Europe the church courts administered justice to ecclesiastics and laymen alike; it was clearly recognized that all cases concerned with marriage, legitimacy and wills, together with the important subject of the validity of oaths which had far-reaching political effects in a feudal society bound together by oaths of fealty, were subjects exclusively under ecclesiastical control. No wonder then that the Capets of France and the Saxon house of Germany realized in consolidating their kingdoms that the appointments of bishops who were supreme in these courts was the key to controlling a large area of law and order.

The competition between church and state was in abeyance whilst law and order were only semi-established in the Dark Ages. So long as the peoples of Europe were faced with constant danger from invasions in the centuries preceeding the eleventh century, so long no one had the time or energy to inquire whether a bishop of a district was trying cases which lay purely within ecclesiastical law or were purely civil and dealing with secular matters. Moreover, the law itself was

not clearly divided into two groups. It was uncoded and becoming increasingly confused. The inhabitants of a district were content to know that somewhere, amidst the uncertainty and insecurity of the times, they could obtain a measure of justice. They were not concerned in such troublous times with the exact nature of the authority presiding over the court, or the law administered therein.

The progress of law and order begun in the eleventh century and rapidly pressed forward in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries made the clash between church and state inevitable. The gradual stabilizing of conditions in the eleventh, the codification of canon law in the twelfth, the great development of civil case law in the thirteenth centuries, brought the anomalous position of the mixed courts of law increasingly into question. Wherever the secular power was establishing order, friction was bound to arise over these courts whose authority was so undefined that it seemed in a fair way to be limitless. First in France and then in Germany the secular power came into sharp collision with the church over this rivalry for control of the administration of law throughout identical areas. Both powers had precedent on their side for claims to administer the same districts in a slovenly and careless fashion. If administration was to be efficient it was essential that either the church or the state must control all the courts of law within the administrative areas. It was impossible for the two authorities to exist side by side without much confusion; laws were being codified on all sides during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was the period for the removal of confusions. The struggle between the establishment of a purely ecclesiastical system or a purely secular, between a theocracy and the state, dominated the Middle Ages. The state after centuries of effort finally emerged triumphant, but the church had a temporary success.

The investiture controversy in which the kings of Europe repeatedly attempted to obtain control over the appointments of the bishops of the ecclesiastical courts was part of this general problem of delimiting the spheres of the spiritual and temporal powers. A specific aspect of this was the position of the pope in relation to the other monarchs of Europe: whether he as representative of the spiritual power was above all princes; or whether the princes could claim that he as a mere bishop was under the control of whatever secular prince

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was giving him support against the encroachments of the Italian feudal magnates.

The theoretical issues arising from this situation were fundamental. The medieval schoolmen were concerned to extricate the spiritual power from any secular hindrances and establish its authority on a basis impregnable to their contemporaries. They were forced to develop some conception of the nature of the church and the part it was called upon to play in the social structure. They could not neglect to define the nature of their rival the state, and to determine the subordinate functions they relegated to it. Whenever the controversy waxed furious the authority of the state was most decried and the supremacy of the church most exalted. Despite the incidents of controversy, throughout the period of constructive thought over these issues there can be seen certain stable conceptions of the nature of the church and its relation to the state. In this attempt to disentangle these closely interwoven authorities the schoolmen postulated a conception of a European state based on international law and an international system of justice arising from their own claims to absolute supremacy.

The inefficacy of purely ecclesiastical discipline over churchmen and laymen alike in the thirteenth century made the schoolmen realize that force of some sort was necessary in the machinery of government. When a clerk was tried in the ecclesiastical courts for a crime against the community rather than the church, such as stealing, the church courts had the power to punish by ecclesiastical penalties; but surely a crime which injured the community at large ought to be penalized by civil as well as spiritual disabilities? Surely the criminal ought to be punished by the state as well as the church; and the case to be taken over into the secular courts? But the church whilst wishing to obtain the help of the state to make its sentence effective against the criminal, was not willing to allow its clerk (whose position was privileged by being in the sacred orders of holy church) to be abandoned without protection to the state which was nothing but a body of worldly men ignorant of God's holy will. Similarly when a layman had offended against the law of the church and was judged in the church courts, would ecclesiastical penalties be sufficient to make the sinner feel his guilt; surely the spiritual censure should be accom-

panied by some material deprivation which would bring home to the sinner the weight of his offence? But had the church who claimed to wield only the power of the spiritual sword, to persuade by eloquence, and to penalize by deprivation of heavenly joys, the right to inflict these material penalties; would it not be more dignified to leave these lower penalties to a subordinate, to relegate to the state the unpleasant duty of executing the sentences declared in the ecclesiastical courts? In theorizing on this situation which was a matter of daily occurrence, the schoolmen declared that the church was given authority by God to promote true religion in the world. The promotion of true religion involved the suppression of evil-doers. Spiritual penalties were not sufficient to bend these evil-doers to the law of God, so God had ordained that the state should exist in order to force men to do the will of the church. The state then was essentially subordinate to the church and was merely instrumental to its will. The church on the other hand was the depository on earth of the law of God; she was God's trustee for carrying out this great design. To her head, the pope, belonged all power and authority over men. The pope was Christ's vicar upon earth holding the keys of heaven. He could excommunicate recalcitrant men whether princes or subjects who offended against the church's laws which were the replica of God's law; in excommunication he could jeopardize their chances of eternal salvation.

By linking up human law so intimately with eternal law, the schoolmen brought the whole legal systems of earthly governments into line with the eternal plan; and in so doing made the decisions in the ecclesiastical courts matters of eternal moment. In this scheme all secular princes as servants of mother church were in equal subordination to the pope. Christendom was conceived as a unity, as the mystical body of Christ whose members were bound together by one law of God, by one system of justice administered by the church, aided by the secular princes.

The best form of government for this state comprising the whole of the then known world seemed to the schoolmen to be a hierarchy patterned on the heavenly hierarchy of angels. The higher the position in this system the nearer to God and the greater the authority possessed. The pope on earth was supreme, then came his servants

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the emperor and the princes (both spiritual and temporal), then the various lesser princes ranged in accordance with the ranks of birth already determined by the feudal rules, each possessing a lessening extent of authority over his inferior whilst maintaining his own duty of obedience to his superior; until finally came the serf whose only function was obedience. The whole of society was rigidly divided into a caste system based on a series of duties and rights which were the outcome of feudal ideas informed by Christian theology.

Aquinas alone of all the schoolmen maintained that the state had a basis of its own apart from the church. Influenced by his study of Aristotle he considered that the state was not merely the shadow of the church. He saw in the state a body created to help the church not by blindly following out its commands, but by establishing peace as a necessary preliminary to the pursuit of salvation. A minimum of law and order was essential before men could concentrate on eternal life. This minimum must be established by the state; in the performance of this function the state, he asserted, was independent of the church. The chief function of the state to Aquinas was a negative one: it released men from the cares of a hand-to-mouth existence in order to give them leisure for contemplation of higher things. In a very narrow sphere the state was master of its own actions.

By the thirteenth century the medieval synthesis amongst the schoolmen had attained its final development. In the works of Aquinas; in the letters of protesting popes to erring and self-opinionated emperors and princes; in the law-books of careful canon-lawyers who from the twelfth century onwards were occupied with the task of codifying the chaotic mass of ecclesiastical law; in these and other contemporary literature can be seen the firm conviction that God pervaded and dominated the life of man; that the soul was as superior to the body as the sun to the moon; that the church as the guardian of God's law was supreme in authority over all men and must bring them eventually to eternal salvation. Christendom was a mighty and vital living society, was indeed the only society, comprehending within itself in the person of the church all that was necessary to the welfare of man's soul and body. 'All things come from God, and to God must return.'

CHAPTER VI

THE SECULAR REACTION

THE beginning of the fourteenth century was marked by a violent reaction against the church's claims to omnipotence. Many men were eager to check the extravagant claims to absolute sovereignty made by the papacy on its own behalf. They concentrated on developing a rival concept of society which was essentially secular. The controversy between church and state had entered upon a new phase. The state and not the church focused all attention. So urgent were the circumstances, so energetic the minds engaged on the problems, that in a short forty years the secular apologists formulated an elaborate concept of the state in which its former dependence on the church was totally abolished. Many causes contributed to this growth of anti-clerical feeling and its corollary, the exaltation of the secular power.

The glaring contrast between the ideals of the church and its actual condition brought it into bad repute everywhere. This continual source of irritation and criticism fostered contempt of the church from the thirteenth century onwards. The church sworn to poverty was nevertheless in possession of great wealth. The ecclesiastics maintained that this property was used for the benefit of the poor. In point of fact, as was well known, it was mainly used for the benefit of the clergy themselves, who were continually accused of being grasping and selfish. The charge of simony was universal; it applied to holders of all offices, high or low. Dubois writing at the beginning of the fourteenth century cited with condemnation the custom in Bourgoigne of the sons of noblemen becoming monks in order to obtain the revenues of priories which were a great source of wealth. The many attacks against the wealth of the clergy repeatedly formulated in the English Parliament in the fourteenth century were indicative of the attitude of the English. The support Philip IV received throughout France in his brutal attack on the Templars was similarly indicative. All agreed that the clerical misuse of wealth forfeited the claims of the church to be the best guardian on earth of its common fruits.

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The inability of the ecclesiastical authorities to maintain a high standard in the personal lives of the clergy made matters worse. Envy of the Church's wealth and a very real disgust at the hypocrisy of the clergy and their lax observance of their ideals combined to give the attack on the clergy a certain bitterness and an air of righteous indignation. Many of the writers of this period grieved at such a falling away, and almost always suggested the deprivation of the clergy of their property and its better distribution amongst the laity. If the church was failing, who should succeed to this task of guardian of property and the regulation amongst men of all questions touching the mundane affairs of this life?

The rulers and supporters of the secular state at the beginning of the fourteenth century felt this was their particular function and a task with which they were specially competent to deal. The emperors had always been hampered in their opposition to the papacy by the sprawling extent of their dominions. The emperors were neither German kings nor Italian potentates but had tried to combine both in their single persons. The popes had thus been at an advantage throughout their struggle with them. But the death of Frederick II put an end to this superiority. The papacy was weakened by its struggle with the emperors, whilst the length of the struggle had given the new kings of Europe much needed time to proceed with the consolidation of their kingdoms unhampered by either papal or imperial interference.

When the pope by a change of circumstance found himself in opposition to the French king he was face to face with a ruler whose power was not to be despised. The royal authority had momentarily been extended unchecked throughout the compact kingdom of France and the king chafed resentfully at the presence of a jurisdiction in his kingdom which prevented the final establishment of his absolute sovereignty. Philip IV was the strongest king in Europe. His lawyers were tightening up the legal system of France. Imbued with Roman legal theory they looked upon the king as the supreme lawgiver in his kingdom. At such a moment Boniface VIII arrogantly promulgated against the French king bulls which repeated in exaggerated terms all the claims to supremacy which the popes had made against their weaker rivals, the emperors. The pope declared that the clergy were

not to pay taxes to the state, nor had princes the right to tax the clergy; that the pope as supreme ruler on earth had the law hidden in his heart and that all princes and kings were subservient to him and only held their office at his discretion. The pope was claiming for the clergy absolute immunity from taxation and all processes of law. He reiterated the schoolmen's theory that the church was entirely independent, and further, with greater emphasis, was superior to the state. Such a claim made at such a time was bound to raise a storm of opposition. The royal jurisdiction and authority was attacked at its very foundation.

France was not alone in her protests. The position of Henry III of England during the thirteenth century had left little doubt in the minds of the English as to what meaning the pope attached to these claims. During that period the pope had reduced the English king to a position of subservience, and had involved him in disputes with his barons. The pope had looked upon the English church as a source of revenue and its best benefices as fit rewards for his favourites. The church in England with its revenues and its courts of law must be under papal control and brook no interference from royal authority however much English lawyers were anxious to extend royal jurisdiction until the king alone presided over the juristic system of the country. The old conflict over jurisdiction was revived more bitterly between the new and strongly constructed kingdoms of France and England and the decaying fabric of the church.

The rise of strong kingdoms and a chance redistribution of political power in Italy precipitated the struggle between church and state into a new phase. Hitherto the papacy had been opposed by a rival whose claims to power extended even further back than its own. The position of emperor in relation to the early Christian church was an integral part of Christian thought, woven into the very fabric of Christian political speculation. The office of emperor had existed indeed before that of pope. The apologists of the emperor were in a strong position traditionally in their refusal to acknowledge papal supremacy. The empire was based on as firm foundation theoretically as the papacy. At the height of the empire-papacy controversy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the imperialists relied in their arguments on the theory of the two swords. They maintained a clear

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distinction existed between spiritual and temporal matters, and that the emperor in his visible empire had complete and independent control over temporal matters. They denied that the spiritual power had any right to interfere in temporal matters; they further invested the emperor with absolute powers taken wholesale from the Roman tradition of imperial sovereignty. Pope and emperor were claiming identical powers over the same type of body politic. The struggle between them was an almost personal rivalry for the same post.

The death of Frederick II in 1250 closed the long struggle between the two outstanding protagonists in this essentially medieval conflict; it changed its entire character. The papacy ceased from that time to be primarily concerned with the attitude of the German emperor. The death of Frederick II had effectively removed imperial influence from the pope's near neighbour, the kingdom of Naples. An Angevin prince was established there instead. The pope immediately became vitally interested in French rather than German politics. He had as his opponent a king of a single strong kingdom, not the emperor of a universal but scattered empire. The advocates of the secular power in the conflict between Boniface VIII and Philip IV had to justify the position and authority of a king of a single kingdom with no particular tradition to uphold him in his place. What was said of one king was true of any other. There were many kings in Europe. The arguments which justified Philip IV against the pope were valid on behalf of any secular kingdom against the spiritual power. The secular apologists were faced with the possibility of complete political disintegration in Europe if they upheld the rights of the secular state as such, unless they followed the traditional arguments and elevated their kings to the position of an emperor. They could avoid in this way alone the advocacy of a disunited Europe composed of sovereign independent kingdoms recognizing no authority superior to their own. The latter conception was one of chaos to the medieval mind. Most of the apologists of the secular state rejected it and clung tenaciously for another two centuries to the ideal of a European state. The failure of the conciliar movement gave the final blow to this hope; political thinkers perforce had to abandon their ideal of internationalism. Meanwhile, the exigencies of the situation at the beginning of the fourteenth century forced the secular apologists to withdraw in their arguments to

some extent from the traditional position of the imperial authority. No king could boldly claim imperial power whilst still unelected to the empire without causing friction with the actual holder of that office. The apologists of the kingdoms were forced to seek other arguments apart from imperial tradition to justify the new situation which had arisen. The nature of the controversy had changed with the change in the protagonists. The struggle developed from a rivalry between two persons for supreme control over the one organization, Christendom, into a conflict between the papacy increasingly regarded as an Italian or French power, and the separate organizations of newly arisen kingdoms. The secular state, forced to emerge from the protection of the imperial tradition, was analysed afresh on a basis of its own disconnected with Christian theology.

Belief in the necessity for a universal church was further sapped by suspicions of another kind engendered by the growing hatred of the increasing wealth of the church. Many writers of the time held the church responsible for the continual warfare which distracted kingdoms and city-states alike. They asserted that the church's greed for power and added wealth led her to interfere in the internal affairs of secular states to the increasing detriment of the peace of Europe. The maintenance of universal peace, they reiterated, was the main justification of such extensive power as was claimed by the head of Christendom. Of what use was the church if instead of peace it stimulated war? The source of this friction, they maintained, was the vast property of the ecclesiastics, diverting them from their spiritual and elevating functions to concentrate on the extension and preservation of their worldly properties. Once strip the church of her possessions and peace in Europe might eventually be established on firm foundations. The increasing conflict in Europe especially between the Italian city-states made the necessity for peace ever greater. *Tranquillitas*, the end suggested by Aquinas for the state as a means to achieving the highest life of spiritual contemplation, loomed ever larger in the eyes of such men as Dante, Dubois and Marsilius of Padua. It seemed the supreme necessity and the primary goal of any effective organization. But *tranquillitas* could not be obtained so long as the arch-disturber, the church, revelled in irresponsible possession of vast wealth. The church was regarded as the destroyer not the

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promoter of peace. Distrust of the church and disappointment in its failure to maintain peace discredited the ideals with which it had so long dominated society. A new end was conceived as the most desirable for social effort; peace not salvation was to be the goal of human organization.

The intellectual development of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries drove men still further away from the theological concepts of the medieval schoolmen. The study of Roman law continued unabated; but its position of pre-eminence was challenged in Paris, Bologna and Padua by new subjects. The recovery of Greek thought through the medium of Arabic translation did much to divorce scholars from their previous pre-occupation with theology. New unexplored realms of speculation opened up to the medieval thinkers hitherto confined to interpret life in terms of theology alone. Philosophy, ethics, politics, medicine, were all treated by the Greeks as interesting in themselves, and were not studied with the ulterior motive of conforming them eventually to a set pattern. The school of Paris quickly accepted an important distinction made between philosophy and theology. The pursuit of truth and the thirst for righteousness were no longer automatically regarded as identical. Truth and God were not synonyms.

The release in intellectual life from the cramping bonds of theological doctrines was further promoted by the spread of intellectual scepticism. The original impetus came from the Sicilian court of Frederick II. Normans, Arabs, Mohammedans, Christians, atheists, men of every race and religion had gathered there in the first half of the thirteenth century to discuss and dispute with complete freedom on theology, philosophy, art, medicine and other sciences, anything in fact which their varied experiences dictated as worthy of intellectual exchange. The familiarity of the Arab members with Greek thought introduced in a stimulating form the criterions of value of an ancient civilization. An atmosphere of critical inquiry towards their own modes of life and thought was engendered amongst the westerners. It did not melt away with the death of Frederick; but flowed upwards from the south; penetrated the north Italian universities; passed onwards to Paris where it settled and imbued new students with a desire to question the fundamentals of their faith in a

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way distressing to the ecclesiastical authorities in command of the pedagogic staff.

Chief amongst the group who approached knowledge by inquiry rather than by faith was Sigier of Brabant, a contemporary of Roger Bacon and Aquinas. Aquinas kept to the old approach to knowledge whilst adopting the subject matter newly presented to him. He was pre-eminently a theologian. But Sigier and Bacon broke away and became complete sceptics in their attitude, believing in the desirability and necessity of trusting to experiment rather than accepted formulae as the starting point of the quest for knowledge. Both men were experimenters in technique, the one in philosophy and logic, the other in physics and other scientific subjects. Scepticism was almost their faith.

Sigier was the accepted leader of the sceptical revolvers. Pierre Dubois came to Paris as a student to study law at the height of Sigier's fame when too Aquinas the great authority on law was still there. Later Marsilius came to the University of Paris to study medicine and physics, the subjects of Baconian interest. He was drawn into the circle of sceptics where John of Jandun was also making a name for himself. Dante, though it is doubtful whether he ever came to Paris, studied at Bologna where Aquinas's work on Aristotle was made known to the public at the end of the thirteenth century. Dante showed an intimate acquaintance with this. His acceptance of the division between philosophy and theology revealed his acquaintance with the Paris courses of study; his sympathy with the sceptics was apparent in his placing Sigier in Paradise as the fourth representative of philosophy in company with the great churchmen Aquinas, Bonaventura and Bernard.

The growth of scepticism, the rejection of the schoolmen's methods of thought and their very premises, the recovery of Greek conceptions however mauled by translation, came at the very moment when the position of the secular state demanded a justification of its action on non-theological grounds. Philip IV was opposing the divine authority of the pope with the mundane kingdom of France; let the mundane kingdom of France be justified on mundane pagan grounds. The growing disgust with the church strengthened this attitude. But the time was not quite ripe for such a complete break with contemporary

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religious assumptions. Only Marsilius of Padua dared be so bold as to defend the secular state on blatantly mundane grounds.

Dante's *De Monarchia*, though written a few years later than Dubois' *Recovery of the Holy Land*, belongs by its attitude and content to the end of the imperial-papal controversy rather than to the new type of opposition to the pope on purely secular grounds. Its treatment therefore should come before Dubois' work. It is a complex production containing elements of both the old and new phases of the conflicts with the church. It belongs as much to the imperialists of the thirteenth century as to the secularists of the fourteenth.

Dante's main concern was to discover how to achieve unity and peace for the distracted city-states of North Italy. His immediate problem was somewhat similar to Aristotle's by whom he was greatly influenced. The Italian city-states resembled the Greek in their faction fights, artistic interests and arrogant independence. But Dante's solution to their difficulties was conditioned by a very different environment from Aristotle's. His political ideas were gleaned from the many systems of thought which had developed since the fourth century B.C. He produced a curious hybrid of Christian Roman and Greek conceptions resulting in the postulation of a world state to meet the peculiar needs of fourteenth-century Italy.

Dante's practical experience of Florentine politics prejudiced him against the church and coloured his political theory. His term of office as a member of the Signory, the supreme executive of the Florentine state, had been cut short by the fall of his party, the anti-clerical faction. Dante attributed this turn of fortune, his subsequent exile, and the continued intestinal faction fights of Florence, to papal interference. He had high hopes that papal influence would be exterminated when the emperor Henry VII invaded Italy in 1310. But the Florentines rejected imperial rule in favour of their own independence despite its manifold disadvantages. Dante was bitterly disappointed. His chagrin increased when the papacy moved to Avignon and lost its Italian setting under the shadow of the French monarchy. The folly of the Florentines in refusing their opportunity to get rid of papal control, the fear of further laceration of Italian pride by a French pope, urged Dante to violent protests. He wrote

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his *De Monarchia* about 1310-13 to show the need and to urge the acceptance of a single monarchy for all Europe. He was determined to strip the pope of all temporal power and petty states of their right to independence which were alike detrimental to the peace and prosperity of his beloved city.

The starting point of Dante's political thought is found in his general philosophy. He repeated Aristotle's definition of the nature of man. Man was a sociable being. He was not, as the schoolmen held, an isolated individual primarily concerned with his own salvation for which he was dependent on God alone. 'No man was able to obtain felicity by himself without the aid of many, inasmuch as he needs many things which no one is able to provide alone.' This material sociability was further strengthened by the necessity of co-operation amongst mankind in order to fulfil their common destiny. Dante asserted that the goal of all human civilization was the realization of the whole potentiality of human intellect (whatever that might mean). The 'felicity' for which men worked together was defined as 'the virtuous exercise of our rational faculties in the active and (so far as may be on earth) in the contemplative life'. No individual or small group of men could achieve this end by themselves. The whole of mankind must move forward in a harmonious effort of sustained co-operation towards the complete realization of the whole potentiality of the human intellect. Defection of however few of the members prevented the fulfilment of the ideal. Dante concluded that all humanity belonged to one body politic over which a single authority should preside. The main function of this world state was peace. Only in quietude and security could men hope to pursue the development of their intellectual powers. Dante elaborated Aquinas's suggestion of *tranquillitas* as the basis of the state into the main theme of his *De Monarchia*. He attempted to show the best means for its establishment.

The best form of government for keeping in check the disastrous friction between states was a monarchy. Dante cited some of the hackneyed phrases from the empire-papacy controversy such as the rule of one man imitated the rule by God, whose essence was unity, in support of his choice. His more cogent and original reasons came from his belief that a universal monarch was in a peculiar position of

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strength to enable him to override successfully the forces of dissension then disrupting European peace.

The inherent selfishness of the petty sovereign condemned straightway the small state itself. On Aristotelean grounds that state was bad in which the interests of a part were pursued before the welfare of the whole. The covetousness of the small ruler for greater possessions and power held a further danger. It made him always put his own ambitions first to the detriment of the liberty of his subjects and the peril of their ultimate welfare. Liberty was freedom to perform the will of God in order to attain the ultimate goal of humanity. But liberty could never flourish in a state in which the subjects were compelled to help their ruler in the achievement of his selfish ambitions to the neglect of their own prescribed end. Justice itself was contravened, for justice depended on liberty. Laws were 'the image of natural justice . . . and the observance of them is not only proved not to be slavery, but is plainly seen to be itself the highest liberty'. The welfare of the community, liberty, justice and the progress of civilization itself, was endangered by small states. Constant conflict between self-seeking rulers was the inevitable result. Peace and the attainment of the full potentiality of the human intellect were impossible under such conditions.

The universal monarch on the contrary held the key to the solution of this difficult situation. Satiated with all power, he would be free of the vice of covetousness. Satiated in all his ambitions, he would be free to seek the welfare of the whole community. The natural kindness of his disposition unhampered by the lust for power would make him the best executor of justice, which to operate effectively must be administered by one who loved the people for whom the laws were required. Only an impartial and benign monarch could be trusted to enunciate and execute just laws truly acceptable to mankind in accordance with their ultimate aim, the development of their intellect. Only a universal monarch could be impartial and benign; only he could rise above the selfishness of the petty ruler and be free within himself of the all-pervading desire of self-aggrandizement. Such a monarch with no personal ambitions to pursue would serve the interests of the whole community. 'It is clear that although the consul, or the king, be masters of the rest as regards the *way*, yet as

regards the *end* they are servants; and the Monarch most of all, for he must assuredly be regarded as the servant of all.' Under such a rule, freedom defined as the liberty to do right, would flourish; mankind would be free to pursue its ultimate end; the omnipotent monarch elevated above conflicting selfish interests would point the way to this goal and be in a position to enforce the law by which it might be achieved. Dante aware of the potency of law as a binding factor in a state envisaged a system of universal law recognized as binding on all men, as a necessity to the achievement of their final goal. He urged the acceptance of a supreme authority in the person of the universal monarch to enforce this law and override the wills of recalcitrant members in the interests of the peace of the world. By one law, by one monarch as its sole executor set up in the image of the divine monarchy justified by practical necessity, religious conviction, and the traditions of the Roman empire, Dante hoped to eradicate from Italy, nay from all Europe and the world, the devastating scourge of war. Peace would ensue; civilization would press on to complete realization of the whole potentiality of the human intellect.

What of the papacy in the face of this universal monarchy? There was no room in secular politics for another power claiming the right to dictate to the monarch. Such dictation would destroy his authority and renew conflict. For various reasons Dante rejected the pope as suitable as the final arbiter in European politics. Chief amongst them was the conviction that the very nature of man itself gave to the spiritual power another function to perform entirely apart from the maintenance of peace. Dante returned to the theory of the separation of the powers. Man had a dual end in life which kept the temporal and spiritual spheres irrevocably separate. 'Providence has set two ends before man to be aimed at by him: the blessedness of this life which consists in the exercise of his proper power and is represented by the Earthly Paradise; and the blessedness of eternal life, which consists in the fruition of the sight of God, to which his proper power cannot ascend unless assisted by the divine light. And this blessedness is given to be understood by the Celestial Paradise. Now to these two ends man must attain by different means, for to the first we attain by the teachings of Philosophy, provided we follow them by acting in accordance with the moral and intellectual virtues; to the

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second, by spiritual teachings which transcend human reason, provided we follow them by acting according to the theological virtues — to wit, faith, hope and charity. Now although these ends and means are made plain to us, the one by human reason (which the philosophers have wholly brought to our knowledge), the other by the Holy Ghost (who hath revealed the truth that is beyond our nature, but yet needful to us, by means of the Prophets and sacred writers, and by Jesus Christ, the Son of God, co-eternal with the Holy Ghost, and by his disciples), yet would human greed cast them behind were not man (like horses going astray in their brutishness) held in the way by bit and rein. Wherefore,' concluded Dante, 'man needed a twofold directive power, according to his twofold end — to wit, the Supreme Pontiff, to lead the human race, in accordance with the things revealed to eternal life; and the Emperor, to direct the human race to temporal felicity, in accordance with the teachings of Philosophy.' Thus the two powers were completely separated by their diverse ends and functions; the division was based finally on the dual ends of man. Dante saw no need for the spiritual power to interfere in any of the affairs of the Earthly Paradise. Unlike the schoolmen he did not assume that morality was an off-shoot of theology; rather he accepted the division of the new school of Paris where ethics was classed with philosophy and could exist independently of religion. The moral rational state could exist, as Dante saw it, as entirely separate from religion and could pursue its own end independently of any interference from the spiritual power. In the *Purgatoria* the four moral virtues appeared as maidens clad in imperial purple. The papacy as the head of the spiritual power was relegated to the dim recesses of the Celestial Paradise.

Dante rejected the schoolmen's assumption that man had a single end, and revived the conception of a dual end in which one goal was limited to this world and the other relegated to the next. In this way the temporal and spiritual powers could never clash; one functioned on earth the other in heaven. On earth man had but one end, the perfect development of his intellect. On earth there could be only one power. As the necessities of this life made it essential that peace must be the primary factor before any other development could take place, Dante insisted that the power which established peace should

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be secular and temporal. Earthly peace was but a transitory condition though essential to the progress of civilization. The spiritual power dealt with eternal matters. It had nothing to do with a transitory condition. Let it be relegated to the Celestial Paradise. The earthly paradise was no place for it. Only the universal monarch must preside there with no rival claimant to supremacy exercising a subversive influence. Dante had made an effective breach in the theology of the schoolmen by denying their basic assumption that man had but one end in life.

Pierre Dubois, a French lawyer, writing at the same time in defence of the action of Philip IV, went further than Dante and rejected the assumption to which Dante still clung that man was dominated in this life by the divine will, and was primarily concerned with the affairs of the spirit. Dubois had watched the controversy between pope and king with keen interest. He had written violent polemics in support of Philip IV's action at every critical stage in the conflict. His works were essentially of practical import dealing with particular events. They give an insight into the attitude of the secular lawyers who were chiefly responsible for the consolidation of the secular state. It is still doubtful how influential Dubois' works were at the time, but in perspective his attitude forms a link between the imperialists like Dante and the pure secularists, like Marsilius. Dubois still clung to an international ideal later seen only as a chimera in Marsilius' works. Dubois still felt the necessity for a church for which Marsilius could see no rational justification.

Unlike Dante, Dubois was a pragmatist in his attitude to politics. Yet by a trick of circumstance his scheme for the reorganization of Europe was not carried out and his project remained among the group of unfulfilled dream states. His chief work, the *De Recuperatione* or *the Recovery of the Holy Land*, sketched a reconstruction of Europe on original lines under the cloak of a crusade to recover the Holy Land. Dubois took many suggestions straight from the practical experience of the fourth crusade. His book was almost an historical account of the Venetians' effort at the beginning of the thirteenth century to capture the trade of the east for their own benefit under the leadership of the papacy. He wrote out his project about 1307 on the assumption that the imperial office was vacant and he hoped that

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either the English, French or German candidate would take up the neglected ambitions of the Venetians.

Dubois upheld the motives of this historical expedition as the ideal desirable for Europe as a state. The attainment of more wealth, specifically the wealth of the east, should be the supreme object of the body politic. Co-operation between the now divided European states was essential before this could be achieved. Europe must reconstruct itself into a strong united state before it could conquer the east. Peace between the European nations was the first necessity for the accomplishment of this aim.

Two sources of unrest disturbed the peace of Europe: the constant conflicts between secular rulers, and the wealth of the church. Dubois suggested as a remedy for the first that the European princes and kings should meet in a council convened by the pope, where they would agree to forswear war between themselves during the crusade. This international council should enforce their voluntary agreement to maintain European peace by attaching penalties to its breaking. The property of the offenders should be taken from them and they themselves deported to the Holy Land and placed there in the forefront of the battle. This would be more effective than excommunication, which though a more serious punishment was felt by men to be a lighter blow than deprivation of property. But Dubois left vague the exact type of machinery for enforcing these sentences, and the composition of the court which should be competent to pass judgment on the offenders. He hinted that the French king would act as policeman. His own consciousness of the urgent necessity for peace seemed to blind him to the fact that others might have to be persuaded forcibly that peace was more essential than independence. He assumed that the reward of eastern wealth would be sufficient bait to induce petty sovereigns to forgo the satisfaction of attaining their personal ambitions by private war. Dubois condemned the right of the European kings and princes arbitrarily to engage in war on the grounds of its pernicious effect on the welfare of all Europe, defined specifically as its material prosperity. Dubois had travelled far from the schoolmen's or even Dante's vision of the aim of the international state.

The wiping out of the second cause of dissension, the wealth of the church, involved more drastic alterations in the European system.

Dubois entered energetically on the main part of his thesis, the deprivation of the church of her wealth and its redistribution for novel secular purposes in the reorganized state of Europe. He justified the deprivation on well-known grounds. Too much occupied with the care of their vast property, with seeking high office for further aggrandizement, with entering on litigation on behalf of their possessions, the clergy neglected their proper function, the care of souls committed to their charge. Further, the insatiable lust for possessions inspired the clergy to go to any lengths to gratify it. This was a constant menace to European peace. Deprived of their wealth, the clergy would concentrate on their proper function, the care of souls, to the benefit of Europe's spiritual life. The European state would be free of the main cause of its unrest; it would be enriched by a vast wealth. Part of this would finance the crusade itself. The monasteries and nunneries were to be reserved to promote a great and original educational scheme.

Dubois ascribed a new function for the church in his reformed European state. Superstitiously in dread of evil spirits, he did not wish to deprive the church of all its spiritual power. A strong efficacious church was needed in the conflict with the demon-infested east. But the chief function of the church was to educate both sexes throughout Europe, not to cast out demons in the east. Dubois did not mean the crusade to end with the conquest of Palestine. This was but the beginning of a settlement in the east which should command the trade routes between Europe and the far east.

The settlement of Palestine would necessitate secretaries for the new rulers, who had a knowledge of eastern languages. The Greek church would be a fine source from which to draw these linguists. The Greek and Latin churches must first be united, if this was to be accomplished. Dubois suggested that the union of the two great Christian churches should be brought about by sending emissaries to the orthodox church to persuade them to union. These emissaries should be taught in the new schools established in the monasteries and nunneries of Europe whose curricula must be adapted for this special end. Languages and medicine must be taught. The chief innovation, drawn from Plato, was the insistence that women must be equally well educated as men. They had a leading part to play in

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the conversion of the east to western ideals. Dubois wished them to go out as prospective wives to the clergy of the orthodox church and as adopted daughters to noblemen settling in Palestine where they might marry the easterners and in both cases convert their husbands and children to western standards. The church must concentrate on education as its main new object with a view to helping forward the national prosperity of Europe which depended on the conquest and settlement of the east. The church was entirely subordinated to the state and only existed to serve its peculiar purpose, material ambition. Education in the international state would play as formative a part as designated it by the Greeks.

Dubois' insistence on the importance of education was based on a conception of law very different from that accepted by his contemporaries. He rejected the idea of law as an absolute rule emanating from God and binding on the consciences of all men, and of any political institution as divinely established and immutable. On the contrary, laws and forms of government in a country were the product of its environment, defined as the climate, the customs and immediate needs of the particular community. Each group had its own peculiarities, its own customs determining its political structure. Its laws were formulated by the criterion of expediency, not the dictates of divine will. No political or moral standard was absolute in a collection of groups of the medieval variety where the peculiar custom of each community had the binding force of law therein. Once change the standards of the east to those of the west by his ubiquitous educational and settlement projects, and Dubois felt hopeful of the permanent establishment of western rule in the east. But beyond the bare statement that climate affected custom and so determined the form of a country's government, Dubois did not describe how a European state extending into the east was to develop one form of law and government despite the difference of climate within its bounds. He never met this difficulty nor elaborated in detail the exact machinery of government suitable for the peaceful organization of Europe.

Dubois' political ideal was far removed from the theocracy of the schoolmen or the medieval empire of Dante. His rejection of ecclesiasticism was based on his quite different conception of the nature of man and his end in life. Man was more interested in earthly

wealth than eternal welfare. He was the creature of circumstance, the product of climatic conditions. No conception of divine or natural law checked the urge of men's desires. Customs were flexible under the pressure of men's needs. Ecclesiastical rule based on spiritual values was irrelevant to such men. The secular state sufficed. Its comprehensive powers were necessary to subordinate every other authority to its will, in order to achieve the object of all men's desires, greater material prosperity. The church still existed in Dubois' political scheme, but its nature had undergone a metamorphosis. Religion was an instrument in the hands of the state; it was an excellent method of converting its opponents to its own creed of material welfare.

The controversy which had evoked the *De Monarchia* and the *De Recuperatione* continued after the death of Boniface VIII. Pope John XXII in particular repeated the high-sounding claims of his predecessor against the Emperor of Germany. In the bitter quarrel which ensued both sides engaged controversialists to support their several claims. The *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun was written in 1327 as part of this controversy on behalf of the claims of the secular power.

Critics are still at variance as to the exact content of each author's contribution; it is generally agreed that the collaboration was close. In any case, the two men were sympathetically attuned in their interests. Both were well read in Greek literature. Marsilius had studied medicine, John was noted as a commentator on the works of Aristotle. Both were intimately connected with the sceptics of Paris and the law schools of Padua. Marsilius was nominated by Louis of Bavaria as his vicar in Italy. He was able to observe at close quarters the same internecine struggles of the Italian city-states which had impressed and troubled Dante. The disastrous effects of papal interference which he witnessed there enhanced his hatred of ecclesiastical power. The *Defensor Pacis* was written to show finally the innocuous nature of the papal claims. The authors were determined to demolish for ever the tyranny of papal power to which they ascribed the downfall of the power of the Italian cities and the break-up of European peace. For the first time in the history of the struggle between church and state, the opponents of the church attacked its authority

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at its foundations. Marsilius and John were determined to show that the divine appointment of the papacy on which the entire authority of its claims rested was a myth and that the church was an unnecessary encumbrance to the state.

The authors set out to establish two theses: firstly that the state by its very nature precluded the institution of the church; secondly that the papacy was not divinely appointed. The first theme involved a discussion of the nature of the state. The similarity of the Italian to the Greek situation made the copious illustrations from Aristotle very relevant. The presence of the church and the different political machinery of the Italian city-states added novel factors and necessitated a divergence from Aristotelean precepts. The authors tried to follow Aristotle closely, but an Aristotle informed by Italian experiences.

Marsilius as a doctor of medicine started by dividing the state into two conditions: healthy, when all its organs were functioning properly; unhealthy, when free action was impeded. The first was defined as the condition of political peace; the second of political discord. What were the causes of discord leading to the ruin of states? The authors searched for a diagnosis of the internal ill-health of the state, and the attainment of internal health and peace. They examined and analysed the origin and nature of the state.

Following Aristotle's account of the growth of communities supplemented by evidence from the book of Genesis, the authors concluded that the state was a natural phenomenon subject to the law of growth. It was defined in Aristotelean terms as 'the perfect self-sufficing community aiming at the good life'. Its primary object was to supply all that was necessary for attaining this good life. Bare necessities were not enough for the achievement of *bene vivere*. Human needs were manifold demanding diverse types of men for their proper fulfilment. Nature produced this commodity with the required variety; husbandmen, artificers, soldiers and many others existed to attend to the innumerable demands inherent in human nature.

The presence of the priesthood created an insoluble difficulty. The priesthood like any other profession was found in states. What need did it supply? The authors were doubtful. The priest, a type un-

known to Aristotle, was found in contemporary communities. Rulers had found it necessary in the past to invent a God who would overawe recalcitrant men. Perhaps the priesthood was necessary to maintain this important fiction. The truth or falseness of their religion was irrelevant. The important consideration was the actual presence of the priesthood which could only be accounted for by analogy with the other professions, each of which existed for fulfilling a specific need in the community. The need satisfied by the priesthood was not manifest of itself or demonstrable. It was an artificial factor introduced by men in an organism essentially natural.

The nature of law was so defined as to endow the community with unlimited sovereign power. Law was divided into two categories: the science of the just and the beneficial; coercive enactments declaring the same. The science of the just and the beneficial was related only to the needs of each specific community, which held within itself the coercive power necessary to give the force of law to rules it had itself enunciated. Law was essentially the expression of human will; it must be coercive to be effective; it was limited to each community as only within the natural organism of the body politic did such law-making power reside. Law was not a principle of justice extending beyond the confines of a given community co-ordinating it with other communities by some external standard; it had nothing to do with divine law. Rather it was a legal system built up by the community itself, fluctuating with the expediency of the moment, but dominated ultimately by the will of the group to satisfy its need and achieve the *vita sufficiens*. The power of the community was absolute and unlimited; it was an elaboration of the old Roman conception of *imperium*.

The form and powers of the state were closely modelled on the political institutions of the Italian city-states. The authors again tried to show that there was no rational basis for the church in such communities. The assembly of all male adult citizens called the *legislator* formed the sovereign body of the state. It made and amended laws by majority will and enacted taxation. Its chief function was to elect and control by criticism and reprimands the executive chosen to carry out the will of the *legislator*. The form of the executive or *pars principans* was left vague though the authors

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expressed a dislike of hereditary succession or an elective monarchy. Its duties were to draft the laws to be presented to the *legislator*, to supervise the military and ecclesiastical departments to prevent their becoming overcrowded. Its supreme task was to administer and control all jurisdiction within the state. For this it was accorded a unique authority. All other executive and judicial bodies must be subordinate to it. It must have an armed force behind it greater than any other force in the state. This armed force was an inalienable part of the office of *pars principans*, necessary for the enforcement of laws whose binding power rested on coercion. No group had the right to oppose the *pars principans* or impinge on its power over the entire jurisdiction exercised within the state save the *legislator*, its creator and its superior. The *pars principans* was subordinate only to the sovereign people expressing their commands or criticism in the *legislator*. The *pars principans* must function freely, wielding a supreme authority within its prescribed sphere to remove disorder, to suppress faction fights by its great force, to establish and maintain peace, the primary necessity before health could be obtained in the body politic and the supreme goal of the community achieved. The nature of government was such as to reject from its inner mechanism the disruptive element of a church which claimed a separate independent jurisdiction, a right to make its own laws, and the supremacy by divine right, of its own head over all other political communities. There was no place in the state described in the *Defensor Pacis* for the church of the fourteenth century. It was an irrelevancy.

The claims of the church resting on divine right were then attacked in order to demonstrate further the hollowness of the ecclesiastical position, and to demolish finally the entire structure of ecclesiastical authority. The authors cited the familiar arguments that the church had no right to temporal power because Christ and his disciples had submitted themselves even unto death to the secular authority of the Roman emperor. Furthermore, divine law, the other bulwark of the church's powers, was made by God; it concerned only the mind of man. Its function was to bring souls to salvation. Such questions as salvation, the administering of divine law, penalties for its breaking, could only be decided and carried out in heaven after death. The clergy had no right to administer here on earth a law which was con-

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cerned essentially with heavenly matters. Nor should the state meddle with divine law, with one exception. Though heresy as a rule should be tried in heaven yet the state could declare a particular heresy to be a crime on earth with temporal penalties attached, if the state should find such a heresy detrimental to its own welfare. A full-fledged Erastianism was advocated in the *Defensor Pacis*. The Franciscan ideal of poverty was held up as the true ideal for the clergy. The authors boldly concluded that all the property of the church still rightfully belonged to the original donors. The clergy could never rightfully hold more than was sufficient for their bare necessities. Nor could the donors, however zealous, bequeath to them more than the use of their property. With the death of the original recipients the property passed back into the hands of its original owners. Finally the supremacy of the pope was declared null and void on the grounds that the pope was but a priest; all priests were equal in the time of the Apostles and so should be for ever. The Apostolic era was peculiarly sanctified and its example compelling. The claims of the church or the pope to exercise temporal authority were shown to be alien to the peculiar function of the church and contrary to the example of its founder. The church was left without purpose or ruler on earth.

The authors' suggestions for the ideal governance of the church further emphasized their desire to reduce the ecclesiastical power to an unreal formula. Their argument was a close analogy to their conception of the natural state, with certain important differences arising from the peculiar difficulties presented by a religion claiming universality. The whole multitude of the faithful constituted the Christian community which had power to appoint its executive of priests. But the multitude of the faithful were scattered throughout Christendom; they were not confined to a particular locality. How then was this scattered mass of people to gather together to elect their executive, or to perform any of the functions exercised by the *legislator*? To overcome this difficulty the authors suggested that general councils should meet, consisting of laymen and priests chosen as worthy by the different *legislatores* of the various natural states. General councils should define the grounds of faith and remove ambiguities which might arise in the doubtful passages of the scriptures. But their

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authority was strictly limited to this small sphere of interpretation, because the essence of the Christian faith was unalterable; it was contained in the plain literal meaning of the scriptures, and was beyond the need of explanation. General councils could exercise no coercive force unless they were authorized by the *legislator* of the Christian community (designated as the *legislator primus* or *universalis* or *humanus*). The authors carefully explained that such a body had never existed. Former councils could claim no authority unless they could prove that their members had been chosen as worthy representatives of the various *legislatores*; this condition was beyond proof. Nor could the authors perceive the possibility of any such properly representative assembly ever gathering together to consider the ruling of the church. The *legislator universalis* was an unreal body without a vitalizing will to give meaning and power to its actions. The will of Christendom was the will of God, which was administered in heaven not on earth. Christendom was voiceless when deprived of its corporal expression, the church. The determination of faith, the last function left to the ecclesiastical power, was shifted from the pope to the general council, which was so constituted as to make its authority and validity unreal and ambiguous. The real determiner of faith was the *legislator* of each separate natural state professing Christianity. The members of the natural state were identical in such small groups with the multitude of the faithful, the *legislator* of the natural state was synonymous with the *legislator* of that particular body of faithful. The universal church was swallowed piecemeal by the several natural states insatiable in their desire for absolute power. By the nature of the state, by the impossibility of ever constituting a universal ecclesiastical organization, by the nature of religion itself, the state was justified in claiming for itself omnipotence.


The authors of the *Defensor Pacis* had successfully recaptured in terms of the Italian city-states the state of Aristotle's descriptions, embellished and modified by concepts taken from subsequent schemes of thought and experiences, Roman, Christian and contemporary politics. They reintroduced to Europe in a form closely related to its political structure the Greek enthusiasm for the state. They gave coherence to the body of facts which were producing the new secular states of France, England and the Italian cities; they drove home the


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truths of the new situation to all those united in the effort to throw off the papal authority.

Dante, Pierre Dubois and the authors of the *Defensor Pacis* illustrate a gradual approach towards a conception of the purely secular state untrammelled by spiritual obligation or the divine will. Dante rejected the church on earth, but infused his temporal empire with the spirit which had dominated its rival; the end of his empire was still spiritual and moral. Pierre Dubois went a step further, and sketched a European empire whose main concern was economic prosperity. Yet a feeling for the necessity of a spiritual power, though under a strange guise, lingered in Dubois' mind; he still retained the church. The authors of the *Defensor Pacis* boldly presented a conception of the secular state ultimately subversive of all co-operation between states. Their scepticism was scarcely veiled. They could not even comprehend the need for a church. They elaborated a theory of the state, according it an absolute power unrelated to any end but its own will. The secular reaction came to full fruition in the *Defensor Pacis*.

The suggestions for the future governance of the church caught the imagination of contemporaries. Despite the condemnation of the *Defensor Pacis* as heretical and its formal burning by the church, the book was much read during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It formed the basis of the dominating movement in the church during that period. In the years which followed the writing and banning of the *Defensor Pacis*, the notion of reforming the church by a general council which should be superior to the authority of the pope, the substitution of a federal for a monarchical form of government, grew and matured into the fatal conciliar experiment.





CHAPTER VII

THE CONCILIAR EXPERIMENT: DISINTEGRATION OF UNITED CHRISTENDOM

A LONG pause of nearly two hundred years ensued in the struggle between the spiritual and temporal powers over the limits of their respective authorities after the writing of the *Defensor Pacis*. The two groups of antagonists were otherwise preoccupied. The successors of the turbulent John XXII settled down quietly at Avignon where they became absorbed in artistic interests. Intermittently they fulminated harmless bulls against various European rulers on behalf of the French monarch whose power overshadowed them. The rivals of the papacy were simultaneously distracted by their own particular difficulties. The states of France and England were facing the results of a premature attempt at centralization. The royal authority was dangerously menaced by the growing activity of the anarchical decentralizing feudal elements. The rise of towns in both countries to positions of unprecedented economic power added a new and distracting factor to politics. In Italy the rivalries between the cities continued to drain the energies and resources of these small states. The policy of the emperors vacillated between striving to recover their position of head of their scattered empire, and concentrating on establishing a strong German state with severely delimited boundaries. The empire was weakened by indecision. The outbreak of the Hundred Years' War between England and France further disturbed the European states. The emperor and most of the important princes became embroiled in this struggle for trade. Secular emergencies absorbed the monarchs of Europe. For a brief while interest in political speculation of any sort was swallowed up by practical exigencies. The Black Death prolonged this interlude. The rapid development of the Renaissance followed. Men's minds were further estranged from the pre-eminently theological discussions of the beginning of the fourteenth century. When the disaster of the Great Schism made joint action in Europe imperative, the states, their

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leaders, the church and the general attitude towards it, had undergone radical changes. New political problems emerged and demanded solution. The controversy over the relations of church and state sank into the background.

In 1350 the Black Death swept across Europe, depopulating the countryside and spreading death and despair everywhere. Boccaccio's *Decameron* leaves little doubt of the effect the visitation had upon the attitude to the clergy and religion in general. The church had failed to avert the catastrophe; of what use was the church? Men sought refuge in mysticism and solitary forms of religion as the binding force of social customs disintegrated in the wake of the scourge. They concentrated on developing an inward perfection of the individual soul as they felt the external structure tottering to collapse. It was the age of the *Imitation of Christ*; of deep despondency; of a growing contempt of the clergy whose lives were a bitter mockery of their faith.

Scepticism also was rife. The Renaissance in art and learning supplied a variety of new interests in place of the old shattered beliefs. The sporadic keenness to recapture special aspects of the ancient civilizations manifest earlier in the revival of Roman law and the study of Greek philosophy increased to a continuous and passionate curiosity of every aspect of classical culture, Greek and Roman. Scholars concentrated on accumulating manuscripts from any available source. The continued threat of the overthrow of Constantinople by the Turk encouraged the immigration of Greek scholars with their precious manuscripts and their priceless knowledge of the Greek language into a delighted Europe. Greek writings were studied in the original for the first time. The real nature of Greek culture was revealed. New themes, new literary forms were discovered. Simultaneously Italian artists accomplished a revolution in the mechanism of art. Emotionally stirred and intellectually stimulated by their discoveries, well equipped in their new technical accomplishments, artists and thinkers alike were able to make full use of the variety of knowledge which circumstances had suddenly thrown at their feet. Classical models and ideas were sought and copied. Italy was flooded with a reverence for the distant past, and that past was pagan. The flood rose in Italy, and swept over Europe. The intellectual life of

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Europe became paganized. The interests of these ancient civilizations seemed to centre in man and his innumerable activities. The Renaissance in a sense was the rediscovery of the importance of humanity in contradistinction to God. The tendency in the early fourteenth century amongst a select minority was to resent ecclesiastical control and negate religious doctrines. The tendency at the end of that century and throughout the fifteenth, amongst an increasing majority, was to ignore the church and assert a positive belief in human rather than divine values. Humanism gradually superseded theology.

The period after the Black Death was one of great political activity and experiment in the secular states. Their political institutions became more complicated as the activities of the central authority increased. The feudal magnates challenged the royal power; the rise of the towns to political importance introduced a further complication. A non-aristocratic element of society entered the competition for power. The three claimants to political control were in perpetual antagonism. The struggle revolved round the position of sovereign power in the state. In England Parliament was asserting its right to control the king. It formally censured Richard II and finally forced him to abdicate. In France the Estates General, in the Empire the College of Electors attempted to play a similar role and use their authority to curtail the absolutism of their rulers. Constitutional monarchy was their suggested remedy cloaking their desire to concentrate the power into their own hands. The problem was to redistribute political authority amongst a variety of claimants. A growing sense of national consciousness spurred on the interest in national institutions. In France, Italy and England national literatures were springing up. Intellectual activity and national pride stimulated political developments. The secular states were rapidly developing complicated political institutions fitted to their respective needs. Europe was disintegrating into separate entities, each infused with a proud consciousness of its individuality.

The church after 1378 became involved in the same problem of political authority complicated by peculiarities inherent in the nature of the spiritual power. But there was an important difference between the position of the church and that of the secular states which made

the church's attempts at solution of more significance in the development of thought than that of any other body. The experiments and ideas of the states were conditioned by their own particular circumstances. They were provincial problems, the solution of which was relative to particular needs and was of momentary value. But the problem confronting the church was of universal importance. The church was striving to achieve the right form of government for the one perfect society known to the world. What was found to be true for the church must be held true of any society seeking to achieve perfection. The church was seeking perfection; the states expediency. The ideas evolved about the constitution of the church would carry with them an air of universality, an air of finality as the last word in the prophecy of perfection.

The issues at stake for the church were graver than those confronting the particular states. The church not only had to consider her internal condition; she must face the fact that her failure to recover unity within herself would result in the break-up of the ideal of a united Christendom. If the vision of political unity was destroyed, what of the faith? Would it be able to withstand the shock of the disintegration of its outward body, the church, and persist as an inner flame within the consciences of those who formed the mystical body of believers? In seeking to maintain its unity the church was seeking to maintain its authority over spiritual matters upon which the doctrine of one faith depended. It had to confront the rising tide of nationalism and bid it stop in the interests of the welfare of all Christendom. From this source, which to the church threatened disintegration, the states were deriving a greater unity. The church with more to lose than any other society was faced with stronger forces set against it than against any other contemporary organization. The conciliar movement as an attempt to solve these problems and in view of its failure stands out as the most important political development of the period. It shows the idealization of constitutional government and the forces at work in Europe which made both that ideal and the ideal of a united Christendom fail.

The events leading up to the convening of the general councils were not without significance. In 1378, after long solicitations, the pope decided to return to Rome. He immediately became the prey of

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the Italian factions. The large number of Frenchmen who by then composed the majority in the college of cardinals registered their distaste to Italian supremacy by electing another pope, their countryman, to the Holy See. The Great Schism had begun. The effect on papal authority was devastating. The two popes claimed an equal authority over the church with all the high-sounding prerogatives asserted by previous popes to back their claims. Europe was bewildered. She was divided into two camps, those adhering to the French choice including France, Naples, Castile and Scotland, and those adhering to the Italian including Germany, Italy and England. Confusion was rampant. The appellate jurisdiction of the pope was seriously affected by the presence of two final courts of appeal instead of one. No country could afford to be neutral. The ecclesiastical system of law was too closely interwoven with the secular to admit of its rejection by any ruler at this time. Marriages, wills, inheritance were ecclesiastical causes. The schism penetrated into the everyday life of every country. It was no academic discussion on the legitimacy of the two rivals. So long as the schism lasted, so long would the burden of choosing the spiritual guide for his people be thrown inevitably upon the shoulders of each secular prince. Force of circumstances added a new power to the already extending authority of the secular governments. The compulsory exercise by the secular prince of this power to select or reject the highest spiritual authority was a dangerous precedent. The European princes were rapidly acquiring a habit of independence in spiritual matters to the detriment of the papal authority and the unity of the church.

The prevalence of abuses and heresies further obstructed the achievement of unity. The reform in morals was urgent. The Black Death had further demoralized the clergy. The delights of the Renaissance distracted them. Riches, desire for high office, simony and personal laxity debauched the morals of the clergy. They were universally contemned. Yet there was opposition to their reform. There was a definite expressed distaste for any effort at uniformity or any compulsion from an Italian or French pope on members of the church who belonged to other nations. A contemporary remarked to one of the schismatic popes at the end of the fourteenth century that any attempt to enforce the vow of celibacy on the German clergy

would result in an even greater schism within the church. The opposition was not individual but national. Nevertheless the desire for reform amongst the ardently religious was profound and urgent, provided the methods adopted did not offend their national pride.

A host of heresies were also undermining the unity of the faith at this critical juncture. The most formidable of these was predominantly nationalistic. The followers of Huss were both heretics and patriots. They claimed simultaneously political and religious independence. The two demands were indistinguishable and consequently highly subversive to the political unity of Christendom. The Hussite attack was levelled at the emperor who wielded the sword of Christendom. It was no provincial matter.

The church by the end of the fourteenth century was disintegrating in authority, morals and doctrine. The cry was raised amongst enthusiasts for a drastic reform in 'head and members' which would re-establish the pristine glory of the church and close its ranks against the forces of disruption.

The schism remained as an insurmountable obstacle to these efforts. By 1393 anxiety reached a great height. Men like Gerson and Pierre D'Ailly in the University of Paris endeavoured to bring about a reconciliation. Steeped in the works of Marsilius and the early Fathers, aware of the early traditions of the church, they suggested a general council should be called to settle the question. The Council of Pisa which met in 1409 as a result only made matters worse. A new pope was elected, but his rivals refused to resign. The church was burdened with three heads. The University of Paris without faltering pressed for the calling of another council. This met at Constance in 1414. It succeeded in closing the schism.

The steps taken by the council to achieve this end involved it in vigorous discussions on the legitimacy of its actions. Its debates covered a wide range of problems in political theory. The two main questions were the exact position of sovereign power in the state, and the extent and limits of political authority. The Council of Constance was preoccupied almost exclusively with a discussion on the nature of political sovereignty.

The council had to assert and obtain recognition of its supremacy over the papacy in order to end the schism. Its famous decree

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Frequens embodied its conception of its right to subordinate the actions of the popes to its authority. The decree stated that sovereignty in the church lay in the representative organ of the people. The Council of Constance was such an organ. It was composed of the pope and representatives both lay and spiritual assembled in council with him. The rule of the church should be centred in this full council. On the defection of John XXIII, the council went further and declared itself capable of deposing the pope. The action of John XXIII forced the members of the Council of Constance to assert the superiority of the body of the church over its head on earth the pope. Sovereignty no longer resided in the full council of pope and members, but amongst the members only. The council showed a preference born of its peculiar necessities for aristocratic rather than monarchical government. They were suggesting a limited or constitutional monarchy instead of the absolute sovereignty claimed by the pope. The deposition of Richard II in England in 1399 followed similar lines.

The papal authority was not so easily dismissed. The pope claimed that his authority came immediately from God through the agency of St. Peter. It was divine authority. The council met this objection by asserting that the authority of the people whom it represented came indirectly from God. It did not follow here the example of Marsilius who regarded the authority of the people as an inherent part of their equipment as a community. The Roman conception of *imperium* underlying Marsilius's theory of the origin of political authority was human not divine. The members of the Council of Constance could not fall back on such a line of argument when meeting a claim of divine right.

When the deposed pope, John XXIII, fulminated bulls against the council, the question was raised as to the validity of these bulls. What were the exact limits of papal authority and when was it right to refuse obedience to any ruler? Underlying this was the general question of the nature of law and how far human laws were to be obeyed. Were they merely human or were they connected with some fundamental natural law to which the bewildered individual could appeal? These were the main questions which the exigencies of the moment forced on the Council of Constance. Men like Gerson, the

Chancellor of the University of Paris, and Pierre D'Ailly on the French side, Dietrich of Niem and Henry of Langenstein on the German, Zabrella and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, later Pius II, on the Italian, debated their individual solutions in the council chamber and in copious pamphlets. The majority of these works were written in justification of particular circumstances and crises. They were necessarily disjointed and partisan. The decree *Frequens* embodied the common factor of these views. But the events and statements of 1414 were not synthesized into a comprehensive body of political theory until Nicolas of Cusa was able to see the whole crisis in perspective some thirty years later. Then the decrees and discussions of the Council of Constance became the starting point of a political philosophy informed by that humanism which was the deeply marked characteristic of the age and the man.

The closing of the Great Schism ended the life of the Council of Constance. Immediately the members attempted to discuss the suggested reform in 'head and members' they disagreed so violently that nothing could be done. The needs of the nations varied so greatly that uniformity was no solution. Moreover, national independence was too strong to submit to more effective control from a central authority in matters deemed to be local and domestic. The nations bitterly resented any suggestion of a more powerful central authority, by which the necessary reforms could have been enforced. The Council of Constance broke up without achieving any reforms, without quelling the religious-nationalistic movement in Bohemia, despite its dastardly treatment of Huss. The decadent condition of the church in morals and doctrine remained untouched. The ominous rumblings of nationalism effectively checked drastic action and destroyed the precarious unity of the council. The assembly at Constance dispersed after declaring that councils for the future governance of the church should meet at least every seven years. They were determined that constitutional rule should not fail from lack of the perpetuity of the proper authority.

The hopes of Constance were doomed to disappointment. No important council met for twelve years. The pope carried on the governance of the church as formerly. No reforms were carried out. The abuses remained and the clergy were regarded with even greater

contempt. However, under pressure of the desire for reform vehemently expressed by the princes and the populace, the pope at last convened the Council of Basle in 1431. Cesarini was president. Nicolas of Cusa attended as secretary to Cardinal Orsini. The council achieved nothing save to demonstrate its ineffectiveness to govern. It revealed to a Europe anxious for reform the causes which made such a policy impossible. Its failure marked the final break up of the hope that Europe might act as a single organism. The disunity of the church involved the breakdown of all pretensions to international harmony in Europe.

The work of Nicolas of Cusa written especially for this council and as an outcome of its meeting embodied in a full system of thought the aspirations of Constance and of all constitutionalists whether priest or member of parliament in England or France. His *De Concordantia Catholica* remained as a vivid protest against his own subsequent defection to the papalist reaction and against all who advocated absolutism in Europe. It expressed in philosophic form the constitutionalism which the church was failing to achieve, which the Lancastrian experiment in England, the estates in France and the electors in Germany were striving unsuccessfully to accomplish. He generalized from these particulars; embodied the main principles which underlie any theory of constitutional government; and endued them with a universality that increased their significance.

Cusanus was a man representative in his interests of the most striking characteristics of the period. Whilst a student at Heidelberg University which he attended in 1416 he came into contact with the full force of the political agitations of the time in connection with the Council of Constance, the deposition of Pope John XXIII and the Hussite heresy. Heidelberg University had high hopes of the conciliar movement. It was indignant at the division of the voting at the Council of Constance into national groups. The lively discussion of all these subjects made a deep impression on Cusanus. He left Heidelberg to study law at Padua where he became intensely interested in the study of Greek. He was a typical renaissance scholar in his passion for the collection of manuscripts. His library was famous. The proximity of Padua to Venice and the Greek influence there did much to make the study of Greek easy for him.

Later he became secretary to the famous renaissance cardinal, Orsini. Again the classics had caught him in their toils. He developed a highly critical attitude to historical sources and was the first anti-papalist to reject the papal claims to supremacy on the grounds of lack of historical evidence rather than mere desire to prove these claims false, such as activated men like Dante and Dubois. He was intensely interested in the scientific side of the Renaissance and made experiments in mathematics and physics which brought him to the conclusion in anticipation of Copernicus that the earth rotated round the sun.

At the same time he gathered to himself the heritage of the Christian past. He threw up the study of law to enter the church and pursued his course of theology at the University of Cologne, the centre of Aquinine philosophy. He was impregnated with the mysticism of the age which had produced Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation of Christ*. His scientific studies of Aquinine philosophy brought him to the conclusion that the finite mind of man could never attain to a full knowledge of infinite truth. All human knowledge was conjectural and the highest wisdom of man was to recognize his own ultimate ignorance. But he escaped from scepticism through his mysticism and asserted a doctrine of intuition describing an exalted state of the intellect in which all limitations disappear and the finite mind apprehends the infinite mind of God. Critical yet mystical, experimental yet full of a great faith in the ultimate validity of his experiments, Cusanus stood out as a magnificent specimen of the renaissance churchman. His political philosophy was profound, original and comprehensive of the deepest movements of his age.

Peace which from the time of Aquinas had seemed to be the primary end of human society still remained the elusive goal to be sought in the fifteenth century. Dietrich of Niem had gone so far as to assert early in the century that the attainment of peace justified any means, whether of fraud or violence. Dietrich was speaking in the shadow of the Great Schism. To Cusanus and his contemporaries later in the century the unity of the church was still precarious and the warfare between states pointed to the need for some solution to the never-ending conflicts which devastated and distracted Europe. In the church the suggestion of unity with the orthodox church also

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brought the question of peace to the fore. Cusanus was consumed with zeal to establish peace and unity in a church reorganized to effect its full responsibilities.

Two specific issues were raised by the exigencies of the moment: what was the proper relation of a general council to the pope? how best could the church be reorganized to function smoothly and efficiently? The residence of sovereignty in the body politic, the nature of sovereignty, and the very essence of society itself underlay these particular questions. Cusanus' discussions in the *De Concordantia Catholica* revolved about these themes. He set out to discover the forces which bound together the body politic in a united whole as well as to show which form of government was best suited to organized society. Cusanus sought to justify the actions of the Council of Constance in deposing the pope and appointing his successor. He asserted that the authority of general councils was superior to the pope's. His arguments in support of this statement led him into a minute analysis of the composition of general councils and the origin of their sovereign power.

General councils ideally should reflect the image of the whole church. How was this to be achieved, and why was it necessary? General councils were not separate bodies distinct from the general body of the whole church. Cusanus conceived of the church as a body woven together by the principle of election into an intimate and dynamic whole. He saw the church rising as a pyramid whose base was the faithful, whose apex was Christ. The faithful elected the curates by votes; the curates with the consent of the faithful and the metropolitan elected the bishops who ruled mainly in provincial councils; the bishops elected the metropolitans who in their turn elected the cardinals who chose the pope. The provincial councils composed of bishops and metropolitans should send delegates to the pope who must make them into cardinals. These should form a permanent general council.

The nature of the general council determined its supremacy over the pope. Cusanus was then slightly inconsistent. He first stated that no council was oecumenical unless the pope or his legate was present and that the pope had the right to summon general councils. But, he added illogically, should the pope refuse to associate himself

with the council when convened, then the council could act on its own initiative driven by the pressure of its own needs and the welfare of the church for which it was responsible. A general council was justified in ignoring the pope's defection for several reasons. General councils represented the universal church and received their authority direct from God. The pope's authority was not as cogent. He had received certain privileges from St. Peter and the Apostles, but many also from the human origin of canons and secular rulers. His authority was fallible coming from such a mixed source, and he himself capable, as a man, of sin. This explained the actual deterioration of the papacy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Cusanus' conception of knowledge deeply influenced his conception of the position of sovereignty in the state. Convinced of the fallibility of all human knowledge, Cusanus argued further that the judgment of a single man, the pope, was likely to contain less of the truth with its compelling certainty, than the combined wits of many men, such as the gathering of the bishops and cardinals in a general council. The aggregate findings of several men was less open to error than the opinion of one. Moreover, Cusanus regarded the office of pope merely as the executive of the ecclesiastical organization. The pope was only a member of the church like any other member; he was part of the corporate whole of which Christ alone was head and the church the body represented by the general council. If the pope did not perform his function of administration for the general council, then the general council could depose him. The tacit condition on which the pope was elected to office had ceased; the authority he had exercised in this capacity returned to its source, the general council. The latter must be able to control its executive. The pope was bound by the decrees of these councils. If he should disobey them, then he must be chastised by the body which by its nature and relation to him was recognized as his superior. Cusanus was asserting that a general council could depose a pope not only for the grave charge of heresy, but for any trifling misapplication of his delegated authority. The supremacy of the pope was reduced theoretically to the limits of a constitutional monarchy.

The general council representing the whole church was alone able to decide matters of faith. This and its supervision of the papal office

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seemed to be its main functions. The day-to-day administration of the church was not left in the hands of the pope, but was given over to the provincial or patriarchal councils, a new grouping coinciding with national boundaries. Cusanus recognized the force of nationalism and ceded to these provincial councils the entire control of their districts. Provincial or national councils presided over by local patriarchs were to be held responsible for the reform of abuses, everywhere so eagerly demanded. To reduce the power of the central body further, Cusanus suggested that the compulsory taxation of local groups for papal revenue should cease, and only voluntary offerings be given. He hoped this would reduce the power of the papacy and curb the ambitions of aspiring bishops for the riches of the papal office, which would be considerably reduced. Cusanus' exaltation of the national group served two purposes: it was an added check on the pope; it drew the power of nationalism into his scheme for the reorganization of the church. Cusanus hoped to utilize this new force to improve the ecclesiastical administration. He did not see it as a force hostile to the harmonious workings of the ecclesiastical machinery. The permanent general council was, as he described it, nothing less than a supreme federal council composed of permanent delegates from the independent national groups designated as provincial councils. This federal council was supreme over all local patriarchs including the pope. But it was composed of delegates of the very men whose actions it was supposed to control. The power and indirect control of the national groups completely dominated the general council. Cusanus was giving a theoretical explanation to the events of the last 50 years.

Cusanus rejected centralized control by the papacy for several reasons. He realized that the reform of morals would be better undertaken by the districts concerned with their particular problems than by a central body which would have to impose uniformity distasteful to the independent nations. He hoped that in national groups the power of the secular princes would be more potent. He exhorted the kings to summon national councils of lay and ecclesiastical representatives to undertake the task of reform immediately. He did not grant the power to interfere in religious questions to secular princes but clearly he relied on the exercise of the temporal sword to enforce the

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decisions of the national councils. The laymen were to act in an advisory capacity without the power to vote at the national councils. Cusanus was advocating for each national group the relationship with its secular head which, he observed, existed between the emperor and the Council of Basle.

Finally Cusanus rejected in the *De Concordantia Catholica* a centralized monarchy implying absolutism because of his passionate belief in the church. His mysticism and humanism informed his judgment on this, the basic assumption of his political philosophy. The church was a living unity defined as 'the union of souls with Christ in a sweet harmony'. It was the body of Christ in which the Holy Spirit dwelt perpetually, guiding and directing the judgments of the faithful. The bond of society was the spirit of brotherhood. The children of God were knit together and infused by the living flow of this eternal spirit. The church was dynamic not static. Love was its driving force and peace its end.

The reorganization of the church and the empire suggested by Cusanus exemplified this conception of a living society in terms of practical politics. He enunciated the principle of representation. He believed that anyone who was elected immediately represented the electors in their totality. The installation of any authority in the church was sacramental like marriage. In some mystical fashion the voters and the representative became fused in a peculiar union. Hence Cusanus described the general council elected by a closely knit system of representation as the image of the whole church. The people through their representatives ruled, and were capable of ruling. Cusanus' belief in humanity convinced him of its capacity to order, though indirectly, the higher matters of state and the faith. Disobedience to the commands of those in authority was ruled out as an impossibility in such a theory. The entire populace and not its particular rulers were inspired by God. The community had indirectly a divine right to govern. Humanism and nationalism met in this theory. Their union gave it peculiar strength. The elected authority was the representative of the voter he was commanding, how could that voter protest and refuse obedience to commands which in a sense were of his own dictation? Moreover, the ruler was the instrument of his people elected by their will and dismissable by their

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will. In either case disobedience and disharmony were eradicated, save for one difficulty. When a disagreement arose between ruler and ruled, how was it to be solved? How in fact did those in authority, the elected representatives of the voters, keep in close and living touch with the people they represented? Cusanus offered no remedy. He did not reveal how the changing opinion of the whole body of the faithful should be kept constantly reflected in its representatives. The general council of the church once elected was always there. Cusanus' firm conviction of the unity of the bond of love and the power of the spirit of God to direct the actions of man led him to overlook the machinery necessary to the production of that harmony between the rulers and the ruled he so desired.

The end of this living dynamic society was peace. The Holy Spirit which dwelt in the church infused it with unity and harmony, and sought peace and brotherly love as a supreme good. Anyone who worked for peace was *ipso facto*, in the eyes of Cusanus, inspired by God and hence justified. The decrees of the Council of Constance, which had closed the schism and re-established peace, were almost sacrosanct. Peace and harmony were the fruit of love. The representative system induced harmony and was the outcome of the desire of men to work together as brothers. Hence the representative system guaranteed the establishment of peace in Europe.

The absolutism of the pope was an easy sacrifice for the establishment of peace. The supremacy of general councils over the pope was justified by the needs of the moment, the nature of society, and the nature of man himself.

Cusanus hoped to see this elective representative system extend throughout every form of society. He applied it in detail to the empire. Here he suggested reforms which would be a middle course between the highly centralizing policy advocated by the emperor supported by the cities and imperial orders and the federal policy of the princes who would recognize only nominal control from the emperor. He proposed that the empire should be divided into twelve districts or circles concerned with the reform and administration of justice. These would represent the three estates of the nobles, the ecclesiastics and the populace. Similarly the central annual diet should represent the whole empire with its electors, judges and

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cities. Again Cusanus was insisting on a measure of popular control through representatives. The emperor should have a strong executive position. Cusanus accorded him far more power in this than he had granted to the pope.

He strengthened the position of the emperor for other motives than the welfare of the empire. Cusanus looked to the emperor to supply that measure of order in the Council of Basle which would make its meetings less stormy and its decisions more potent. He accorded the emperor a superior position to other princes on the grounds that the emperor had special functions to perform in relation to the church. He must maintain order and defend the faith against the encroachment of eastern and internal heresies. But this did not give him the right to interfere in religious decisions. Though he could even summon a general council to meet, his summons were exhortative not compulsory. Nor could he interfere in the election of bishops and governors of the church. He and other secular princes could join in the debates of general councils, though only in an advisory capacity. Cusanus did not identify the church and the empire. He adopted the imperialistic view that church and state were essentially separate, differing in function and organization; but they had need of each other.

The separation of church and state by an ardent churchman was a novelty. Cusanus registered in this a vast change in the attitude of ecclesiastics towards secular organizations, hitherto considered by them to be their inferiors. He still used the old metaphors declaring the church was the soul and the empire the body of the living commonwealth of united Christendom, whose head was Christ. He transfused the old conception with a new spirit: the commonwealth of United Christendom, though separated into two sections, the spiritual and temporal, was infused throughout with the spirit of brotherhood which bound together the two separate parts into a corporate whole. The essential features of this society were the principle of representation by which the whole body of Christian brothers might find their opinions articulated through their elected representatives; a constitutional monarchy as the best form of government to achieve this ideal, in which the representatives of the national or provincial councils played the role of controllers of any attempt at arbitrary

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absolutism; above all, a unity of faith whereby all men adhering to a simple unquestioned body of doctrine could feel themselves indeed children of the one God and brothers in Christ. The unifying element in this ideal society was emphatically adherence to a single faith. Nicolas of Cusa's intense personal beliefs led him to assume that the bond of faith was greater in the Europe of 1432 than the fierce egotism of newly awakened nationalism.

The proceedings of the Council of Basle shattered his vision of political unity and harmony. Immediately attempts at reform roused the latent national antagonisms. The members of the council were unable to reconcile their differences. The council finally petered out, creating as it dragged on yet another minor schism to add to the disturbances in Europe. But the proceedings of a general council were no longer of interest to the European states. The long-looked-for reforms had not been achieved; the Great Schism was long closed, of what importance were the quarrels and disagreements of a handful of bishops at Basle whose authority the pope had finally repudiated? Cusanus himself disillusioned by the downfall of his hopes turned to the papacy as a last resort for maintaining the unity of Christendom. The pope to accomplish this task efficiently must have full authority to silence recalcitrant bishops whose cavillings had already brought disaster on the conciliar efforts at reform. Cusanus apostatized into an ardent supporter of papal absolutism.

The abortive attempt at constitutional government in the church was killed by the failure of the councils to meet the three great needs of the moment, reorganization, reform and the suppression of heresy. The failure of the church was accompanied by a similar failure in the constitutional experiments in the states. The attempt to rule by the representatives of the communes in France and England had plunged both countries into civil war. In Germany the cities never achieved sufficient political control to involve them in a spectacular downfall. They never united sufficiently to disunite violently. The city-states of Italy had long since given up any attempt at inter-civic agreement. The individual states of Europe had disintegrated within themselves into antagonistic factions which only strong dictatorships could overrule and restore to some semblance of order. The choice of two ideals presented to Cusanus in 1432 between a monarchical and a constitu-

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tional form of government was no longer open to the church or any state. The conciliar experiment in its failure destroyed for some centuries the belief in the power of the people to control effectively their own political institutions. The ideal of democracy as formulated by Cusanus was discredited. The only alternative was absolute monarchy.

The collapse of the conciliar movement taught Europe another lesson. Cusanus had stressed the importance of the unity of faith. He had seen the commonwealth of Christendom as, in the words of Dr. Figgis, 'ruled by the principle of harmony, rather than that of uniformity, in which one polity shall still embrace both civil and spiritual activities, and brotherhood, the supreme principle of Christianity, shall become the inspiration of a delicately articulated society, the source of a varied and developing activity'. But the councils demonstrated effectively that the unity of faith was a chimera. Heresy remained persistent and intractable. The doctrine of the church was queried by those disappointed in her power to effect the simplest reforms. The bond of the great society was brotherhood; but were the faithful really brothers? Were they not rather primarily Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans and Italians? Did they acknowledge the same elements of faith in all their countries? What were the essential dogmas of the Christian faith which to deny meant damnation? No one at the end of the fifteenth century could give a certain answer to these questions. The faith was not formulated nor decisive; heresy was not defined; corruption persisted in destroying the very entrails of the church. The intellectual scepticism of the Renaissance was rapidly gaining ground. The failure of the church made men turn more ardently to the distractions and solutions offered by secularists. The church could not reform herself nor bring peace to Europe. Who would save Christendom? The fifteenth century closed on a note of religious and political scepticism.

The failure of the conciliar movement demonstrated conclusively the lack of unity within the church and the reality of national differences. It was a terse comment on the political perception of the authors of the *Defensor Pacis*. There was no actual body of the faithful; nor a mystical corporate life of the whole. The church was composed of separate organizations roughly representing national

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divisions and each strongly nationalistic and resentful of foreign control. The unity of faith could only be achieved by the co-operative effort of these national or, as Cusanus described them, provincial groups. But the nations were rapidly becoming self-conscious and boisterous in their self-consciousness. The failure of the church removed the slight nominal check on their independence. No authority in Europe existed, in fact, superior to their own. The failure of the conciliar movement left Europe disintegrated into a congerie of separate independent states with only a nominal leader, and ready to embark inevitably on the conflict of their several sovereignties characteristic of modern international politics.



CHAPTER VIII

THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATION-STATE

THE long struggle over jurisdiction, characteristic of the Middle Ages, came to its final crisis in the sixteenth century, and was resolved in favour of the new entity, the nation-state. At last the state took control 'over all persons and in all causes' within its territories. This assumption of absolute power was accompanied by a devastating convulsion in political institutions. Long-revered ideals were discarded to give way to conceptions evolved to meet the exigencies of the moment. The secular state attained a supremacy which would have gratified the highest ambitions of the earlier anti-clericalists. But the secular state which thus triumphed was very different from the old empire which straddled across all Christendom and struggled to occupy the same position as the universal church. The new nation-state was essentially separate and distinct from its neighbours. The striking phenomenon of sixteenth-century politics was the presence of countless separate entities all claiming absolute power for themselves and irresponsible independence of each other. Political thinkers were occupied with the problem of justifying or attacking this new entity. Its nature was something new, but its claims to sovereignty were similar to many which had developed during the Middle Ages in the long struggle between pope and empire. As the conception of a nation-state was new, so the discussions of its particular form of sovereignty followed somewhat original lines.

The reception of new ideas was facilitated by two major factors. The geographical discoveries at the end of the fifteenth century stimulated imagination and introduced a different perspective. The medievalists had viewed the universe as the audience of their human drama. The earth in the centre had hell beneath it and heaven as a canopy above. The earth itself was a flat surface, over whose edges men might fall into utter darkness. The Mediterranean basin was the centre of this world. These long cherished beliefs were jarred and broken to pieces when Columbus discovered America and Vasco da

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Gama sailed round the Cape of Good Hope. The world extended far beyond the bounds long held to be its limits. Europe shrank in proportion as the world grew. Simultaneously the early scientific speculators were suggesting that the earth was not flat but round. Aristotle had held this opinion and his works reintroduced the idea to Europe. Cusanus was further suggesting that the earth rotated round the sun. In a spherical world the locality of hell became a problem, the position of heaven a greater one. The structure of the medieval universe was rapidly being undermined. The geographical discoverers revealed the border of the Mediterranean basin to be one of many lands, the earth to be spherical, and were suggesting that the medieval Christian world, in fact Christendom itself, could no longer claim to be the central floor in the architecture of the universe. A new universe opened at the end of the fifteenth century before the staggered gaze of men already eager to explore, already intoxicated with the intellectual stimulants they had received from their study of antiquity.

At this moment the mechanism of printing introduced a new vehicle for the transmission of thought. Ideas which had been forced to travel slowly at the speed limit of hand-written manuscripts now were precipitated from place to place as fast as the printing machine could turn them out in large quantities to an eager world. Intellectual curiosity had always existed. It was particularly alive in the sixteenth century, and the art of printing enabled men who would otherwise have passed their lives unknown to each other to interchange views with a rapidity hitherto unknown. The art of printing quickened the speed of intellectual life. It introduced variety. A man was able to obtain books in his own home which before he had had to travel to read; many more ideas were thus available to him. Variety had a broadening effect and stimulated to controversy. Men were more aware of each other intellectually and knew more concisely of their differences and their dislikes. A clash of intellects ensued unparalleled before for which the printing press was primarily responsible. Thought was vigorous and a new medium for its transmission had been discovered. The pioneer of modern communications was established.

The beginnings of the scientific movement in the sixteenth century

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helped further to relax the old bonds of thought. Though the scientists did not dominate thought until late in the seventeenth century, yet their approach to knowledge from an experimental rather than an authoritarian angle emphasized again the general trend away from the rigidity of old ideas.

The bonds of society were most loosened in Italy which had been early and deeply affected by the Renaissance and its own internecine struggles. The tradition of the fourteenth-century secularists had left its mark. The Italian Machiavelli was the first thinker to examine and analyse the characteristics peculiar to the nation-state and to attempt to produce a theory of this new political organism.

The cities of northern Italy astir with new ideas with no stable criterion in religion or philosophy seethed with unrest and intellectual curiosity. Their political machinery had passed from the chaos of the faction fights of Dante's time to the more orderly regime of the Tyrants. Strong government had succeeded in the cities in restoring order and some measure of security. But warfare was constant between the city-states themselves. This source of instability could only be checked by extending strong government over a wider area than the city-state. If the city-states were to achieve complete security, they must unite. For the danger was not merely internal exhaustion. From 1494 onwards the co-ordinated state of France was pressing downwards into northern Italy, which became thenceforth the battleground of the conflict between the French king and the German emperor. The independence of the city-states was threatened by these intruding foreigners. Unity between the states from external and internal motives was essential if their vaunted political independence was to be maintained. Machiavelli looking across the border to the strongly established kingdom of France, aware of the weakness of the Italian city-states, and of the potential strength of the Tyrants if once properly applied, burning with the patriotism of a man soaked in the history of Italy's glorious past, determined to examine the issues and attempt some solution of Italy's political instability. Again the problem of instability absorbed an Italian's mind. But political institutions had become more compact and more centralized since the days of Marsilius; the church had been discredited by the Great Schism and the failure of the conciliar movement: the Renaissance

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had further developed and subtly undermined the medieval concept of man's relations to God. Machiavelli was not concerned with the relations of church to state; nor was he filled with an insensate hatred of the church such as had overwhelmed earlier Italian writers. The power of the church was too weakened to be of much interest to the Italian cities of 1513. Machiavelli wrote in a very different world from Marsilius, to solve a different problem.

Machiavelli wished to discover how to establish a strong state against foreign oppression and domestic upheaval. He sought his answer in the history of Rome to see there the causes of the decay and rise of a state to great power, to analyse the experiences of man, to show where lay the strongest bonds of social union, where they failed. The *Discorsi*, written as discourses on the works of Livy, the great classic author, showed Machiavelli's search for the forces which bind men together in society; the *Prince*, better known and often cited as the epitome of Machiavelli's political thought, embodied rather a section of the *Discorsi*, dealing with the governance of a state when already formed. The *Discorsi* was Machiavelli's philosophy of the state, the *Prince* a manual for the guidance of rulers, in particular the Italian Tyrant, Lorenzo de Medici.

Machiavelli's approach to his subject was new to the Christian world. He sought to show actual conditions and to analyse the causes for their appearance; he assumed from these actualities that certain principles underlay their behaviour. He generalized from particulars. He treated men as they were, not as they ought to be. He asserted that only by the known events of the past could one foresee the future, 'he that would see what shall be, let him consider what hath been'. Principles of conduct, principles of politics emerged from the mass of evidence he brought forward. What men had done dictated what they should do; and the criterion of value was the success which accompanied their action. From the past alone could men deduce what caused success, what brought failure. To the past he turned.

Men, he asserted, at first lived like animals, wild and scattered about haphazard, until population increased and defence was necessary to preserve security. This could not be obtained without association, so men gathered together in groups for the primary purpose of achieving security. The origin of society was a matter of chance arising from

the urgency of the need for defence. There was no fixed model for society. Political institutions were not constant. They obeyed a cyclical law. Accepting Aristotle's definitions of good and bad states, Machiavelli showed by historical examples how all states tended to pass by a regular progression from monarchy to tyranny, then to aristocracy, then to oligarchy, reacting into popular rule at first good and then bad, which in its turn went back to monarchy. Generally the cycle was interrupted by the destruction of the state by foreigners who took advantage of a moment of decline. States obeyed a law of change which made them sometimes good, sometimes bad. This law did not operate at the same rate in each state, hence the differences between actual states at a given moment. If the very nature of the state determined its decay and ruin, how could men stay the course of this fundamental law? Machiavelli argued that men and chance or fortune had each their part to play in the ordering of human affairs. Men had a measure of free will left to check the forces of nature; in this way they had the power to combat the forces of decay inherent in every state. Some measure of equilibrium between the forces of decay and growth might be obtained for a short time; but in the long run Machiavelli believed every state doomed to destruction. For 'all things are in continual motion, and nothing stands firm'. Not only states 'must ever be rising or falling', but the universe itself was flux and governed largely by chance or fortune.

Yet Machiavelli clung with the tenacity of a visionary to the hope that one day Italy would emerge triumphant above her enemies and be secure against the forces of disruption. Though the perfect static state was inconceivable, yet the moment of equilibrium might be prolonged indefinitely. How was this to be achieved?

Machiavelli saw one constant factor emerging in the swirl of change, on which he based his arguments. The nature of man seemed unchanged throughout the ages. Man had sought security in the beginning; he still sought security. Glory and riches were the aim of all. Men 'were always and are subject to the same passions'. The minimum a man demanded was security; but the ultimate fullness of good government which he wished to enjoy was sought in order 'to enjoy freely one's own without suspicion, not to doubt of his wife's or daughters' honours, not to be in fear for his sons, or for himself'.

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Property, honour and security attended by glory and riches were the constant aims of all mankind. These were the objects in varying degrees of every state. Essentially they were selfish objects, each man seeking his own fortune, glory and safety. The problem Machiavelli had to solve was to reconcile the selfish nature of man always 'bent to mischief', and always seeking its own end to the detriment of others, with the claims of social life. Yet in social life alone could men hope for security. A balance must be struck between the inherent selfishness of man and his need for security. How was this to be done?

Machiavelli asserted that when men first entered into social relations to obtain safety, it became apparent quite early that if one man acted ungenerously towards the ruler chosen to enforce security, that he aroused by his action feelings of hatred towards himself and apprehension in others that he would act similarly towards them. This fear of insecurity bred laws to restrain the disturber of internal stability. A sensitiveness to such disturbances gradually developed. It was considered wrong to act against the interests of the community, and right to act for its welfare. Thus a sense of right and wrong arose, from which sprang the notion of justice. The criterion of justice was the security and well-being of the community. The criterion of morals was the same. Public and private morals were not dissociated. Politics and ethics were not divorced. They were part of the same system. The criterion of social as of individual action was the security of the state. Therein ultimately lay the security of the individual and the sole possibility of his attainment of his private ambitions and the fulfilment of his end. If the individual acted against the well-being of his own community then he was bad and must be punished. No other meaning was attached by Machiavelli to the words good and bad. They were related solely to the ends of particular states. There was no general principle of morality superseding the standards of each state. Each state was essentially and inherently independent, knowing no law but its own necessity to maintain its independence and its security. These two ends were by Machiavelli's code of ethics binding on the state and on its citizens. It was conceivable in such a state that the citizen might have to be sacrificed to the community, that the security of an individual might be the price demanded for the security of the majority. Machiavelli was compelled to acknowledge

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this possibility and indeed agreed that it must be so. The highest good was the security of the whole, not the preservation of the one.

To achieve this end any means might be employed. What was popularly considered wrong could not be regarded as such, if it managed to attain its end, the preservation of the state. Thus Machiavelli approved of homicide as in the slaying of Remus by Romulus. Thus he asserted in the *Discorsi* 'it is he who does violence with intent to injure, not he who does it with design to secure tranquillity, who merits the blame', and in the *Prince* 'it is necessary for a Prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong and to make use of it or not according to necessity'. Cruelty by a prince was similarly justified. 'The act may condemn the doer, the end may justify him.'

To achieve security force and absolute authority in the ruler were necessary. Men were recalcitrant and prone to pursue their own ends not society's. They were evil. They must be restrained by the one weapon they would understand, force. Force bred fear, and fear was more disciplinary than love which easily gave way under trial and turned to self-interest. Laws were necessary to restrain men from pursuing their selfish ends and upsetting the stability of society, and laws would not be effective unless force lay behind them, 'seeing it is not possible for men to live in security without force'. The duty of the ruler established to achieve security was to make these laws. To do so, he must have an unfettered authority. No rival could be tolerated otherwise his whole purpose would be frustrated. The slaying of Remus by Romulus was again justified.

The actual structure of the state most approved by Machiavelli followed as a natural sequence from these premises. Machiavelli preferred a mixed form of government closely allied to that advocated by Aristotle. He agreed that the chief obstacles to security were the differing and insatiable ambitions of men. If these could be identified with the welfare of the state, each citizen would have a personal interest in maintaining its stability. So if the monarch's power was balanced by the senate's and the senate's by the people, all would be concerned in the authority of the government. Ultimately all power lay with the people who in true Roman fashion were sovereign. Machiavelli trusted the judgment of the people far more than that of a single man. All men were subject to error, but when united in a

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commonwealth the risk of error seemed less. Machiavelli endowed the people with an almost mystical power of perception, 'as touching wisdom, and settled stayedness, I say that the People is wiser and more staid, and of more exact judgment than a Prince. And therefore not without cause the People's voyce is likened to God's voyce; for we see that the universal opinions bring to pass rare effects in their presages, so that it seems by their secret virtues they foresee their own good or evil.' Machiavelli was delicately placing his finger on the pulse of nationality; the people as a group entity possessed 'their secret virtues' illuminating their morality. The best state was a republic in which the power of the people possessing such virtues could operate unchecked. In such a state security of property, honour and person was best obtained by all the citizens, and their liberty and independence assured. Failing this best of all states a limited monarchy might achieve security. Machiavelli had no patience with a Prince who had 'power to do what he list' for he was bound to commit 'divers follies'. Though at the foundation of a state not instituted by a free people, the ruler must have absolute power to establish the laws necessary to achieve security, yet once these laws were established Machiavelli looked to the development within the state of that public spirit which would eventually demand a full share in the government and the final establishment of a republic. Machiavelli then repeated Marsilius' views on the power of the legislator, stating that in either case the people were sovereign, whether the Prince existed to legislate and administrate in their interests, or whether they themselves undertook the task of maintaining the laws established for their benefit.

Public spirit was essential for the establishment of Machiavelli's ideal republic. What did he mean by 'public spirit'; how might it be developed? Machiavelli described it as 'virtue'. It was the motive force which induced men to sacrifice their inherent desire to pursue their own ends for the sake of the community. It was something more than mere desire for security which could only be attained by group life. If Machiavelli began by declaring the need for security alone drove men to live in groups and limit their freedom and independence by association with others, he finished by sublimating this need until it became an ideal that would demand the highest sacrifice from men.

If he at first described men as 'bent to mischief' he ended by asserting that these same men joined together as nations could speak with an authority 'likened to God's voyce'. Never did Machiavelli use the word nationality in our modern sense; but he was vividly conscious of the forces which united a state, his description of which constituted a description of the forces of 'nationality'. He warned his contemporaries of the danger of attacking a state that seemed divided within itself. The presence of a foreigner at its gates was sufficient to close its ranks and make it stand united against the external alien danger. There was something alive in a community which could force men to forget their most flagrant wrongs and unite with others they had but lately sought to destroy. What was this force? Machiavelli believed that a common tradition, a common language, a common system of law were the bonds of unity. The sense of their innate difference from outsiders and their right to their independence was so strong in a people that to Machiavelli it was almost invincible. Only the destruction of the people themselves could successfully destroy it: 'He who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget.' This passion for liberty and independence was present in varying degrees in all states. Where it was least developed there a tyranny or at any rate the rule of one man was likely to flourish. Alas! Italy had been denuded of this spirit by the church and lay under the heel of many tyrants and foreign oppressors. Machiavelli blamed the church for the decay in religion so conspicuous in Italy, and religion, he maintained, was a strong bond of unity between a people. No matter whether true or false, religion fostered public spirit, and as such should be encouraged by the good ruler in all states.

As the primary object of the state was security, Machiavelli devoted much of his time to the art of war as the most obvious means of maintaining security in a world peopled by men bent on mischief and subservient only to force. He rejected the popular idea that war should be fought by paid foreign soldiers. The best defence of a city was its citizens impregnated with their desire to defend their homes, wives and personal freedom. An army composed of citizens who

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fought for the glory of their commonwealth was the only reliable defence. 'Men not money is the sinews of war.' In war where the security and independence of a commonwealth was in jeopardy, all means for its preservation were permissible, nay justified, by the nature of the emergency. War itself was just when necessary, 'and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them'. The limits of a state must be carefully fixed with its security in view; it must be neither too big nor too small, strongly situated and 'of such resistance, that no man can hope to subdue it on a sudden; and on the other side that it be not so great, to become a terror to its neighbours . . . For,' he added, 'upon two occasions ordinary men make war against a Republic: the one to become master of it, the other for fear it become master of them.' For strategic purposes Machiavelli believed that natural boundaries, particularly rivers, were the best limits of a state. By strong armies and by adequate laws, with the right limits and delicately adjusted powers within the state, above all with an ever-increasing development of public spirit based on the past glories of Italy and the hope of future triumphs, Machiavelli strove to substantiate his dream of an independent and dominant Italy.

He had gone far from accepted standards in his search for stability in political institutions. He rejected the idea of the innate knowledge of good and evil, and declared this knowledge developed as a result of social intercourse and born of fear of social consequences. The criterion of moral and political conduct was not the law of God but the security of the society in which a man lived. These societies differed one from the other; he implied that as their standards of conduct were identified with their ends, so no one standard of conduct existed. Europe was honeycombed with a variety of moral codes. Natural law was non-existent. Human law was unrelated to any general principle of justice and connected solely with the need of man for security. Justice as a principle was swallowed up by the ravening desire for security of life, honour and above all property. Property was sacred to Machiavelli as to his Roman forebears. The universe itself being dominated by chance, there was no ultimate possibility of attaining stability. The fixed regime of Christian ideals was shattered into a thousand unrelated fragments. As all states were obliged to

seek their individual preservation, as all states were ultimately self-seeking and absolute, no basis existed for relations between states. International law was inconceivable, and international diplomacy became the field for the acutest deceivers. No international law could bend to its will the independence of the sovereign states. Christendom long moribund was destroyed at its roots. The origin of society as an institution of God was completely refuted by historical evidence. Men had gathered together to satisfy their own needs, not at the promptings of a divine Providence. Machiavelli went further, chance not God ruled the universe; and a religion was not appraised by its nearness to ultimate reality but by its ability to perform a service to the community of mankind. Men needed stability. If religion could help to foster this, its nature was irrelevant. Man prone to evil, but capable of discerning the factors conducive to his own immediate satisfaction, insatiable in his desire for glory and riches, recalcitrant and wavering when alone, strong and just when in association, with a passion for liberty, clinging tenaciously to his accustomed environment, man and his needs was the ultimate end of all society; his security alone formed the ultimate object, the final criterion of all morality. The nation-state united in religion, customs, language and law, stretching to its natural frontiers in France, England and Spain found an eloquent vindicator in Machiavelli as he cast his eye from the ruins of Italy enviously on the surrounding rising powers of Europe.

The Reformation made Machiavelli's theory of the state momentarily irrelevant. His contempt and disillusion about religion and his suggested substitute of patriotism for the universal truths of religion were out of place in a Europe precipitated after 1519 into the full stream of religious controversy. Machiavelli's *Prince*, though much read and quoted during the sixteenth century, was little understood as part of his deeper philosophy. His belief in the power of the people expressed in the *Discorsi* was ignored by monarchs and statesmen whose chief desire was to maintain their authority sometimes in the face of popular opposition. His works were premature at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The attainment of national religions had not yet occurred.

The Reformation begun as an attempt to purge and consolidate

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the universal church ended by a strange trick of circumstance in promoting the development of national usually antagonistic religions. It was a retrograde movement in political theory. Once again Europe was involved in a struggle between church and state which had been quiescent for nearly two centuries. In the sixteenth century the struggle was more intricate, more bewildering; it was enacted within the confines of a single nation. Each sovereign state was opposing a particular church. Each petty state or church paradoxically asserted its particular independence in terms of universal supremacy. At the end of the religious wars of the sixteenth century the nation-state emerged triumphant from these conflicts with an added function to its credit: the duty and power to control the consciences of its subjects. This extension of the power of the state, implicit in Machiavelli's belief in the compelling force of the 'voyce of the people', was the direct result of the ideas that developed during the violent reaction caused by the Reformation. A change occurred in the assumptions about human nature which facilitated this extension of political control to the state now provided with a vastly improved administrative machinery.

The concentration on the study of human activities and the spread of the humanistic attitude throughout the Renaissance suggested the capacity of man to judge for himself in all matters even and more especially in matters of religion. Luther's protest in 1519 was in train with the renaissance spirit; it was an exaltation of the individual. He pitted his particular opinion against the whole weight of the corporate authority of the church. His defiance had extensive consequences, apparently unsuspected by Luther at the time. His action raised anew the whole question of ecclesiastical reform. It raised graver issues. His protest implied that the neglect of those in authority might be remedied by the action of individuals. He suggested that the individual had the right, if not the duty, to inquire why those in authority were failing in their duty; that he had the power to decide what the church ought or ought not to do; that he could by the light of his own conscience discriminate between what was the law of God and what was not. The individual was bound to obey what he unaided perceived to be God's law, despite threats or persecutions from the church though it was backed by its claim to divine institution and

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centuries of accepted authority. One man's judgment could stand against the accumulated experience of centuries of religious thinkers and saints. If the individual could speak so certainly on the law of God in the high matters of faith, surely he could judge what was the law of God in purely human relations? Luther in claiming the right to individual judgment in matters of religion was simultaneously implying that the individual could ascertain what was justice, for justice and religion were indissolubly bound together in the minds of his contemporaries. If divine institutions could be defied by the individual in the name of his conscience, how much more so merely human laws only indirectly derived from a divine source. Every man became by Luther's theory a priest, every man he implied became a law unto himself in political as well as religious matters.

The Peasants' Revolt in Germany was the comment made by an ignorant peasantry on Luther's action. Social abuses lay unremedied; Luther's justification of the individual's power to remedy religious abuses suggested a similar justification for those eager to remedy social conditions. The peasants revolted in the name of justice whose meaning they now felt capable of interpreting. Luther found himself the fountain-head of anarchy not justice. He retreated in panic, and reversed his first judgment. He declared that only civil magistrates could undertake necessary reforms. As the spiritual authorities had failed in their duty of removing abuses, the secular authorities, not the private citizens, were instituted by God to do so. They were given their power, the civil sword, to cleanse and purify the church and maintain it in its pristine glory. Luther was applying to every individual prince, or, as he said, civil magistrate, the duties which had hitherto been regarded as exclusively pertaining to the office of emperor. The ecclesiastical authorities were moribund; the emperor was preoccupied with the teasing details of administering his scattered domains; the individual was untutored and incapable of ordered action; Luther turned in his fear and passionate desire to see religious abuses remedied to the substantial power of the new compact secular governments. He endued them with almost imperial authority. Luther was thus driven into a denial of the basic assumption of the Renaissance and its humanistic philosophy. He rejected its belief in the power and dignity of the individual to regulate and con-

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trol the details of his own every action and hence to assist in the management of public affairs. His apostasy started a reaction which developed on the one hand into uncompromising religious intolerance and on the other into a secular absolutism.

Luther's apostasy of his belief in the individual was not sufficient to stem the flood of anarchical elements which had broken loose at his first action. Reformers sprang up everywhere in Europe claiming divine authority for their particular views. New churches were founded only to divide again into other churches each claiming a clearer vision of the truth. Europe became a patchwork of ill-assorted religious communities bearing little or no relation to the underlying structure of petty states, themselves claimants of political autonomy. In the innumerable states of Germany the anarchical political elements allied with the religious; civil war or revolts broke out throughout the empire. The unrest spread to France where political, religious and economic conditions were already disturbed. The efforts of the French kings to centralize the government of France from the north southwards had met with great resistance in the southern provinces. The traditions of the south, their language, their predilection to Roman law, even their racial origins, were different from the Teuton north. The Reformation aggravated this difference by adding an alien religion. The organized rebellion of the southern cities then plunged France into the chaos of a long civil war.

The French civil war introduced a new phase in the development of the nation-state towards its goal of absolute supremacy and independence. The forces which clashed in the struggle were both striving for complete dominance; both claimed absolute sovereignty. The centralizing royal authority was impregnated with ideas taken from Roman law in which the sovereign was absolute; the church-state of Calvinism claimed supremacy in the might of the law of God. The old struggle between emperor and pope was revived in a concentrated form within the confines of a single state. France and subsequently the rest of Europe were plunged back in political issues to the problems of some three hundred years before. Was the king or the head of the particular church to have supreme authority? What was the nature of political obedience and of law in the state? Was there a sovereign power within the state, and if not by what limits was the

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independence of the nation-state curbed? By what right did these upstart churches make such vast claims? In attempting to defy the power of this new religious enthusiasm the secular state had to augment its own power to include all matters pertaining to religion and the consciences of its subjects. The particular course taken by the Reformation almost forced the nation-state to adopt the longed for control 'over all persons and in all causes'. Calvin's theory of the state was an urgent factor in pressing the secular power, not unwillingly, towards the assumption of this supremacy.

Calvinism marked the greatest reaction away from the liberating forces of the Renaissance and its belief in humanity and the possibility of democracy. Calvin consolidated the movement towards absolutism which had begun at first within the church after the failure of the conciliar experiment had discredited constitutional rule. He picked up the anarchical threads of the early reform movement and wove them into a strong and irresistible system. He synthesized like a medievalist the chaotic conceptions inherent in much of the political thought of his age.

The calvinistic system was simple and logical once its premises were accepted. Calvin's object was to discover a substitute for the authority of the catholic church which should be as powerful and coercive as that living flexible body. He found his substitute in the bible, the inspired Word of God. Paris, where Calvin studied, had been considerably influenced by the study of Roman law and the new discoveries in science. Both stressed law as a governing principle, the one in human relations, the other in the whole universe. Man, to Calvin, was gripped and enmeshed in a rigid system of laws, regulating his every action, until of himself he could do nothing. The originator of the law had planned everything to the minutest detail; nothing was left to man but to carry out these laws. Man's every action was predestined from the beginning, he had no freedom left him with which to choose. The justification of this theory of the all-per-vading power of God lay partly in a very real sense of awe engendered by the conception of the vastness of the universe which was just then being revealed through the scientific and geographical discoveries; partly in Calvin's conception of the nature of man. Man seemed to him utterly incapable of any good action whatsoever. He did not

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even allow him the possibility of wanting to do good. 'Let it stand, therefore, as an indubitable truth, which no engines can shake, that the mind of man is so entirely alienated from the righteousness of God that he cannot conceive, desire or design anything but what is wicked, distorted, foul, impure and iniquitous; that his heart is so thoroughly envenomed by sin that it can breathe out nothing but corruption and rottenness: that if some men occasionally make a show of goodness, their mind is ever interwoven with hypocrisy and deceit, their soul inwardly bound with the fetters of wickedness.' Even Machiavelli had not gone so far. Such a creature could not be capable of running the business of government with any success. God had to make every rule of government beforehand for such decrepit beings.

God had laid down once for all in the bible his scheme of government which he thought most desirable and obligatory for men. Men could not alter this scheme. Obviously such polluted instruments could not change for the better the institution prescribed by the Almighty. The nature of man prohibited at the outset any attempt to get behind the authority of the Word of God. Nor would Calvin admit the possibility of the catholic church or any church as a fit authority for interpreting the Word. To assert that the Word needed interpretation was to imply that God had set down his precepts confusedly for man whom he knew to be utterly corrupt and incapable of making an interpretation. This was to impugn the wisdom of God and was a grave sin.

Calvin's fundamental premises were the omnipotence of God, the all-pervading nature of his law embodied for man in the bible, the utter incapacity of man to do aught but evil. From these sprang his political theory in logical sequence. He asserted that the divine purpose for mankind was to bring some men to the supreme happiness of salvation. How was this to be achieved? The answer was to be found in the bible. There God had shown to the Israelites the form of government by which his will could be effective. Moses had received from God the tables of stone on which was engraven the law of God. The end of all human activity was to obey this law; the penalty for disobedience was eternal damnation. The law was divided into rules for conduct towards God, and rules for conduct towards man. The slightest slip in the performance of the smallest of these details was as

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grave and consequential as the most formidable sin, for man could not differentiate between the different orders of God, each was equally binding. Man could not give more value to the one duty and less to the other. He was incapable by nature of any moral evaluation. The best form of government was that used by the Israelites as commanded by God. God had set up priests and kings, the one to carry out the first table of the law, the other the second, but there was no real separation between the powers, for both were instituted to carry out the law of God. A default in one's duty towards one's neighbour was a crime against the community and a sin against the second table. A default in one's duty towards God or religion was a sin against the first table and a crime against the state whose primary function was the maintenance of the whole law of God, not a limited part. So to Calvin crime and sin were identical terms. The state was as much a theocracy as the medieval church. The priesthood must in such a society hold the superior position. Obedience to the commands of those in authority was a religious duty. To disobey was to defy the law of God and his appointed ministers. The sovereignty of this homogeneous state pervaded by the one system of divine law laid down in the bible was absolute over its subjects. They had no right left them for rebellion or even protest. There was only one law of God, one form of government. Any other form was criminal and sinful, and merited the most severe punishment. So Calvin felt justified in promoting the most severe religious persecutions. The calvinistic premises necessitated a simple uniform system of government throughout all Christian countries. There was but one true form of government and Calvin had discovered it to a perplexed world. Calvin in his reliance on the bible was making a gallant bid for the re-establishment of unity in the religious chaos of the sixteenth century.

The great weakness in Calvin's theory of the state was this reliance on the bible. It was not enough for Calvin to assert that the inspired Word of God required no further interpretation. In point of fact his views in the *Institutes* were themselves a particular interpretation; and as the bible came more and more into the hands of the people it received in increasing degree a variety of interpretations. But for a long time each interpreter held, as Calvin did, that his view alone

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was valid and must carry with it the weight of authority lying behind the Word itself. Everywhere it was agreed that obedience to the law of God was a religious duty, that human laws were valid only when they partook of the nature of the divine law, that government was instituted especially to carry this system of law into effect. Hence obedience to government was a religious duty of the highest order, and disobedience a corresponding sin. So religious persecution spread throughout the length and breadth of Europe, and France, Holland, Germany and finally England were torn with religious wars bound up inextricably with political issues. All the protagonists claimed obedience to their particular form of government as a religious duty; all believed their form the only one sanctioned by divine law. Each secular authority sought to justify its desire to establish an absolute authority within its realm on a religious basis of the most binding nature. Calvin reintroduced in an acceptable form through the fiction of the authority of the bible, the most powerful conceptions of the Middle Ages in relation to the nature of law and political obedience. But the bible was more passive than the catholic church, and lay inert in the hands of its interpreters offering no resistance to the twisting of its words to justify the actions of its believers. The secular authorities had received an opportunity for power through this medium which would never have been accorded them from the hands of an actual church, a living rival and opponent to their claims.

The immediate result of the wholesale adoption of this theocratic conception of the state as advocated by Calvin was to increase political confusion and religious persecution and to intensify the reaction away from the renaissance liberalism and its joyous belief in the potential capacity of man. Each party in turn as it came into power claimed divine sanction for its acts, claimed to be the only and best form of government for the country. To disobey its commands was regarded as a grievous sin; to profess another religion was regarded as a heinous crime. The suppression of every other form of religion was incumbent on whatever party was in power in order to substantiate the basis of its authority, the one law of God, whose maintenance was the primary function of government. The attempt to enforce one religion in each country invariably ended by stirring up fierce

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rebellion. It was becoming increasingly apparent in the sixteenth century that the maintenance of one religion was not conducive to peace and order. The resulting chaos impressed upon men's minds the need for strong secular government. The initial premise of Calvin's, that the private citizen was incapable of ordering his simplest acts, was reinforced by circumstances. Some of the most eminent catholics professed their belief in the utter vileness of human nature. The corollary to this in political philosophy was a belief in theocratic absolutism. Everywhere, particularly in the French civil wars, one theory of absolutism clashed with another. No political solution was possible so long as religion and justice were interchangeable terms, for the religious controversies were endless.

Several groups of which *Les Politiques* in France were the most famous began to form, whose object was to dissociate politics from religion in order to combat that corrupting element of stability, the conflict of religious passions. They sought to show that a state might be as firmly established without religion as its basis. They insisted that the welfare of the community and not the maintenance of true religion was the primary concern of government.

Bodin was the most outstanding philosopher of this group. He gathered together the views of the new school of thought, and suggested a new set of values for political society. He sought to extricate the state from its divine entanglements and human law from the controversial ambiguities of divine law. He endeavoured to show that an absolute authority existed within the community which whilst morally binding on the members of the community was yet dissociated from any form of religion and could remain indifferent to the charge of impiety. His main concern was with the nature of government and the validity of its authority within the state. In attempting to elucidate this for immediate application to the domestic affairs of France, Bodin was led on to the exposition of a profound philosophy of the state. As a keen lawyer he had considerable knowledge of many of the European constitutions; his reading was voracious. His method of approach to his subject was somewhat similar to Machiavelli's, but with a far wider scope. He analysed the past and the present conditions of many states instead of one, and constantly compared his findings. He took much from Greek and

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Roman theory, something from Christian sources and the later medieval jurists, and added copious illustrations from contemporary events. He tried to find amidst this welter of information certain laws reducing the developments and behaviour of states to an intelligible form. He presented in his results an original though confused view of the state, its origin and the nature of political obligation.

Social life to Bodin originated in the family group. This was a natural unit for the obvious reason that wherever men were found they must associate themselves with women and children. The maintenance of the family demanded property; whilst the natural inferiority and incapacity of women and children to take care of themselves demanded the exercise of full paternal control. Following Roman and Christian precedents, Bodin declared that the father had in early times a supreme power over all his children, even over life and death. This power, much circumscribed during Bodin's time by several new laws, should be re-established in full force. He was fully convinced that much of the chaos in France was due to the decay of the family which he considered to be the basis of the state. The family supported by private property and absolutely controlled by its paternal head was the primary form of government, a complete cell from which the state grew.

Bodin tantalizingly left obscure the manner in which isolated independent patriarchal groups were converted into communities composed of several families and so organized as to substitute control by the community for paternal control. He suggested that the change was brought about by conquest and by the natural necessities of life drawing families together into associations for mutual benefit. Whatever its mode of formation, Bodin implied that the state was as much a natural product as the family. It grew out of the natural impulses and needs of human life.

Once founded the state had certain peculiarities which distinguished it from other forms of association. The main attribute of the fully formed state was an absolute power to make laws and to command obedience to them from all its members. '*La souveraineté est la puissance absolut et perpétuelle d'une République.*' This was the essence of the state, without which it disintegrated into the former

loose association of families. Bodin examined the nature of this sovereignty in detail; he strove to define the term abstractly. Dissociated from circumstances it was by nature indivisible, absolute, unlimited. The assumption that it could be divided into the component parts of a state which would then form a 'mixed constitution' as suggested by Aristotle, was, Bodin pointed out, ludicrous. Once divided it ceased to be sovereignty. The form of government might be a democracy (which to Bodin was the sovereignty of the majority), an aristocracy or a monarchy. This should not obscure the fact that sovereignty could and did exist in any of such states, once, wherever it was, it remained an indivisible power to make law. Was this power in fact absolute and unlimited? Bodin declared its nature to be so, but in his application of his definition he limited it by three things: property, the family and the law of nature. Property was essential to the family which was itself the basis of the state. Neither could be infringed upon without the dissolution of the organism of the state. The right of the sovereign to tax was thus queriable; Bodin could find no solution to his dilemma between the sacrosanct nature of property and the absolute power of sovereignty. Nor could he draw a line between where the authority of the father ceased and that of the state began; did the father or the state for instance decide on the religious education of the children?

The third great limitation to sovereignty was the law of nature. What did Bodin mean by this much controverted phrase? He regarded the law of nature as the law of God which was implicit in the universe, controlling every detail of its structure and known in part to men as the knowledge of good and evil. Men then had a standard by which to judge and delimit the sovereignty of the state. The end of the well-ordered state was not merely to vaunt its independence; the end of such a state was to satisfy all human needs both material and spiritual. Government was concerned primarily with justice, defence and economics. How and when could subjects refuse obedience to the commands of the sovereign if he overstepped the bounds of the law of nature? This was the crucial question of Bodin's time. To this he gave no direct reply. He implied that rebellion was never justified; and his conception of the law of nature was something very different from the rigid rules of the religious

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protagonists. It was no body of known laws to which the individual might appeal in support of his own judgment. Flexibility in the law of nature was an essential part of Bodin's philosophy. He was convinced that the law of growth operated throughout the universe. He believed that evolution took place in social institutions and the habits of man. Societies were constantly changing; the chief determining factor was climate. Bodin elaborated Dubois' vague suggestions into his famous theory of climate and its effect on social institutions and morals. The differences between countries in habits, ethical standards and intellectual development were due essentially to climatic differences. In the southern countries of Europe, men's morals were lax but their intellects alert. Only the states in the middle countries of Europe had achieved sovereignty; they alone were climatically fitted to this success. Even religion was the product of the physical environment of the inhabitants of a country. Nowhere then could there be in the nature of things one uniform system of law or morals. No one religion was possible in a world diversified by its climatic and geographical conditions. Moral values and intellectual capacity, the very foundations of religion, varied with the heat or cold, wet or dry nature of the country in which a man was born and bred.

The catholic and protestant insistence on the necessity of one faith and one uniform law of God was totally irrelevant to Bodin's political philosophy. So too was their belief in the divine nature of government. The very basis of the state to Bodin was the family, a unit formed as a result of human need and desire. Its absolute power was not given it by God to carry out the divine will, but was essentially an expression of human will. Sovereignty was the power of making law; or, in other words, the power of exercising the will of the community over its members in the interests of the community. Will not law was the characteristic of sovereignty, itself the core of the state and its distinguishing feature. Deprived of the duty of maintaining true religion as its primary function, the state no longer need persecute religion. Bodin insisted that persuasion was the better policy as men were always recalcitrant when forced. His theory of the state left religious persecution an open question of policy. It was no longer a duty incumbent on the government. Bodin had effectively released the state from its burden of divine obligations. He vindicated the

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establishment of a strong rule on the basis of natural and compelling human needs. He showed the state to be a natural product, and its sovereignty part of the process of its growth. He explained and justified the variety of political institutions present in Europe, and boldly propounded a theory destructive of any notion of the one state of Christendom. He argued cogently that the natural state, natural in its origin, natural in its area, whose boundaries and laws were determined naturally by its climatic and geographical conditions, was the nation-state, all-powerful and independent of all other states.

Bodin's chief work *Six Books of the Republic* appeared in 1576 when France was still in the throes of civil war. It was widely read throughout France and Europe. But it took more than Bodin's ponderous accumulative arguments to press home to the protagonists the need for a government whose chief function was not the maintenance of true religion. Henry IV's statesmanship and the exhaustion of the country put an end at last to the chaos of the religious wars. In 1598 the Edict of Nantes embodied a principle of toleration which implied that religion and justice were no longer indissoluble, and whilst more than one religion could and did exist under one government, that government alone was responsible for the maintenance of justice and was the sole controller of jurisdiction within its area. The state assumed to itself the right to make matters easy for the consciences of its subjects. Indirectly it was claiming absolute sovereignty 'over all persons and in all causes' in its realm. The churches both Gallican and Huguenot had their positions defined by the secular government, they were subordinate to the authority of the state.

The peculiar development of the Renaissance and Reformation in England towards the end of the sixteenth century produced a theory of the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state stripped of the limitations imposed upon it by Bodin. The Renaissance was first felt in England at the beginning of the fifteenth century, but the outbreak of the Wars of the Roses destroyed all interest in the new learning for over a century. Englishmen were pre-occupied at first with the struggle for power in the fifteenth century and then with maintaining the very precarious edifice of the Tudor monarchy, the only bulwark against the flood of disorder which they had lately experienced. The absorption of the jurisdiction of the church by the state under Henry

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VIII as part of his policy of a strong monarchy took place with little realization of its full significance. A few sporadic rebellions broke out and were as easily put down. Speculation naturally existed, but it was neither as passionate nor as universal in application as the views of continental writers. Sir Thomas More wrote his *Utopia*, but was beheaded for other reasons than the expression of his opinions therein. The royal power did not need to justify itself vigorously against the kind of opposition with which it met. The belief in the necessity for a strong rule permitted with little comment the publication of Thomas Gardner's *Commonwealth of England* in which he expounded at length the lawyer's attitude of the necessity for one jurisdiction in the state, and the presence of a power of command residing in the sovereign closely allied to the Roman theory of *imperium*.

This acquiescence in the *status quo* broke down in England at the end of the sixteenth century. Criticism of the government was rampant. Interest in literature had revived gradually as order was re-established. The influence of the Italian Renaissance made itself felt. Sidney composed his sonnets in Italian verse form; Shakespeare took Italian themes for many of his plays. The vigour of the humanistic learning stimulated inquiry and introduced its own set of ethical and aesthetic values. Simultaneously the full force of the Reformation struck England. The reformers who had fled the country during Mary's reign, returned from Geneva imbued with strong religious fervour. They found a church filled with abuses which had not been remedied when the state took over control. They saw no signs of the establishment of the church on the Genevan model such as they longed for. They sensed the opposition inherent in the humanistic movement which was just then intoxicating their fellow-countrymen. Everything encouraged them to oppose the Elizabethan Establishment. After 1588 the defeat of the Armada and the execution of Mary Stuart removed the danger from Spain and its corollary the constant conspiracies circling round the rival claimants for the throne. The *raison d'être* of the Tudor dictatorship as a bulwark against foreign and domestic dangers was gone. Parliament became restive under the dictatorial ways of the ageing queen; presbyterianism became passionately active throughout the country as a rival to the queen's ecclesiastical system. Religious and constitutional opposition

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informed by religious emotions and the new spirit of freedom culled from humanism awaited the successor to the throne.

The early events of James I's reign precipitated this criticism into a controversy in which the conception of national sovereignty was further developed. The presence of a large number of catholics acknowledging a lukewarm obedience to the monarch had long embarrassed the government. The gunpowder plot, a demonstration of a few catholic extremists, gave the government the opportunity to impose a test on the catholics in order to sort out the loyal subjects from the disloyal. The government formulated at once a special oath of allegiance and required catholics to assent to it. The pope refused to allow the catholics to take it as he maintained this oath removed his spiritual control over his English flock. Immediately a fierce controversy broke out involving some of the finest writers throughout Europe. The issues at stake were of universal interest to all European countries desiring national independence. A ruler had demanded an assurance from his subjects necessary to the maintenance of order within his realm, and the pope had interfered in this domestic situation and was opposing the simple maintenance of order. By what right did the pope claim such powers? Was a nation never to have any independence whatsoever from outside foreign control? Must it submit its security and well-being into the hands of the Roman pontiff and order its laws and its system of jurisdiction in which the taking of oaths was a primary procedure according to the dictates of an alien patriarch? The claims of the pope amounted to a claim to subordinate the nation-state to the control of the catholic church. No European ruler could remain silent under such provocation. The controversy over the English oath of allegiance exercised European ingenuity for over ten years. Its outcome in England was the recognition of an absolute irresponsible sovereignty within the state more complete than any suggested since the Réformation.

It was an axiom of the Reformation that all governments existed for the maintenance of the law of God. To this catholics and calvinists alike ardently subscribed. The struggle centred in the meaning of the real law of God. The catholics declared the church was the residuary legatee of this law and could interpret its difficulties to its members; the calvinists believed that the bible needed no interpretation; so they

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hoped to escape from the authoritative statements of the catholic church on questions of right and justice. In the controversy over the oath of allegiance in England the battle raged round this question of interpretation of the divine law. Whoever interpreted the divine law was *ipso facto* the final judge of the validity of all law governing human action. This was accepted by all parties. Each struggled to prove their side held the magic power to declare what was valid law and to dictate rules to the secular government to circumscribe its actions. The secular power, it was agreed, administered the law; who interpreted it? If it was the pope then he was the king's master; if the calvinists through the *Institutes* then they would control the king. National pride forbade the first; James's personal pride the second. The defendants of the king declared instead that the king himself was the interpreter. He declared and administered what was the law of God. He was the fountain-head of justice as the lawyers had constantly declared for some centuries; this was interpreted to mean that he had power to discern what was just and to enforce it. Practically, all jurisdiction in the realm was royal jurisdiction. The ecclesiastical courts were royal courts. Furthermore, any court could be set up by the king and must be both legal and just. To reject the validity of such courts was to impugn the majesty of the king and the law of God. The reaction against the suggested control by the papacy threw many Englishmen into a full-fledged theory of royal absolutism. The defendants of the king automatically justified the arbitrary courts of Star Chamber and High Commission. They forged a weapon against the catholic attacks from without and the calvanistic and constitutional attacks from within. The theory of the divine right of kings was an elaboration of the Tudor theory of royal supremacy in the direction of a more fundamental control. For the exponents of the divine right theory extended the Tudors' royal supremacy from its negative position of independence from foreign control to the Stuarts' positive assertion that the king alone could interpret what was just, he alone had an intimate control over the consciences of his subjects.

The controversy over the oath of allegiance produced in England and parts of the continent a theory of royal supremacy fit to reject papal pretensions by the addition of a new function to the state, the interpretation of the law of God by its divinely chosen head. The

divine institution of the ruler was essential to this theory of absolutism. Only by divine almost mystical right could he claim to be sole discerner of good and evil, justice and injustice, for his whole realm. The theory of divine right of kingship was the coping stone to the edifice of national independence and sovereignty. Not only was the state bound to administer the law of God and promote true religion; but it declared, through its head, what that law was, what true religion meant. There were as many true religions in Europe as there were sovereign independent monarchical states. This was the devastating implication in a nationalism so closely associated with divinity. Therein lay its weakness. Few of the sincerely religious would concede such portentous rights to any secular ruler. In the early years of the seventeenth century in England, every one from anabaptist to sober member of parliament claimed for his section a divine institution, and a consequent power to interpret the law of God. These irreconcilable claims to absolute power made a clash inevitable. The chaos of imminent civil war instigated many Englishmen to attempt, as they knew Bodin had done for France, the disentanglement of the state from its religious trammels. Amongst these Hobbes was pre-eminent.

Thomas Hobbes produced several works on law and politics during the civil war. He developed in these a theory of absolute sovereignty divorced from religion. He went further than Bodin in his attempt to describe a sovereignty totally unlimited by any constriction. He was particularly anxious to destroy the pretensions to criticism which were being made in England by advocates of religious toleration and political liberty. He saw in the claims of the individual to know the good the seeds of complete anarchy when every individual asserted his power to judge the actions of the state by this inner criterion of justice. He was aware, in the medley of religious sects which flourished in England at this time, that the good and the just had as many meanings as there were sects. He rejected the divine right theory of government built on the shifting sands of private conscience open to every change in religious opinion; he chose rather to base his political theory on the rocklike foundation of an incontrovertible view of human nature in which conscience was the product of the state, not the state of conscience. Written in the middle of the seven-

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teenth century, the *Leviathan* was a belated remark in the Reformation controversy between national state and multiple church. It was the last great defence of the nation-state. By the time it was written events had moved away from this issue, but Hobbes was an old man commenting on the exciting problems of his youth. Hobbes was intent to prove the supremacy of the nation-state over all its subjects; incidentally he established its claim to absolute independence from all external control. He set up the nation-state as a self-contained unit deciding for itself what was just and unjust. His greatest difficulty was to eradicate the conception of the right of the individual to define the limits of his own obedience to the state, and also the conception that the individual could rely on a power external to that of the state for the making of his decisions on this same point. In both cases the individual had pointed to a law above the state controlling its every action and limiting its claim to absolute authority. Hobbes strove to show that any such statement was based on false foundations. He insisted that the state alone was the creator and judge of such laws as controlled the action of men.

Hobbes began with an acute analysis of human nature. Enlarging the accepted calvinistic doctrines of the nature of man he declared man to be utterly devoid of any sense of right and wrong before social bonds were formed. In the state of nature every man was out for his own ends, to fulfil his own desires which were insatiable. No laws existed to curb his innate selfishness, as the laws were the product of society, and Hobbes was dealing with a pre-social condition. His later definition of law precluded it from constraining men in the state of nature. If every man continued to strive only for himself then the clash of unrelated wills would inevitably end in a state of complete confusion, where the life of man became 'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short'. The last qualification weighed most with Hobbes. A non-social condition led to precariousness of life; the fear of insecurity dogged the footsteps of natural man. It instigated him to use his natural capacities to discover some means to escape from the uncertainties of his life; he formulated certain principles which he found expedient to guide not only his own life but those of his fellow men, principles which would curb their insatiable desires in order to promote security, the primary need before any desires might be fulfilled.

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These principles resting on the general rule 'to love your neighbour as yourself' were described as 'laws of nature'. But they were in no way binding with the force of real law, because Hobbes believed no law binding until it had brute force behind it. In a state of nature the only brute force that existed was so much as was contained in the personal capacity of one man; no union of strengths had taken place which could be used to support the initial 'laws of nature'. Nor were these laws binding on the conscience, because man in the state of nature had no conscience. Sensitiveness to justice and injustice could only exist where the standard of justice was clearly known to men; but justice was the attribute of law, and law only came into existence with the establishment of society. Man of himself had no idea of right and wrong nor of the just and unjust. Fear drove him onwards, insecurity lurked everywhere, insatiable desires drove him to seek their satisfaction at the expense of his security with whatever wiles or physical strength he had at his command. Mutual trust was impossible amongst individuals who each recognized but his own desires antagonistic to and overlapping every other man's.

The rules of expediency indicated a way of escape from this impossible predicament. All the members of a would-be community, save the man or group of men destined to be the future rulers, must lay down their natural right to enforce their respective wills on others. Those recognized as rulers retained their original activity over the now passive remainder of the community. With the removal of the competing wills of every man out for his own satisfaction, those left in authority had a monopoly of all power. By a species of cessation rather than delegation or contract, Hobbes erected the government of a community making it all powerful and of the dimensions of a leviathan. The governing body now had unlimited power and could establish laws necessary to obtain security for itself and its subjects. These laws were the only laws Hobbes recognized as binding on man. For men being what they were would only yield obedience through fear. Laws to be binding must be supported by paramount force. The establishment of laws was tantamount to the establishment of justice; Hobbes identified positive law and justice as the early lawyers had done. It was just to do that which led to security, and the laws of the state were established to maintain security, hence justice and

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state law were identical. No criterion outside the state could judge the state; no criterion set up by the individual could be a criticism of the state; the state alone was the establisher of law and of the norm of justice within its boundaries.

Several difficulties confronted Hobbes as a result of this theory of the origin of the state. In the first place, in the original establishment of the leviathan the principles of nature were not binding according to definition, yet they had forced men to establish the state and to keep to their original cessation of power. Before the accumulation of force in one place which alone could coerce men into obedience, men had agreed to obey the 'law' of nature and to keep to it as though it had coercive powers inherent in itself. Hobbes took over scientific assumptions on natural law, asserted they were non-moral, yet paradoxically treated them as paramountly binding and imbued with a certain moral quality. The same confusion between calvinist and scientist appeared in his theory of the state. As a professing calvinist Hobbes cogently denied men any capacity to help themselves; they were as much automata as the wheels of a clock. The state under such conditions was a superstructure arbitrarily imposed on these helpless beings in a way very similar to the Christian ideal of government as a convention of divine establishment. Yet whilst asserting that the state was an artificial superstructure, Hobbes still maintained that it was primarily activated by an evolution of natural principles emanating from some forces active amongst men living in 'the state of nature'. Which was it really; a natural organism as reliance on natural law suggested; or a conventional superimposition as Hobbes' view of human psychology indicated it must be? On this distinction manifestly left in confusion by Hobbes rested the possibility of refusing obedience to the commands of the state after its establishment. Again Hobbes was faced with difficulties. Once the state was established, individuals had seceded from their respective rights to resist its authority. Yet Hobbes maintained that the original right, the primary law of nature, to preserve one's life, persisted after the close of the pre-society condition and allowed a man within the state to resist the commands of authority, if and when they threatened his life. Hobbes in the name of a natural right countenanced conspiracies and successful rebellion if undertaken in the name of the maintenance of

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security and justified by the duty to preserve one's life. When the established government failed to keep the peace, its initial duty, then its absolute power passed into the hands of those who were more capable of performing this duty. Success was the only criterion of a lawful government. Hobbes was reticent of the difficulties of the transitional period. To whom did the subjects owe obedience when success hung in the balance? Hobbes was more concerned with the power of government (as established in Tudor days) than with the vagaries of a condition of civil war.

Hobbes' theory of the state satisfied no one at the time. The royalists hated his justification of rebellion; the parliamentarians his preference for a monarchy as the best form of government to utilize the absolute power which he showed was essential to the existence of the state. The religiously minded objected to his denial of the divine elements in human politics, and deeply resented the bold manner in which he presented the consequences of the contemporary divine right theory of government stripped of its mystical pomposity. His uncompromising insistence on facing the logical consequences of many of his assertions appalled less clear thinkers and earned him almost universal hatred or fear. He was attacked everywhere as an atheist and a scoundrel. He had shown as a logical consequence to the calvinistic premise that men were incapable of moral decision, that such decisions must be made for them if social activities were to persist. He pointed out that the state must undertake this function of creating moral values and enforcing them; that the controversy over the merits of different religions was irrelevant, for the state must decide what was right and true and the function of the church was merely to administer the rules of the state in the particular department devoted to ecclesiastical affairs. The ministers of the church as under the Tudor regime were regarded as royal nominees. They did not and could not in the nature of the case uphold a law superior to the civil law of the land; no such law existed; they merely administered a branch of the law which was created by leviathan. The struggle between the two rival jurisdictions was easily resolved in favour of the secular government. Nor did Hobbes hesitate to recognize that this triumph of the nation-state over its ancient rival the universal church left Europe infested with sovereign states whose respective rights to

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security were repeatedly conflicting and theoretically were incapable of solution. For no law existed outside the state. Each state created its own law, its own norm of justice; and the security of any state might easily impinge upon that of another. No common ideal could reconcile the independent sovereign wills of two rival states. 'Kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another; . . . which is a posture of war.' The state of anarchy which the leviathan was created to remove within the nation persisted in international relations.

The works of Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes are commentaries on different stages and aspects of the development of the idea of the nation-state. There was an almost universal acceptance at the end of the sixteenth century of Machiavelli's ideal of the state as containing the final aspirations and demanding the whole-hearted devotion of its citizens. Machiavelli showed patriotism as the supreme political virtue; he was unconcerned with the problem of a divided loyalty in the hearts of his citizens. Before the Reformation he could easily ignore the feeble protests made by a renaissance conscience. The revival of religious enthusiasm in the Reformation introduced a strong rival to the religion of patriotism. But the progress of events and ideas in the sixteenth century showed that the Reformation contained its own antidote to its poison of religious enthusiasm. It suggested methods of quietening the consciences of the people into complete subservience to their rulers. It gave the secular authorities their opportunity to extend their power over the souls and bodies of their subjects, and to give the final blow to their age-long rival the church. The triumph of the secular authorities over the church was purchased at the price of the independence of the citizens. The republic of the people beloved by Machiavelli was obliterated by the leviathan of Hobbes. The government was exalted over the state; the penetrating 'voyce of the people' was reduced to a whisper of subservience. So Bodin was mainly concerned with the problem of political authority, and strove to show that the sovereignty of the state gave over an absolute unlimited power to command and create law into the hands of the rulers. So Hobbes extended the functions of government beyond the

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administration of law and even its creation to the implanting of a sense of justice within the hearts of potential citizens. Neither writer would countenance any form of religion which claimed the right to limit the sovereignty of the state and to rival the claims to secular obedience by the more potent claims of obedience to God. To meet these attacks both writers endowed the state with a claim to a complete devotion of its citizens; infused patriotism with the undying fire of a holy zeal; and transferred to the secular authorities inalienable rights to control the consciences of its subjects. Bodin asserted that morals and religion were as much the natural product of climate as the state itself; a climate which produced a certain type of government could not produce at one and the same time a form of religion and a code of morals antagonistic and subversive to that government. Religion could not by its nature be a rival to the secular authority. In any case sovereignty, the mainstay of the state itself, demanded that the allegiance of the subject should be indivisible, absolute. Hobbes, in maintaining that the state itself created the sense of justice, was asserting that the state created morals and religion was but the attendant pomp attached to the maintenance of the moral system. In either case religion had become the handmaid to the absolute sovereign residing in each nation-state.

The results of this exaltation of each nation were far-reaching. The nation was a separate independent body declaring its own code of morals and its own religion. The disintegration of the universal church into several national churches each intolerant of the other involved the disappearance of a very real sense of obligation based on the all-pervading law of God. Europe resolved itself into multitudinous sovereign states whose claims to independence were incompatible with the acceptance of any limiting general law. There was no common acceptable basis for a system of international law. International relations openly became, as Machiavelli had foreseen, a struggle between a-moral communities in which ingenuity and guile were the necessary virtues for success, and they were perpetually, as Hobbes said, in a posture of war. The triumph of the nation-state was the downfall of any immediate hope of internationalism. The works of the Spaniard Victoria and the Dutchman Grotius, amongst others, showed the apprehensions and difficulties of this subject to contem-

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poraries. Internally this triumph was associated with the annihilation in theory of any form of constitutionalism. The idea of sovereignty was not in itself incompatible with the rule of the people; but the particular form which it took in the sixteenth century negated the development of responsible citizenship. Rigorous subjection of the individual to the sovereignty of the state was the only adequate reply at the moment in the interests of order to the disintegrating effects of the Renaissance activated after 1519 by the dynamic forces of a religious revival.

CHAPTER IX

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

THE development of a comprehensive theory of religious and political liberty was, paradoxically enough, the peculiar product of the age of the triumph of national absolutism. The reaction into autocracy was symptomatic of the presence of strong anarchical elements. The perpetual refusal of the multiplicity of religious sects to recognize the authority of the nation-state over what they considered to be the law of God remained a thorn in the side of the body politic around which an incurable inflammation set in. The cancerous growth thus started by this primary claim for freedom of conscience to obey the law of God developed into a healthy life of its own during the sixteenth century and blossomed out in the seventeenth century into an elaborate theory of the state almost completely different in assumptions and detailed structure from its antagonist the absolutist state. The right to religious freedom led to an assertion of political liberty, which stimulated the growth of democratic conceptions of representation and popular control and the postulation of a contract theory of the state involving a constitutional form of government. But these conceptions were not formulated until certain intellectual and emotional inhibitions were overcome. Nor were they generally accepted as important until in England the particular circumstances of the civil war gave a unique opportunity for their practical demonstration. The progress of the development of the ideas of liberty and constitutionalism was twofold: the prevalent assumptions about the nature of man and the end of the state were first revised and then re-defined; the application of these new assumptions to practical politics was then attempted and their significance amplified. The first with sporadic suggestions of its practical implications took place on the continent in the latter half of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth; the second was the direct product of the English civil war.

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The belief in the dignity of human nature particularly emphasized in the Renaissance was not entirely suppressed during the reaction occasioned by the Reformation. Indeed it was in some ways slightly enhanced, though for the most part it was much complicated by the addition of religious fervour. The anabaptists in Germany adopted the same attitude towards religion suggested in Luther's early defiance of papal authority. They continued in the path from which he had quickly fled. Influenced strongly by the mysticism which had affected Nicolas of Cusa and Luther himself they believed in a form of religion essentially non-authoritarian; they emphatically maintained that the individual was the final source of inspiration. No one could act against the dictates of his own conscience; no one had the right to try to force anyone so to act. The anabaptists in the light of this conviction refused to admit that the civil magistrates could exercise any kind of force whatsoever. Force, because it might impair the free action of conscience, was unjustifiable. So the anabaptists passively refused obedience to the commands of any authority in the state which might impinge on their conscientious scruples; so they declared that war, which was the epitome of the use of force by the civil magistrate, was fundamentally wrong, and they themselves refused to take up arms in any cause. They scoffed not only at particular authorities but at all authority whose weapon was the force of arms. So they decried the validity of all courts of law and their procedure based on fear of penalties and the binding of the conscience by oaths. Liberty of conscience as held by the anabaptists became synonymous with licentiousness, for to no human regulation or authority would this sect submit themselves. Anabaptism became a term of deep reproach; despite the fact that the sect quickly settled down after the first few years of extremist activity into peaceable citizens who in practice only refused obedience to the magistrates under grave provocation.

The administrative difficulty apparent in the treatment of the anabaptists formed a serious complication in the struggle for religious liberty. Religious liberty seemed at first totally impracticable. Luther's and Henry VIII's actions over their marriages were typical examples of the kind of difficulty and scandal arising from a rejection of the accepted authorities and their law courts. The monk, Luther,

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having defied papal authority, having denied the validity of canon law administered in the ecclesiastical courts under papal control, felt he was not acting illegally to marry a nun whose vows with his own were sacred by a law he had repudiated. But by what law was his marriage valid and his children his legitimate heirs? Similarly Henry VIII having repudiated the authority of the pope over his first marriage had hastily to trump up another court whose authority he hoped would be accepted as sufficiently valid to prevent the undermining of the legitimacy of his heirs to the throne. In practice new courts were necessary to take the place of the old ecclesiastical courts if the authority lying behind those courts was repudiated by the individual or the state. Even if new courts were established the difficulty was not overcome, for the individual might at any moment become recalcitrant and refuse to acknowledge the authority of the court. With the multiplication of sects in Europe, each state was faced by a multitude of groups each claiming that they alone knew the law of God and the limits to which state action might go. The exact limits were undefined and created a no-man's-land of bitter controversy between the secular authority and the variety of religious authorities springing up like mushrooms overnight in every state. The old difficulty of the separation of the powers was revived in a new and more acute form. Innumerable sects and even individuals claimed the right to act according to a law known in its perfection to themselves alone. The Reformation as Calvin perceived pointed the way to pure anarchy. The licentiousness which accompanied the religious transports and the cruelty of the civil wars in France did much to enhance this impression and further to discredit the idea of liberty of conscience. The popular conviction that a clear view of the law of God was ascertainable either through the catholic church or in the bible or through divinely appointed governments made it even more difficult to prefer the instabilities of individual interpretations. So long as men believed that somewhere the right law existed without ambiguity, so long no one desired to sacrifice the certainty of well-known authorities for the vagaries of unknown mystic revelations.

The case of Servetus in the middle of the sixteenth century shook the complacent acceptance of this belief in the commensurable character of the law of God. The controversy which it provoked

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flashed the theme of religious liberty from the obscurity of the anabaptists' practices into the limelight of European thought. It earned for the cause of religious liberty the publicity it had hitherto lacked. Calvin himself entered the controversy to defend a position that had suddenly become extremely precarious. The case was one of pure heresy uncontaminated by political issues. The question of religious liberty was discussed on its own merits. The Spaniard Servetus was burnt on the charge of heresy by the command of Calvin himself in Geneva. There was no secondary charge of sedition or any political motive for the execution. Servetus' crime had been to dare to throw doubt on the validity of the *Institutes*; as a scholar he had given his own comments on biblical texts. They were not always the same as Calvin's. Calvin at the hubbub raised after the execution felt it necessary to justify his action; he immediately published a work on the necessity of stamping out heresy and the righteousness of maintaining true religion by the sword. His whole philosophy justified religious persecution.

Castellion, a professor at Basle, replied to Calvin in a work which immediately became the textbook of all those in favour of religious toleration. He revived the views held by the renaissance humanists before the zeal of the Reformation had contorted men's minds. The influence of Erasmus and the German mystics was clearly visible. Castellion made two assertions as preliminaries to the development of his conception of religious liberty. They constituted a complete break with the prevalent assumptions of his day. First he declared that theological speculation had always been very obscure and vague. Nothing definite could ever be said about the real nature of the deity. By this statement (as Beza, a disciple of Calvin's, pointed out in his reply to Castellion), Castellion was denying that God had ever revealed his will adequately to man. Man must be for ever wandering in the mists of uncertainty. To the orthodox calvinists, who at the same time believed that man was utterly vicious, this statement was tantamount to a declaration of the utter destruction of all human society. But Castellion did not hold to the calvinistic conception of human nature. Secondly he asserted that seeing the doubtfulness of all theological systems all that was required of men by God was that each man should sincerely seek to find out the truth and live

accordingly. Man must seek by the use of his reason to discover the norm of conduct by which he must live. In short, bereft of the direct revelation and aid of God, man was forced to rely on his own qualities to guide him through life. He must evolve his own morality and religion by means of his own efforts, not by the external doubtful media of churches or inspired writings. To execute a man because he clung to his convictions in which he sincerely believed as Servetus had done was to strike at the root of all morality and religion. To force a man to deny himself was to destroy his only means of salvation. The ultimate rightness or wrongness of a man's convictions could not be decided by any of his earthly compeers, whose knowledge of ultimate truth was also limited. This must be left to God. On earth men were only concerned with making it possible for their fellows sincerely to live up to their inward convictions. This belief in the part which the conscience of the individual played in the structure of society, morality and religion was in complete antipathy to calvinistic sentiment and principle. A proper doubtfulness, he maintained re-echoing Cusanus' views, was the essential condition to the attainment of all knowledge. No wonder that Calvin tried his utmost to get Castellion dismissed from Basle university. No wonder that the book roused fierce controversy for years amongst orthodox calvinists and catholics; and that Castellion has had to bear the stigma of scepticism as the result of his enunciation of a supreme faith in the powers of the individual to attain his ultimate salvation without the aid of external authorities.

Many political thinkers and practical politicians arrived at Castellion's belief in the undesirability of persecution but from quite different premises. Castellion as a convinced believer attacked persecution on the grounds of its detrimental effect on sincere religious development. Increasing scepticism supplied other reasons for the rejection of persecution as a function of the state. The well-known sceptic Acontius propounded the view that magistrates could not use force to crush out heresy as no one could ever be certain about the meaning of heresy. Unless the truth were clearly known, a falling away from the truth could not be ascertained. Acontius looking out from Geneva on the Europe of 1560 was hard put to it to say which of the many churches then existing had the right to claim to be the

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only true church. As Castellion had pointed out if every state in Europe had the true religion established within its bounds and the right to force all within its borders to believe that truth, what would be the predicament of a traveller through Europe? in Italy he must believe one thing, in Geneva another, in France a third and so on in every country. In 1555 the Treaty of Augsburg had aptly described the situation '*cujus regio ejus religio*'. In view of this situation Acontius declared emphatically that civil magistrates were no more capable of judging the merits of the different churches than any other men; they had no justification for putting people to death on a dubious charge. The end of the state was not to maintain true religion; the truth about religion was an unknown quantity.

The practical experiences of the civil wars were driving home the same conclusion to the politicians struggling to find some solution for the orderly management of the conflicting sects in France. The group known as *Les Politiques* rapidly formed, comprising most alien elements of protestants and catholics, and even informal religionists like Bodin, who were agreed on one point, that the burden of enforcing true religion was too much for the state. The performance of this duty resulted, as they perceived, in the complete breakdown of all government. The civil magistrate, they felt, was not the right person to decide between the claims of the different churches to be the true one. The responsibility of such a choice was too onerous to be borne. A duty to do something implied the capacity to perform it. But the state had not this capacity. Its function was not the maintenance of true religion in its pristine unity. Order and peace were its primary concerns. If the exigencies of the situation in restoring order required the existence of more than one religion in the state, then it was justifiable for the state to tolerate these several religions. So *Les Politiques* publicly advocated the adoption of legal toleration to restore order to distracted France. The end of the state was no longer the maintenance of the law of God in its twofold division of religion and justice. The aim of political association was to establish and maintain the security necessary to the existence of its subjects and itself. But security as Bodin at once perceived was not an end in itself. The emergencies in France urged political thinkers to deny the old conceptions of the end of the state, but did not encourage them to think

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out a satisfying new end to society. Security was not positive enough. The need for order enabled Henry IV to pass the Edict of Nantes in 1598 granting a measure of toleration to the Huguenots. But the edict was always precarious, based on the assumption that it only existed to promote order. The moment the government felt strong enough there was no expressed reason why they should feel bound to honour their word. In the seventeenth century in France, advantage was taken by the anti-protestants of this barren form of toleration, and the edict was revoked about one hundred years later at the height of Louis XIV's power. The granting of a measure of legal toleration in France as in Germany in the middle of the sixteenth century resulted from the exigencies of the moment not from the development of a comprehensive theory of the right to freedom of conscience in matters of religion. It was a price begrudgingly paid for the benefit of the restoration of order in an exhausted and distracted country. A tenuous principle of expediency precariously supported the Edict of Nantes.

A far more cogent argument against religious persecution was supplied by a further revival of the humanistic belief in the dignity of human nature. The tentative suggestions of Castellion were elaborated by Arminius and his followers into a profound theological system of thought during the famous controversy over free will and predestination which broke out in Holland at the end of the sixteenth century. Arminius was called upon by the calvinists about 1590 to refute certain unorthodox suggestions impugning the omnipotence of God which had arisen through expositions of Acontius' idea. Arminius found his own faith in this dogma considerably shaken and was unable to proceed with the refutation. His study of the relation of divine omnipotency with human frailty led him to conclusions in direct contradiction to orthodox Calvinism. Arminius rejected the calvanistic belief in God as a supreme law-giver prescribing the minutest details for human beings incapable of any good action whatsoever. The very nature of God he asserted forbade the idea of omnipotent force crushing out humanity. God was a loving father not a ruthless taskmaster demanding unswerving obedience from a mechanical universe. Nor did Arminius find it possible to maintain the doctrine of the omnipotence of God in face of the problem of evil.

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The arminians were horrified at the statements of some of their extreme antagonists who did not shirk the conclusion that the omnipotence of God made him logically the author of evil. The problem of evil and a renewed belief in God as a mysterious loving presence communing with men not dictating to them alike drove Arminius to the conclusion that men had some measure of free will. Free will was necessary in order to account for human sin and human capacity to commune with God. The essence of the relationship between God and man was love not force. To force a conscience into a groove by sheer might and fear was to destroy this relationship at its root. Man must have left him some measure of choice to give his approach to God its proper value as an act of free will. An automaton predestined to every act would give no satisfaction to a deity who sought for love from his creatures. Man was no longer held to be a totally vitiated creature; he had a power of choice centring in his conscience, this gave him his knowledge of good and evil from which to choose. He was no longer the possessor of 'the stinking puddle of a private conscience' (as a contemporary catholic tersely expressed it) but was in possession of the priceless gift of free will by which he should obtain his salvation.

This elevation of man from the contemptible object of calvinistic and counter-reformation nightmares did not involve the proportional diminution of the goodness and grace of God. As Arminius vividly explained, the relationship between God and the unregenerate soul was somewhat like the relations between a beggar and a rich man who in his graciousness gave alms to the beggar, but the beggar had to make the one act of raising his arm and taking the gift so offered. Man must choose to accept grace; it was not automatically conferred on the elect and kept back from the damned as the orthodox calvinists maintained. Nor was Arminius deterred from his belief in free will by the consequences which his opponents suggested were entailed in such a doctrine. Was it possible to believe, they argued, that the omnipotent will of God was limited by the microscopic will of every minute individual? Was this not, as an English writer on the same theme asserted, to impugn against God and giantlike to fight against the majesty and might of the Omnipotent One? The arminians refused to define the exact limits of man's subservience to God

demanding by their opponents. They accepted rather a mystical interpretation of religion. They relied on the continuous informative presence of the divine rather than a detailed list of laws from the past to direct their actions. Consequently they no longer held to the belief that the rules laid down in the bible for ecclesiastical matters were final and complete. The absolute authority of the bible, the theocratic basis of the state held by the calvinists, the incapacity of man by which such state absolutism was justified, were all shaken by the arminians' challenge of the fundamentals of calvinistic theology.

The attack on the arminian heresy was immediate and drastic. The calvinists ably supported by the Prince of Orange with his monarchical ambitions set to work not only to denounce the arminians in pulpit and pamphlet but launched forth on a persecuting campaign. The arminian tenets of faith were pronounced anathema in 1618 in the Synod of Dort and the majority of the Dutch provinces joined in a renewed profession of faith in a rigid confession drawn up at this time. In 1619 Oldenbarneveltdt, the tolerant supporter of the arminians and the dangerous political rival of the Prince of Orange, was put to death with only a show of judicial procedure. For some years the majority of the Dutch became predominantly and rigidly calvinistic.

The arminian faith was in no wise obliterated by this momentary triumph of the reactionary forces. The scattered remnants of the sect withdrew into the more tolerant provinces and continued vehemently to uphold the principle of free will and liberty of conscience in the more congenial atmosphere of the opponents of the Orange monarchy. Arminianism in the United Provinces became associated rapidly with opposition to the extension of monarchical absolutism. The publicity gained by the Synod of Dort spread the heresy even further. The English bishops sent by James I to refute the new doctrine returned home doubtful of the validity of their position. A few years later some of the most eminent ecclesiastics of the English church subscribed openly to the doctrine of free will. The anabaptists in Holland became further contaminated with the new heresy. Their contact with some English exiles spread the epidemic. These English se-baptists returned to London in 1612 fully convinced of the necessity of religious liberty and the right to freedom of conscience. They estab-

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lished their form of religion on a congregational basis of government, and founded the Independent movement in England. Through the sects and through the Establishment the disintegrating tolerance of Arminianism sapped the foundations of absolutism and intolerance in England.

The cause of religious liberty gained much by its contact with this theological dispute. The accusation of licentiousness could hardly be sustained against a doctrine of free will which was justified on the broad and profound basis of the very nature of the Deity himself. However much Arminianism was disliked, it could not be perfunctorily dismissed. Some of the ablest men of the period were persuaded that its tenets, particularly its belief in human reason and goodness, were worthy of respect. The reasonableness of Erasmus had borne fruit in the theology of Arminius, who justified his intense religious emotion in a highly rational system of thought. Liberty of conscience became associated with a belief in the reasonableness of man and his power to choose and act on his own responsibility. The plea for freedom of conscience was no longer sporadic; it had become a broad stream gathering to itself scholars, theologians, politicians and the humble persecuted sects. All for a variety of reasons agreed that the conscience of man must be free to act according to its inner light. By the beginning of the seventeenth century on the continent a principle of toleration was formulated and in some degree practically demonstrated.

Neither in France nor in the United Provinces did the acceptance of religious toleration lead spontaneously to the development of political liberty. In France the politico-religious wars were essentially a movement for the breaking away of a part of the kingdom. The Edict of Nantes recognized this fact. It created the Huguenots into a state within the state. The protestants did not participate in the general government of France, but withdrew into their strongholds and governed themselves. They were not concerned with the rights of individuals but with the rights of their group. The French government accorded the benefit of freedom of worship to an organization not to the individuals within that organization. Similarly in the United Provinces the question of individual religious or political liberty was not advocated nor would it have been attended with any

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success. The seven provinces struggled with each other to maintain their own rights. But the rights of their individual citizens were not in question. The struggle in the United Provinces was between rival organizations, and after the death of Oldenbarnevelde the tolerant party slowly yielded before the encroachment of the monarchical house of Orange.

The course of events in England in the seventeenth century determined that the theme of religious liberty should expand into a theory of political liberty and constitutional government. The renaissance belief in humanity persisted in England despite the zeal of the returned exiles from Geneva in Elizabeth's reign. The moment when the religious enthusiasm of the Reformation first struck England coincided with a literary renaissance of unparalleled force. The Elizabethan poets and playwrights in their exuberance mocked at the restraint advocated by the reformers seeking a sterner repressive way of life. Their delight in liberty was scarcely repressed before reinforcements appeared from an unexpected quarter. Repercussions of the Arminian controversy were felt at the English universities from 1596 onwards. The doctrine of the vileness of human nature was attacked before it became deeply rooted. The spread of Arminianism in England, both through the sects and the Establishment, further emphasized the importance of the individual's judgment. By the seventeenth century contact with this form of Dutch religion and its inherent mysticism resulted in an outburst of lovely religious poetry in England infused with a spirit of individuality and a scorn of set forms. The form and the spirit were symptomatic of a trend of thought still inconspicuous but growing in volume.

The belief in human faculties was endorsed under Elizabeth by many of her leading statesmen and thinkers. Though divine right of government was the current philosophy of the state, the demand of the Genevan reformers for a form of church government similar to that laid down in the bible by divine will provoked the Elizabethan politicians into a defence of the queen's ecclesiastical settlement on grounds of human wisdom only remotely connected with divine right. Francis Bacon was not alone in maintaining that ecclesiastical matters could be divided into two categories. Those which concerned the fundamentals of faith were 'things essential' to salvation; those which

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concerned the outward governance and matters of detail were 'things indifferent' to salvation. Things essential could not be altered by men, they were under the governance of God, but things indifferent were left to the judgment of men who were quite capable of dealing with these details with the aid of their own natural abilities. Indeed, Bacon asserted, the nature of all government was to obey the laws of change and decay; it was essential in ecclesiastical as well as civil politics for men to have the power to adjust the structure of government to meet this inherent decadence. By the very nature of government men must and did have the power to order and adjust social activities. Amongst 'things indifferent' to salvation government held supreme place. Bacon was approaching a recognition that the state was not concerned with true religion.

The gentle Hooker irritated by the fanaticism of the cavillers at established law a few years later defended the action of the Elizabethan government in his subsequently much quoted *Laws of Ecclesiastical Policy*. Hooker denied that men must wait cap in hand for divine inspiration of every one of their acts; he perceived men as endowed with faculties enabling them to govern their own actions. He pointed out the absurd position into which the reformers had put themselves when declaring that all lawful church government could only be according to the ecclesiastical form which they advocated from the bible. What, he asked scornfully, had happened to the church for the fifteen hundred years after Christ's death and before the discovery of the zealots of this, the right form of church government? Had there been then no church? Then what of the faithful? Hooker in answering his own questions argued that humanity did not depend only on scripture for its guide. Reason and experience aided by scripture indicated the path of righteousness. Reason was the essential characteristic of human nature by which mankind came to acceptable decisions. These decisions were binding as reason was a divine faculty pertaining also to the nature of the Deity. Laws were established by the considered judgment of men informed by their reasoning powers. Laws were the very fabric of the state. So the authority of the state proceeded from the reasonableness of its commands which extracted recognition and obedience from a rational populace. Reason, it was true, was open to error, but the aggregate

of individual reasons in a state was less likely to be blatantly erroneous than the separate judgments of single men. The ecclesiastical polity of the church was built by generations of holy men who after considered judgments had ascertained the best form of church government. Hooker's main objective was to establish the proof that the governance of the church could not be left to these zealots for 'when they and their Bibles were alone together, what strange fantastical opinion soever at any time entered their heads, their use was to think the Spirit taught it them'. Hooker deprecated this claim for direct inspiration which was spreading alarmingly throughout England as religious enthusiasm increased. He saw in the growth of fanaticism a danger to the 'sweet reasonableness' of which he was so powerful an advocate, and a threat to the flexibility of government by which alone the state and the Elizabethan church settlement might hope to survive. Hooker's fears were only too well grounded. The accession of James I introduced into the government the rigidity which its former supporters had deprecated. 'Sweet reasonableness' was eclipsed by a fanaticism that momentarily overwhelmed England. Hooker's work though no longer representing the predominant attitude to affairs of state was much read and quoted by a minority. Its influence was great later in the seventeenth century when the violent passions of the civil war had spent themselves.

Both Hooker and Bacon emphasized the power of men to assist in the details and management of public affairs. This proposition accorded well with the aspirations of a new body of potential governors. Revived at first to give a semblance of popular approval to the royal acts, Parliament slowly accumulated a measure of political experience which instigated its members to desire complete control of the government. Freedom of speech, privileges of individual members of Parliament, control over taxation by the representatives of this wealthy portion of the population, were hotly debated in Elizabeth's time. At the end of Elizabeth's reign friction between the monarch and the members of Parliament showed that the Tudors had raised up a formidable rival to their own absolutism. The strength of this new party lay in their economic prosperity. The Tudor age had produced a new rich middle class with a taste for, an experience of, and a strong interest in the control of political power.

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The arbitrary rule of the early Stuarts converted these aspirants for political power into defenders of the fundamental liberties of their countrymen. The first resentment of arbitrary rule had come from the Genevan reformers supported by a few lawyers even whilst the queen was alive. The government successfully suppressed the platform of the reformers in 1588 chiefly through the activities of the court of High Commission. Originating as an off-shoot of the Privy Council, this court had rapidly developed under pressure of its increased business into a separate court of law with extensive and undefined powers including the right to fine and imprison. The reformers objected to its authority as merely a human body, part of the ordinary machinery of secular government, which could not exercise jurisdiction over the sacred law of God. In the name of conscience they refused to acknowledge its validity. The common lawyers immediately apprehensive of this formidable new rival joined in the protest against the upstart court for very different reasons. They maintained no court could tamper with the liberty and property of subjects by fine and imprisonment save the common-law courts. They regarded the new court as an innovation overriding the judgment of the ordinary courts of law which were the custodians of the law of the land and the ancient liberties of the people. Nor was it easy for the king's lawyers to defend their use of fine and imprisonment in causes ecclesiastical when for several years after the gunpowder plot the government was anxious to demonstrate that for the catholics at least the royal supremacy did not extend as far as spiritual matters. In the long drawn out case of the catholic archpriest, the government asserted emphatically that the spiritual supremacy of the pope could only be expressed in spiritual form. Temporal punishments, such as the deprivation from a king of his kingdom which was his property, were unnatural and unlawful weapons of a spiritual power; no spiritual court had authority to deprive either king or subject of his worldly goods. The common lawyers in sympathy with the now increasing number of reformers picked up these arguments wholesale and insisted that the court of High Commission had no right to inflict the penalties of fine and imprisonment on any subject. The common lawyers from quite different premises were committed to a defence of the ancient liberties of the land.

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In Parliament the same issues were at stake. The attempt of the early Stuarts to override the power of Parliament impinged upon the newly developed privileges and rights of that august body. Charles I left no doubt in the minds of his subjects either by word or deed that he regarded their ancient liberties already threatened by the prerogative courts as unlawful pretensions. Manwaring's sermon in 1627 depicted kings as Gods and subjects as subservient to them in body and soul. Subjects had no rights save the right to obey. The sermon created a furore in Parliament and the members requested the apprehension of the preacher. Their request was disregarded. In the following year the members, further infuriated by Charles' oppressive taxes and arbitrary fines and imprisonments, enunciated in the Petition of Right their belief that the subject possessed certain ancient liberties which the king should respect. These included chiefly liberty of person and security of property. In the years following the dissolution of Charles I's third Parliament, the arbitrary acts of the king in defiance of his assent to the Petition of Right pressed home to the erstwhile members of Parliament the increasing danger to liberty from such a ruler. The outstanding cases of Pym and Hampden roused popular fury. The taint of popery associated with the growing Anglo-Catholicism within the established church increased the fear of episcopal oppression. The extensive jurisdiction of the court of High Commission gave substance to these apprehensions. On every side the cause of liberty found advocates against the increasing absolutism of the king. Charles I's inability to make his dictatorship efficient further discredited his rule in the eyes of men conscious of their own ability to regulate commerce and landed property and only too anxious to try their hands at governing public affairs for their further advancement. These men regarding themselves as guardians of the peoples' liberties and their own were ready at the first opportunity to curtail the power of the king and place his government within defined limits. In England the political and religious liberty of the citizen quickly became associated with limited monarchy, rule according to the ancient laws of the land, in short, with constitutional government.

Before the clash in 1640 when the Long Parliament met, only sporadic efforts at definition of the claims of liberty were made. Only

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sections of the population were intimately affected by immediate oppression. At first these were mainly religious bodies. The non-conformist sects maintained a division between church and state by which the state had no right to inflict punishment on the spiritual body of true believers. But this was not a claim for absolute freedom of conscience. For most of the sects maintained that once the true church was established the magistrates must enforce true religion by the sword. There was to be no quarter for heretics in their system. The catholics in an anomalous position continued to plead for a toleration of wider scope than demanded by their fellow sufferers the non-conforming sects. At the same time popular feeling was averse to extreme penalties for purely religious error. The burning of a heretic on religious grounds alone in 1612 was attended with such public demonstrations of disgust that James I declared that such sentences should not be executed in future. Other less obvious penalties must be imposed. Here and there other more powerful sections of the community expressed their belief in persuasion rather than force over conscience. A few of the leading bishops professed the arminian attitude of moderation though Laud's control of the administration of the church made their protestations of little effective value to the oppressed.

An increasing number of influential young noblemen formed the important group known as the Latitudinarians. Amongst these were Chillingworth, Falkland and Hales. Influenced by the views earlier maintained in France and Holland, their main contention was twofold. They asserted that it was impossible in the nature of things ever to obtain an infallible authority on earth in matters of religion. Those who declared for infallibility were in fact only enwrapping their own conclusions in a sacrosanct cloak. Chillingworth denounced it as: 'This presumptuous imposing of the senses of men upon the general words of God; . . . this deifying our own interpretations and tyrannous enforcing them upon others.' Both he and Hales urged that as men's judgments were always subject to error no man could be held responsible for errors unless wilfully pursued. Those who honestly pursued a course of action which was perceived to be wrong by others or later by themselves must trust ultimately in the goodness of God for pardon for their human frailty and lack of understanding. Wilful error was

heresy, but error alone was not sin, 'For', as Hales put it, 'if we account mistakes befalling us through human frailties to be heresies, then it will follow that every man since the Apostles' time was an heretic'. God must be trusted to be merciful enough to forgive the frailties of his human creatures. All these men held that could the antagonists but perceive that they were all holding to the same fundamental tenets of faith, then the diverse excrescences of worship which now comprised their main differences would appear too insignificant to warrant persecution and bloodshed. Like Edwin Sandys in his work on *A Relation of the State of Religion* written in 1599, these men advocated not a toleration but a comprehension of sects into a universal church. They denied the belief in one set form of church government laid down on a divine plan. They trusted rather in human faculties to readjust the difficulties besetting religious life. Again the division between things indifferent and essential earlier made by Bacon was stressed; it became the basis of a constructive form of religious toleration.

Everywhere before the Civil War the old rigidity of belief in infallible external authorities was being undermined. The nature of conscience was held in some quarters to be affected rather by persuasion than force. The position of the individual was so uncomprehensibly proclaimed as supreme by some that in 1634 John Canne, a rigid calvanist, scathingly pointed out that the effect of the wild Dutch heresy (Arminianism) was to make of every single man 'a domestic little God'. The constitutional and legal struggle with the king was impressing upon Englishmen that ancient liberties belonged by inalienable right to these fragments of divinity. The arbitrary power of the king was threatened by the ancient constitution of the land. A divine infallible authority was challenged in the name of a human fallible institution.

One and the same act in 1640 destroyed the instrument of religious persecution and circumscribed the royal power. The abolition of the court of High Commission left the church without any means of enforcing its decisions by civil disabilities. The lawyers from henceforth determined never to allow a repetition of such a court which would threaten their own independence. The lawyers were in no mood to see this power over jurisdiction transferred from the episco-

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pate to the more intolerant presbytery. After 1640 the cause of religious toleration had the lawyers unequivocally on its side. The abolition of the courts of Star Chamber and High Commission left the king shorn of his prerogative courts and the means of establishing absolute rule. The Long Parliament in no ambiguous terms declared in justification of itself that the king had abused his trust as ruler and must be called to account in the name of the people whose liberties he had ignored. Parliament like the Council of Constance regarded itself as the representative of the sovereign power of the body politic (this time the state and not the church), and treated the king as the servant of the people. The people through Parliament described the limits of royal authority and vindicated their ancient liberties of which freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and negatively from religious persecution were the foremost. The influence of foreign thought was most conspicuous in these arguments. The works of the continental exponents of constitutional rule were read with avidity.

In 1645 the character of the struggle changed. Hitherto the conflict was between king and the indivisible body Parliament. After 1645 the army challenged the supremacy of Parliament. The army was the stronghold of individualism. It had been nurtured in the democratic habits of congregationalism, it was imbued with a supreme faith in the individual's conscience and right of judgment. Liberty of conscience implied to the militia a power of judgment which expressed itself in political form as democratic control over the important organs of state whether civil or ecclesiastical. The indivisible authority of Parliament was challenged in its turn by the multitudinous voices of the people made vocal in the army. Parliament stood out in defence of the liberty of the constitution. The army stood out in defence of the liberties of the component parts of the constitution. A spate of literature covering every aspect of liberty burst forth from the pent-up ranks of the militia after 1645. Everywhere men became concerned with individual liberty and its repercussions on social life. The struggle for liberty on the continent was between conflicting group liberties, between whole churches and the state or other churches. In England, the struggle was between the particular liberties of individuals. The nature of individualism and its relation to the state was the consuming topic of these momentous years. How could the

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perfect freedom of the individual in all matters be reconciled with the necessary rules conducive to order within any society?

Amongst the various exponents of liberty, Milton's defence in *Areopagitica* stood out in form and substance as one of the most powerful pleas for unrestricted freedom. Milton's work illustrates simultaneously the change in attitude towards human nature and knowledge which had slowly developed in the first half of the seventeenth century. The occasion of the work was the attempt by the Long Parliament to censor the press. The church had hitherto been responsible for controlling expressions of opinion. But, with the abolition of the ecclesiastical court of High Commission, the press was unmuzzled. In 1643 Parliament suggested a reimposition of control over publications. The following year Milton's work defending unrestricted publication came out to challenge Parliament's caution.

Milton pleaded for liberty of the press as a necessity to all progress mental and political. He argued from every angle in *Areopagitica* for this freedom of expression. He described the futility of suppression of books. Not only was it too like the Inquisition to be palatable to convinced protestants, but what was the point of restricting the publication of books alone when 'whatever thing we hear or see, sitting, walking, travelling, or conversing may be fitly called our Book'. To shut away men from all contact from evil was to do without the very elements which developed their integrity, 'how much we expel of sin, so much we expel of virtue: for the matter of them both is the same; remove that, and ye remove them both alike'. God has given men 'minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety' by which they can choose between good and evil. 'When God gave him Reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for Reason is but choosing; he had been else a mere artificial Adam, such an Adam as he is in the Motions (i.e. a marionette show). We ourselves,' he continued, 'esteem not of that obedience, or love, or gift, which is of force; God therefore left him free, set before him a provoking object ever almost in his eyes; herein consisted his merit, herein the right of his reward, the praise of his abstinence.' To Milton the conflict of intellects was the very stuff of life from which emerged the ultimate reality purged by its struggle of all falsities and inconsistencies. To shut away men and forbid them this conflict was to deprive them of all opportunity to

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discover the truth and to develop character. 'I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered Virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat . . . that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary.' Milton cleverly argued that to clamp down a system of licensing on the free expression of thought in England was to cast an implied slur on the power and integrity of the English nation. Were they not sufficiently well trained in the truth to discover error; had they not the moral stamina to reject the wrong and to seek after the right? Surely this interest in controversy was a sign of the mental and moral vigour of a people and was symptomatic of its spiritual regeneration? 'Methinks I see in my mind,' he added, 'a noble and puissant Nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks; Methinks I see her as an Eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; purging and unscaling her long abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; . . . What should ye do then? Should ye suppress all this flowery crop of Knowledge and new light sprung up and yet springing daily in this City? Should ye set an oligarchy of twenty ingrossers over it, to bring a famine upon our minds again, when we shall know nothing but what is measured to us by their bushel?' The object in view was liberty and that could not be suppressed without detriment to both the suppressed and suppressors. The latter would become 'oppressive, arbitrary and tyrannous', whilst the former would lose 'liberty which is the nurse of all great wits; this is that which hath rarified and enlightened our spirits like the influence of Heaven; this is that which hath enfranchised, enlarged and lifted up our apprehensions degrees above themselves'. So Milton pleaded passionately: 'Give me the Liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.'

This stupendous faith in the ability of the human mind to probe the mysteries of the universe and to emerge unscathed, enriched and triumphant took concrete shape in the foundation of the Royal Society of Science. Milton had succeeded in his object of preventing restriction of publication and free discussion of hitherto forbidden topics. From 1645 onwards began weekly meetings of men 'inquisi-

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tive into natural philosophy and other parts of human learning and particularly of what hath been called the *New Philosophy* or *Experimental Philosophy*'. In 1660 this nucleus constituted itself into the Royal Society of London for improving Natural Knowledge. The scientific movement had seriously begun. Its attitude to knowledge was very different from the authoritarian methods of the theologians hitherto regarded as the guardians of the secrets of the universe in their privileged position as intermediaries between God the author of the universe and man. Tentatively but persistently the scientists challenged the theologians as guides to the secrets of the universe. They no longer believed that the fullness of knowledge would descend upon them in a blinding flash of direct revelation from heaven. The discovery of the mysteries of the universe depended on ceaseless patient investigation. Knowledge must be sought for by the process of trial and error; no conclusions were to be accepted which could not be demonstrably proved. Measurement and exactitude took the place of vague generalizations in a search that was realistic not mystical. What could not be measured must be relegated to the realm of hypothesis. The greater field of knowledge was covered by working hypotheses. The laws of the universe though laid down by God were no longer conceived as adequately revealed to men to guide them unfalteringly through the labyrinth of this life. The extent of human knowledge was still so limited that the laws of the universe or of nature were still unknown and could only be formulated as hypothetical statements open to constant revision in the light of further discovery. Nowhere was there an infallible guide to certainty.

The scientific movement struck at the root of previous conceptions of the state and its relation to religious institutions. Since the plan of God for men was not known in detail, men must rely on themselves to regulate their social activities. Their experiences must be their guide. Precedents in law courts, ancient constitutions, were dug up and cited as reliable helps, almost authoritative statements in the mental chaos of the seventeenth century. Close observation of institutions was necessary before the laws which governed them could be formulated. The laws of society were not preconceived plans superimposed from above but were the product of ever-changing circumstance and human experiences. The end of the state could no

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longer be conceived as the maintenance of the law of God, when the law of God was itself perceived as but partially and very inadequately revealed to men. Persecution was unjustifiable in the name of unknown truth. Science began to destroy the old conceptions of the end of the state, but offered no substitute as yet. Some other end to social activities must be postulated of a more defined character and based on a better known quantity than the as yet undiscovered divine law.

The tentative attitude of the early scientists was not of the kind to make them the leaders in a time of doubt when the foundations of society were visibly shaking. Nor were the scientists as yet interested in political structure. They concentrated rather on other aspects of knowledge changing imperceptibly but fundamentally the whole intellectual attitude to knowledge. The scientific movement completed the break with the Middle Ages which the Renaissance had begun. 'The seventeenth century', says Dr. Singer, 'opened with an extraordinary wealth of scientific discovery . . . The acceptance of Observation and Experiment as the only method of eliciting the Laws of Nature reaches an ever-widening circle.'

Meanwhile England sought frantically for leaders to stem the flood of liberty that threatened to drown her in chaos. Experiment after experiment in political structure was tried. The works of continental constitutionalists, monarchists, republicans were read and found wanting. English thinkers themselves offered their contributions to the solution. How was order to be evolved without detriment to liberty? Levellers, republicans, democrats, parliamentarians scaled the heights and plumbed the depths of political theory to give the right balance between the two extremes. There was an orgy of democratic experiments and justifications in their defence. Everywhere the aspirants to power insisted that the will of the people should be represented in the government, and government without popular consent was invalid. But the exigencies of the time prevented the full trial of these suggestions. Cromwell realized only too well that the supreme need of the country was for order and that order could only be achieved by autocratic control in such a state of distraction.

A reaction set in against the idealism of Milton and the uncertainty of scientists and latitudinarians, born of the needs of the moment for

security and order. As the civil war dragged on Milton's optimistic belief in the final triumph of truth over error emerging from a clash of unhampered mentalities was quenched by grim reality. Great controversies petered out into petty details and revealed their futility to a generation grown weary by physical strife and uncertainty. As each sect rose to power, it abused its former claim to freedom of conscience and persecuted its sometime oppressors. Each section of the religious community learnt in turn the penalty of intolerance. Each sect justified its action in the name of true religion. Doubt festered in many minds. Scepticism not absolute truth emerged and grew. The basis of Milton's appeal was undermined; the edifice of his ideal tottered. Liberty which did not lead to a further discovery of reality seemed nothing less than licentiousness. Those who had not Milton's goal in view could not so readily reach his conclusions that the liberty to argue freely according to conscience was worth the sacrifice of order involved in letting each conscience hold on its untrammelled way. Order and security became as the years wore on the passionate desire of a country satiated by practical experiments and unwonted intellectual effort. The death of Cromwell and the resulting anarchy drove men further towards the restoration of the monarchy and its promise of stability.

Neither political nor religious liberty was established at the Restoration of 1660. The reaction in favour of order and the return of the old form of monarchical government was too great to countenance a recognition of political liberty. The resentments against the sects who had ably despoiled the vineyards of the established church was too great to permit of a religious toleration when the church was restored to its pristine position of authority. But the *status quo* was not really re-established. The arbitrary courts of High Commission and Star Chamber were not restored. The absolute sovereignty claimed by the earlier Stuarts for the monarch no longer had political institutions ready to hand to manifest the theory in practice. The divine right theory of kingship advocated under the later Stuarts was built on very slight foundations in fact. This divorce between fact and theory enabled the enthusiasm of the royalists to exhibit itself in wildly extravagant theories of absolutism, safeguarded as they were by a knowledge that their views would never be trans-

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lated into action. The schemes for a comprehension of all churches into one or for a toleration of all sects were prevented more by the desire for personal revenge than because the intellectual and religious difficulties were too great to make them acceptable. The orgy of repressive measures promulgated by Clarendon was not the result of religious zeal and a passion for the suppression of error. Rather it promoted the removal of people who were personally obnoxious to the government which was on the whole indifferent to the views expressed by their victims. The government was not interested in maintaining true religion. Legal religious toleration was only a matter of time and the rights of the subject would only be categorically reaffirmed in a cogent theory of the state when those rights, tacitly accepted by Charles II as inviolable and embodied in a mass of well-known literature, should be attacked by any ruler less tactful than the restored exile.

Events moved rapidly towards the end of Charles II's reign. The belief in the necessity of toleration grew as the futility of the persecution of the dissidents became apparent and as dissent spread from a small section of the community to include an important part of the ruling classes. The reign of James II revived the two issues of the civil war again in close conjunction: religious and political liberty. The king's policy of indulgence towards the persecuted sects was believed to be an effort to re-establish Catholicism in the land and roused the suspicion and anger not only of the established church but of the persecuted dissidents themselves, whilst his attempt to take absolute control over the government revived the champions of liberty to withstand once more the encroachments of royal authority. This time the opponents of absolutism were not content to leave the governance of affairs vaguely to the goodwill of the monarch as in 1660. That could no longer be trusted. The revolutionists of 1688 took matters into their own hands and finally denied the rule of an absolute king in England. The dissidents played their part in this effort; the price of their help was the passing of the Toleration Act in 1689. The man chosen by the government to defend their position and ably fitted for such a post was John Locke.

Locke's wide interests and varied experiences equipped him for this post of publicist of the bloodless revolution. The son of a lawyer who

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resented the arbitrary rule of Charles I sufficiently to take sides against the king in 1642, Locke himself studied medicine and was deeply interested in the scientific movement. In 1668 he became a member of the Royal Society. Boyle and Isaac Newton were amongst his intimate friends. The scientific approach to knowledge made a profound impression on his mind and laid the foundations of his philosophy and his political theory. He early became acquainted with and enthralled by Descartes' philosophy and works. His travels abroad in France and Holland brought him into closer contact with continental thought and conditions. He was at the same time keenly alive to the actual problems of the English government. His association with Shaftesbury from 1666 until the latter's fall from power and exile brought Locke into vital contact with contemporary politics. Shaftesbury was in continual opposition to Charles II; he was the centre of the radical element in the restoration government. Locke soon became sufficiently interested in the earl's schemes to begin jotting down his ideas on religious toleration. An essay begun in 1667 on this subject though unfinished formed the basis of much that he and Shaftesbury's friends included in his *Fundamental Constitution for the Government of Carolina*, drawn up two years later. Before 1688 Locke was already marked out as a man of ability and competent to justify new and radical changes of government.

Locke stands out as a writer of modern political thought. His theories of government rest on assumptions more in keeping with modern premises than any of his immediate predecessors. His great contemporary, Hobbes, was definitely of a bygone generation whose beliefs were unreal and unacceptable to the new generation. Belief in the viciousness of human nature was the mark of orthodoxy in Hobbes' youth; it was the stigma of atheism in his old age when Locke began to write. The controversy between Hobbes and Bramhall over free will and predestination after the restoration was the measure of the change in attitude towards human nature which had arisen during the civil war. Hobbes' views horrified men of the new generation who like Locke saw in the qualities of human nature the foundations of all social effort. The basic premises of political thought had changed. The reaction of the Reformation was almost accomplished.

Locke's philosophy expressed in his well-known *Essay on Human*

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Understanding gives the key to his political theories later developed in his *Two Treatises on Government* and already partially expounded in his *Letters on Toleration*. He set himself to probe into the nature and extent of human knowledge. He concluded that there was no basis for the belief in innate ideas. To think that man came into the world with fixed notions in his mind was to Locke not in accordance with the facts. Man's mind at first was a 'white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas'. The knowledge which man subsequently acquired came as a result of his observation upon external phenomena and his brooding within himself over the things he had observed. So knowledge came from Sensation and Reflection and was, ultimately, the result of experience. Human knowledge was inherently experimental in character. This was the determining factor in Locke's view on politics. He could no longer entertain the popular belief that government was superimposed from above by a divine agency and that it arose without the consent and without any effort on the part of man.

Locke carried out specifically in the sphere of politics what he had laid down as his fundamental premise in philosophy. In his *Two Treatises on Government*, the first was a refutation of the divine right of kings as set forth by Robert Filmer in his *Patriarcha*; the second was Locke's own theory of the state. The latter seemed an implicit attack on Hobbes' *Leviathan*.

The measure of Locke's service to political theory can only be taken when one realizes the strength of the views which he so adequately demolished. The first of the *Treatises on Government* was important for clearing the way for the establishment of the theory of the state on new grounds. Filmer's *Patriarcha* contained all the old arguments in favour of an absolute form of government based on divine institution. But the necessities of the moment and the increasing alertness of his readers pressed Filmer to substantiate the vague claims to divine institution of kingship by an elaborate mass of fabricated detail showing the lawful descent of the King of England from Adam. The absurdity apparent to the modern reader was not perceived at the time by men who still clung to a belief in the verbal inspiration of the bible and the inadequacy of the human race to evolve its own forms of government for itself. The strength of this

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belief can be measured by the earnestness and care with which Locke set himself to refute it in detail. The theory of divine right of kingship still flourished in England and France. It is not necessary to follow the ramifications of Locke's arguments against Filmer's position. Suffice it to say that Locke showed that in fact such a claim as Filmer made could never be substantiated by sufficient evidence. Unless evidence was forthcoming to prove the direct lineage of a king from Adam, the theory of divine right of kingship was left *in vacuo*. God himself was never known in human history to have marked out a particular person for the throne. Moreover, there were elements in human relationships which themselves did not countenance such a view of society. Human rule came into being by some other process. Locke elucidated his own theory on the origin and nature of government in his second thesis on government, entitled *The True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government* in opposition to the first section which he had dubbed *Certain False Principles*. Throughout his argument in the second section Locke showed himself sensitive to the originality of the ideas he was propounding. Repeatedly he excuses the novelty of his suggestions on the grounds that after careful consideration they appeared to be true and he hoped they would appear so to his readers also. There is a naive simplicity about this tentativeness which is charming and persuasive in itself.

Locke began by defining political power 'to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good'. Certain questions arose from this definition which Locke set himself to answer. How did such an overwhelming power arise amongst men that they should suffer the community to penalize them even to death? Why was the preservation of property so important? And what was meant by the 'public good'? It was significant that the mention of religion was conspicuously absent from Locke's definition of the primary end of government.

Locke began his constructive arguments with a dissertation on the state of nature, the law of nature and the rights of man. To Locke the condition of man before the establishment of political institutions

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was very similar to the Stoic conception of the 'golden age'. Men he said, were in 'a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man'. In such a state men were all equal and similar in characteristics and potential power. Locke did not then assert as Hobbes had done that in such a state of nature antagonism was the supreme force between men. On the contrary he firmly maintained that sociability was the strongest bond between men. In this he declared himself at one with 'the judicious' Hooker. Hooker's tolerance and rationality had been unsuitable to an age on the verge of an outbreak of furious passions; but with the quenching of such turbulence he came into his own. Locke's exposition of the law of nature, the sociability of man, and his high premium on reason, were closely related to Hooker's views formulated a century before. So Locke picked up the humanistic thread of a more tolerant age and diverged at this crucial point from the intolerance of Calvinism and Hobbes.

Men were equal, sociable and free; but they were not licentious. Locke laid great emphasis on the fact that in the state of nature men were governed by the law of nature. His concept of the law of nature is fundamental to an understanding of his whole political theory. Locke influenced by his study of science and his belief in human nature maintained that man's actions were regulated even before social restraints were consciously imposed upon them, by their necessity to obey reason which was the law of nature. The obligation to obey arose from the origin of the law which was divine. God had placed rational man upon earth giving him reason to guide him in the way he should go and making him instinct with sociability. As God had made all men equal and independent no man had the right to take another's life or subordinate another to his own pleasure. 'The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about

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His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure.' Therefore, Locke concluded, there were certain rights which every man inherently possessed and no one should ever abrogate; preservation of life, liberty, health, limbs and goods. In the state of nature each man had another right, the right to enforce the law of nature for himself; otherwise the law would be a dead letter. So men had authority over each other even in a state of nature, but not an arbitrary and absolute authority; each had only so much as was necessary to preserve his own rights against the violence of those who by passion violated the law of reason. So punishment could be inflicted by one man on another if and when that other had made himself an outlaw to the rule of reason, but the punishment must be only 'so far as calm reason and conscience dictate. What is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint'. It must never be overwhelming and arbitrary. Thus man in the state of nature and government when established were always limited by the rational law of nature, by which certain rights belonged inviolably to man. No law was binding except it was in accordance with this fundamental law known to man through the use of his reason.

Locke then described all the disasters which attended the abrogation of the law of nature: the loss of freedom when one man tried to subordinate another to his will; the consequent state of war when men set themselves not merely to maintain their own rights but to destroy others' and so violate the law of nature. He carefully distinguished between the state of nature and the state of war which Hobbes had identified. He asserted the first was when the law of nature was in operation, the second when men set out to violate it at the dictates of their own passions not of reason. He admitted that a state of war would have to be said to exist between different nations, were it not that men were bound together by the bond of their common humanity not by the bond of their particular societies. The law of nature outstripped the limits of national association, 'and keeping of faith belongs to men, and not as members of society'. So Locke's fundamental belief in human nature led him to conclude that political society was not the final goal of man, but that man belonged to the greater body of humanity and was constrained by a law which was

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recognized wherever reason not passion was dominant. Locke here made the important distinction between society and the state. Where Hobbes' premises led him to conclude in favour of arbitrary rule at home and a perpetual state of war between independent sovereign states abroad, Locke building on different foundations, concluded in favour of constitutional rule at home and the possibility of a development of international law based on the omnipresent law of nature. Society had certain laws which transcended the limits of particular states.

Locke then described the origin and nature of political society. Man was created sociable with needs which could only be satisfied through social life. 'God having made man such a creature that, in His own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination, to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it.' So constrained men tended to form first family groups and then political communities. The reason for the conscious formation of the state was the inability of single individuals to enforce the law of nature impartially.

This lack of impartiality created a great disability under the law of nature. Each man was responsible for the execution of that law in relation to himself. Each man was automatically 'judge in his own cause'. To Locke as the son of a lawyer this was fraught with much inconvenience and was detrimental to the exercise of right and equity. Apparently though reason resided in each man's conscience and was the rule of law, yet it could not be completely trusted to execute the law impartially. It would be better to shift the responsibility of judgment from the individual whose rights were in question, to a group who might be held to be somewhat more impartial. Inconsistent as this was with Locke's original premises that the law of nature was clearly known to all those who tried by reason to comprehend it, yet it formed the basis of his argument to shift the execution of the law of nature out of the hands of partial individuals into the hands of the comparatively impartial community.

The first act of the individuals desiring to form themselves into a body politic was to make a contract. Under this each member agreed to secede to the community his right to enforce the law of nature.

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Unlike Hobbes' original contract, this did not leave an illimitable power to execute the law of nature in the hands of the governing body. Locke had shown that men in the state of nature possessed several rights, only one of which, the right of executing the law, was seceded. The rest of the rights remained as the inviolable possession of the members of the new community. They formed the basis of the law of nature. They set the limit to the extent of political control. Just as the individual had been bound and limited by the law of nature in the natural state, so too the new executor of the law was bound and limited. Locke as opponent to the absolute rule of the Stuarts was eager to constitute an irrefutable argument against arbitrary absolutism. Nowhere would he admit that any ruler had the right to abrogate the fundamental natural rights of man.

This contract was not sufficient to keep political society in being. Some arrangement must be made to prevent disintegration setting in. So long as men retained their several natural rights which political society was set up to protect, they would query every action of this body which impinged upon their property, liberty or life. The political community under the conditions of the original contract could easily split into two factions and from that would continue to split until men returned to the state of nature. Locke advocated a second contract as the way out of this predicament. The members of the political community agreed to submit to the rule of the majority. Unless the minority agreed to accept the rule of the majority the original contract stood no chance of being kept. Majority rule was the solution of a very real practical difficulty. Political society could not exist without government. The second contract was essential to the maintenance of the first. To think otherwise, Locke asserted, 'would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in, which cannot be supposed till we can think that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again'. So Locke set up the political maxim that the rule of the majority was binding on the minority who must rationally perceive that the community could only act as a corporate body if the lesser part agreed to political oblivion.

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This consent to passivity was imposed upon the luckless minority by the law of nature which was reason. For any portion of the population not fortunate enough to be in the majority, reason pointed the way to political suicide. But Locke did not venture to deal with the position of the minority. He was concerned only to justify the acts of the majority. He was engaged on a defence of the settlement of 1688 and the seizure of the government by an overwhelming proportion of the ruling class.

Certain important conclusions arose from Locke's belief in the law of nature and the part it played in society. The state was not the final goal of man; man had an end transcending that of the state. The purpose of the state was the preservation of the individual's rights as prescribed by the law of nature. The state was merely instrumental to the fulfilling of the law of nature. Locke showed political society as a conventional arrangement set over and above the relations of men already partially regulated by the law of nature. The essentials for social life existed prior to the establishment of the state. Justice and equity belonged to the state of nature before the first contract was agreed to. The 'state of nature' still existed and regulated actions between two independent political societies which had not formed any original contract with each other. 'It is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises and compacts men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature . . . for truth, and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society.' Consequently Locke recognized the possibility of international relations based on law and denied Hobbes' contention that independent political societies were *ipso facto* in a state of perpetual warfare with each other. Locke's faith in human nature made him draw conclusions entirely contrary to Hobbes' and many of his contemporaries, though most of them would have agreed with him in his belief in a transcendent law of nature of divine origin.

Locke's belief in human nature and the part the individual must play in maintaining his natural rights led him to advocate a democratic form of constitutional government as the best. No government could be 'civil' or properly constituted unless it had the consent of its

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subjects behind it. Men being rational and the guardians of a set of prescribed rights must have the opportunity to express their views of the policy of the government, to help it enforce its decisions to which they originally gave their consent, to see that it did not abrogate the law of nature by which their rights were established. So consent and representation of the citizens' views must find expression in the structure of the state. The sovereignty of the people must be given formal expression in the mode of government. How was this to be done? Absolute monarchy was out of the question (so Locke dismissed the claims of James II). Aristocracy tended to become oligarchy and was ruled out as government by the minority and incompatible with the second contract. Democracy alone remained acceptable. It was majority rule. But, Locke insisted, it must also be rule by consent of the majority; and the will of the majority, by which the law of nature was conserved, must be constantly focused on the government and constraining its acts in the way they should go. To do this effectively representative government was necessary. Locke was facing the problem which Cusanus had avoided over two centuries before. Locke advocated a drastic reform of the machinery of government even suggesting the abolition of rotten boroughs in order to obtain the proper relation between the majority of the sovereign people and those of their members whom they had deputed to rule. The law of nature required two processes to make it effective: it must be formulated, it must be enforced. The first was the process of legislation for which only the body politic was competent; the second was the process of execution. This could be delegated by the sovereign people to any executive body, one man or many. The process of formulation was sporadic and quickly accomplished. The process of execution was constant and permanent. So the legislative body of representatives need only sit for a short time when occasion arose. But the executive body must be in permanent office. The executive and legislature were separated in function and persons. For, Locke maintained, if the two coalesced into one body the danger would arise that the legislators 'may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and its execution, to their own private wish, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and

government'. This end, the preservation of the law of nature, prevented the sovereignty of the people from being absolute; it was always conditional. 'A government is not free to do as it pleases . . . the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others.'

The duty of the people was to preserve this law; its breaking gave them the right to rebel. This justified the revolution of 1688. Force must be opposed but rebellion could only be by the majority, otherwise the structure of society fell to ruin. The minority had the right of persuasion only. In time it might hope to become the majority. Persuasion was the weapon of the submerged minority; enlightenment of the electorate their only hope. A cogent reason for political propaganda was advocated in an age that had no use for it.

Rational persuasion was of the essence of Locke's philosophy both for state and church. In the state only intolerable emergency could justify resistance and that within very restricted circumstances. In the church no such occasion could arise. Religion was a matter where force was useless and unnatural. Locke in his *Letters on Toleration* followed the route already marked out by the pioneers of religious liberty. Accepting the separation of church and state and depicting a state whose end was the establishment of peace for the preservation of life, limb and property, Locke could find no brief for interference in religion by the state. He advocated almost unlimited legal toleration. But he took exception to catholics, Mohammedans and atheists, on the ground that the first were ready to abrogate the rights of others and themselves owed allegiance to a foreign power; the second adhered to a form of civil law alien to European codes; the third in denying the existence of God, denied the validity of the law of nature itself and so were literally 'outlaws'. Within these limits Locke advocated a full measure of religious toleration. The nature of religion itself denied the validity of forcing the conscience. It was a rational process requiring persuasion as its advocate. It could only be freely accepted by the understanding individual soul. Civic rights moreover pertained to the law of nature and were not dependent on the acceptance of a prescribed form of religious belief. So at last in 1689 the first great breach in legal religious intolerance was made by the passing of the Act of Toleration. By a general consensus of opinion a certain

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portion of the population was recognized as holding beliefs contrary to the established church but not contrary to the fundamental laws of society.

The importance of Locke's political works needs no emphasis. They were widely read in France and America. His constitution for Carolina though not accepted in detail by that state indicated the principle of religious toleration which its rulers subsequently adopted in its entirety. The influence of Locke in the American revolution in the next century was stupendous. His ideas much modified and elaborated returned to Europe in the French revolution. In England Locke had the advantage of former believers in constitutional rule in that he was defending the accomplished fact of the revolution. He could draw upon an actual situation to point his remarks and give content to his theories. His political theory was essentially realistic in character. It carried added weight in the beginning of a scientific age.

The English revolution was a living example of the overthrow of arbitrary kingship. Its underlying principles directly in contrast to the orthodox conceptions of the beginning of the century made an indelible impression on intellectual life. The state was no longer conceived as a superstructure imposed by a sovereign God from above through the medium of an absolute monarch. It was built instead on the very human basis of the consent of its citizens whose will expressed by the majority guided the ship of state where formerly God's will and law alone were recognized as directors. The nature of law itself was understood to have undergone a change. It was no longer self-evident truths revealed beyond doubt in the bible or through some divinely appointed church or king. The law of God was the law of nature, and nature refused to reveal her secrets save to those who earnestly and carefully sought them by experiment. Human experience subject to error as part of its nature was substituted as the guide where infallibility had reigned supreme. Honest doubt took the place of self-opiniated dogmatism. But blank scepticism had not set in. Locke and his contemporaries held firmly to their faith in the law of nature which was both rational and divine. The reason of God sustained the universe; and man himself had the divine spark within. This divine spark must be protected from all possibility of extinction. On it depended the discovery of the law of nature and the direction

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of all social conduct. First religious and then political liberty must be enforced if the individual was to play his essential part in the body politic. The maintenance of true religion and justice was no longer unquestionably accepted as the end of the state. Neither were clearly known in a world where the belief in infallibility had been rudely shaken, where the will of God was but partially revealed. The individual alone was the mainstay, the protection of his natural rights, the end of all human society. The citizen had evolved from the chrysalis stage of the subject. The state was no longer master of his soul and body, but the creature of his own efforts.

So English thinkers took up the threads of freedom of conscience and thought from continental thinkers and wove them into their structure of the state. But continental thought had developed on very different lines in the seventeenth century. The age of science was just beginning. The scientific spirit informed only a select few. Religious toleration had but a precarious foothold everywhere. In England it was extended to the dissidents and was an annual act of concession impermanent in character. In the United Provinces religious and political liberty was strictly limited. In France the absolutism of Louis XIV was extending itself to the destruction of the peace of the Huguenots. A final orgy of persecution on purely religious grounds began at the end of the seventeenth century in France. The ideas of liberty and constitutional government were in no sense generally accepted in Europe. The age of reason had not yet dawned.

CHAPTER X

POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN

Part I: The American and French Revolutions

THE centre of political unrest shifted from England to America and France at the end of the seventeenth century. England settled down politically in the eighteenth century to a period of comparative calm. The Hanoverians remained fairly undisturbed figureheads on the throne; the people remained apathetic under the rule of the Whig oligarchy. Energy was concentrated rather on economic development and colonial expansion than on domestic politics. The industrial revolution beginning slowly in the first part of the century gathered impetus towards the end, when every decade saw a hitherto inconceivable change in modes of work, transport and domestic life. The pursuit of economic wealth led to interminable colonial wars, culminating at the end of the century in the long and exhausting struggle with Napoleon. England was in a constant state of foreign war and economic change; her citizens were not interested in speculating abstractly on political issues which did not vitally concern them. The outstanding figures in English political thought at this time were men interested in preserving the *status quo* not in probing into the depths of political philosophy to discover if their concepts needed adaption to the growth of new circumstances. Burke and Blackstone stood guard over the treasure of English tradition. So England sank down out of the welter of political speculation which was beginning to seethe in America and more particularly in France. Not until the end of the century did she begin to rouse herself from her somnolence. Then the revolutionary politics of France united with English economic discontents, to make it necessary to reconsider a situation which English thinkers had come to regard as sublimely static.

In America and France political conditions did not warrant such

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magnanimous acquiescence in their perfection. In America there was a growing volume of discontent against the English methods of government. The customary policy of exploitation of the colonies was deeply resented in the American states where, as the century proceeded, the settlers became more expert in the art of government, more cognizant of their peculiar needs, whilst the home country became less acquainted with its colonial dependencies, more indifferent to their needs yet simultaneously more rapacious of the accumulating wealth of its offspring. Friction between the colonies and England increased apace until after the Seven Years' War it was impossible to prevent a clash. The American colonists became absorbed in the right to rebel. From a very different basis Frenchmen were approaching the same problem in the course of the eighteenth century. The decadence of the French monarchy, the increase of privileged classes, the incapacity of the government to rule and finally the rise of a discontented intelligentsia and peasantry, produced a growing volume of criticism against the established order. Again at the close of the Seven Years' War, French politicians spoke ominously of the inevitability of revolution. Political discontent directed attention both in France and America to the possibilities of revolution and the justification of repudiating the established authorities. The problem was broadly the same as had faced the English in the seventeenth century; misgovernment and the presence of another class anxious to rectify abuses in accordance with their own interests. But in neither America nor France did the political thinkers and publicists repeat glibly the arguments of their seventeenth-century predecessors. This they could not do. A new attitude to life had arisen. Their particular difficulties emphasized new aspects of political theory. Both factors produced fresh combinations of ideas in the realm of political philosophy.

The preoccupation with theology and religion disappeared in the eighteenth century. As God receded into the background, man and the universe in which he found himself became increasingly interesting. The distinction made at the beginning of the seventeenth century between theology and philosophy enabled thinkers to pursue truth independently of holiness, sometimes indeed in antagonism to it. Philosophers concentrated in their search for knowledge on the

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means by which they might achieve their end. Since mystical communications were considered unreliable, they sought a more certain faculty within the human being capable of directing human efforts. The methods developed by Descartes and suggested by Locke were taken up and microscopically examined by later thinkers. Man's reasoning power was selected as the suitable guide to knowledge. Philosophers became absorbed in the nature of human reason. As in the preceding centuries when the bible was substituted for the church as the infallible authority in human affairs and then the bible itself was attacked and criticized until its fallibility was made manifest, so the reliance on reason led to a study of this faculty until its authority also was gravely questioned. Two schools of thought then sprang up. The one maintained that the amount of error made by human reason accumulated until the final conclusions drawn were totally untrue. They denied all possibility of knowledge. They were the pure sceptics amongst whom Hume was foremost. The other school admitted the possibility of error but firmly believed that it was not sufficient to destroy the small ingredient of discovered truth. These trusted the reasoning faculty of man, and postulated the possibility of knowledge as a goal to man's intellectual efforts. Kant was their prophet. Both sides were concerned with the problem of human reason and the measure of its fallibility. In such a philosophic background old formulae based on a belief in absolutes were prone to disappear. The direct effect on all realms of thought was to suggest that all human activities should be reconsidered in relation not to a preconceived end, such as the design of God, but to some end connected with their own nature. The disintegration of the belief in a single dominating purpose in the universe resulted in the outcrop of a mass of new studies each pursued independently for its own sake. Scepticism drove men to despair in the fifteenth century; it drove them three hundred years later to make a greater and more sustained attack on the baffling mysteries of the universe. The eighteenth century was paradoxically an age of scepticism and enthusiasm.

The isolation of subjects was further emphasized by the new method of study advocated by the growing number of scientists. The inductive method of reasoning was held to be the only sound approach to knowledge. The accumulation of facts was the first step before the

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formulation of a principle or the revelation of a true law. So each subject gathered to itself facts peculiarly relative to its own nature. These separate bodies of evidence grew in the eighteenth century into the first attempts to examine scientifically the several branches of knowledge. Medicine, biology, mechanics, economics and politics amongst other subjects began their scientific treatment. Scientific technique increased the breach already made by the philosophers in the dominating authority of theology.

The effect on political theory was great. Politics divorced from theology in a way alien to the seventeenth century were left isolated amongst intellectual concepts, and had yet to be brought into harmony with this change. New formulae were necessary to describe the nature of a political obligation which did not rest on a law of nature regarded as synonymous with the law of God; to describe the new type of state arising from this different sense of social relations. Montesquieu, Rousseau, Burke and Bentham tried in their turn to formulate the new position.

The slackening of interest in theology had another important result. Since God no longer regulated minutely men's lives, men themselves had to shoulder their own responsibilities. The exaltation of man was inevitable in the scientific renaissance just beginning even as it had been in the artistic and literary renaissance of the preceeding ages. Human reason was the key to knowledge. Every increase of knowledge of the laws of nature added to human power. After the interlude of the repressive Reformation humanism burst forth again with greater force. The scientific rationalistic movement was no longer confined to a select few as in the seventeenth century. It rapidly became the dominating movement of the eighteenth century. Its ideals were everywhere manifest. The rabble of Paris in the revolution worshipped the Goddess of Reason. The artist Blake saw the world dominated by man whose muscular capacity was vast, at whose feet lay the mathematical instruments by which he hoped to reduce the universe to comprehensible and commensurable terms. The rights of man were the political expression of this mood. The new concept of the state had to make room for this unprecedented exaltation of humanity in the place of deity. The form of government must be modified to give expression to this reorientation of values. If the

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individual was the mainspring of all activity then he must have scope within the body politic to direct its policy and control its every action. The discontents in America and France forced these issues into practical politics. Both countries became in the eighteenth century practically concerned with the question of the right to rebel and to overthrow the established order. The Americans were concerned primarily with the problem of forms of government; the French and later the English with the more profound question of political obligation and its relation to the nature of the state and the universe.

The American revolution was the first affirmation in the century of the belief in the people's powers and rights. Circumstances concentrated attention on the forms and nature of government. The Americans sought to justify their break with the English though still agreeing with them in basic principles. Locke's political philosophy had cast its spell over both sides of the water. Both sides agreed that man had certain inalienable rights. But in England Locke's advocacy of a representative form of government as the proper method of protecting these rights had received short shrift from the Whig oligarchy. In America, on the contrary, the incident which started the war emphasized this aspect of Locke's political theory as primarily important. The long smouldering discontent of the colonials was fired by the imposition of a tax to pay for the expenses of the Seven Years' War fought partially on behalf of the colonies. The Americans resentfully declared their right to be free from any tax levied without their consent. They developed Locke's theme of representative government around the phrase 'no taxation without representation'. They neglected the premises of his philosophy simply because these were not in dispute between them and the English. They concentrated fiercely on justifying their rejection of English rule and their substitution of a form of government which would yield them complete control of their political machinery. Their essential concern was to shift political sovereignty from the English aristocracy to their own community.

The Americans concentrated on the element of consent in any government in justifying their rebellion. Why was it necessary; how should it be expressed? They sought a formula embodying a democratic form of government in opposition to the autocratic methods of their opponents. First they elaborated the importance of the rights of

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man. Their literature was filled with descriptions of the several rights possessed inalienably by man which no government could lawfully abrogate. The constitution of the rebel government pointed out the most important of these rights. Men were 'endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness'. These were very individual needs. How could they be assured of proper respect from the hands of a governmental authority? How did the Americans propose to reconcile individualism with the claims of society? They argued that the form of government must be such that the individual could take an active part in the maintenance of his own rights. The citizen must hold watch and ward over his own liberty and other rights. His consent to acts of government and his participation in those acts were necessary if the end of the state was to be achieved. Political association only existed to maintain the inalienable rights of man. The representative principle was essential to the state. Without it the consent of the individual citizen could not be given to the rules concerning his liberties which would therefore be jeopardized. The existence of the state was bound up with the principle of representation. The best and only form of government was that in which every citizen had his view-point represented in the councils of state. The Americans promulgated a republican constitution in which the voice of the private citizen was given a prominent position. The basis of the state was the consent of its individual citizens. Representation and consent were the chief political maxims imbedded in the American constitution. European statesmen were astounded. They recognized in America the first democratic government known to them in modern times. The establishment of the United States was epoch-making. The new republic remained as a tangible expression of the establishment of the rights of the people themselves against arbitrary rule. Democracy flaunted its new-found liberty at the oppressed nations of Europe.

This example and its justification were not lost on the discontented subjects of France. But events in France had followed a very different course when the news of the American revolution penetrated through. The American rebellion was a sudden almost unpremeditated outbreak. The discontent in France was long standing. It was supported

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by philosophical arguments which had been slowly developing throughout the century long before the moment for action came. The outstanding French political writers were speculators in political philosophy, not publicists of a given situation. This gave an abstract quality to their works absent from either the English or American writers on somewhat similar occasions. The French were concerned more or less abstractly with the problems of government and their speculations thus free to roam covered a wide field. They probed beyond the form of government into the nature of law and political obligation. The structure of the government in France precluded that knowledge and interest in the actual details of government characteristic of the English and Americans. The French government was highly centralized under Louis XIV and XV. The king in the eighteenth century was supported in his task of government by a staff of professional administrators who were not concerned to argue about the abstract rights of their position in the state. The philosophers and thinkers who were interested in the problems of politics were faced with a form of government in which there were no rivals for ultimate power, no startling friction within the machine itself. The king and his subordinates moved as one man; they rose or fell together. The political thinkers were not called upon to associate themselves with a particular party whose practical experience would form some tangible basis for their arguments; nor to justify a given situation which would again have afforded them an opportunity to proceed by the more pragmatic methods of the English and Americans. These French thinkers concentrated rather on the more abstract problems of society taking their illustrations at first from other countries to which they could compare the conditions of France, and then as the irritants at home increased drawing more upon the domestic situation. They were more concerned with universal principles than particular details.

Montesquieu led the way in the early part of the century by attempting to analyse the nature of law and the state. Collecting his data like any other scientist he examined not only the French constitution but the constitutions of most of the important states of Europe at first hand whilst on his travels. His early works the *Lettres persanes* and a slight study of the Roman empire showed the genius of his technique of comparison which was the special characteristic of his

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work and, in a sense, the determinate of many of his most original conclusions.

This scientific comparative approach to the study of politics led Montesquieu to his first important conclusion: no absolute system of law similar to the theological conception of the law of God governed men's social activities. Nowhere to man's knowledge was there an immutable law in the universe, save in one limited sphere. The knowledge of God was an absolute necessity. All else were but apparent necessities coming under the general heading of 'conditional necessity'. Except in the sphere of mystical religion all other laws were relative and changeable. This belief in the constant changeableness of all laws concerning the major part of human activities was Montesquieu's basic principle. From this he elaborated a conception of the state embodying ideas which had long remained dormant in the west. His belief in flexibility was a subtle and dangerous attack on the growing rigidity of the French constitution and society and its obsolescent belief in the efficacy of divine right. But Montesquieu did not need in the eighteenth century to demolish in detail, as Locke had previously done, the theory of divine right by which the French monarchy justified its absolutism. The prevalent scepticism had already accomplished that task. Montesquieu was able to begin immediately on the elaboration of his own political theory in terms of this new conception of the nature of law. The *De l'Esprit des Loix* gave in its title the key to his philosophy of the state.

Having analysed and compared innumerable constitutions with Aristotelean patience and all the exactitude of a lawyer, Montesquieu affirmed that all positive laws within communities were made with direct reference to particular environments. They were closely bound up with what he described as 'nature'. This he expanded into the sum total of their economic, social and political background. Positive laws varied with the climate, political institutions, quality of the land, customs, commerce and manners of a people. They were in fact the product of environment. Their nature was variable and their essential characteristic adaptability. Montesquieu was feeling after a definition of law which would give it flexibility and elasticity as opposed to the set forms revered in the France of his day, where change was anathema to a society honeycombed with traditional pri-

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vileges. All positive laws were related to nature, and the law of nature was human reason. Thus the necessary changes made in the expression of laws within a given society must conform to reason; they must be rational adaptations to environmental conditions. Montesquieu picked up Bodin's suggestions of the influence of climate on politics and elaborated it into a full blown theory of law and the nature of the state and its form of government.

The state was not, to Montesquieu, the result of a contract between its members. It was the product of its environment and obeyed the law of nature, which was the law of the universe, subject always to growth and decay. So the nature of the state became in his ~~eye~~ organic not conventional. In this Montesquieu broke away from a theory of the state which had dominated European thinkers with few exceptions ever since the Christians had introduced the idea that the authority of the state was superimposed from above and hence was alien to its natural surroundings. There was no such conflict in Montesquieu's mind between man and nature: man was a part of nature whose chief characteristic was reason. The state was a natural growth subject to the law of change; its chief responsibility was to remain flexible and ever ready to adapt itself to any changes in its environment. Certain elements in the environment were necessarily static, such as climate. These gave a decided character to states. So Montesquieu thought that the temperate climates by the operation of the seasons gave just sufficient stimulus to the men of those districts to develop in them the best social virtues of hardihood, prudence and industry. In contrast to this, men of more relaxing climates, as in the south of Europe or of more strenuous climates as in the extreme north, had a handicap always imposed upon them, and their indolence or exhaustion were both essential factors in the development of the type of state in which they lived. There was no possibility that a mere human contract made between men could check or divert the development of their political institutions which irresistibly adapted themselves to the condition nature imposed upon them from without. Nevertheless, the law of nature was rational and political institutions must be moulded and modified by the operation of human reason upon them. Montesquieu's conception of the law of nature as human reason prevented him from becoming a wholehearted believer in

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determinism. The law of nature might be irresistible but it was always rational. The essence of positive laws within a state was not command but recognition. The lawgiver did not dictate but strove to advocate by rational persuasion a rule which must be recognized by the recipient as reasonable before it would command obedience. So Montesquieu could not tolerate the absolute autocracy of France, but lauded with high praise the mixed constitution of Great Britain, which to him with the cursory glance of a stranger appeared to have achieved the correct equilibrium between the innumerable environmental conditions. He admired especially in the English constitution what he considered to be the complete separation of the legislature and executive. He saw in such a separation a formidable check on the development of an absolutist government resulting from the fusion of all powers into an indivisible control centre. The English constitution had the merit in his eyes of being capable of adaptation without violent upheaval. Nothing was so rigid in it that it could not be modified gradually and without a jar that would shatter the whole structure to pieces. The French constitution on the contrary was inflexible, absolutist and contrary to nature, for it could not adapt itself to the changing needs of the community.

Montesquieu's attitude was a grave challenge to the absolutism and decadence of Louis XV's government. His book published in 1748 became the gospel of the moderate legal party, which had such an influence on the course of events after 1789. His views on the necessity of the total separation of the powers were accepted as axiomatic and as the best check on absolutism. But the belief from which this sprang, the belief in the desirability and necessity of a flexible constitution sensitive to any environmental change, was not so wholeheartedly accepted by the constitution makers of 1790 whose chief object was to set up a rigid permanent constitution in France based on the example of America, and justified by such theorists as Locke and Rousseau. Nevertheless, Montesquieu's work was not without its influence. It formulated in terms of the state the discoveries and methods developed amongst the scientists. His technique was gradually to usurp the place of the methods used by his more famous contemporaries. In examining the state as a product of human activity and comparing its various manifestations, he suggested that the

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human species had certain elements in common. These bound men together as a species and differentiated them from other animals. Reason was peculiarly human and enabled men to feel themselves in a fellowship transcending national or local boundaries. Montesquieu implied a fraternity within the species which later caught the imagination of the revolutionary mob. Fraternity became one of the watchwords of the crusading army of France against the oppressive governments in the rest of Europe.

But Montesquieu's theory of adaptability and the importance of tradition was not in keeping with the turbulent events of a revolutionary epoch. He wrote in quieter times and constructed a political theory more suited to a period of growth than to a period of cataclysmic changes. As events hurried the French nation on to the crisis of 1789 the question of the authority of the government was raised in a more acute form. The Encyclopaedists became more fiercely critical of the foundations of political authority and the limits of political obedience. The bonds of social and political union were minutely examined. Why did a man feel obliged to obey the commands of those in authority? Why did he yield his own judgment to that of the community in which he lived? Was the nature of man utterly subservient or had he in reality a motive force capable through reason of recreating his environment in greater harmony with his aspirations? Was the belief in the rights of man ephemeral, or founded on the solid rock of reality? None of the various answers given to these questions before the revolution fitted the mood of the time as well as Rousseau's. The personal conflict within Rousseau was the replica of the conflict within society just then gaining prominence. Rousseau sought to reconcile within himself his anti-social and social instincts; he sought to reconcile in politics the relation of the individual to the state; he examined with a fierce egotism the problem of political obligation. His solutions were inevitably cataclysmic and subtly in tune with the spirit of revolution.

Rousseau's writings on political institutions fall into two main groups: the first dealt with the idea of man in the state of nature, the second with man in society. Entirely contradictory as they seem on the surface these two conceptions were linked together by a unity of purpose. Rousseau was searching always for some power to bolster

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up the moral weakness in man which he felt so acutely within himself. The development of Rousseau's character is the key to his political thought. He probed into social conditions in order to find some solution to his personal problems. His influence arose from the brilliance with which he examined the phenomena around him, the emotional vigour with which he set forth conclusions which were of supreme subjective value to himself and the sensitiveness with which he reacted to surroundings which his contemporaries also felt to be jarring but were incapable of apprehending so acutely. Rousseau was at odds with himself and could not let accepted notions rest. He searched feverishly amongst all the dogmas of the day to find amongst them some solution to the turbulence which racked his spirit. He would write on the principles of education, and place his children in the foundling hospital; he would demand equality for all men but would be content to profit from the privileges of his rich friends; he denounced immorality fiercely and was himself aghast at his own iniquities. He sought for a guard and stay in well-known paths, and finding no help he rushed on to construct his own principle which he hoped would render his vacillating will more upright, more consistent with itself. Rousseau was in search of moral integrity, the great gap in his own composition. In his search he examined and criticized accepted moral and political notions, and finally evolved a conception of society in which his weakness might receive strength.

Rousseau began by examining the conception of the state of nature. Many influences induced him to this. He had been brought up a calvinist of the Genevan mould where the *Institutes* was read and the belief in the original evil of man's nature emphasized. Man was a vicious outcast until God of his supreme mercy elected him for salvation. Steeped in calvinistic dogma Rousseau had read and meditated on the conflicting notions of the nature of man as presented by Hobbes and Locke. Was man vicious or virtuous by nature? Both writers envisaged primitive man as either rationally bad or rationally good; but Rousseau's ungoverned emotions made him query the rationality itself of human nature. Just at this time the discovery of the natives of the Pacific islands emphasized the fact that primitive peoples were peaceful but not particularly rational; custom and superstition formed their social obligation. The discoveries of the day

influenced Rousseau even as the discoveries of the warlike North American Indian tribes had influenced Hobbes. Rousseau set himself the task in his first essay touching on political philosophy to inquire into this presupposed state of nature by which certain rights were claimed for the individual, in which every individual was supposed to be equal to his fellow. Were all men equal, were they all vicious, or virtuous? What exactly was the nature of man? Did his nature warrant his disgust with himself and his surroundings? Rousseau's first semi-political essay was appropriately entitled '*Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*'. Rousseau in his very first essay struck at the root of an almost sacrosanct dogma of the eighteenth century.

Rousseau denied both Hobbes' and Locke's views of primitive man. He asserted that they were both presupposing a man with highly civilized attributes whether moral or social. Hobbes' terminology of 'force and fraud' suggested that he was condemning the state of nature in terms which would have been totally unintelligible to a man without highly developed moral sensibilities. Locke on the other hand described his primitive man as firmly bound by the law of nature which was the law of God, and living a restrained moral life without an urgent need for political institutions. Both these views were wrong. Rousseau maintained that primitive man was nearer animal than man; he lived an isolated life with no ties and no obligations. His relations with other men were casual; his mode of life erratic. The only distinctions between men and beasts were a sense of pity and the capacity for development. Rousseau's 'noble savage' was a blend of impressions of the recent geographical discoveries and the results of the science of anthropology just then beginning. The moral sense might and did exist in man but it was very slow to develop and was in no way as clearly defined as suggested by Locke. Nor had man the intelligence to outwit his foe as suggested by Hobbes. Man in the primitive state was a creature of impulse and instinct in whom the quality of foresight was also slow in developing. In the state of nature then man was solitary and non-moral. Speech even was undeveloped, for speech presupposed communication and some social interplay. So primitive man was devoid of language and wandered about the primeval forests begetting his offspring by the

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way, hunting for his food and concerned only with the satisfaction of physical needs. More sophisticated needs had not yet developed.

How long this state of solitude existed Rousseau made no attempt to estimate, but a time came when men changed their mode of life, and began to live in settled groups. Immediately the state of nature receded into the background and social institutions sprang up. The family unit came into being and from that political institutions gradually evolved. But the fundamental change was the exchange of a precarious mode of life to one involving the institution of property. What a man had been content to look upon as his mere possessions, now that he had interest in a given portion of the earth and a posterity to care for, he wished to be regarded as his very own inalienable goods. He wished his possessions to be recognized as his property. The effects of this desire were very great. "The first man who enclosed a plot of ground and bethought himself of saying *This is mine*, and found others foolish enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society.'

The change wrought in man's nature by this change in his conditions was immense. He was no longer independent and solitary and innocent; but was now dependent on others, and, resenting it, was filled with a sense of rivalry, self-assertion and vanity. Above all the institution of property brought with it insatiable greed and a desire for dominance by its possessors. So the rich made slaves of the poor and society sank into an abyss of vice and antagonism from which it had never extricated itself. The pristine happiness of man in a state of nature vanished for ever never to be recovered. The essay ended on a note of utter despair. Society corrupted man; man could only maintain his innocence at the price of knowledge and society. The untarnished innocence of the state of nature was the unsullied darkness of ignorance. The gleam of the law of nature which had guided and restrained the brutish man of Hobbes' imagination and the Christian of Locke's was declared by Rousseau to be too fitful and uncertain for such a purpose. Rousseau in his distrust of the law of nature broke from a tradition which had been established in the west since the time of the Stoics. He could not rely on anything to help man in his dilemma. The primitive savage, a creature of impulse and instinct, had no innate knowledge of good and evil sufficiently con-

vincing to form a reliable guide to conduct. His moral perceptions were weak, whilst his desires were strong; his reasoning power was still in embryo. On what could he rely? His more sophisticated descendants in society were corrupted by their mere contact with their fellows with whom they only associated for the extension of vicious desires such as greed and dominance. Nowhere could Rousseau find either in the state of nature or society some authority which was vital enough to stay the corruption in man. The individualism inherent in his description of the solitary state of primitive man was examined by Rousseau and found wanting. Never again did he return to the individual to search for that stability which was his goal. Rousseau's own emotional instability found its justification in this description of primitive man; he was confirmed in his belief born of his calvinistic upbringing, that order and restraint could not issue forth from the undeveloped consciousness of primitive man nor the corrupted desires of his more sophisticated descendant. There was no hope to be found in the individual, nor in the law of nature. Where then was moral integrity to be found? On what could society build its foundations?

Rousseau did not attempt to answer this question in the *Discours sur l'Inégalité*. He was content in this essay fiercely to denounce existing corruptions and to blaze abroad his contempt of existing society. His disillusionment with human nature did not preclude him from championing sections of humanity on whom he thought social institutions were more oppressive than on others. He identified himself with the poor against the rich; for he saw in the poor some traces of those primitive qualities of pity and untarnished humanity which the rich trampled carelessly underfoot in their pursuit of power. He still could write 'Everything is good as it comes from the hand of the Creator', though he immediately had to add, 'Everything becomes evil in the hands of man'. He could not throw off the mighty shadow of Calvin. As he proceeded in his search for an absolute standard of conduct he came very near his great predecessor's conclusions, with one great difference: where Calvin believed God to be the fountain-head of all moral vigour Rousseau in the religious scepticism of the eighteenth century believed that the mystical body of the state had this virtue. This was the second and final stage in the development

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of Rousseau's political thought; it followed upon his failure to believe in the individualism which flourished in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Rousseau finished his *Discours sur l'Inégalité* in 1755; in the same year he wrote the *Économie politique* which formed the basis of the *Contrat Social*. The *Contrat Social* was not completed until 1762. This work contained his own solution to the vexed question of a standard for personal conduct. As he developed his theme in relation to political institutions he revealed his conception of the relation which the individual bore to the community. Psychologically Rousseau sought for a co-ordination between himself and his surroundings; politically he tackled the problem of political obligation. He examined carefully the exact amount of restraint which the community should exercise upon its individual citizen; the nature of that individual which required restraint and a certain measure of satisfaction to its desires; the nature of those desires; the form of government which would best conform to the needs of the community; the nature and extent of the power exercised by the community.

The real subject of the *Contrat Social* is given in the more appropriate sub-title '*Principes de Droit politique*'. Rousseau set himself to find the bond which might justly unite men together in society. He rejected the theories that society was the off-shoot of the family, and that it was created by force. Neither of these would have constituted that moral sense of obligation he sought so passionately. In spite of his disillusionment with the nature of the individual he allowed it to make one more gesture before he entirely obliterated it. The establishment of an association of men whose commands would be binding must be made by the free consents of its members if it was to be morally binding on them. So the actual making of the original contract was the work of the individual. In the eighteenth century when God was discredited, man alone was left to perform the creative act of society. Rousseau wasted no time in elaborating what condition men were in when they decided to unite in communities, whether they are still primitive and unsullied, or sophisticated and vicious; he merely labelled the pre-social condition the 'state of nature', the same name he had given to the long period so fully described in his *Discours sur l'Inégalité*. He did not even attempt to

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account for the motives which drove men to abandon their solitude except to say vaguely: 'I suppose men brought to the point at which the obstacles which make it difficult for them to remain in the state of nature carry the day over the forces which each individual can bring to bear, so as to maintain himself in that state. That being so, it is impossible that the primitive state should continue; and mankind would perish, if their way of life were not entirely changed.' So driven by necessity to escape the corrosive forces within their own nature, lest they perish, men sought refuge against themselves in association with their fellows. The state of nature was merely a negative condition antecedent to a state of society. In the *Contrat Social* it played no other part. Rousseau looked to the community to save his vacillating soul.

The moment of recognition which was the foundation of society was described in almost mystical language. Rousseau undoubtedly felt a sense of relief amounting to the illumination of a conversion when he envisaged the community undertaking the burden of responsibility he himself was too weak to bear. He saw the individual striving to maintain his liberty not in the sense of freedom to do as he would, but rather in a religious sense, of freedom to pursue the right; liberty to Rousseau must include that strength by which alone man might be free of his inner corruption. 'How can we find', he asked, 'a form of association which shall enlist the forces of the whole community for the protection of the person and good of each associate? And in virtue of which, each, uniting with all, shall in spite of this obey no one but himself, and remain as free as he was before? Such is the crucial problem, the solution of which is given by the social contract.' This contract was a dramatic submission of the will of the individual to the group rule. It was unhampered by particular forms; it was essentially a mystical experience. 'These clauses (i.e. the particular forms the contract may take), properly understood, reduce themselves to a single one; that is, the total surrender (*aliénation totale*) of each associate with all his rights to the community at large . . . If then we put aside all that is not of the essence of the contract, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms: Each of us throws himself and all his powers into the common stock, under the supreme control of the general will; and, as a body, we receive

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each individual member as an inseparable part of the whole.' The language is strikingly reminiscent of the rite of baptism; the alleged transformation was as profound. 'The passage from the state of nature to the civil state brings about a momentous change in man. In his conduct, it replaces instinct by justice, and gives to his acts a moral character which was wanting to them before. The voice of duty takes the place of physical impulse; right supplants appetite. Now for the first time, man, who hitherto had thought only of himself, sees himself forced to act on other principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his desires. It is true that, in the civil state, he deprives himself of many advantages which he holds from nature. But, in return, he gains advantages so great, his faculties are so trained and developed, his ideas so enlarged, his whole soul exalted to such a degree, that, if the abuses of the new order did not often degrade him below the level of that form which he has escaped, he ought without ceasing to bless the happy moment which tore him for ever from the old order, and which, of a stupid and limited animal, made him a reasoning being and a man.'

Whence came the power to effect this miraculous change? Rousseau asserted it arose in the act itself of association. By that act not only did the individual abdicate from the weaknesses inherent in his nature, but there came into being the living body of the community, from which the vitalizing controlling 'will' flowed which Rousseau sought so diligently. The description of the creation of the body politic was again similar to the Christian doctrine of the foundation of the church. 'At that very instant and in virtue of this act of association, the individual self of each contracting member is replaced by a moral and corporate body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes. And from the same act this collective body receives its unity, its corporate self (*son moi commun*), its life and its will.' Thus the sovereign body was created whose main function was to guide and strengthen its individual members who had associated together in order to partake of its moral virility sadly lacking in themselves. To carry out this function effectively the community must have absolute power both moral and physical. 'In order that the social contract may not prove an empty formula, it includes the tacit understanding that, whoever refuses to obey the general will, shall be

compelled to obedience by the whole body of citizens. But this means nothing more than that they will force him to be free.' The will of the community was omnipotent. Rousseau regarded the will of the community described as the 'general will' as an emanation from its corporate self, something inherently different from and superior to the sum of the individual wills of which it was composed, which separate parts Rousseau distrusted completely. His psychological necessity drove him to exalt the body politic into that authority which he so desired in his own life; it forced him to conceive of the community as a group consciousness having a life separate from the life of its members, from which alone its members could draw the sustenance necessary to their full development. Unless this act of association was a conscious act of the people, unless they had together felt the rapture of throwing the burden of their loneliness on to the pulsing quickening heart of the corporate self they themselves created, 'the earth might be covered with men, but among them there would be hardly any communication. We might touch each other at point after point, and find union in none. Each would remain isolated amongst the others; each would think only of himself. Our understanding could never develop. We should live without any feeling, and die without having lived. Our whole happiness would consist in not knowing our misery. There would be neither kindness in our hearts, nor morality in our acts. We should never have tasted the sweetest feelings of which the soul is capable: that is the law of virtue'. In the group life Rousseau found rest and strength for his lonely restless self. He recommended it in burning fanatical eloquence as the solution to the social and moral problems of his day.

The political conceptions inherent in this view of the origin of society and flowing as a result from it were composed of a mixture of ideas drawn from Plato, the Roman lawyers whom Rousseau profoundly admired and Montesquieu's works whose impression can distinctly be seen in the section of the *Contrat Social* devoted to the functions of the lawgiver. But the conglomeration of ideas was not merely repetitive; they were welded together by Rousseau's intellectual originality and the force of his emotions driving him to prove his case conclusively, to himself at least.

The motive for the creation of the state is the clue and the deter-

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minate cause for the rest of Rousseau's political conceptions. He had postulated as a necessity arising from the quality of human nature and as a condition of its proper growth the establishment of a corporate body whose powers would be absolute and unlimited. The individual was merged into the community from whence alone his highest life flowed. He was entirely dependent on it. But Rousseau did not mean to reduce his citizen to the position of a slave. The truest freedom lay within the bounds of society which forced every man to be free. Paradoxical as this may sound it is the key-note of Rousseau's political philosophy. He was seeking, as he said at the beginning of the *Contrat Social*, to find how the individual self might develop and maintain his freedom; and Rousseau's disillusionment with human nature had forced him to rely on the community to supply the driving force necessary to keep the individual in the path he himself would wish to follow had he but the moral strength. The main object of the *Contrat Social* was to show how the individual might best develop by means of this instrument, the corporate self, to which Rousseau clung as his solution.

How did the corporate self express itself? How far did it keep in touch with the individual wills by whose act it had originally been created? In political terms what was the form of the executive and its powers; what was the relation between the government and the state or the legislature and the executive; what were the limits of the political obligation of the citizens? The expression of the general will of the community was the law. Unless everyone partook in making the law it would not be an expression of the general will, so it would cease to be law or binding. The conclusion was that sovereignty must reside indivisibly within the community. But Rousseau again could not trust the voice of the people whose individual characters were still in his mind unreliable. Throughout the *Contrat Social* he never swerved from his condemnation of the multitude. He saw no hope in the rule of the people. 'How can a blind multitude, which often does not know its own mind because it seldom knows its own interest, carry out in its own strength an enterprise so vast and intricate as that of legislation?' Yet if the multitude were not to do it, who was to create the law which was the first concrete manifestation of the general will without which the original compact would be but a phantom?

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Rousseau, like Plato, turned to the wise man in his dilemma and called him out of vacuum to perform this, the first function of the living community. The wise man was to be the saviour of the community. He was its lawgiver. His powers were omnipotent. He 'must feel himself in a position to change the nature of man; to transform each individual, who in himself is a self-contained and isolated whole, into part of a larger whole, from which he receives in some sense, his life and his being. He must feel himself able to alter the constitution of man, with a view to giving it greater strength; to put a dependent and moral existence in place of the independent and physical existence which we have received from nature. In a word, he must take from man his natural powers, in order to give him powers which are foreign to him, and of which he can make no use without the help of others. The more completely those natural powers are mortified and annihilated, the greater is the strength and durability of those which he acquires; the more solid and perfect, moreover, is the work of the Lawgiver'. The work of the lawgiver must, however, be submitted to the people for recognition otherwise it would not receive their sanction, and without the sanction of the general will no law was binding. The sanction was given by the free votes of the citizens. But the agreement had to be unanimous otherwise the general will did not operate, and the community would break up into factions of particular wills. In order to overcome this difficulty of an early split and a return to the abhorred state of nature, Rousseau insisted with a touch of Montesquieu that the lawgiver should adapt his laws to the needs and nature of the people he sought to govern. The guide of the lawgiver should not be moral right but expediency. Expediency must take into account climatic, commercial, social and traditional characteristics of a nation.

The form of government was determined by circumstances. Any form was legitimate; but Rousseau persisting in his distrust of the people rejected democracy and chose aristocracy as the best form of government. Monarchy seemed to him too prone to corruption to be given supreme control of the executive. An aristocracy was the most likely group to possess the right amount of will and intelligence to grapple with the difficult task of formulating laws agreeable to the sovereign people and then carrying them into execution. Rousseau

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distinguished carefully between sovereignty and government, and whilst insisting that sovereignty, the greatest power in the state, resided in the general will of the people, refused to allow the same people to meddle with the reins of government lest their natural incapacity bring the whole state to ruin. In the ideal republic the relation between the government and the people was not, as Locke maintained, between two parties of a contract. The government to Rousseau was the trustee of the people who were constantly supervising its work and at any moment might revoke their trust and vest it elsewhere. There was no need in such a relationship for a judge between the two contracting parties as there was in Locke's theory. Sovereignty lay in the people embedded in them in the same inexplicable manner as *imperium* resided in a Roman community or divine grace in a church. The people could not share their sovereignty through a contract with the government; it was indivisibly part of their corporate self.

The necessity of maintaining the sovereignty of the people over the acts of the government led Rousseau to two important conclusions. The general will being of a mystical character inherent in the corporate body of the community could not be expressed through representatives but must always be expressed directly. Government by representatives was vetoed as impossible. The governing body had at any crisis to go direct to the people for their consent by their direct free votes. Rousseau roughly swept out of his path all theories of government resting on the representative principle. He drew his second conclusion urged by this desire to keep the government in intimate touch with the general will of the people: he advocated that the proper territorial limits of the state should be those of a small city-state, a size commodious to the frequent consultation of the general will. In this Rousseau rejected the existing national organizations and proposed in their stead a federation of innumerable small republics. This federal system, much modified, became later the model used by the revolutionaries when they established new forms of government throughout a conquered Europe.

Rousseau's influence was dynamic and ubiquitous. The French revolutionaries and later the rest of Europe attempted to translate his political theories into history. His early examination of the state of

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nature and natural rights led him to a fierce attack on the existing systems of government. He saw in them the epitome of the viciousness which arose from the establishment of property and the desire for exploitation inherent in unregenerate man. His eloquence in condemning the decadence of society fired the discontented citizens of France to further efforts to break down the old order and to make room for the new. Rousseau's later postulation of the new potent community which would rise from the wreck of the old set a concrete ideal before the inflamed imagination of the revolutionaries. His theory of the state as a moral entity filled with a new regenerating force capable of restoring the downtrodden vitiated subjects to the full vigour of upright citizenship, expressed in coherent form the uprising force of popular nationalism just about to sweep Europe from its old political moorings. The works of Rousseau were the textbooks of the French revolution. His disciples in those troubled times preached his gospel at the street corners and in their many assemblies. Just so had the bible filled the imagination of the men of the Reformation; just so did *Das Capital* intoxicate the revolutionaries in twentieth-century Russia. All three postulated a new gospel of emancipation. But their methods of achievement differed. Rousseau stands midway between the two extremes of the divine agency of the Christian solution and the biological atheism of Marx. Rousseau saturated with the Christianity of Geneva and psychologically at war with himself endowed the community with that mystical power to regenerate himself and others hitherto only associated with religious bodies. This moral entity was possessed by its very nature of an absolute, indivisible, unlimited sovereignty stretching over every phase of its citizens' lives, nay indeed, being itself the source and inspiration of their newly quickened life. The community reconstructed from the several vitiated fragments of humanity was itself miraculously but inconsistently delivered of the burden of vice. It was the source of all morality. The community was strong enough to override the weaknesses of its individual citizens; it strengthened them by its sheer force to be free. Rousseau offered to Europe at a moment of deep perplexity and discontent a justification to break from the old worn out systems, and an ideal to be sought for after the work of demolition was over. In the new national community infused

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with popular enthusiasm he revealed a bond of association strong enough to override the disunity inherent in the natural rights' theory of the state. He postulated in the community a mystical union of wills into the 'general will' capable of demanding the utmost obedience from its separate members. The community and not God nor nature was the real source of political obligation.

The French revolution stirred Europe to its depths. The revolutionary armies immediately threatened the states with tangible attack; their doctrines more slowly but more subtly and effectively undermined old standards and concepts. Within less than a generation men saw their old mode of life dissolve and a new one take its place. The French set up republics modelled on their own throughout the greater part of Europe within less than twenty years from the outbreak of the revolution. The gospel of Rousseau with its many inconsistencies spread with the rapidity of a new faith.

Part II: Parliamentary Reform in England

England alone of the old countries remained apparently unshaken by the onslaught of French enthusiasm. But her calm was only apparent. Long before the outbreak of the revolution, the works of its writers and the tenets of its faith were causing some agitation amongst English political thinkers. The writings of the agitators for Parliamentary reform and of the group round Paine and Godwin formed a nucleus of revolutionary literature sufficient to cause apprehension to the government and its supporters. The wild excitement aroused by the Middlesex election showed the growing strength of popular feeling even though confined to a small locality. The formation of the society for the defence of the Bill of Rights in 1769 indicated the trend of advanced opinion. Within Parliament the discontent expressed itself in a persistent demand for some measure of reform. The growing rapidity of economic changes increased the sense of insecurity. Burke as early as 1770 noted 'that rank and office, and title, and all the solemn plausibilities of the world, have lost their reverence and effect'. The arguments for and against the American colonies' independence stimulated inquiry into the basic assumptions of the

state from 1776 onwards. The American war of independence brought forward the question of the extent of the rights of man and the limits of political obedience. But the question of the colonies was too remote to provoke widespread discussion. It was not until the advocates of the rights of man began to criticize the existing English government as an inadequate institution and subversive of the proper expression of these rights, that Englishmen interested in the problems of government roused themselves to consider whither the new criticism might lead. In 1784 Pitt made his famous appeal to the voice of the people. Five years later across the narrow twenty miles of sea, the French people gave their dramatic interpretation of these popular rights. Few Englishmen were prepared to go as far as the revolutionaries after 1790. The movement for Parliamentary reform leading to a greater expression of popular opinion was momentarily checked. The English paused in distaste of such violent upheavals.

Edmund Burke eloquently expressed the motives for this hesitance and interpreted with acute perception the eighteenth-century belief in benevolent despotism and the value of gradualism in reform prevalent amongst the governments of his day. His defence of the British Constitution embodied a justification of conservatism at its best. He perceived and attempted to define the essence of the conservative mood of a people. Incidentally from this fresh standpoint he offered yet another exposition on the theme of political obligation and its relation to the popular and growing belief in democracy. Writing before the actual upheaval of his own country, he depicted the laws of gradual change in terms reminiscent of Montesquieu by whom he was greatly influenced. But Montesquieu had written before either the American or French revolutions. Burke saw both as accomplished facts. His intense interest in practical politics gave immediate importance to his views. He was, so to say, applying the general principles of Montesquieu to the particular situation of his time. He modified them here and elaborated them there.

Burke denied outright the validity of the idea of the rights of man. He asserted this was but an abstract conception, totally unrelated to any evidence of the actual working of states. Men were not seeking to assert a group of rights appertaining to their nature in some mysterious fashion. Men were placed on the earth with their relation-

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ships already specified and arranged by God. 'The awful author of our being', he said in his *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, 'is the author of our place in the order of existence; and that, having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic, not according to our will, but according to his, he has, in and by that disposition, virtually subjected us to act the part which belongs to the place assigned to us. We have obligations to mankind at large which are not in consequence of any special voluntary pact. They arise from the relations of man to man, and the relations of man to God, which relations are not matters of pact. On the contrary, the force of all the pacts which we enter into with any particular person, or number of persons, amongst mankind, depends upon these prior obligations.' So, he insisted, the relationships arising from marriage, parenthood and nationality had an inherent sanctity which men could not abolish. The duties not the rights of man were fixed irrevocably by divine law.

But Burke did not sweep away all possibility of progress with this statement. Though the basic relationships of mankind were immutable, their particular relationships in a given society were subject to change. Every society was marked with signs of corruption and decay. How were these to be removed? How did Burke propose to adapt the existing governments to the needs of the people? How did he hope to reconcile popular rights with the aristocratic form of the English benevolent despotism?

Burke recognized the importance of public opinion. He regarded it as 'the great support of the state' which depended entirely on the voice of the people. He supported the claims of the American colonies; he protested in favour of the rights of the Indians to protection against the exploitations of the trading companies who worked contrary to the temper of Indian opinion. But he was not prepared to admit that in England sovereignty lay in the people. 'I cannot indeed take upon me to say,' he asserted in his *Speech on Economical Reform* in 1780, 'I have the honour to follow the sense of the people. The truth is, I met it on my way, while I was pursuing their interest according to my own ideas.' The people were not capable of executing the functions of government, however important it was that the government should always act in their interest. So long as their demands 'do not militate with the stable and eternal rules of justice

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and reason (rules which are above us and above them)', then their desires can be regarded as a law to be obeyed by the governors. But the people of themselves could not judge this high matter of whether their desires were in accord with justice and reason. Nor did they want to.

Such power of discrimination and hence the ultimate sovereignty of the state resided in England in Parliament. In any other state he implied that sovereignty resided where it happened to be found. This finding was not accidental. It was the result of a long sequence of events. Burke embarked on his philosophy of tradition. The constitution of a state was established, Burke explained, by prescriptive right; its 'sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind'. Prescription, he urged, was 'the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but what is to secure property, to government'. Time-honoured custom and tradition placed authority on a more solid basis than just the inertia of habit. Prescription was 'accompanied with another ground of authority in the constitution of the human mind, Presumption'. Every nation had a presumption towards a certain form of government, which was never the product of a moment's effort or turn of fortune. 'A nation,' he explained, 'is . . . an idea of continuity which extends in time as well as in numbers and in space. And this is a choice not of one day, or one set of people, not a tumultuary and giddy choice; it is a deliberate election of ages and generations; it is a constitution made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the people which disclose themselves only in a long space of time. It is a vestment which accommodates itself to the body.' The constitution of a state, as Montesquieu had already shown, was the result of a long process of growth motivated by the habits of the people reacting to their physical environment. The people by some natural power had selected their governors in the dim recesses of the past. Time sanctioned authority. The people's voice was not strong enough in a single blast to direct their own activities. 'For man is a most unwise and a most wise being. The individual is foolish; the multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but,' he added, proudly illogical, 'the species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species it always acts right.' It was this blind

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process operating within the people, he concluded, which had made the British Constitution what it was, that had placed sovereignty for ever into the hands of the governing minority of English aristocrats.

Since Parliament had received its authority from the only valid source, the custom of the ages, reforms which suggested that sovereignty resided in the people were irrelevant and dangerous to the natural habit of the people. Burke unhesitatingly condemned the movement towards democracy and the attempt to make Parliament a representative organ of the people. Parliament was the ruling body in the country; it had no need to be representative of a people whom its function was to govern. Burke deeply resented any infringement on Parliamentary authority or privilege. He was suspicious of advice even of an expert kind to members of Parliament. In arguing against the Board of Trade as a corrupt ineffective body of men eager for office, he indignantly declared: 'We want no instructions from boards of trade, or from any other board; and God forbid we should give the least attention to their reports. Parliamentary inquiry is the only mode of obtaining parliamentary information.'

Nevertheless Burke was ready to curtail the actual sphere of governmental control to certain narrow limits. Government existed vaguely enough to serve the interests of the people, to interpret their inarticulate desires as best as might be good for them, to lead the people to material prosperity and eternal happiness. Governors should regard themselves as holding a sacred trust for the people in the eyes of God, not to be lightly abrogated or destroyed by the moral corruption of the governors. But there were some things with which the governors were incapable of dealing. Commercial and industrial life should go its own way, obeying the laws of its own being. 'Commerce . . . flourishes most when it is left to itself. It is very well able to find its own way; and its necessities are its best laws.' Burke, whilst advocating a benevolent supervision for the people, was prepared to allow complete freedom in economic matters to the business world. He argued that the state could have no proper knowledge of so skilled a pursuit as business. Vividly he denied that 'the desk ought to read lectures to the anvil, and the pen to usurp the place of the shuttle'. Burke, whilst denying the rights of the individual in politics, heartily

supported their free expression in economics. He endorsed the doctrine of *laissez-faire* with all the eloquence at his command.

In politics, no quick changes were desirable or truly valid. 'A temperate reform is permanent; . . . because it has a principle of growth.' Change he certainly advocated, but always with a slow movement, so that 'we can proceed with confidence, because we can proceed with intelligence'. Any 'hot reformatations' were too crude, too undigested to remain; they were 'so contrary to the whole course of human nature and human institutions'. The very flow of time which had suggested to Montesquieu the inevitability of change formed the basis of Burke's argument against the rapidity of that change, which he perceived from 1770 was fast coming upon the society he so cherished and longed to keep intact from the contaminating influence of the rude populace. In a form of society about to dissolve Burke clung to the sense of continuity to check the rapidly flowing tide of change. 'Individuals', he poignantly realized, 'pass like shadows; but the commonwealth is fixed and stable.' In this protestation he hoped to calm his own fears. The whim of individuals could not be the proper guide to any change. Only the aristocracy could really discover the type and measure of reform necessary to keep the body politic in health. The people had to obey these rulers chosen as their guides by the accumulated experience of past generations to discover and effect their secret desires. Burke reviled in growing hysteria the French populace who had dared to reject their sacred constitution, who had dared to assert that government came ultimately from the hands of the crude untaught multitude, and was no favour conferred on a people by those appointed to rule by the decree of ages. Yet earlier he had declared that public opinion was the great support of the state.

Burke still retained that reliance on divine agency in politics which almost all his great contemporaries had rejected. He was essentially conservative. But his conservatism was not rigid. Far otherwise. He recognized the importance of the populace; he saw the governors as the 'virtual' though not the actual representatives of the people. The legitimate wishes of the people must be regarded as a law unto the omnipotent House of Commons. His philosophy of tradition promoted a belief in the desirability of change, of constant growth. Like

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Montesquieu he rejected the conventional notion of the state. He saw it rather as a living organism evolving through space, and as a species, always acting right. Humanity actually was responsible for its own form of government. God had merely drawn the design which the growth of the living species had filled in according to its will. Past experience was the competent source of the authority of the state. The conservatism of Burke was impregnated at its core with the scientific humanism of the eighteenth century.

The passion for constitutional reform so feared by Burke was checked after 1793 by a diversion into patriotism. The long war with France broke out. It not only absorbed the national energies but it created definite antagonism to any extension of popular control. It enhanced the fears of the conservatives and gave point to their policy of reaction and preservation of the traditional form of government by an aristocratic minority. But the peace of 1815 released with renewed vigour the forces for reform. Burke's conservative belief in the necessity for only gradual change was no longer relevant. Cataclysmic events had thrown political, social and economic life out of joint. Drastic adjustments amounting to revolutionary change in the machinery of government became urgent. The growing belief in democracy made it impossible to bolster up for much longer the edifice of aristocratic rule which Burke had so ably supported. After 1815 the sacred British Constitution was subjected to attacks of increasing frequency from the tumultuary and giddy populace. Several causes contributed to this growth of democratic feeling and the importance of the rights of man in opposition to the control of the ruling class.

The situation was in some ways parallel to the situation in France before the revolution. French revolutionary ideals had made an indelible impression on the English. The slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity were the commonplaces of every agitator. These rights of man became familiar to a host of Englishmen through the revolutionary works of Tom Paine and his many literary disciples. These rights were not merely inscribed in lifeless books; they stirred with dynamic force the peoples of Europe to resist first their legitimate rulers and then the oppression of the tyrant Napoleon. The English had been foremost in this war for the liberty of nations against the

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overweening imperialism of Napoleon. Paradoxically the English fought for popular rights abroad whilst the rights of their own people were persistently ignored, if not suppressed, by the government in power. Just as in France before 1789, a new class had arisen in England after 1815 who keenly felt their political exclusion. This new middle class of business men arose as a result of the changes in economic conditions. They were associated with the professional class, they were stimulated by the poets of the new romantic movement such as Shelley, Byron and Burns. They were inflamed with a passion for liberty, and articulate against the exclusiveness of the ruling minority. As in France a new *bourgeois* class had arisen with substantial claims for a right to participate in the government of their country.

Two new factors made the pre-reform situation in England differ substantially from the French situation prior to 1789. The industrial revolution created for the first time in the west a proletarian multitude. The peculiar conditions of factory life induced a degree of intimacy and association amongst the masses hitherto unknown. The appalling conditions attendant on factory life at the same time furnished irritating goads to discontent. The working classes, though for the most part too downtrodden to be active, yet were beginning to stir in their apathy. Here and there workers' associations sprang up. The more intelligent of the workers had attempted to combine in defence of their economic status at the beginning of the period of rapid change. These efforts were met with rigorous suppression. The Combination Acts drove the economic resistance of the advanced workers into political revolutionary channels, where the rights of man embodying liberty of speech, freedom for fraternal organization and equality before the law gained a new and poignant content. The *élite* of the proletariat in the face of a sardonic indifference to their sufferings were becoming dangerously articulate and revolutionary. The rights of the masses and not merely of a section of the people were becoming of vital interest to an increasing number of people. The social conditions of a vast multitude had become a just cause of complaint.

Simultaneously the public conscience became more sensitive to suffering. The evangelical movement of the early nineteenth century

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stimulated the growing concern over the wretchedness of conditions. The evangelicals preached the worth of the human soul to masses half-dazed by the oppressive conditions thrust upon them by the unaccustomed mode of life in a factory. The same motives which fired the zealots in the campaign for the abolition of the slave trade instigated them to emancipate their own fellow countrymen from the stupor of ignorance and immorality which threatened their immortal souls. The great weapon for the evangelicals was the bible. But the art of reading was a necessary precedent to the assimilation of the reviving word. The evangelicals led the way with their Sunday and Saturday schools in a campaign to educate the illiterate masses. They were ably assisted in their task by the enthusiasts for democracy who urged the necessity of educating the sovereign people to the full measure of their grave responsibilities. The evangelical humanitarian movement quickened sympathy for the masses and inaugurated a campaign to stimulate and upraise them from their apathy. The situation in England before 1832 differed from the pre-revolutionary French period in having this new closely herded together and slowly awakening populace, gradually gaining a sense of injustice and a sense of injury from society, and in having a public opinion quickened to a new sensitiveness about such wrongs. Just as the evangelicals, the radicals and the poets were emphasizing the importance and beauty of the individual, just at that moment the industrial revolution was degrading human life with mechanical indifference to the sufferings of individuals. The essential problem in England was the misery of the masses. Conversely Bentham and the radical reformers held as their chief objective 'the right to happiness', which had been catalogued as early as the American war of independence as one of the inalienable rights of man.

The glaring contrast between the ideals held before the people by evangelicals, radicals and poets, and the actual appalling conditions of life, emphasized the urgent need for action to be taken in the interests of the oppressed multitude. New social problems of unprecedented magnitude had arisen. It was urgently necessary to regulate conditions of life and work which had sprung up like mushrooms in the night of a single generation. The request became articulate that the rights of the people merited some attention from

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the government. This involved an apparent contradiction. The advocates of individualism called upon society to take concerted action in the name of the masses. How was it possible to reconcile the thesis of individualism with the antithesis of the state?

Specific queries centring round this problem arose in the realm of political philosophy. A new multitude of citizens had entered the political arena claiming new rights for themselves and demanding a satisfaction of their needs which put an unprecedented strain on governmental action. What was to be the relation of this new type of citizen to his fellows? Had they all equal rights? And by what means were these rights to be so regulated that they did not overlap each other and so prevent their effective operation? How much liberty had each individual the right to expect? Was society merely a mass of unrelated individuals or was there some common factor uniting the community and constituting an end in common which the individual could only achieve through the community? What was the end of each individual; was it coterminous with that of the state or not? These and kindred problems orientating about the nature of the individual and his relation to the community were the prominent questions of the day. The central figure was 'the individual self' of Rousseau's earlier works. The task of the radical political thinkers was to give weight to the individual unit through the action of the community. They must strive to justify in acceptable terms the belief in the value of each single personality and the necessity of state interference on a large scale in the various activities of the citizen. Again in England, as earlier in France, the reformers sought for a reconciliation between the rights of man and the obligations imposed by society for the preservation of those rights without fundamentally destroying them. What was the most valid basis of political obligation?

Jeremy Bentham stood out as the dominating political philosopher of the radical reform group. He did not seek like Rousseau to escape from grim actualities into mysticism. He approached his problem in the spirit of a scientist firmly convinced that the wrongs of the people were commensurable, that their happiness could be assured when once its measurements were ascertained. Again he differed from the French theorists in his application to actual conditions in politics and

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did not wander into the labyrinths of abstract speculation. His theories of the state and of law were composed with a view to their practical application. His theories were essentially comments on a given situation. He was an inductive scientist drawing conclusions from his laboriously collected data.

The circumstances of his life peculiarly fitted him for his task as leader of the radical reform party and as their political scientist. Bentham's long life bridged the gap between the pre-revolutionary world of the middle eighteenth century and the turbulence of the early nineteenth century. '1776 was the year of the American revolution, which prepared the way for the European revolutions; it was the year in which Adam Smith published his *Wealth of Nations*; in which Major Cartwright drew up for the first time in England the future radical and chartist programme of annual parliaments and universal suffrage; but it was also the year in which Bentham, who was then twenty-eight years old, published his first work, the *Fragment on Government*. 1832 was the year of the reform which, for the first time in England, granted the benefit of the vote to the industrial districts, and to a certain extent, to the working classes, and gave to radical opinion the chance of expressing itself and of exerting an influence on the legislation of the nation; but it was also the year in which Jeremy Bentham died, at the age of eighty-four, venerated by a group of disciples as a patriarch, a spiritual leader, almost a god, with James Mill as his Saint Paul.'

Bentham's life falls naturally into two divisions corresponding to the two centuries which he sat astride. In the first part he was primarily concerned with combating current notions whilst formulating his own philosophy based on the principle of utility. During this time he was more interested in events abroad than in English politics with the exception of English law for whose codification and reform he entertained a consuming passion throughout his life. His popularity was great abroad during this period. He seemed instinctively to feel that his own country was not yet ripe for the ideas he conceived. England was politically behind revolutionary Europe in the eighteenth century. All eyes were fixed on the French experiments. During this first period culminating about 1808 Bentham was dissociated from the movement for political reform which was already

agitating a section of Englishmen. Two circumstances occurred then to break down Bentham's aloofness from English politics. His efforts to obtain judicial reforms met with continual opposition; his own experiments to found a model prison had resulted in failure and financial ruin for himself; but the greatest blow was the refusal of men like Pitt to have anything to do with his schemes. This bit deep into his consciousness and turned him against oligarchical and monarchical forms of government. At this critical moment he became acquainted with James Mill whose intense interest in the movement for political reform inspired Bentham with a like enthusiasm. By 1819 Bentham was fully occupied in justifying the position of the radical reformers on the basis of his philosophy of utility. The principle of utility developed in the eighteenth century became the corner-stone of political reform in the nineteenth century. The core of this theory was individualistic and primarily concerned with a reconciliation between the claims of the individual and those of the community regarded as a collection of individuals. Bentham obtained his solution by a rigid application of scientific methods and assumptions to the sphere of morals and politics. He set himself in the first part of his life to carry out the task attempted by Hume which was 'an attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects'. As M. Halévy remarks: 'What is known as Utilitarianism, or Philosophic Radicalism, can be defined as nothing but an attempt to apply the principles of Newton to the affairs of politics and morals.' This task Bentham set himself. He attempted to translate the spirit of the eighteenth century into the political terminology of the nineteenth.

Bentham, like Burke, was in conscious revolt from the doctrine of natural rights popularized by the American and French revolutionaries. He objected to their vagueness and their abstract nature. His passion for science made him sceptical of anything approaching what he described as 'sentimentalism' or reliance on emotions rather than reason. He believed firmly in the power of reason and made it the guardian and director of morals. He did not agree with Hume's sceptical view of reason; nor Rousseau's reliance on mysticism. Everything in social phenomena must be calculated and tabulated and reduced to measurable proportions even as he was able to measure precisely the results of his amateur experiments in botany and

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chemistry. Nevertheless he was not able to dissociate himself from his environment; he was as much concerned throughout his life with the rights of man as any of his contemporaries whose vagueness he so heartily despised. He concentrated all his attention on one of the fundamental rights enunciated in the American Declaration of Independence, 'the right to the pursuit of happiness'. He endeavoured to discover the laws which governed human action in this impelling urge towards happiness. He was determined to reduce these laws to the precision of a mathematical formula. He was endeavouring to prove to the contrary Burke's assertion that a science of politics did not and could not exist.

Bentham expounded his theory of utility, his basic philosophical premise, in a work published in 1789 under the title of *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Its popularity was greater abroad than in England. It was widely read in France, Russia, Portugal and Spain. Despite the growing interest amongst the intellectuals in the principle of utility in England where Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* had applied it to economics and Hume had introduced it into philosophic circles, there was no demand in the body politic in eighteenth-century England for the recognition of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. There was certainly very little sympathetic feeling towards Bentham's ideal of a reformed judicial system. His moment of popularity in England was yet to come. He had to wait for the stirring of the people caused by the discontent due to economic distress and the awakening of the public conscience by such men as Wilberforce and Dickens before the right for a semblance of justice to all was so much as recognized. England in 1789 had little use for a visionary reformer of the law, the law courts and the prisons. The demand for legal reform was not yet articulated. But the importance of this work at the time lay rather in the fact that Bentham worked out in it his basic ideas on the principle of utility.

Bentham found the activating force in man in his sensitiveness to pain and pleasure. About this exquisite sensibility orientated all morality. 'Nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain and pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain

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of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we say, in all we think: every effort we make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.' The principle which governed human action was its avoidance of pain and pursuit of happiness. But it was not merely a principle. Bentham stepped into the same confusion as Hobbes and endowed what he had first regarded as a natural almost physical reaction in man with the force of a moral law binding man in his every deed. In this confusion between the discovery of a principle and the assertion of the basis of obligation, whether moral or political, Bentham was able to formulate his system of morals which he himself regarded as undeniably binding, but which rested on a confused assumption that the principle of pain and pleasure could 'alone point out what we ought to do' and could moreover 'determine what we shall do'. The pleasure-pain principle not only showed the way; it forced men to make certain pre-valued choices. Pleasure or happiness became the object of all human endeavour and was the only absolute good; pain must be avoided as it was the epitome of evil. Bentham never explained how a scientific law suddenly changed from a description of what actually took place, to having the power to dictate to men what they ought to do. Like Hobbes he was confusing natural or scientific laws or principles with the law of nature where nature was synonymous with God. Bentham's 'dominating idea is just this,' says M. Halévy, 'that he has discovered in the principle of utility a practical commandment as well as a scientific law, a proposition which teaches us at one and the same time what is and what ought to be'. Morality, that is the pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of pain, was of a commanding nature controlling every human action by means of the individual's reason and the machinery of positive law. Bentham developed this theme.

As pain and pleasure were felt by the individual, then surely his unique sensibility alone was the measure of value? Bentham avoided this anarchic interpretation of his first proposition. He argued that the nature of pleasure was essentially measurable and reducible to arithmetical terms; that the principle of utility made of morality and law a unified objective science and not one relying on subjective valuations; that the interests of the individual were artificially identi-

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fied with those of the community. He proceeded to elaborate these three propositions.

Bentham first attempted to reduce all pleasures to measurable proportions whereby they might be easily compared to each other; he formulated a scale of values attached to the various kinds of pleasure. He was firmly convinced with his predecessor, Helvetius, that the principles of morals were 'as certain as the principles of geometry'. He dubbed his table a moral arithmetic and searched for a calculus of pleasure and pain. He was looking for a price list of pleasures. Pleasures and pains could be measured by the presence in them of seven factors, intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and finally extensiveness, that is the number of people affected. The value of a pleasure was obtained by the multiplication or addition of these factors one with another. The task of moralist and legislator alike (between whom there was little difference in Bentham's mind) was to compare one 'quantity' of pleasure to another to obtain its value and to enable the construction of the moral code. But until the heterogeneous mass of existing pleasures was reduced to a homogeneous unit, it would be impossible to undertake comparison. The first task of the legislator then was to classify pleasures. Bentham gave a list of fourteen simple pleasures and twelve simple pains. These he regarded as the foundation of all other pleasures and pains which were merely compounds of the original group. These he further classified into *self-regarding* and *other-regarding* groups. Only two, benevolence and malevolence, were to be found in the other-regarding section. The nature of pleasure appeared to confirm the current belief in egoism from which Bentham was trying to escape. If most of the pleasures were self-regarding, the moralist and legislator were again thrown back into the hands of the individual's estimation of value. The moralist could neither classify nor compare nor compose his calculus of value under such conditions. Bentham turned away from seeking his common denominator of value amidst the causes of pleasure to seeking it in the effects it produced. This was a less subjective evaluation. He found the solution to his difficulty in the principle of utility. He was able thereby to justify later the claim that the masses were the most important object of attention for the state.

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One of the seven factors giving value to a pleasure was its extensiveness or the number of people it affected. The greater the number of people participating in a pleasure or pain, the greater or less its value. Bentham had arrived at the conclusion which had already impressed itself on the minds of many of his contemporaries, the principle of the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' enunciated by the Scotchman Hume, the Italian Beccaria, and the Englishman Hutcheson. The principle of utility formed the criterion of every action. Bentham defined it thus: 'By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question . . . I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.' The great advantage of this principle was that it furnished an objective standard of value, the very tangible unit of the number of persons affected. Bentham ignored the more subtle problem of the quality of the effect provoked and the varying degree of response it might meet with in different temperaments. Morals and law in this system were identified in method and aim. Morals, he declared, was 'the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view'. The 'interest in view' determined the sphere of control and the nature of the directive authority concerned. M. Halévy vividly states Bentham's propositions: 'Either the man whose actions I intend to direct is myself, in which case morals is the *art of governing myself* or *private* morals: or else the men whose actions I intend to direct are men other than myself. In this case, if they are not adults, the art of governing them is called *education*, which is either *private* or *public*: if they are adults, the art of directing their actions so as to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number appertains to legislation, if the acts of the government are of a permanent kind, or to *administration*, if they are of a temporary kind, dictated by circumstances.' Morals and legislation were confused together and both given a commanding character; both directed and controlled men's actions in order to establish 'that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law'.

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As law and morals were merely different degrees of the same thing, Bentham's natural interest in law made him concentrate on this subject as his primary concern. What was the legislator's function in society; how was he to extend the totality of happiness in the community? How were the rulers of the eighteenth century to lessen the miseries of the masses at last becoming articulate in Europe? How were the flagrant injustices of the legal system to be remedied for the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number? The business of government, he stated, was to promote the happiness of society, by punishing and rewarding men. The magistrate was in a sense the teacher and controller of men to the end of their lives. The function of the legislator was so to utilize the instrument of punishing and rewarding that he would extend pleasure to its utmost limits and reduce pain to a minimum. To do this scientifically he must first catalogue the pains and pleasures into their varying degrees of value and arrange legal penalties in such a way as to deter men from crimes which were merely the pursuit of their individual happiness to the detriment of the happiness of the majority. The medieval conception of the magistrate administering the law of God by a system of rewards and punishments according to a divine scale of good and evil reappeared in Bentham's philosophy in the guise of the legislator determining good and evil according to the criterion of human happiness now accurately ascertainable by scientific methods. In both cases the governing authority had to have a large measure of control, and was essentially autocratic. But whereas to the medievalist the individual received his instructions through the responses of his conscience, to Bentham the individual was responsive to control through four different channels reducible in the last resort to one. Bentham declared that men were sensitive to pleasure-pain reactions, the ultimate determinate of obligation, in four ways, politically, morally, religiously and physically. Each pleasure rushed from its source with a certain amount of force attached to it compelling obedience from the individual. This compulsion Bentham called a 'sanction'. Moral and political obligation rested on this sense of compulsion which invaded the individual from these four avenues of sensibility. He was bound to follow pleasure and eschew pain by the very laws of his being. In the last resort all sensibility and hence awareness of obligation was

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reduced to the single plane of physical reactions. The primary task of the legislator was to reduce every impression to terms of physical disability or delight. The law with its system of rewards and punishments naturally held first place in this system.

Bentham in his first treatise was essentially the law-reformer advocating changes in a system of society obviously autocratic in nature. The *Principles of Morals and Legislation* was intended as a foundation for widespread legal reforms. Much of the book was taken up with the detailed application of the principle of utility to the English legal system. Bentham had achieved a criterion of judgment and a general principle from which to criticize the legal system of his day. He was then not much concerned with the difficulty of establishing a sympathetic relationship between the citizen and the legislator to ensure that the arbitrary acts of the legislator did indeed extend the separate happiness of the citizens. Bentham undertook this task when he became involved with the radical reformers after 1808. The repeated failures of his attempts to achieve recognition of his legal reforms from those in authority disgusted him with the autocratic rule of a select minority. Personal disillusionment and his friendship with James Mill alike conduced to an application of the principle of utility to the sphere of politics proper. Bentham began to work out his theory of the state in the terms of the greatest happiness of the greatest number at the beginning of the nineteenth century at the very moment when the miseries of the masses were evoking increasing interest.

How was Bentham assured that the happiness of the masses was the primary concern of the legislator, or that the legislator was a fit instrument to perform the gigantic task of achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number of citizens? How was he to be assured that the self-interest of the rulers would not deter them from promoting the happiness of the many? How was he, in terms of political theory, to ensure a proper relation between the governor and the governed, between the legislature, the executive and the rights of the citizen including above all the fundamental right to happiness? How was he proposing to change the oligarchy of the eighteenth century into the partial democracy of the nineteenth, which was the first step before his cherished schemes for legal and social reform

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could be accepted by a government sympathetic to the masses? In the *Introduction to the Principles, etc.*, Bentham suggested that the legislator could, through a careful application of punishments and rewards, induce the individual citizens to certain actions which were in the legislator's opinion conducive to the general happiness, and were believed by the citizen to be for his own happiness. The object of the *Constitutional Code* (1822-30) and the *Plan of Parliamentary Reform* (1817), was to show that whilst the functions of government remained as extensive yet the citizen took a greater part in the making of the laws designed to restrain his own happiness in one direction in order to promote it in another. In these works Bentham rejected aristocracy and substituted representative democracy as the best form of government. The change of view typified the change in attitude which had taken place in England between 1789 and 1817.

Bentham offered as his solution to the discrepancy between the antagonistic desires of ruler and ruled his theory of the artificial identification of interests. Each man was essentially egoistic and sought primarily for his own happiness. The egoistic pleasures of each individual were bound to clash and mutually destroy each other. How was the legislator to effect an identification of interests according to the principle of utility to prevent this apparent consequence? Bentham reached the core of his problem. He argued that as the value of a pleasure increased with its extension, then the more people who were happy the greater the value of the happiness of the individual. Moreover, the individual was sensitive to the sanction of public opinion. If the general tone was happy then the individual would bask in the sunshine of approval. The task of government was thus confined to the promotion of the happiness of the majority and not of the whole body of the community. Bentham never answered any criticism about the rights of minorities. He was always concerned with majority rule. He accepted as axiomatic Locke's principle of the inherent value of the majority's judgment. How then was a fitting interaction between the majority and their rulers to be achieved so that the rulers would indeed be promoting the happiness of the greatest number and not seeking their own selfish interests? How were the interests of ruler and ruled to be identified so that they promoted each other to their mutual advantage and increase of the

general happiness? Bentham as leader of the radical party for reform suggested far-reaching changes in the existing constitution to meet this difficulty. First, in order that the true weight of the majority might be ascertained, universal suffrage must be instituted. Then every adult citizen (no general objection was taken even to women as they too possessed capacity for pain and pleasure) could record his vote and thereby contribute his modicum of opinion to the general sum. So far Bentham was following closely in the footsteps of Locke. But his second point took him much further and identified his political theories with the conditions of the nineteenth century when a semi-articulate populace had become the vital factor in political life, a factor unknown to Locke in the seventeenth century. Secondly, the body thus constituted must be elected every year in order to keep the governors in constant touch with the governed and to prevent the abuse of the power of governing which a minority of rulers must always possess. Bentham and his party were strongly in favour of annual elections of Parliament. Parliament when elected should be regarded as a delegate not a representative body. Bentham was afraid that a representative member could easily cast off the control of the electors from whom he originally received his authority, and on the plea of freedom to represent their interests, in fact pursue his own pleasure to their detriment. In the closer relationship of a delegate system, Bentham hoped to avoid this first check on the direct control of the reins of government by the sovereign people. As Parliament was a body of delegates of the people, Bentham had no use in his vision of a reformed community for the excrescences of king, House of Lords or established church. His personal disagreement with George III and the governing aristocracy fitted in with his philosophical bias and made him bitterly attack a form of government which suggested the rule by a privileged minority either of king or peers. His ideal form of government was republican, consisting of one house of delegates under the annual supervision of the electorate.

The business of Parliament was extensive. It must pass the necessary laws for the achievement of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Nor was Bentham ready to accept the belief in the separation of the legislature and the executive. On the contrary, as the people must remain sovereign, the connection between their

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elected delegates and the executive must be very close and direct. Parliament must have complete control over the whole executive. As the business of government must necessarily increase as it undertook the promotion of the happiness of an increasing number of the citizens, so the administrative machinery must increase. Bentham with prophetic insight envisaged the growth of an extensive civil service. Yet as the business of the state increased, popular sovereignty must retain its hold tighter, lest the new governors, the permanent bureaucracy, should be tempted to pursue their interest and neglect those of the majority. Again Bentham prescribed in a series of detailed rules methods whereby this danger to the state might be obviated. Chief amongst these was his advocacy of the power of the electors to dismiss any functionary of government by a direct petition to Parliament. The appointment to the very important office of Minister of Justice, controlling what in Bentham's eyes appeared to be one of the key positions of government, was made direct by the electorate, not, as with the other offices, through the medium of the elected delegate members of parliament. The numerical majority whose happiness was the object of the state, whose happiness would (because happiness was psychologically infectious) react to the benefit of the whole community, this majority must control and direct its rulers in every governmental activity. The sovereignty of the people (or rather of the majority) was justified in terms of the nature of man.

But the sovereignty of the majority was not really absolute. The weakness of the majority lay in the exquisite sensitiveness of the individual. Man sought happiness and could only achieve it through an increasing awareness of his environment. Any change in that environment immediately reacted upon him. Through religious sentiment, through political fervour, through the moral code of taboos, through the subtle criticism of public opinion, through the sharp pain of physical punishment inflicted by law, the individual was tossed hither and thither instinctively attempting to seek happiness and eschew pain. Man as Montesquieu and Burke had recently asserted was but the product of his environment. But Bentham did not leave the environment as a mysterious and omnipotent force determining the course of human action. He was not content to see in it like Burke the process of ages, or like Montesquieu the result of climate, or like

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Rousseau, the emotional pressure of ecstatic nationalism. Rather he strove to analyse it and discover it in terms of a commensurable science. In so doing he revealed that behind the sovereignty of the majority lay the controllers of this all-powerful environment. He who tabulated the moral code, he who regulated the scale of criminal penalties, he who filled the people with fear or delight through the organ of the press, he it was who eventually dominated the majority. Bentham's theory of democratic republicanism vacillated between two extremes. Sometimes in the spirit of the eighteenth century he saw the benevolent legislator regulating the scale of penalties judiciously, wisely and altruistically for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The dictator dominated the mob. Sometimes in the spirit of the nineteenth century he saw the multitude with all the force of its numbers determining to make felt the weight of its numerical superiority by controlling the machinery of government and by leaving free for the expression of its opinion the vital organs of press and church. The mob dominated their rulers. Bentham's hatred of sentimentalism induced him to flee from the conclusions that this mob was activated by the unknown quantity of passion. Always he believed that the instincts of the herd could be reduced to a table of values, always eventually they could be ascertained exactly in terms of the measurable factor of happiness. So he fought with no uncertain weapons to assure that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should prevail, that the majority should rule with reason and equanimity. Bentham in the spirit of the eighteenth century strove to bring about reforms made necessary by the peculiar conditions of nineteenth-century England.

The growth of rationalism in the eighteenth century discredited theology to such an extent that politics no longer relied upon divine sanctions. Even Burke placed the influence of divine agency in laying the foundations of political obligation so far in the background that his theory of the state was intact without any divine plan. Stripped of God-given laws and institutions, cut off from mystical communications of reassurance to the governors, the state must seek and find new foundations for itself. Two solutions were offered in the eighteenth century. Either the state was the result of environmental conditions as advocated by Montesquieu and Burke, in which tradition played

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the important role of authority, and the state was regarded as a natural living organism. Or the state was a conventional product of human activities, and its authority was strictly limited by the individual rights of its creators. When public opinion and discontent worked up towards a greater, more radical change than the living organism, bound by its traditional modes of action, was capable of making in the face of a sudden emergency, then the former concept gave place to the latter. But the rights of man stripped of the theological justification given them by Locke were no sure foundations for the timid. The American revolutionaries firmly believed that the rights of man were divinely instituted. Individualism was in theory circumscribed by divine law. Ultimately such a theory did not admit of philosophic anarchy. Behind the apparently conflicting rights of individuals lay the harmonizing design of God co-ordinating the separate rights to his larger purpose. Both Hobbes and Locke had firmly believed in their different ways in the sustaining purposeful law of God giving reason to the acts and instincts of man. Rationalistic Europe in rejecting this theological support in the eighteenth century was faced with the logical conclusion of its advocacy of a detached set of inalienable rights; such individualism led inevitably to a concept of complete anarchy. Faced with this conclusion the advocates of human supremacy divided in the eighteenth century into two groups. The first, like Rousseau, only retained the individual long enough to create the state; then the newly-created nation, awakened to a passionate belief in itself, became the supreme authority. They had no faith in human nature and sought like the religious for an authority outside the individual. The individual was sunk in the dream of national supremacy. The second group like the English rationalists led by Bentham had a greater faith in human nature; they sought to build the life of the community on human nature as it was, unregenerated by any sudden conversion to the religion of patriotism. They relied on reason and scientific calculations to direct the groping individual towards his goal. The philosophic foundations of this group were laid in the eighteenth century. The political conclusions were not drawn therefrom until the nineteenth century. So the intellectual activities and political events of the eighteenth century produced these two groups of idealists and realists, the one looking to

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the community, the other to the individual for ultimate support in the chaos of unrelated rights. Rousseau and his disciples propounded a belief in popular sovereignty expressed in an exalted nationalism. Radical English thinkers elaborated their admitted belief in rank individualism, and under the guidance of Bentham enunciated at the beginning of the nineteenth century a theory of democracy based on self-interest. Rousseau launched the enthusiasm for popular, as opposed to governmental, nationalism, in which a moral patriotism bound the individual to complete obedience to the authority of the community. Bentham calculated the forces of popular democracy, in which the common factor was the unit of happiness, the touchstone and the determinate of all moral and political behaviour.

CHAPTER XI

THE INDIVIDUAL *versus* THE COMMUNITY

First Phase: The Illusion of Liberty

THE conflicting streams of thought which the nineteenth century presents to an observer at such close quarters as the present day seem nevertheless to converge on one central theme, itself the inheritance of the immediate past but given content and direction by developments peculiar to the nineteenth century. This centralizing theme was the problem of the relation of the individual to the community. Several factors in the nineteenth century united to produce a vital and intense interest in this particular aspect of political thought. Some of these factors were widespread, affecting the intellectual background of the whole continent including Great Britain. Such were the scientific discoveries and the profound changes in philosophic terminology usually associated with the names of Darwin and Hegel respectively. Others were the products of particular environments, which starting in certain parts of Europe spread outward and gradually affected the rest. Such were the economic changes produced by the industrial revolution, whose home was England, but by the end of the century it had penetrated to all Europe, stimulating particular reactions and problems in practical and theoretical politics wherever it went. So too the force of popular nationalism developed on the continent in a form new to England, and only gradually reperculated on English politics at the very end of the century, not in the form of popular nationalism but in the more subtle guise of the worship of the power of the community. So too England developed on her own the theme of popular democracy which only gradually disturbed the equilibrium of the European states and seemed for the greater part of the century to be irrelevant to European politics. This criss-crossing of influences inevitably produces a confused view of the development of political thought in the period further enhanced by the near perspective in which we are compelled to see it. If any clarity

of treatment is to be achieved then the subject must be separated into easily manipulated divisions created by its main tendencies. These divisions are by no means absolute, but are adopted merely as a method for examining the general development of the political thought of the period centring significantly about this theme of the interaction of the individual and the community. The theme thus treated seems to fall into two fairly easily handled groups apparent at the beginning of the century and happily localized in particular parts of Europe. English thinkers were more preoccupied with the nature of the individual; continental thinkers with the nature of the community. These two developments began fairly separately but they rapidly interacted as each group became more vitally impressed by the general economic and intellectual development which overshadowed them both. Towards the end of the century the distinction created by the differences in the countries was wiped out by the similarity of their economic and intellectual conditions and European thought became a veritable whole. In treatment then the simplest approach seems to be to indicate the general changes affecting everyone, then to proceed to the particular aspects of this single problem, examining it for convenience' sake in the countries of its origin; the growth of individualism connected with the cry for liberty and democracy as it developed in England; the postulation of a rigid social control as it developed on the continent more particularly in Germany, as a strange blend of nationalism, Hegelian philosophy and Marxian economics.

The revolution in philosophy, which had gradually been developing in the eighteenth century as a result of the growth of science, suddenly took dramatic shape at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Hegel's name is usually associated with this reorientation of philosophy around a new concept of the universe. In his dialectic method he formulated in his new logic the new philosophy of life. The old ways of reasoning were fitted to a static conception of the universe. Whilst it was held that the world was created at a given moment or had existed from eternity, it followed that its nature remained unchanged according to the pattern laid down by its creator or the principles by which it was governed throughout. The nature of the universe was thus immutable and static. The object of philosophy was to discover

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the nature of this unchanging reality and philosophers employed in their searchings a method of reasoning or logic whose sole aim was the identification of reality. Philosophy strove to use logic as the perfect method of identifying the elusive and continually disguising reality. The development of science at first gradually and then precipitately undermined this static concept of the universe and rendered the method of identification (so prominent in Bentham's philosophy) useless. The investigations of the scientist demonstrated ever more conclusively that the universe was in a perpetual state of flux, that the changes wrought in the structure of the universe were not, as Bacon suggested in the seventeenth century, always changes towards decay, but that the change was one of quality proceeding to new forms of life rather than to a general dissolution in death. If then the quality of the universe was perpetually altering, a logic of identification of its original nature was unreal and useless in the attempt to understand its present nature. So in the eighteenth century scientific discoveries rapidly outstripped the machinery of thought. The gap between philosophy and science widened, perilously divorcing philosophy from reality and so making it an unreal and dead exercise comparable to the useless mental gymnastics of the fourteenth-century scholastics.

Hegel bridged the gap with his dialectic method. He revitalized philosophy by linking it up with science. He produced in his dialectics a method by which the mind could comprehend this process of change, this evolution of the universe hitherto incomprehensible to the professional schools of philosophy. Hegel in and through his dialectic propounded the belief that reality could only be apprehended by a method of contrasting one thing with its opposite. Thus goodness was only understood when it was contrasted with badness, heat with cold, want with satiety. Nothing was understood by man until he saw it standing out before the background of its contradiction. The mind then only worked in an elaborate system of contradictions, only proceeded to further understanding by perpetually contrasting one thing with another. Hegel called the first assertion made by the mind the thesis, its contradiction the antithesis. 'The state of negation', said he . . . 'is the very heart-beat of progress and life.' He argued further that once the thesis and antithesis were perceived by

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the mind the apprehension of these two aspects of reality produced a new concept by their juxtaposition. This composition or reconciliation of the two opposites into a third and new idea was called the synthesis. All life proceeded by this method, assertion, negation, reconciliation, producing in its turn a new assertion from which a new cycle started. By this process, true of the workings of the mind, the universe and the various forms of life in it had evolved. Thus in the simple example of the evolution of the life-germ in an egg the whole dialectic process could be seen. The egg contained a germ (thesis) which when fertilized gradually consumed (negated) the contents of the egg. This act of destruction resulted not in death but in the production of a new form of life completely different in nature from its origin the germ or its environment the contents. A chick (the synthesis of the two forces) emerged from the shell. Hegel strove to demonstrate that the laws of thought were similar to the laws of the universe. As matter evolved so mind evolved. Indeed mind and matter were identical. But Hegel was not pledged thereby to a materialistic view of the universe. Far otherwise. Though identifying mind and matter he believed that mind or Idea (God as the religious would have called it) was the ultimate reality. He explained that this reality was 'an Idea containing within itself all forms of being, which it develops dialectically. The idea creates for itself a material embodiment; it first expresses itself in the objects of inorganic nature; then in plants, organisms wherein life awakens; then in animals, in which the Idea attains to the twilight of reason; finally, in man, where reason rises into mind and achieves self-consciousness and freedom. As self-conscious mind it expresses itself in the history of peoples, in religion, art and philosophy, in human institutions, in the family and in law, until it realizes itself in the state as its latest and highest object.' Thus Hegel saw clearly in the process of evolution the explanation only vaguely suggested by some of the political thinkers of the eighteenth century, when like Burke they propounded a belief in the power of gradual but ceaseless change always proceeding upwards to a higher and fuller life.

Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) written in the middle of the nineteenth century only demonstrated dramatically in a particular branch of science what was already an accepted assumption amongst intel-

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lectuals. All animal species, amongst others the human, had developed throughout the ages by a process of struggle (or contradiction) from which only the strongest or fittest survived. By analogy with the Hegelian philosophy this survival of the fittest represented the survival of the best. The criterion of value, the norm by which one measured the value of anything, was its ability to survive, or its success. Such success was conclusive proof that the successful was the higher or better type, was the fuller expression of the Life-force, evolving towards self-consciousness. The scientific principle of evolution became in the nineteenth century the basis of an ethical code, a new measure of value for moral conduct. Hegel's and later Darwin's more popular works combined to produce a new criterion of value by which to judge men's actions. A revolution in philosophy and ethics had occurred tied to the apron strings of science.

The doctrine of evolution formulated by Hegel and illustrated dramatically by Darwin formed the most important element in the intellectual background of the nineteenth century. It created an irreparable break with past ideas of the universe. It produced an immediate and virile conflict between the believers in the static concept or the religious on the one hand and the advocates of the new dynamic concept of the universe on the other. The nineteenth century was the scene of a perpetual and bitter controversy between scientists and religionists. Then too the belief that the universe was in the process of becoming, that 'the best was yet to be', as Browning sung, made the investigations of the scientists in their endeavours to discover the laws of evolution an exciting process of constant revelation. The scientists became the prophets of the new gospel. They challenged dangerously the authority of the church with its priesthood upholding belief in a created static universe.

The controversy over the evolutionary philosophy which broke out in England in the middle of the century was symptomatic of the general unrest in that country. Nowhere could be seen more blatantly the struggle between the individual striving towards self-consciousness and the community slowly awakening in its turn to the need to assert its powers in opposition to those of the over-reaching individual. Two developments peculiarly English made England the scene of the first important clash between the individual and the community suggested

by Hegel as a contradiction yet unresolved in the evolutionary process. After the first headlong spate of individual enterprise in industry which marked the beginning of the century, the industrial organization tended towards large scale corporate activity. Trusts and companies took the place of the single management of the founder of the firm. Capital was organized in joint-stock companies and depended on the innumerable shares of a large body of subscribers rather than on the fortune of a single man. Labour found itself powerless to bargain with the organized reserves of capital unless it too combined its forces into strong organizations. The strident chorus of the trade unions was more likely to be heard than the single voice of a unit of labour whose only bargaining power was the offer of withdrawal of his daily work. So the importance of individual effort was minimized in the eyes of a society which for economic reasons was rapidly acting in collective groups.

The same problem appeared within the political machinery of English government. The reforming activities of Bentham and the later Utilitarians succeeded in establishing governmental control over an increasing number of the activities of the citizen. The liberty of the child to earn its own living and of the parent to put it to work so to do had been contravened by the acts regulating child labour. The factory acts further impinged upon the liberty of the worker to control the extent and conditions of his daily life. The activities of Chadwick in clearing up the insanitary conditions of the country threatened the liberty of every citizen over his personal cleanliness. In every department of life the reforms following the Parliamentary Reform Act of 1832 showed the government undertaking further and further responsibilities in its attempt to remove pain and induce pleasure in order to accomplish the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Governmental machinery increased with the extension of governmental activities. The permanent civil service came into being. A departmental bureaucracy was gradually becoming as important a feature in the English constitution as Parliament itself. Yet whilst bureaucratic activities threatened the pre-eminence of Parliament, the movement to extend the franchise persisted and with it the movement to increase by education the capacity of each citizen to join in the responsibility of government. The revival of local government in

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England was another attempt to force the local patriotism of individuals to play its part in the government of the country. So on one side the growth of the central government of the country and the increase of social legislation emphasized the importance of communal action over the welfare of the masses; and on the other side the extension of the franchise, of education and the revival of local government emphasized the importance of individual effort.

England by this convergence of a peculiar group of circumstances became the scene of speculation on the nature and extent of individual liberty in the middle of the nineteenth century. It was the old theme which had dominated thought in the seventeenth century. But the nineteenth-century version was very different owing to the difference in the intellectual background and the political structure. In the seventeenth century the individual strove for emancipation from the overwhelming demands of an omnipotent divine state or church striving through rigid and autocratic methods to obtain mastery over his spiritual and secular activities, over his temporal and eternal welfare. In the nineteenth century the individual was faced with the far more insidious claims of an omnipotent but human society which sought by the force of public opinion and the justification of scientific demonstrable law to establish an obliterating supremacy over its component parts. The doctrine of evolution expounded by Hegel and accepted in intellectual and scientific circles several years before Darwin enunciated his particular version of it, postulated a theory in which every species including the human was developing in close interaction with its fellow members. The development of the individual was as much the result of his own power to struggle as the result of the strength of his competitors in the struggle for existence. Evolution moreover depicted human development on a stage whose limits receded far beyond the historic field of exploration. The development of the species occurred prior to social activities. Were social institutions but a product of the general development? How far could it be said that social institutions were controlled or uncontrolled by man? Were they perhaps a growth obeying the laws of growth immutable to human agency? If so, could individual effort perform any effective part in society? The intellectual postulates of science, the rise of the masses, the attempt to make their desires articulate and to govern on

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behalf of the happiness of the majority taken as an indivisible whole, threatened the individual with a new master whose omnipotence would be far more comprehensive and compelling than the loosely organized omnipotence of the seventeenth-century state even though the latter was held to be divinely instituted. So England, which had been the first country to industrialize on a large scale and was in the process of experimenting with popular democracy under the new conditions of an awakening multitude, was the first country in Europe to realize the danger to individualism inherent in the new order of society.

English political thinkers steeped in the utilitarian philosophy of the importance of each unit in the sum total of the general happiness anxiously began to re-examine the foundations of their system which seemed threatened alike by new forces and the consequences of their own acts. The danger always latent in Bentham's philosophy menaced the whole structure of Utilitarianism. Bentham tended to exalt the powers of the legislator far too high for the safety of the individual. Bentham was principally concerned with law and incidentally became interested in politics. His bias always remained. He depicted the state as dominated by its legislator, who was its moral overseer and director. The legislative body was supreme; its acts representing the sum total of the majority's desires could interfere in every sphere of life. After 1832 this was being practically demonstrated at an alarming rate. The suggestion of rigid control by the majority implicit in Bentham's theory was passing from theory into practice. The intrinsic egoism of the utilitarian philosophy was seriously threatened. The pursuit of one's own happiness as the criterion of value and the motive of all moral and political obligation was being strictly curtailed by an increasing number of acts passed in the interests of the majority. Liberty of action and thought, the corollary of egoism and a necessity for development into self-consciousness, was at stake. John Stuart Mill, as a convinced believer in the egoistic attitude to life, was urgent in its defence.

Personal inclination as well as the exigencies of the political situation drove J. S. Mill to take up the defence of liberty, and to reconstruct the utilitarian philosophy of the state on a new basis. Trained from earliest childhood by his father, James Mill, and

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Bentham himself, John Stuart early showed symptoms of revolt from the rigid control exercised by his dictatorial monitors. After a nervous collapse resulting from the strenuous nature of his education, J. S. Mill emerged into manhood with a passionate devotion to the cause of liberty in every form. His sub-conscious revolt from the preceptors of his childhood led him to reject Bentham's belief in the 'average man', a concept fundamental to Bentham's theory of quantitative happiness, and obnoxious to the young critic as the rigid pattern to which the old moralist had tried to restrict the child's more varied nature. Thus activated Mill strove to show that the quantitative theory of happiness was unreal; that variety not equality was the clue to happiness; that liberty was by the very nature of man the final goal of the state.

J. S. Mill never consciously repudiated the views of his revered teachers, his father and Bentham. His divergence from the old school of utilitarianism never seemed to him fundamental. He began by asserting in his famous essay, *On Liberty*, his own belief in liberty and in demonstrating that the nature of happiness was qualitative not quantitative. He passed from this new concept of human nature and ethical values to elaborate their application to the sphere of practical politics in his essays on *Representative Government* and the *Subjection of Women*. Then he sought to reconcile his new view of society arising from his very different premises, to his adherence to orthodox utilitarianism. His essay on *Utilitarianism* was essentially superficial as he attempted to smooth over the differences which divided him from his teachers. Nevertheless the differences were too fundamental to be hidden, and the essay on *Utilitarianism* amounts to a sharp criticism of the orthodox standpoint.

Mill's fear for the liberty of the individual was born of the exigencies of the moment striking a sympathetic chord in his own life. He envisaged the problem as a part of the general trend of civilization, as an intrinsic and inevitable element in the relations of the individual to society. In his eloquent and most searching essay, *On Liberty*, he stated his fear of the extinction of that delicate and aspiring flame, the individual personality, by the harsh winds of the general mediocrity of public opinion. He insisted that the individual alone must be the final and only judge of his actions. For this purpose, liberty was

as essential as equality had been to Bentham's system of quantitative morality. With the attainment of liberty, equality faded away.

Though not formally expressed until 1863 in his essay on *Utilitarianism*, the underlying premise in the essay *On Liberty* was Mill's concept of the diverse nature of happiness. He rejected Bentham's concept of quantitative pleasure. He stated in the essay on *Utilitarianism* that pleasure could not be regarded merely quantitatively. Were this so then there could be no distinction between the pleasures enjoyed by human beings and swine. But 'human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites', and 'it is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd,' he concluded, 'that while in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone'. Bentham's theory of ethics was useless once pleasures were graded, because Bentham had asserted that man was of necessity bound to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Once he was obeying this natural impulse towards happiness he was pursuing the ultimate good. If, as Mill asserted, the ultimate good could be divided into pleasure and happiness and subsequently graded within these two categories, how was man to decide between the multiplicity of goods presented to him; by what criterion must he measure their quality; what was to form the new standard of morality and why was it binding on man? Mill rejected the fundamental premise of his master; he was in search of a new ethical code.

Though in the essay on *Utilitarianism* Mill declared that when such a choice arose between two or more pleasures 'the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or if they differ, that of the majority amongst them, must be admitted as final', yet in the essays *On Liberty* and on *Representative Government* it was clear that Mill rejected a belief in the judgment of the masses over moral or political issues. He relied rather on the judgment of the individual or on 'those who are qualified by knowledge'. In either case he showed that liberty was indispensable to the making of such judgments. Liberty was essential to morality. The essay *On Liberty* was an elaborate discussion on this theme and its relation to politics.

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The opening passages of the essay set the stage for a profound discussion. 'The subject of this Essay is . . . Civil or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely to make itself recognized as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.' This he proceeded to give it.

Mill showed that throughout the history of man there had been a constant endeavour amongst the 'lovers of liberty' to resist the oppression of strong men who had become tyrants. The solution was wrongly conceived as obtained when the European liberals of the nineteenth century so arranged the political constitutions that the people were said to be their own rulers. This school of thought saw no reason to limit the power of the people by any checks. Theoretically their own will controlled them. To this Mill took strong objection. He pointed out that in fact the rulers were not the same as the ruled; and in any case the rulers represented only the majority of the people. The government, Mill pointed out, was not the same as society; the government with unlimited power might (and did) take away that liberty which had been fought for for ages. Moreover, assuming the susceptibility to suggestion in man which Mill believed to be one of his essential characteristics, men were open to oppression from society through the force of public opinion and custom. 'Reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant . . . its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries . . . it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since . . . it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling;

against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compels all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.' Mill revolted from this vision of monotonous mediocrity imposed by the procrustean bed of society on the varied types of human individuality. He anticipated a gloomy future: 'The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the government, as it already is from public opinion.' How was this to be avoided? By what means was the power of the government to be restrained so that it did not exterminate the individual by curtailing that liberty which was essential to his varied development?

Mill sought to find the proper limits of this social control whether legal or by 'the moral coercion of public opinion'. His arguments implicitly denied the possibility of the measurement of human happiness. He rejected Bentham's belief in a calculus of pleasure. Without such a code, society had no means of ascertaining what conduced positively to the happiness of the individual. The latter must make such distinctions for himself. Mill declared that for one reason only could the group interfere with the individual: 'The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their members, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.' Otherwise society had no right whatsoever to interfere. No one except the person concerned could ultimately judge what conduced to his highest happiness. Outsiders could only see when harm was arising to others. This harm society had the right and the duty to prevent. Mill concluded forcibly: 'The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.'

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Where was the dividing line to be drawn between what concerned others and what concerned only oneself? Who was to draw that line? Mill defined 'the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological . . . Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others'.

Mill then examined the question of liberty of thought in great detail. He asserted that unless men were free to form and maintain their own opinions, they could not develop that 'mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends)'. Otherwise there would be 'baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that,' he insisted, 'to the moral nature of man'. Whilst freedom of thought was indispensable, freedom of action must be more limited. 'The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.' Provided he kept within this bound, a man could and should be free to pursue his diverse desires. Individuality was desirable, diversity was 'not an evil, but a good'. 'Free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; . . . it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things.' Only freedom of thought and the measure of freedom of action necessary to insure spontaneity could develop that originality which was the end of civilization, and the highest good. Quoting von Humboldt, Mill proclaimed 'that the end of man, . . . is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole; and that, therefore, the object towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which

especially those who design to influence their fellow men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development'. Diversity and originality were both necessary and desirable in such a scheme of values. The orthodox utilitarian insistence on equality, the rule of the majority in favour of the measurable happiness of the many, were implicitly denied. Inequality must exist where individuals developed at different rates according to their inner capacities and opportunities. Mill declared that the free play of individuality must lead to differentiation between men, some being herded together into a 'collective mediocrity', others standing out as a superior minority of a higher type. Government by the many could not be advocated after such a realization of the distribution of quality throughout society. Mill rejected rule by the majority. He rejected rule by the masses who were but average men. He did not want the finer types to become the absolute rulers; but saw in them the leaders of mankind guiding persuasively the more imitative and less original masses. No one was to be compelled; no one was to be fitted into a preconceived pattern. Variety was essential to the well-being of mankind; it was the condition of its progress. 'Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral and aesthetic stature of which they are capable.' Mill was suggesting that inequality was in the nature of things. So far had he travelled from the average man and the calculus of pleasure postulated by Bentham. If the individual was so important, what then of the limits society should exercise over his actions? Mill came to no very definite reply to this in the essay *On Liberty*. He was content to cite many instances of ways in which the government could act to protect its citizens from harm. He suggested more freedom for private enterprise and an increase in local government activities. Thereby he hoped for more variety of experiment, which was enriching, and for more individual effort, which was educative, even though both were bought at the expense of decreased efficiency.

In the essay on *Representative Government* Mill attempted to meet this difficulty of combining efficiency and liberty, of delimiting in-

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dividual freedom by social action. The object of the state as he had already shown was the development of the intellectual faculties of man. Thereon depended all further progress. In *Representative Government* he reiterated that: 'It is what men think which determines how they act.' All factors by which the thought of a people were modified were the controlling and guiding factors of that people. So the press and propaganda played an extremely important part in modern life. By these methods changes in government were brought about. Society was not mechanical as some of his contemporaries maintained but a living body changing and modifying its actions accordingly to its ideas. Nor did Mill subscribe to those who believed that the distribution of wealth was the clue to the residence of supreme power in the community. To Mill the controllers of opinion and propaganda were the sovereign rulers of the people.

The immediate problem of government was so to regulate the distribution of power that those capable of intellectual discrimination should have control. Only thus could the ultimate object of all government be achieved: the protection of the individual in order that he might develop his whole personality. Since development of personality was the goal of human effort, governors must be capable of helping the governed on to this goal. Government was the instrument whereby the intellectual capacities of the whole people might be improved and increased. Government had to perform a distinctly moral function. The constitution of the state should be so regulated that the best qualities intellectual and moral of the citizens should be utilized in the government. 'A representative constitution,' Mill declared, 'is a means of bringing the general standard of intelligence and honesty existing in the community, and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest members, more directly to bear upon the government and investing them with greater influence in it, than they would in general have under any other mode of organization.' How was this to be achieved? Mill advocated far-reaching reforms in the electoral system, in Parliamentary procedure and functions, in the work of the Cabinet and the use of the expert. Some of his suggestions are as pertinent today as they were in 1861.

Mill insisted that the choice of governors should not be left to the indiscriminating efforts of the ignorant masses. A government should

not be chosen haphazard merely on the numerical majority of votes where each vote was of the same value. He suggested proportional representation as a remedy to this difficulty, hoping thereby that proper weight would be given to the right qualities needed in a candidate. But this he perceived was not sufficient to eradicate the numerical superiority of the ignorant masses which threatened to overwhelm the educated minority. Mill was in a dilemma. He set up as an ideal, 'a completely popular government' in which the whole variety of individuality should be utilized for the benefit of the community; in which the people should take that active share in the government so necessary to their proper development. He protested that it was unjust to deprive anyone of the right to voice his opinion on matters which closely affected his life. Yet he was prepared to advocate the disenfranchisement of those he considered incapable and unworthy of a vote. Only those of a certain intellectual capacity should be enfranchised. Mill asseverated emphatically twenty years before elementary education became compulsory: 'I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage without being able to read, write, and I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic.' Education should be obtainable by all; then the exclusion from the suffrage would be the result only of individual laziness. Whilst waiting for this minimum standard of education to be achieved, Mill hoped that some system of plural voting should be devised whereby the educated should be given that degree of superior influence due to them 'and sufficient as a counterpoise to the numerical weight of the least educated class'. Mill hoped by these safeguards and reforms in the electoral machinery to make the representative assembly a 'fair sample of every grade of intellect among the people which is at all entitled to a voice in public affairs'. What were to be the functions of this representative assembly? What did Mill consider was the best form of government suitable to the modern state and its complex activities and yet compatible with the belief in popular sovereignty? He rejected rule by one man as rationally unsuitable. It placed too much work on one man and required from him a 'super-human mental activity' not to be found concentrated in the person of a single man. It meant too for the community an 'abdication of their own energies' which would con-

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tradict the purpose of life, the development of every individual through variety of effort. Who then must hold the reins of government? How was it possible to combine skill and knowledge in government and retain that measure of liberty to the individual which could only be safeguarded if the ordinary citizen himself participated in the business of government?

Mill suggested radical changes in the powers and procedure of Parliament to meet this difficulty, and proposed constructive additions to the existing machinery of government. First he stated the proper function of Parliament in the modern state: 'Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts: to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors. This is surely ample power, and security for the liberty of the nation. In addition to this, the Parliament has an office, not inferior even to this in importance; to be at once the nation's Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, . . . can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion; . . . where the opinion which prevails in the nation makes itself manifest as prevailing, and marshals its hosts in the presence of the government, which is thus enabled and compelled to give way to it on the mere manifestation without the actual employment, of its strength; where statesmen . . . are enabled to shape their measures with some regard not solely to present exigencies, but to tendencies in progress.' These, the ability and duty to discuss, deliberate and to make the government aware of the impact of public opinion, were the proper and only functions of Parliament. How far had John Stuart Mill strayed from the ideal of Burke! Who was to undertake the task of actual government if Parliament was deprived of it?

Mill gave his reasons for this deprivation and suggested substitutes. He pointed out that a large deliberative body chosen as a 'fair sample'

of the nation was unsuitable for the tasks of executive work and legislation which required expert handling in the modern state. 'Every branch of public administration is a skilled business' of which 'the knowledge does not come by intuition'. If then the deliberative assembly whose function was discussion attempted to interfere and dictate in the details of their work then: 'At its best, it is inexperience sitting in judgment on experience, ignorance on knowledge.' Mill suggested that the work of administration should be left to the permanent civil service whose personnel should be most carefully selected in order to obtain real skill in a work which required such skill. He proposed that Parliament should retain control over these new invisible governors by its appointment of the ministers of every department. He concluded that: 'The proper duty of a representative assembly in regard to matters of administration is not to decide them by its own vote, but to take care that the persons who have to decide them shall be the proper persons.' In this establishment of ministerial responsibility direct to Parliament he hoped to check any abuse of power arising from the new arrival of the expert in the technique of government.

Similarly he pointed out that 'it is equally true, though only of late and slowly beginning to be acknowledged, that a numerous assembly is as little fitted for the direct business of legislation as for that of administration'. He amplified this statement by citing the clumsy procedure in Parliament where bills hung over, even in 1861, from session to session, and 'the utter unfitness of our legislative machinery for its purpose is making itself practically felt every year more and more'. He proposed instead the establishment of 'a Commission of legislation, having for its appointed office to make the laws'. This would be a small competent body of experts on law. They would not have power to authorize the laws they drew up. Parliament alone had that power; but any change in the phrasing of the law was a technical task and only experts could do it adequately. Mill envisaged Parliament as controlling policy by checking the expert executive on the one hand and sanctioning the general principles of law drawn up in detail by experts on the other. Mill rejected in the latter half of the nineteenth century Bentham's proposals for the direct control of the administration by the elected assembly. After the experiences of

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thirty years it was obvious that the representatives of the people were not competent to govern where government had multiplied its duties indefinitely by setting itself the goal of achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But they were still competent to choose their leaders and to discriminate between the men best able to carry on the work of government. The ministers and the Prime Minister were to be appointed by Parliament for their qualities as statesmen; whilst the selection of the permanent civil service by keen competitive examinations would supply to each minister that degree of expert knowledge which was essential to efficient government. In this way Mill hoped to achieve the combination of popular criticism and consent with skill, which he postulated as necessary to the achievement of the goal of human effort: the full development of each personality for the enjoyment of intellectual pleasures. 'Nothing but the restriction of the function of representative bodies within these rational limits,' he concluded, 'will enable the benefits of popular control to be enjoyed in conjunction with the no less important requisites (growing ever more important as human affairs increase in scale and complexity) of skilled legislation and administration. There are no means of combining these benefits except by separating the functions which guarantee the one from those which essentially require the other; by disjoining the office of control and criticism from the actual conduct of affairs, and devolving the former on the representatives of the Many, while securing for the latter, under strict responsibility to the nation, the acquired knowledge and practised intelligence of a specially trained and experienced Few.' Thus Mill advocated rule by an aristocratic intelligentsia partially modified by the criticism of the vulgar public. He had completely rejected Bentham's notions of direct popular control in obedience to the quantitative theory of pleasure where each human unit's happiness had the same value.

This divergence expressed itself in various forms. Mill rejected the idea of annual Parliaments. He saw no necessity for a constant reference to the electorate where the function of their representatives was criticism not execution of the government; where the elected body was a representative not a delegated body. He rejected the notion of delegation on the same lines, arguing always that the man of higher intelligence should not be subservient to the man of lower capacities.

Everywhere his political theory was penetrated with the idea of human inequality and variety of ability. Everywhere he urged the development of the unknown capacities of individuals. He advocated an extension of local government in order to place such responsibility on an increasing number of people that they might respond to the new stimulus and develop their latent abilities. Mill had diverged fundamentally from Bentham's premises and his theory of the state.

In the essay on *Utilitarianism* Mill attempted to adjust his own ideas to the pattern of orthodox radicalism, but without success. It was very apparent that he had long since ceased to believe in the basic conceptions of the old school of thought. He had substituted a qualitative for a quantitative concept of happiness. He relied on the judgment of the better qualified rather than on the numerically strong, and would only admit the authority of the latter where all alike were ignorant of the issues. He substituted government by the expert for government by the popular assembly. He agreed with Bentham's theory of the artificial identity of interests, but found it inadequate in view of the events of his lifetime and particularly after the astounding discoveries of Darwin by which he was profoundly impressed. Writing four years after the publication of the *Origin of Species* he maintained that social feelings in man were not merely artificially induced but were based on a 'powerful natural sentiment . . . this it is which . . . will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality . . . The social state is at once so natural, so necessary and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and the association is riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence'. By the whole pressure of natural instincts and social sanctions men were induced to submit themselves to the authority of society. The individual inevitably made 'an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; so that . . . a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action'. But if individuals were naturally bound to submit themselves to the dictates of society, what of their liberty? Mill casually introduced this prevalent notion of the natural bonds of society without entering into its effects on his general theory of the

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state. He merely used it as a further argument in his structure of the state to justify his belief that it was possible to combine the liberty implied in democracy with the good government only obtainable by the use of the expert few. Mill had not reconciled the individual to the state. He had placed the development of the individual as the end of the state and described the means whereby the best personalities might be given their opportunity of expression. There was no reason save the bold statement that men were naturally sociable and Mill's belief that men were not ultimately selfish, to harmonize one personality with another in the final state of existence when all personalities had had their chance and developed in their unlimited diversity. Mill did not concern himself with the final state; he was interested in the immediate tendency to suppress the individual personality. He was the passionate advocate of personal liberty in a world where he saw it rapidly vanishing into the fold of collective mediocrity.

The impact of Darwinism on the utilitarian philosophy of the state was only partially visible in Mill's works. It dominated and created devastating confusions in the mind of Herbert Spencer as he endeavoured with Mill to defend the cause of individual liberty. Mill relied without comment on the belief in the natural identification of interests which bound his citizens to acquiesce in the rule of the intelligent few over the ignorant many. Spencer examined more fully this idea of the natural relation of the individual to society. He came to some interesting though confused conclusions, amply demonstrating the extraordinary influence which the scientific movement of the nineteenth century had upon the direction and formulation of political theory.

Having discarded the belief in God, many of the nineteenth-century scientists postulated a life force. This force was not static but dynamic; it was in a perpetual state of becoming. This concept of the life force lay behind the faith in the process of evolution which characterized the century. The doctrine of evolution was accompanied by a belief that mankind evolved upwards. The notion of progress was formulated. Man progressed though none defined the goal of the great progression. Mill accepted as axiomatic this belief in progress and the perpetual evolution of man to a higher state of

perfection. Spencer subscribed to the same creed; he applied it in detail to his political philosophy in his endeavour to justify and consolidate a claim for increased freedom of action for the individual.

Spencer accepted the utilitarian dogma that happiness was the end of life. He added that this end was willed by the life force. In order to obtain happiness man like every other animal organism must constantly adjust himself to his surroundings. Adjustment required a certain freedom in man which Spencer described as a free energy of faculty. Every man then must be free, but all these separate freedoms activated in obedience to the life force were regulated by a law of nature. Man had nothing to do with the establishment of this law which was laid down for him in a pattern outside his control; in the pattern of the universe. It therefore required no moral effort on man's part to obey as 'morality is essentially one with physical truth — is in fact a species of transcendental physiology'. Spencer like Bentham identified morality with physical laws, and deprived it of its very essence. He reduced it to a system of automatic reactions.

Nevertheless, in society such automatic adjustments between the several freedoms did not take place. The question of the individual's maladjustment with society still remained unanswered. Spencer maintained that men were in the process of adjustment; whilst they were evolving, struggle was inevitable. During this time of unrest government was needed as a machine whose only function was to help forward the few adjustments necessary. Its function was purely negative. It was desirable as a method of removing obstructions in the way of the free development of individuals. In the final stage government would cease to be necessary, and every individual would be capable of freely developing and freely adjusting himself to every other individual. Anarchy was the destiny of society. Government should gradually be losing its control and lessening its supervision. There should be no compulsory education, nor laws of any sort, nor control of industry. Absolute *laissez-faire* must triumph everywhere. Spencer was ruthless in his endeavour to justify the evolution of the individual at the expense of the community.

But the science in which he was steeped did not allow him to precipitate the individual into his ideal of utter freedom where others of his species were of no account. Spencer had to reconcile the

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scientific doctrine of the evolution of the individual with the corresponding evolution of the complex organism of groups of which the individual formed but a part. Human society had passed from a simple to a highly complex state in which specialization of function was the chief characteristic. This was Spencer's clue. He argued that this process of specialization was another aspect of the urge to develop into uniqueness. The goal of human endeavour was to attain to this 'individuation' as Spencer dubbed it. Individuation was the standard of value. The ideal state was reached when the greatest individuation had taken place. In that moment society became static. It reached, he asserted, the point of equilibrium where each man was perfectly adjusted to his environment, and the growth of the social organism ceased.

This was the conclusion to which Spencer came in 1851 in his work on *Social Statics*. At that time Spencer belonged to the foremost group of utilitarians, to the advocates of free trade, to pioneers for social reform in the interests of the happiness of the individual. But as the social structure changed about him, and became increasingly a place where only collective action was effective, Spencer clung the more obstinately to his belief in the importance of the individual and the necessity to protect the single unit from the encroachment of the social organism. Spencer by this change in his environment appeared as a radical at the beginning of his life, and a conservative at the end, but fundamentally his philosophic assumptions remained the same. From start to finish he was an individualist.

In his later work, *Man versus the State* (1884), Spencer attempted to answer the question he had left unsettled in *Social Statics*: how did man achieve the point of equilibrium where he was perfectly adjusted to his environment? His answer to this was confused. He began by repeating the early nineteenth-century dogma that man was endowed with natural rights. The chief of these, he added, was the right of the individual to the 'free energy of faculty'. Every man consciously recognized the rights of others and was bound to respect them. Spencer obtained this sense of obligation by his original identification of science and morals. Natural rights were automatically moral rights. The state could never overwhelm these rights; its primary function was to find means of securing them for its citizens.

A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

Ultimately the individual could defy the power of the state in defence of his rights. Spencer was on the point of condoning complete anarchy. But he diverged suddenly from his former conclusion. He asserted instead that men entered into some sort of contract with each other to preserve their natural rights. The primary function of the state changed from a gradually slackening adjustment between individuals to the continual enforcement of these contracts. The conception of the state as a gradually evolving natural organism whose main function was to harmonize the individual parts into a living whole disappeared. In its stead Spencer envisaged a mechanical contrivance made by men to preserve their individuality. He grossly confused the two theories of the state which Mill had asserted were the main tendencies prevalent in 1861. The state then was not to disappear, but to continue indefinitely with the need to preserve and protect the individual and his rights, ultimately enforcing that free energy of faculty which was the instrument for obtaining complete individuation. Spencer pressed forward Mill's advocacy of the liberty of the individual to the alternative conclusions of pure anarchy or to a return to the contract theory of the state surrounded by its many fallacies. His preoccupation with science prevented him from leaving the development of the individual to the indefinite law of progress. He was not prepared to leave the reconciliation of the aspirations of the varying types of individuals with society to this undefined movement. He followed closely in the tradition of Bentham and believed that the whole social structure and the laws of its being could eventually be reduced to measurable terms. In this faith he worked at *The Principles of Sociology* and thereby laid the foundations of the social sciences of today.

Mill's and Spencer's concern for the preservation of the individual and his liberty and rights was shared by T. H. Green. He approached the problem from a quite different angle. Mill and Spencer belonged essentially to the realistic school of thought. Green belonged to that group of idealists who, like Plato and Rousseau, depicted what should be and tried to reconcile the facts with their vision. Green was deeply influenced by Hegel's philosophy. His religious convictions provided a mystical interpretation to life similar to Hegel's and not to be found in Mill, Spencer or Bentham. His scale of values rested on something

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very different from scientific formulae of the quantity or quality of human happiness. Whilst Mill stopped short at the process of the development of the individual personality, Green proceeded to the stage where development merged into full self-consciousness. Whilst Spencer depicted 'individuation' as a necessary instrument in the process of becoming, Green showed that self-conscious individuality was the final stage in the state of being. So Green was concerned with the final end of man and found it in the mystical conception of God. Green's religious convictions penetrated the whole of his political philosophy. He conceived of man with a defined end; he understood law as the outcome of a divine purpose for the world. Like Aquinas, Green's main concern was to examine the foundations of moral and political obligation, to see where and how far an intricate system of law impinged upon the developing personality. By what rights and to what extent did society with its customs, laws, penalties and public opinion, regulate and direct the activities of the individual?

Surrounded by the political institutions and the intellectual background of the nineteenth century, T. H. Green set out to examine the same question of obligation as had activated the curiosity of Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Both men lived in an age of comparatively rapid change. Both had witnessed an emotional upheaval in which moral values were entirely reorientated, the one about religion, the other about science. Both felt urged to examine the foundations of all social relations, the sense of obligation by which men were bound to each other. The impact of Darwin's theory of human evolution shook the accepted belief in the liberty of human action to its foundations. The utilitarians had unquestioningly accepted scientific valuations. But in Spencer's works it was becoming apparent that the new science, particularly the notion of evolution, raised the problem of determinism. How far did man choose his own happiness; how far was it thrust upon him or away from him by the life force? Could he by any act of his own, by the extension of the suffrage, or by an increase of education, add one inch to the stature of his personality? Or was each member of the human species limited beforehand by the conditions of his inheritance? Was the state there as a mere releasing instrument soon to be discarded or had it some moral function to perform? These were some of the crucial questions raised at the

end of the nineteenth century as the discovery of the evolutionary processes of nature began to take effect on intellectual life.

Green tackled the problem of human freedom and morality in his extensive works on philosophy and morals. In his *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* given between 1879 and 1880, he related his general philosophical concepts to the particular sphere of politics. His examination of political obligation involved him in a discussion on the end of man, the nature of law, and its interaction with social activities. 'My purpose,' he declared, 'is to consider the moral function or object served by law . . . and in so doing to discover the true ground or justification for obedience to law.'

The aim of man, Green asserted, was self-realization. A self-seeking principle urged him on to this goal. This principle was not, as the utilitarians maintained, self-centred and egoistic. Its object was outside itself. Its goal was God. In every assertion of oneself one was a step nearer to self-realization; 'in men the self-realizing principle . . . is the manifestation of God in the world of becoming'. 'This assertion of himself is the demand for freedom, freedom . . . to act according to choice or preference . . . such freedom is precious to him because it is an achievement of the self-seeking principle. It is a just satisfaction of its claims, which is the condition of all other satisfactions of them. The consciousness of it,' he concluded, 'is the first form of self-enjoyment, of the joy of the self-conscious spirit in itself as the one object of absolute value.' Only in God was the process of becoming and the final achievement of self-consciousness present together. 'In God, or rather in the ideal human person as he really exists in God, they are actually one, i.e. self-satisfaction is for ever sought and found in the realization of a completely articulated or thoroughly filled idea of the perfection of the human person.' Man required freedom as a necessary means to attain this end.

Green defined freedom. A man is free when he is in that 'state in which he shall have realized his ideal of himself, shall be at one with the law which he recognizes as that which he ought to obey, shall have become all that he has it in him to be, and so fulfil the law of his being' or 'live according to nature'. Freedom then was limited. It was only freedom to attain the ideal, that is, freedom to become self-conscious. 'The good will is free, not the bad will.'

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Self-realization only to be found in God was the object; freedom was the primary means to achieve it. How could each individual seeking self-realization find it in society without limiting others in the accident of his becoming? How could the separate freedoms be reconciled?

Green argued that all men had the same object in common, the attainment of self-realization in God. Human nature bound for the same goal was essentially the same. What was the good for one was the good for all. Men in becoming self-conscious entered into the state of all consciousness appertaining to the divine; in this state they became conscious of each other. Liberty which was a positive power 'of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying', was not possessed by individuals to the detriment of others, for what was worth doing to one, was worth doing to the other. All men had ideally the same criterion of value as all had the same ultimate end in view. Liberty was thus a social act 'something that we do or enjoy in common with others'. Self-realization of the personality needed society to help it in its process of becoming. Men with an end in common needed each other as a means to achieving this end. They entered into relations with each other. By what means did they regulate these relations so that each personality should develop unimpeded towards its final self-consciousness? How did Green propose to reconcile the individual with society? How did he resolve the claims of the one with the other? He examined the nature of obligation, moral and political, in order to show the extent of society's control over the individual and the part which it played in the development of personality. To do this Green turned and examined the nature of law. He strove to show the exact nature of the compulsion it exercised over the individual.

Green began by criticizing the term 'natural law'. He redefined it, narrowed its meaning, and made an important distinction between natural and positive law. He rejected the meaning given to natural law by such men as Hobbes and Locke. He asserted that law was 'only natural' in the sense that it was necessary to the end which society sought to realize. He then rejected the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' conception of the 'state of nature' as a fact, merely to suggest that it should be taken as the ideal. The natural

state of society was the ideal to which society moved. In some sentences Green interchanged 'natural law' with the phrase 'or the law of God'. But in his definition of the term he delimited it to the group of things which ought to be, if society were to reach its ultimate goal. 'Natural law' was distinct from moral duty on the one hand, and positive law on the other. Morality was a condition of the inner man. Its primary characteristic was freedom. This Green described as 'will' which was the ability possessed by the inner man to make a choice between two actions and choose that which led to greater development of the personality. The will (or freedom to choose) of the inner man could, by definition, never be coerced; hence morality could never be enforced by external pressure. The moment it could be enforced it lost the main characteristic of morality and came under the heading of natural law. Natural law regulated the acts of the outward man, which were controllable. But the acts of the outward man were not all controlled as they should be. Positive law showed what acts were actually under control. Hence moral duty comprised what should be but was essentially not enforceable; natural law comprised what should be, and was essentially enforceable; positive law showed what actually existed, and was enforced. Like Mill, Green found it extremely difficult to distinguish between the outward and inward man, a difficulty as great as in the medieval and later controversies over things temporal and spiritual. Apart from this fundamental difficulty, Green's assertion came to this; that natural law must always be limited by man's moral nature. Society could not arbitrarily intrude on the realm consecrated to the development of the moral nature and personality of man, where will reigned supreme, with freedom as its handmaiden.

The ideal to which society tended was designated in the system of natural law. The means by which this end was attained constituted 'rights'; which were a mutual recognition of the members of society of the necessities they required that they might fulfil their common end. 'Every moral person is capable of rights; i.e. of bearing his part in a society in which the free exercise of his powers is secured to each member through the recognition by each of the others as entitled to the same freedom with himself. To say that he is capable of rights is to say he ought to have them . . . Only through the possession of

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rights can the power of the individual freely to make a common good his own have reality given to it. Rights are what may be called the negative realization of this power.' The means by which the ideal was attained was negative. Rights pertaining to the natural state in which natural law showed the way, were only means to attaining this end; without the end in view, natural rights were unrelated and unmeaning. So by natural law men knew what ought to be done through social effort to obtain their end; they must have 'rights' in order to fulfil their duty. Duties and rights were correlated.

What was the function of the state, and what was the relation of positive law to natural law? Green insisted on the distinction perceived by Mill between the state and society. But he gave the terms his own meaning. Society was the ideal of what ought to be. It was a greater unit than the state which was what is. Society's laws were not incorporated to any extent in the legal codes of a country. They were enforceable by the more subtle but no less effective force of public opinion and custom. Positive law showed what any state actually considered it necessary to enforce at any given moment. There was a perpetual process of adjustment between the system of the positive law of a state and the natural law of society. When had a man the right to refuse to obey the positive law of his country? Suppose the positive law was directly contrary to the ideal of what ought to be, should he obey it? Would he not be vitiating his moral nature, and hindering the ultimate goal, the development of personality?

This was the crux of the right to rebel. Was Green going to declare in favour of ultimate anarchy by according the right to rebel to each individual at the dictates of his individual perception of the good? Green compromised. He asserted that the individual had many rights in common with others, and that it was unreasonable to forfeit all other rights in order to maintain a single one. Better to educate public opinion until it received your standard as its own and then with a majority behind you, you could incorporate your idea in the positive law of the country. The natural law of what ought to be and could be enforceable, was continually passing into the positive law of what is, and is enforced by penalties.

The function of the state was essentially that of the Aquinine state;

it must release men in order that they should 'fulfil their personalities'. 'The function of government is to maintain conditions of life in which morality shall be possible, and morality consists in the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties.' It was negative, but moral. Its sphere of interference was undefined. Anything might have to be controlled in order to remove hindrances from the path of the aspiring members of society. Green approached a paradox. The state must use force to control the outward acts of the man, whose ultimate freedom of action was its only justification. As Dr. Barker remarked, Green 'uses force to create freedom'. For this purpose, power or sovereignty resided in the general will composed of a common consciousness of a common end, which was society. But society had a moral basis in the moral consciousness of its individuals, whose morality rested on their will to choose. So society was conceived as a moral entity, with a moral purpose in view, and Green concluded that 'will not force is the basis of the state'.

The extent of state interference was very great. The state was constantly having to adjust one group within itself to another. The state was constantly regulating the 'rights' (the means to an end) of its citizens. It could put down slavery in order to protect the freedom of one section of the community. It could interfere with education drastically in order to protect the freedom of the child against the encroachments of its parents. Furthermore education was a natural right as knowledge was essential to the development of the personality. Education must therefore be compulsory. It could and must pass any health regulations in order to protect the right to health of all its members against the individual freedom of the few over their external acts which had now become of social importance. Where Mill faltered at vaccination as an infringement of individual liberty, Green saw control of health and housing a necessary duty of the state to promote the full development of individual personality in and through society. Thus Green advocated social reforms not as expedient but as obligatory. The state had a moral duty to perform in releasing the individual from external hindrances to the pursuit of the good life.

This function of adjustment extended beyond the confines of one state. Society was a more comprehensive body than the single state.

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Natural rights were broader than, and not coterminous with, legal rights. The right to life belonged to all as a primary necessity before personality could be developed. The right to life postulated a universal brotherhood in which all nations of whatever varying degrees of consciousness must agree on this primary need. An international consciousness based on the right to life implied a universal society recognizing this right universally. Within such a group, states must seek to adjust themselves in order to maintain the fundamental right, i.e. to life. Consequently Green condemned outright all war. It could never be justified however much it might be condoned. He envisaged an international court of law 'with authority resting on the consent of independent states'. The international state must be continually adjusting the smaller groups of nation-states to each other in order to maintain the natural rights belonging to all men in their communal and progressive search for the complete development of their individual personalities. Green resolved the good of the individual in the good of all humanity.

Green wrote at the end of the nineteenth century. The era of untrammelled individual enterprise was at an end. The philosophic radicals had fought for the greatest happiness of the greatest number against the privileges of the few at the beginning of the century. They had postulated an average man whose happiness was measurable in terms of quantity. The attainment of their first successes led to disillusionment. Happiness was not achieved through enfranchisement of the masses. Happiness was an individual product. Individualism accorded well with the first spurts of enterprise. The threat of its extinction from the middle of the century onwards urged men like Mill and Spencer to defend it with the weapons suited to their differing natures. Green took up the cudgels; but the social forces were too strongly developed by that time. Could not some compromise be made between the inevitable trend towards social control and the preservation of the individual? Green sought to make such a compromise. The shadow of the overwhelming powers of the modern state already fell across his works. The liberty of the individual sank into obscurity. The world state rose on this hidden assumption. The age of the individual was past. In the group activities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the

theme of liberty appeared irrelevant. Freedom to develop everyone's personality required equality of opportunity to all. But opportunities were distributed in direct relation to economic power. The liberty to develop into full self-consciousness, to enjoy the higher intellectual pleasures beloved by Mill and the protagonists of nineteenth-century Liberalism, was meaningless apart from a drastic redistribution of the material wealth of the community. To advocate the right of private property as a necessity to the full development of the personality and to realize that the majority of the people were a propertyless proletariat was to perceive a serious contradiction within society which Green at least sensed in his interesting but confused chapter on the right of the state in regard to property. Liberty, without an economic basis, seemed mere illusion.

CHAPTER XII

THE INDIVIDUAL *versus* THE COMMUNITY

Second Phase: The Doctrine of Social Control

WHILST English political thinkers became absorbed in the defence of the individual in the middle of the nineteenth century, continental political thinkers concentrated on the nature and importance of the powers of the community. The cogent and exclusive force of nationalism on the continent repeatedly thrust aside the liberal movement advocating constitutionalism and a measure of democratic control within the state. The nationalism of nineteenth-century Europe was a passionate desire for the independence of the state, not a movement towards the independence of the individuals within each state. The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 showed definitely that the advocates of individual liberty presented too disjointed an ideal to compel that loyalty necessary to urge the whole people to revolt against their oppressors. In Italy the republicanism of Mazzini yielded eventually to the monarchical power of Sardinia, as after 1849 it was apparent that the chief bond of unity between the Italians was the hatred of the foreigner not a passion for liberalism or republicanism. So too in Austria, the Balkans and Germany, small groups of men enthusiastic for representative government and advocating constitutional reforms whereby the voice of the people might be quickly heard in the councils of government formed ineffective minorities. The demand for participation in the government on the continent came only from the middle class and intellectuals during the first part of the nineteenth century. But the desire for national independence inspired everyone. So the fervour of patriotism tended to swamp in the mystic body of the nation liberal constitutionalism and its belief in the importance of the individual. Both were heritages of the French revolution, but the immediate necessities of the people after 1815 in Europe thrust forward nationalism and the sovereignty of the community into the first place. Until the various new nations had

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each secured a measure of national independence, they had neither leisure nor inclination to consider the question of the best form of government desirable and to enter into the problem of the desirability of loosening the control of the state over its individual citizens and granting them each a greater measure of liberty. In these circumstances until far into the nineteenth century nationalism crowded liberalism off the stage of European practical politics.

Prussia became the centre of some of the most important speculations on this subject of the power of the community. The Prussian state had been the first to resent the dominance of Napoleon. Early affected by the ideas of liberty broadcasted by the French revolution, resentful of the decline of their power after their brilliant pre-eminence under Frederick the Great in the eighteenth century, the Prussian people were eager to re-establish their independence and to reassert their position in European politics. Prussia was rapidly re-organized into a compact state on the model of Frederick and became the centre of resistance to Napoleon in the war of liberation.

This experience of patriotism deeply impressed Hegel as he grew to manhood amidst the excitements of revolution and counter-revolution in Prussia. It determined some of the most vital of his political concepts. It caused him to link together his dynamic philosophy of evolution with the no less dynamic force of patriotism. He had argued that the idea manifested itself in matter whilst evolving towards greater self-consciousness. He concluded from his personal experiences in the revival of the Prussian state, that the epitome of this process was the state. Only in the state, in the overwhelming consciousness of the group, could the individual achieve his greatest degree of self-consciousness. Hegel was not merely repeating the ideas of Plato and Rousseau by whom he was deeply influenced. He added a new element to the belief in the pre-eminence of the state as the final goal of the individual's efforts. His addition was the peculiar product of the nineteenth century. Therein lay its potency. He harnessed the new belief in the dynamic nature of the universe to the old well-established belief in the pre-eminence of the state, recently revitalized by the force of nationalism. He bedded the ideas of the importance of the group deep in the philosophic structure of the universe.

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Hegel's advocacy of the importance of the group had a widespread influence. It penetrated European thought in various directions. It laid the foundations on which most of the subsequent communist and socialist theories were built. Implicit within it was the idea of the personality of the group. This idea later elaborated by the legal school led by Gierke was an important factor in the determination of the attitude of the state towards trade unions, the churches and the trust and combine movement. Everywhere in Europe Hegel's belief in the pre-eminence of the group caught and held the imagination of his contemporaries and disciples whose environment forced upon them consideration of this question as the vital concern of their day.

But much had to be added to and taken away from Hegel's concepts of the state and the foundations of society before they could become incorporated in either the economic or legal theory of the state as advocated by communists, socialists and lawyers respectively. Hegel emphasized the spiritual nature of the universe and the state. Marx, his disciple, frankly denied this and maintained a materialistic view of the universe and the forces activating society. Yet Marx was profoundly influenced by Hegel and the same spirit of nationalism which both men had experienced in their common native land. How then did such a violent reorientation of values take place? Why was it that men, profoundly influenced by a philosophy which, like Plato's, stressed spiritual elements and deprecated the pursuit of economic security and comfort as the goal of social effort, should become the prophets of such a gospel, and for the first time for centuries hold up the attainment of material prosperity as the final consummation of human aspirations? Why did the achievement of economic equality hold out the hope of spiritual development and become consequently the vital necessity to further progress? What was peculiar to the nineteenth century which thrust forward this aspect of political thought as the centre of speculation?

The appalling conditions engendered by the industrial revolution would have been sufficient in themselves to startle men out of their complacent acceptance of the *status quo* and to urge them to take some remedial action to mitigate the hardships resulting from a sudden increase in wealth and a corresponding increase in poverty in the various strata of society. But the industrial revolution did much more

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than instigate a small proportion of society to philanthropic works. It undermined and finally shattered the medieval quasi-christian idea of the nature of property. In attacking this concept, the industrial revolution attacked a fundamental concept of political philosophy. Naturally the controversy arising therefrom had a potent influence on the development of subsequent political theory. New ground was broken in this effort to restate the nature of property in relation to the new methods of producing wealth. The medieval idea of wealth as the gift of God of which men had only the use and to which they had no absolute claim was irrelevant in an age when divine influences were denied or thrust far into the background. The industrial revolution emphasized still further the break with the past whereby wealth was regarded as the product of a good season and the direct consequences of the will of God. Instances abounded from the rise of industry which reflected the growing belief that wealth was the result of human effort and not of the beneficence of God. Tithes were refused early in the seventeenth century in England on any property which did not directly come under the influences of the seasons. If God did not directly control the increase, it was argued, then he had no right to the tax of a tenth on the profits. This view was formulated later in a more positive theory by John Locke. Significantly enough Locke's theory of value took shape simultaneously with his advocacy of religious toleration. The connection between religious leniency and the rejection of the old theory of property as a usufruct from God was very close.

Locke agreed that God had given the fruits of the earth to mankind. Originally there was no private property. But the moment a man took something from the common stock and by his own efforts put it to his own use, that thing became his own by virtue of the work he had put into it. 'Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his own.' A man's right to his property was the result of his own effort not of God's will. Locke's theory was very individualistic. Still he retained the notion that the law of nature should curb the greed of men and prevent exploitation of 'another's pains'. 'As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may

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by his labour fix a property in. Whatsoever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others.' In the seventeenth century when means of preserving food and of accumulating manufactured goods on a large scale for a long time were unknown, this limitation still related the division of property to the condition of natural decay. In the nineteenth century with its artificial preservation of the fruits of the earth and its stocks of non-perishable goods, Locke's limitation was irrelevant.

But Locke had postulated a theory of property, the 'labour theory' of value, destined to have a remarkable influence on the development of political thought. As industry expanded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the fruits of the earth became more and more developed by man's agency. Men co-operating together in a growing scheme of division of labour so mixed their labour with the natural gifts of God that it was difficult to ascertain by which man the new wealth was created. Which of the many agents or groups of agents had the right to have a 'property' in the final product? As Thomas Hodgekins stated in 1825: 'There is no longer anything which we can call the natural reward of individual labour. Each labourer produces only some part of a whole, and each part, having no value or utility in itself, there is nothing on which the labourer can seize and say: "It is my product, this I will keep to myself."'

Whilst changes in the economic life of western Europe were gradually emphasizing the need to consider the distribution of this newly acquired wealth on a basis more in accordance with the facts of the situation, political events emphasized property as a fundamental right of man. In the English, American and French revolutions security of property figured in the lists of natural rights. Any new concept of the nature of property formulated from the economic point of view inevitably reperculated on the attitude towards the state and its functions. If the nature of property was to be redefined, then the function of the state in relation to property must in turn suffer modification. So in the nineteenth century a rapprochement between economics and politics took place as the industrial revolution vividly emphasized changes in the methods of the producing and holding of wealth. So in the nineteenth century Plato's scorn of economic activities, of the pursuit after comfort and security, and the medieval

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contempt of the things of this world based on the assumption that they were but incidental to the ultimate end of human endeavour, alike vanished. The industrial revolution depicted wealth as a result of co-operative effort; the political revolutions broadcasted the notion that property pertained to each individual as his inalienable right; the actual facts of the situation showed that only part of society benefited by the acquisition of this new wealth, only part were property holders, the rest, and this the majority, were disenfranchised of one of their inalienable rights. How was this to be justified? How did the contempt for economic matters change to veneration? How was it that in the nineteenth century political thinkers became profoundly interested in this material aspect of human activities and subordinated to it all other activities?

The explanation of this change in ethical values lay in the development of a materialistic philosophy of the universe derived ironically enough from Hegel. The development of this aspect of the Hegelian philosophy in terms of social values was due in large part to Karl Marx. But Marx was merely making coherent and forceful what was already sought after by the new school of political thinkers: the socialists. Disgusted by the appalling conditions of the masses and their obvious exploitation by the property owners, inspired by the high idealism of the French revolution emphasizing the intrinsic value of each individual, the advocates of socialism denounced a condition of affairs which created such a contrast between their ideals and the actualities. So on every side wherever the factory system with its long hours and hard conditions drove the workers from their homes into the prison life of the factory, denunciations of the system arose and queries were raised as to its justice, as to the nature of property whereby some men were established as the masters others as the slaves, as to the whole system of society whereby one group of men might exploit without question the efforts of another. If the community was the indivisible source of all activities, regenerating and inspiring its individual members whether capitalist or proletarian, how was it that some of these individuals were sunk in a deathly apathy in which none of their latent forces could even hope for development? The masses were deprived of all opportunity to greater self-consciousness by the very community who benefited by

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their activities and held out theoretically the hopes of a fuller life. The early socialists faced with these contradictions examined the problem piecemeal. Saint Simon and Proudhon queried the nature of property and denounced it as an inalienable right of the individual. Robert Owen and the English socialists regarded the whole system as an infringement on the rights of the individual and a stifling of his potential development as a soul. Those who produced should acquire the results of their production on some basis of equity. Since production was a co-operative effort, the distribution should be in terms of co-operation not exploitation. So Owen advocated a system whereby each co-operator could participate in the profits of his work according to a scheme approved by all.

But the schemes and writings of the French and English early socialists were merely nibblings at the greater problem. It was not sufficient to criticize the nature of property, or to set up small co-operative bodies as tiny oases in the competitive struggle. What was the nature of society itself that it permitted such abuses of power? What was the relation of society to its individual members? Must it help them towards emancipation from these frightful conditions? Or must it seek to suppress these manifestations of unrest? Was the Chartist movement a dangerous revolt or the first step towards a higher level of existence? What was the ideal form of society wherein these abuses would not exist, and how could it be achieved? The discontent aroused by the industrial revolution; the firm conviction that society was in some sense a corporate body representing the fullest development of self-consciousness known to mankind; the very real existence of cut-throat competition and rapid changes in the holding of property; all caused a concentration on the nature of society in terms of economics and conflict in the nineteenth century. Karl Marx united in a coherent whole the conception of the pre-eminence of the community, the struggle for existence and the urge towards self-consciousness, already formulated in different spheres by his contemporaries. From these strongest forces of the period, he evolved his theory of communism and the methods of its achievement. No wonder that his gospel of redemption embodying the most cogent emotions of his day swept men off their feet and established a new and compelling school of thought.

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The life and writings of Karl Marx are too well known to require detailed description here. Suffice it to recall a few of the more significant facts of his life. Marx began life in Germany as a disciple of the Hegelian school of philosophy. He, like Hegel, had experienced the uprising of nationalistic emotions which continually swept over central Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. Seizing on the idea that development was achieved only through constant contradictions, Marx set himself to criticize continually the social structure of his day. He regarded criticism as an instrument of progress. Everywhere he went he established critical newspapers in which he and his friends analysed ruthlessly the social phenomena about them. His interests on the continent were mainly political and philosophical, but his exile in England after 1849 brought him into immediate contact with the extraordinary phenomena of the industrial revolution. Marx began feverishly to study economics. He rapidly became familiar with all the classical economists. Malthus and Ricardo had an abiding influence on his thought in their respective theories of subsistence wage and the labour theory of value. His reading was omnivorous. He seems to have read every government report on social conditions issued in England during his sojourn there. He regarded the conditions in England as a particular example of the general development of society, and an example worth studying as it represented a higher stage of development than elsewhere at the moment. He worked then from the particular to the general. He induced from his collected data certain general principles underlying human relationships. He was essentially a realist working as a scientist on social phenomena.

Marx never dealt specifically with the problems of political philosophy. His views lay implicit in his criticism of the economic system whether in such heavily annotated economic studies as *Das Capital* or in his propaganda works like the *Communist Manifesto*, or in his analyses of political events like the *History of the French Commune of 1870*. In these works under the cloak of economic terminology or historic narrative he revealed his conception of human nature, its struggles to achieve its end through society, the difficulties attending this evolutionary process and finally the means whereby he hoped success would eventually be secured.

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Marx conceived of man as an economic rather than a political animal. How did he arrive at this novel metamorphosis? In nature every organism in its struggle to exist developed fresh powers in order to keep pace with the evolutionary process. Simple organisms became complex; plants and animals developed fresh faculties to satisfy their increasing list of wants in a system itself becoming more complex. Man similarly became a more complex organism, until, at a certain point in his career, he ceased to follow the usual course of animal life; he did not produce a fresh limb or organ to meet his fresh wants. Instead he took to making tools. He constructed instruments external to his own body for the satisfaction of his wants. How was he able to do this? Man found developing within himself a new faculty, the power to use tools for a preconceived end. 'What distinguishes the most incompetent architect from the best of bees, is that the architect has built a cell in his head before he constructs it in wax.' Man had the power to conceive of things in his imagination in an ideal form. The mind of man developed rapidly under the stimulus of tool-making. Mind was a new force of nature, antithetical to matter, nevertheless its product. Marx had effectively inverted the Hegelian conception of evolution and translated it into pure materialism. The development of mind, of self-consciousness, was now seen as a by-product of the efforts of man to satisfy his wants. The process by which this satisfaction was achieved became immediately the most vital of human activities. Experimenting mind directed the power of tool-making for the satisfaction of insatiable human wants in a process described by Marx as the labour process. Essentially man was an economic animal. 'Primarily,' said Marx, 'labour is a process going on between man and nature, a process in which man, through his own activity, initiates, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature. He confronts nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate nature's productions in a form suitable to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops,' Marx concluded, 'the potentialities that slumber within him, and subjects these inner forces to his own control.' He defined the instrument of labour as 'a thing or a complex of things, which the worker interposes between himself

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and the subject matter of his labour (e.g. the soil), and one which serves as the conductor of his activity . . . Leaving out of consideration the gathering of ready-made means of subsistence, such as fruit, for which purpose man's own bodily organs suffice him as the instruments of labour, the object of which the worker takes direct control is not the subject matter of labour but the instrument of labour. Thus nature becomes an instrument of his activities, an instrument,' Marx declared proudly, 'with which he supplements his own bodily organs, adding a cubit or more to his stature, scripture notwithstanding. Just as the earth is his primitive larder, so, likewise, is it his primitive toolhouse.' So the evolution of man must be studied through a knowledge of the changes in his tool-making apparatus. For by means of the tools and the elaboration of these tools man revealed his dominance over nature and developed his hidden potentialities. The instruments of labour became then 'the indicators of the social relations amid which labour is performed', and 'the development of material production' hitherto ignored by historians was seen to be 'the basis of all social life'. The economic process was the supreme articulation of human desires and potentialities.

The act of labour was of intrinsic value. Man could only evolve through his contact and struggle with the other forces of nature. Only by the labour process could he satisfy his wants and develop his potentialities. Through the sweat of his brow he realized the slumbering forces within him. Work was lifted from the degradation placed upon it by the biblical curse and reinforced by every great civilization to a great exaltation. It alone had supreme value. The act of labour, of transforming human energy into products for the satisfaction of human wants, was the instrument of individual and social evolution. The more wants man could satisfy, the more complex became his nature, the more self-conscious he became. The individual could only satisfy a limited number of wants. But by co-operation he could unite his physical strength with others and specialize his skill so that he could satisfy an increasing, indeed an unspecified, number of wants. So, as humanity evolved to greater complexity in its desires, and as its potentialities through the labour process became actualities needing satisfaction, the social system in which men lived adapted itself to this urge for satisfaction, for

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development of the life force, of energy, within the individual. Social systems like organisms passed from simple to complex groups. Division of labour took place within the economic and the social structure. Men specialized within their crafts and drew away into exclusive guilds or professional casts. Yet specialization involved dependency as each individual strove to benefit from the increased power of satisfaction produced by this economical form of labour. Exchange of commodities sprang up. Social groups were interlaced by their mutual wants. 'The seeming independence of the individuals is supplemented by a system of general and mutual dependence through or by means of the products.' The evolution of the individual depended more and more in its higher stages on the expansion of society into further complexities. Only in and through society could the individual hope to satisfy his manifold cravings. These too were further stimulated by social contact. 'The very existence of social contact,' said Marx, 'arouses emulation and induces a certain stimulation of the animal spirits, whereby the efficiency of each individual worker is promoted.' So in the labour process, man realized himself, and, involved by it in co-operation with others, gathered fresh energy for further development. 'Man is by nature,' Marx concluded, 'if not ... a political animal, at any rate a social one.'

If the worker was the instrument of civilization by whose efforts alone society evolved then how was it that in contemporary society the worker occupied such a degraded and unconsidered place, and men, who never mixed their energies with the forces of nature, gained all the benefits of the productive efforts of their fellows? How had the machinery of production for the satisfaction of human wants been diverted from its end so that the worker, whose labour alone had value, was cheated of the results of his labour, and, in a world where power to satisfy wants was developing at unprecedented rates, where such power was his own production, found himself rewarded with only sufficient crumbs to keep him alive? Marx endeavoured to show wherein lay the corruption of society, how all power had accrued in the hands of the few and left the many starving and stunted as slaves to the most tyrannical of masters. He explained the discrepancy between society as it ought to be by nature, and society as it was, in terms of the age-long conflict of classes, and in particular of capital

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and labour. In his explanation Marx revealed his concept of the origin of political authority. How had some men become the rulers, others the ruled? Marx was considering a central problem of political thought.

The dominance of one group of men over the majority in the economic-political system was due to various causes. The smooth functioning of the labour process whereby effort was rewarded with its due satisfaction was interrupted at a given point in time by a dramatic event fraught with important consequences. Men invented money as a means of exchange and a standard of value in order to facilitate the exchange of commodities. Money was an easily circularized commodity recognized by society as an equivalent, or, as Marx put it, as the 'general equivalent' of all other commodities. Its proper use was to facilitate exchange of commodities, to further the 'social circulation of matter', so that 'the product of one kind of social useful labour replaces the product of another kind' and the greater satisfaction of the two exchangers resulted. This transaction was represented by the formula C-M-C, where C stood for a commodity, M for the money for which it was exchanged, and the last C stood for the second commodity which the owner of the first received in return for his original commodity. In this way at the end of any proper transaction each man was better off because he had acquired a new means of satisfaction, and the money was merely a means to facilitate the exchange.

But a hidden danger lurked in the use of money. Gradually its original purpose as a means of furthering satisfaction was lost sight of. Money, 'a radical leveller', effaced all the distinctions between the various commodities it represented, and appeared merely as a means of exchange having an intrinsic exchange value. Money then began to circulate as an end in itself. Instead of the transaction C-M-C taking place, a new transaction arose substituting the means for the end: M-C-M¹ where a commodity was merely bought in order to sell it at a higher price, M representing always a different sum from M¹. So the vicious process of money breeding money forcibly condemned by the ancients replaced the natural process of the exchange of commodities for the satisfaction of human wants. The latter object was lost sight of entirely. Money being itself a commodity could be

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possessed as the private property of the individual, who then entered into this process of circulating money as an end in itself in order that his commodity M might in circulation increase in value. So the private individual entered the economic process of the 'social circulation of matter' for an end subversive of the general purpose of mankind, for his own profit, for the increase of his own power. So he obtained, through the private possession of money, a control of social power, and 'social power becomes a private power in the hands of a private person. That was why', added Marx, 'the ancients denounced money as subversive of the economic and moral order of things'.

How did the invention of money enable one man to dominate another? Marx had shown how money which had been given value by a social act could become the sole possession of the private individual. But why did this constitute a danger to society and why was the breeding of money through the exchange process unnatural? Marx argued that labour alone had power to create value. Money could not breed more money. Somewhere the owner of money must be in contact with labour and be extracting value from the worker over and above what the latter required for the satisfaction of his own wants. Somewhere 'surplus value', the difference between M and M¹, the profit made on each transaction, was being created. But the only creator of value was labour. Somehow the capitalist or possessor of money was extracting surplus value from labour, was seducing the labour process from its natural aim, the satisfaction of human wants, and was prostituting it to his own vicious purpose, 'the self-expansion of capital'.

Marx proceeded to show the mechanism for the creation of surplus value on which the parasite capital lived. Incidentally he revealed the dire consequences of such a parasitic growth and suggested methods of removing it and a justification for such action. In political terms Marx was showing the extent and nature of tyranny; was advocating the right to revolution, and suggesting as an alternative an ideal organization for society.

Surplus value was achieved by forcing the worker to labour longer than was necessary. How was this done? The method was ingenious. The worker sold his labour in the market freely to the employer. But the price he obtained for it was not its potential value as a value-

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creating instrument, but the amount necessary to keep him alive and enable him to reproduce further instruments of labour, i.e. to keep the supply of labour up by maintaining a family. There was a great difference between these two sums. The price of keeping a worker at a given standard of living in a given society might be 3s. a day but the value he produced during that day might be 6s. If a man only worked in order to satisfy his wants, then he ought in such a society only to work long enough to produce 3s. This amount of work alone was necessary. But in fact he did not. In fact and in law he had sold the whole of his day to his employer, and the employer had the legal right to force him to work for as long as he liked. The only limit on the length of the working day was the natural limit of twenty-four hours. In that time men must have a short respite for the renewal of their strength, but the length of respite, like the length of the working hours, was indeterminate, depending on the capitalist's idea of the minimum the worker required for his recuperation. The worker in selling his day's labour had sold his life to the capitalist for a mess of pottage. The length of the working day became the battleground between the parasite capital and its victim labour. Only by forcing labour to produce surplus value could capital hope to persist. The nature of capital was such that it must inevitably dominate or perish. 'Capital . . . like a vampire, can only keep itself alive by sucking the blood of living labour. The more blood it sucks, the more vigorously does it live.' This struggle between capital and labour directed the course of history and the development of civilization in the last five hundred years. Capital in its ceaseless urge to self-expansion sought at every point to isolate the worker and make an easier prey of him. The effort to produce surplus value proceeded in every direction: by the extension of the length of the working day; by the introduction of the shift system turning night into day; by the intensification of the worker's efforts within the given limit; by greater economies; by specialization; by division of labour so great that mechanization could easily take the place of human labour; finally by the gradual control of all branches of the industry so that these economies could be effected and large scale industry was established demanding world markets as an outlet. As the capitalist increased the number of his workers, his profit increased. For each worker represented the production of a specific quantity of

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surplus value. The more workers to each capitalist, the more profit would accrue to that capitalist: 'Alike historically and conceptually, the starting point of capitalist production is where a large number of workers are aggregated at one time and in one place . . . under the command of one capitalist, for the production of one and the same kind of commodity.' Large scale industry was the inevitable and desired outcome of capital. As capital sought to impinge upon labour, it developed theories and concepts justifying its actions and furthering its designs. So capitalism was the stronghold of rank individualism. Thereby it maintained its right to private property for the free use of the individual for his own profit, and insisted that the worker must be left free to bargain as he thought fit. By the latter device, the capitalist hoped to isolate the worker and prevent him from uniting with other workers so as to strengthen his bargaining power against capital. The vital force of capital moulded the mechanics of production, the ideas of society and its class distinctions, as it swept forward in its headlong course.

What were the consequences of this self-expansion of capital? The effect on the worker, the real creator of value, was disastrous. The worker was regarded as 'nothing but labour power', and 'time for education, for intellectual development, for the fulfilment of social functions, for friendly intercourse, for the free play of physical and mental forces, Sunday rest (even though he lives in a Sabbatarian country) — all so much moonshine'. The worker instead of utilizing the raw materials and the instruments of production and directing them by 'his purposive productive activity' for the satisfaction of his several wants, was tied to the mechanism of production and dominated by it. The primary object of the labour process was changed and diverted from its natural course. The object now became 'the self-expansion of capital . . . for creating surplus value. Now, in the twinkling of an eye, the means of production are transformed into means for the absorption of others' labour. Instead of the worker using the means of production, the means of production are using the worker. Instead of being consumed by him as the material elements of his productive activity, they consume him as the ferment of their own vital process; and the life process of capital is simply and solely its movement as self-enlarging value'. The humanity of the worker

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was the sacrifice demanded by capital for its own self-aggrandizement.

Capital too was affected. The urge for self-expansion of his money drove the capitalist to exercise greater and greater control over the worker. The capitalist set out to free himself from all manual labour in order to apply himself more strenuously to his function of exploitation. With the extension of capital the gulf between employer and employed widened, the necessity to harshen the treatment of the worker in order to get more from him grew stronger. Despotism and tyranny were essential in a capitalistic society, in a society which 'acclaims gold, its Holy Grail, as the glittering incarnation of its inmost vital principle'.

Two contradictions faced each other in society. Capital was the thesis, Labour its antithesis. What was to be the synthesis evolved from these two opposing forces? Marx argued that capital had completed its cycle of evolution; it was dissolving; the moment for the control of society and the direction of its forces by labour was approaching. Capital had developed the technique of large scale production almost to perfection. When men co-operated to enlarge their capacity to produce, they had to be organized. 'An individual violinist manages his own affairs, an orchestra needs a conductor.' Capital had fulfilled a necessary function in transforming individual labour processes into 'a combined social labour process'. As capital increased its power, the number of workers controlled by one capitalist grew; then the worker's 'power for resistance grew likewise'. The antagonism between the two forces was an antagonism of exploiter and exploited. A class struggle ensued comparable to the struggle of one species against another. The law of nature, the struggle for existence between two opposing species, dominated society. In the act of enforced co-operation the workers not only realized their unity against capital, but developed a social sense. 'When a worker co-operates systematically with other workers, he transcends his individual limitations and develops the capabilities that belong to him as a member of a species.' Co-operation amongst the workers opposed rank individualism amongst the capitalists. What was to be the outcome?

Marx's solution was social control. The workers were realizing that they were caught in a mechanism of production which, though it

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forced them into a desirable co-operation for the greater production of commodities to satisfy their wants, was nevertheless 'the outcome of an alien will', directed to the specific purpose of exploiting their labour and their lives. 'For protection against the worm gnawing at their vitals, the workers must put their heads together, and must as a class compel the passing of a law, the erection of an all-powerful social barrier, which will forbid even the workers themselves from entering into a free contract with capital, when by the terms of that contract they and their race are condemned to death or sold into slavery. In place of the pompous catalogue of the "inalienable rights of man", they put forward the modest Magna Charta of a legally limited working day — a charter which shall at length make it clear when the time "which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins".' The conditions of capitalist industry were such that inevitably they 'evoke a movement to establish a social control, which shall legally restrict the hours of labour, shall regulate and make uniform the working day and its pauses'. In the evolution of society social control followed close upon the heels of capitalism.

But the struggle over the length of the working day was not the only objective of organized labour. Eventually the whole mechanism of production must come under the workers' control. Every way in which capital sought to exploit labour must be checked by controlling the strategic point at which capital had hitherto inserted its mechanism of exploitation. Finally Marx envisaged a time when the same strict organization which existed within industry was transferred to all society, and every branch of industry was so organized as to produce exactly what society required. Instead of leaving the satisfaction of society's wants to the mechanism of competition, a mechanism which enabled capital to exploit labour, Marx suggested social control of all industry as a more reasonable method of achieving that end. By controlling the length of the working day, by subordinating the machine to the worker, by giving over all the means of production into the hands of the worker, labour would not only defeat capital's designs; it would save its soul and the soul of civilization alive. For capital was a parasite preying upon society at every interstice of its being, diverting the aim of the labour process to its own destructive purpose. The conflict between capital and labour was not

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merely 'a protracted civil war more or less veiled' between the two great classes which the peculiar mechanism of large scale production had created, it was essentially a struggle between the destructive and constructive forces in society.

Marx regarded this class struggle with a hopeful equanimity. The clash of interests was a law of nature. It was the sustaining force of the universe. The universe evolved through contradiction. 'In the animal kingdom the war of all against all maintains, more or less, the conditions of existence of all species.' As the class struggle intensified the nearer a resolution of the struggle approached. The day of social control and the triumph of labour drew on apace.

How was it that humanity had divided into two types of men classified by Marx as two different species? Marx repeated Hegel's theory of evolution as an explanation of this development. A man changed from being a worker to being a capitalist in the following way. As specialization took place, the small master employed workers under him, but he himself worked too. Then came a point when he wished to free himself from the tie of manual labour in order to concentrate more intensely on the directive side of his work. Though he appeared to be working in reality he was intent only on exploitation. His rejection of manual labour had radically altered his nature. 'Here,' concluded Marx, 'just as in the natural sciences, we find confirmation of the law discovered by Hegel in his *Logic*, that at a certain point what have been purely quantitative changes become qualitative changes.' The man in the twinkling of an eye became a capitalist. But Marx did not explain what had urged the man in the first place to reject manual labour, to turn away from productive work in order to become a parasite. He was content to show that society was in fact divided into exploiter and exploited. The reason for this division remained obscure. Yet Marx continually implied that the capitalist was in some way responsible for his nature, and was culpable as a parasite on society. Marx seemed to have fallen into the same error as had beset Hobbes. He described a natural law and its results, then he attached moral censures to its operation. He seemed indeed to be adopting an attitude to capital and labour comparable to the puritanical and biblical division of the damned and the elect. Some men were arbitrarily created by nature greedy capitalists, seeking

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whom they might devour. The rest were as arbitrarily created workers, forced by the natural economic process into a vitalizing and uplifting struggle against capital which would result inevitably in the destruction of the evil and the triumph of the good. Marx vacillated continually between these two concepts. Sometimes he spoke of the conflict between the classes as natural and inevitable; at other times he described the struggle between capital and labour as unnatural, and called upon labour to exert its conscious will to rid society of the blood-sucking vampire, capital, and resolve the social order into an harmoniously functioning organism. He urged upon labour its duty to enforce social control to obviate as soon as possible the destructive force of capital.

The establishment of social control involved Marx in the advocacy of revolutionary methods and internationalism. The struggle between the classes was inherently violent and must reach a violent climax. The contradictions must be extreme before they could be resolved. The gradual achievement of social control was impossible given the nature of capital and the violence and intensity of its urge to self-expansion and its corollary exploitation. The scale of capitalist production was world wide. Industry had long since leaped national boundaries. The organization of labour must be on as vast a scale as its opponent capital. Workers' organization must inevitably be international. Marx himself founded and maintained the first Workers' International organization. Capital in its death throes would use any weapon for protection. The workers must beware of the fermenting of the passion of nationalism by which capital sought to keep them locked up in isolated antagonized groups, weakening their power in the great transcending battle against their masters and their foes. 'Workers of the world, Unite', cried Marx. Like Green, he saw internationalism as essential in the evolution of self-consciousness. But whereas Green transcended national boundaries on behalf of the universal right to life, Marx transcended national boundaries on behalf of the universal duty to work. For in work was life. The labour process was the mechanism of evolution, the means by which mind and self-consciousness evolved in direct conflict with nature. The labour process as it now existed was social not individualistic. The worker had transcended his individual limitations in co-operating

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with his fellows. Only in and through the community could he hope for the proper satisfaction of his insatiable wants.

Marx's influence cannot be estimated adequately. The magnitude of the controversies in which he partook during his lifetime are as nothing compared with the fierceness aroused by the experiment in modern Russia of a system of social control for the benefit of the workers. Marx's influence in his own day was great. It is greater today. Its ramifications must be left to the historian of a later date, though something of its effects could be seen immediately in the nineteenth century.

The notions of the importance of the community and the importance of economics gained ground in England and the continent rapidly towards the end of the nineteenth century. The rise of the social democrats of Germany, the communist experiment in France in 1870, the foundation of the Fabian society and the beginning of the formation of a Labour Party separate from the Liberals in England, were symptomatic of the adoption of a point of view where social control of some kind was imperative. It is impossible in so short a study to analyse the varying differences between these groups. There was one point of difference dividing them broadly into two main groups. The theory of evolution was understood in two ways, gradually or cataclysmically. The followers of Marx advocated violent changes and a revolutionary method of procedure. They upheld the right and duty of revolution. The others advocated a piecemeal transformation of society, and in their theory of gradualism denied the assumption of class conflict. The communists and socialists were sharply divided in method and in principle. Their only common factor was their advocacy of social control.

The belief in the mystical value of the community appeared in other directions in the latter half of the century. The lawyers and constitutionalists exercised their minds in discovering the relation between the group activity of such organizations as the trade unions and the churches and the state itself. Did the consciousness of unity proceed from the small unit to the great or vice versa? Was the state sovereign and omnipotent, or were these groups prior to the state and so not ultimately dependent on state sanction for their rights? Gierke in Germany followed by Maitland in England upheld the rights of the

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smaller unit. Using the past as their argument, they maintained that the small group arose first with its inherent sense of corporate life, then came the state as a superimposition taking to itself what powers were not already exercised by the small unit. The state developed as an impingement on the small unit. Neither the churches nor the trade unions had been created by the state. Neither had to wait cap in hand for permission from the state to develop in a prescribed groove. The limits of these organizations were not to be determined by the state; they were undefined save by the will of the small group itself. The legal rights of these groups were granted by the state, but their inherent rights which they were continually urging the state to recognize as the occasion arose resulted from their own nature. They were not the creation of the state. The spread of the belief in the power of the community gave rise to new problems, as there was no general acceptance as to which community contained supreme power. The friction at the end of the nineteenth century resolved itself into a clash between groups instead of the previous clash between the state and the individual. Marx formulated the feeling of the end of the nineteenth century when he scornfully remarked that 'we are leaving . . . a paradise of the rights of man'. But the doctrine of social control which developed in contradistinction to rank individualism was not a final solution to the political situation. A new problem arose on its back: the problem of the relation of these several communities, the one with another. Who was to decide ultimately between the rights of trade unions and the state; the rights of the churches and the state; the rights of one state and those of another? Who had power or authority to judge between these independent communities? The illusion of liberty yielded to a doctrine of social control, but no one knew, nor yet knows, what society, what group shall exercise finally this control. The stage was set for the political struggles and developments of the twentieth century.

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THE historian halts at the gateway of the present. The student of politics must venture in. Can the historian offer any help to the student of politics as he makes his way through the labyrinth of modern politics? A few conclusions can perhaps be profitably drawn from the previous study.

Every idea in the course of its history has passed through definite phases of development. Its usual progress seems to fall into three main stages: first, a formulation of abstract principles vaguely related to circumstances; second, the application of these principles to a given situation and the consequent modification of them; third, the final formulation of the idea in terms of experience, generally in a very complex form. The first stage is the utopian or the wish for what might be, perceived by a few prophetic minds; the second is the pragmatic or experimental stage when by trial and error men find what part of their utopia is applicable to actual circumstances; the third stage is the justification in terms of any and every reason by which men seek to rationalize their actions in an acceptable form. When this stage is completed the idea has become a commonplace. Modern political thought is filled with commonplaces garnered from the past. The ideas of liberty, equality, sovereignty, the state, the citizen himself, his civic rights and many others have all passed through these stages and form the terminology of the present.

But we owe a further debt to the past. It reveals to us the method by which ideals are translated into action or rejected as unsuitable. This method is the core of political life. The struggle in politics is a constant one between the forces of the second stage and those of the third, between those who are struggling for what might be, which is unknown, and those who wish to maintain what is, which is known.

Three factors determine the character of this struggle at any given point in time. The nature of the institutions, which are the foci of irritation for those who wish to gain control in order to assert their beliefs, determines the type and extent of the contest. Thus in the Middle Ages the struggle centred about the exact limitations of the

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opposing organizations, the church and the states, whose administrative boundaries impinged upon each other. Then the ideas held at the time on the nature and purpose of man's activities give direction and point to the struggle. Thus in the early christian era the new concept of the end of mankind transcending this life gave a peculiar power to the claims of the church in opposition to the Roman state. Finally as man is but a part of the universe, any change in the notion of the nature of the universe is reflected in political life as it changes the belief about the end and purpose of man's life. Thus the rise of science since the sixteenth century has altered perceptibly the content of political thought and the nature of the state in the last three hundred years.

The student of politics in the modern world then has three points on which to focus his attention in striving to discover the nature and value of the various ideas and platforms which press upon him today. Where are the points of friction within our own modern institutions; where do they overlap and impinge upon each other? What is the accepted belief about man's nature, and is it challenged or debated anywhere? Finally is there a discussion of any magnitude being carried on today as to the nature of the universe?

The answers to these questions can be found in contemporary literature and politics. The present age confronts radical changes in each of these spheres.

Two types of institution have become centres of controversy since 1917; the first is the totalitarian state and the second the international state. The foundation of the U.S.S.R. in 1917 led the way to a rapid extension of state controls first in Russia, and then in Italy and Germany. In the east, Japan had for some time been a noted example of highly centralized autocratic power, but this had had little effect on western habits. The rapid capitulation, however, of Russia and then the central and most imposing states of Europe to a system of total controls between 1917 and 1933, faced European thinkers and statesmen with formidable problems. What were the limits of obedience to this all-embracing state? Over what areas did its claims to sovereignty extend? Were these claims coterminous with nationalism, with race (however that may be defined) or with economic interests? The resistance of minorities, their brutal suppression and

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the resulting flood of refugees, made the domestic problem of the limits of political obedience in the totalitarian states an immediate practical and universal issue, not merely for Europe but for America as well where the refugees sought haven after bitter persecution. Political thinkers are constrained by the presence of the totalitarian state in the modern world, whatever its guise, to re-examine the basis of individual liberty both religious and political. The nature of political and religious toleration has become again a burning question, and, for the modern world, a more pressing one than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the machinery of persecution was neither so all-embracing nor so efficient as today.

Whilst the sovereignty of the totalitarian state challenges the significance of the individual within its boundaries, its far-flung claims to allegiance over all those having a like ideology simultaneously threatens the sovereignty of existing nation-states and the recent tentative efforts to establish international institutions such as the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations Organization. There are thus present in the modern world several institutions vying with each other for power and for the allegiance of potential subjects. These conflicts of loyalty today are major themes informing a whole mass of political and philosophical literature, much of which is concerned with the antagonisms between the democratic and totalitarian states, and the urgent problem of law versus war in international relations. The invention of the atomic bomb as a means of warfare drives home the necessity to think out clearly the relative values of national sovereignty as against international supremacy. What, for instance, are to be the limits of the powers of the states in the proposed Western Union of Europe and where will sovereignty lie in such a body, or, indeed, in any international body? Thus the presence of the totalitarian states and embryonic international institutions are together provoking new lines of thought and action in the twentieth century.

Within the states themselves the rise of the working classes to political power, manifested in such events as the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the return of the Labour Party to power in Britain in 1945, has raised anew the problem of the exact depository of sovereignty within the state. Does it indeed lie with the masses or

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does it lie with small highly organized groups, non-representative but self-selected, as leaders of the masses? This question is a recurrent irritant in practical politics in all the leading states of the world today.

Great changes have also occurred in the mental and moral atmosphere of the twentieth century which in several ways distinguishes this century from the previous one. The sciences of psychology and anthropology are rediscovering the nature of man in terms of the subconscious and the primitive. These both emphasize the paramount importance of the environment in the development of human beings; the first showing men as the product of emotional strains and stresses of childhood and adolescence, the second showing men as products of tradition and custom. Both tend to assume an irresponsibility in the individual which is shattering to morality. The loss of individual responsibility in the totalitarian states has enhanced this view of human nature; so that there has grown up in the twentieth century a whole group of thinkers convinced of the depravity of human nature yet of its utter inability to rescue itself, and insisting that the only means of salvation is through a controlled environment. Hence the tendency in all modern totalitarian states and amongst the intelligentsia in several of the democratic states is to stress the necessity to initiate and control all education, all youth movements, and to change the social and economic environments of people, in the hopes that their very nature will be changed, and utopia will arrive by the increase of material wealth. Further results of this new knowledge can be seen in the ways in which the state is having to adjust its treatment of the criminal, its relation with the family, its regulation of marriage and legitimacy, its governance of primitive peoples in its colonies. The power of propaganda used by press and wireless is realized in the light of these discoveries and gives fresh point to the anxieties of Mill and Bentham on behalf of the suppression of the individual by the force of public opinion.

This doctrine of irresponsibility of the individual does not go unchallenged in contemporary thought, but forms the basis of a growing controversy. Many people see in it the foundation stone of dictatorship and so fear it without analysing their fear. But many religious bodies recognize the nature of the problem and are vigorously emphasizing the responsibility of the individual for his actions. Hence

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in the twentieth century the conflict between free will and predestination which tore at the roots of political thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, reappears in its modern and yet as effective form, as the conflict between a large body of christians and all those who maintain that man is helpless in the grip of his subconscious motivation, or of his environment, or of the dialectic of a materialistic philosophy of history. Basically the struggle between the totalitarian and democratic states rests on this difference in their respective concepts of human nature: the former regarding man as an automaton, the product of his environment, and the latter regarding man as a moral being with a destiny transcending that of the state and claiming as rights the freedoms necessary for the achievement of this destiny. It is obvious that this cleavage in concepts of the nature of man does not confine itself to the boundaries of states, but that it is a cleavage apparent within states themselves and that in the twentieth century each community faces within itself an internecine conflict of the first magnitude.


Yet another series of developments during this century have drawn men's attention to the problem of the nature of man and his purpose in life. Since the war of 1914-18 the Christian churches have been stimulated into fresh efforts to check the decline in public and private morals. Ineffective in the beginning as many of these efforts were, yet the intensive persecutions in Europe and the avowed materialism of such powerfully established states as the former Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R., together put fresh vigour into the religious bodies and drew together into a strangely consorted group all those religions, Christian and non-Christian, which held firmly to a faith in the moral nature of man and his spiritual purpose in life. This facing of a common threat to their basic spiritual assumptions has forced the religious bodies to reconsider the possibility of unity, not merely between all Christian groups, but also between all those religious bodies who deny a materialistic philosophy of life. This movement towards religious unity has been further strengthened by a twofold development: the wide-flung activities of the churches in the missionary fields throughout the world and the increasing study of comparative religions. Both these developments are revealing in practice and in theory the presence of a basic unity in spiritual

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
consciousness manifested though it be in manifold diversity of form. So within contemporary religious life attention is focused on the purpose of man's life, on the relations between the spiritual and secular spheres, and on the possible resolution of the destructive schisms within Christendom into a harmony so deeply established in true religious toleration that it will overflow and embrace all religions that acknowledge a divine purpose in life. Thus within church and state, the controversy over man's nature re-states itself in modern terms.

Finally the movement within scientific circles to reject the notion of absolutes and to accept that of relativity raises a host of pertinent questions in relation to the nature of the state itself and its claims to absolute supremacy. The uncertainty in scientific circles about the nature of the universe repercusses perceptibly on the notions of society, engendering in many people a feeling of purposelessness and futility emphasized by two world wars of exceptional violence, which effectively cuts off the advanced guard of this age from those who look back to the last century and its belief in the certainty of progress.

But the interaction of these forces and their solution in acceptable form for this generation cannot be dealt with here. The historian can but show how and why in different ages men have been irritated into political activity and have expressed their views on the causes of this irritation and the solutions they would offer. The history of political thought traces in irregular pattern the concern men have had at all times for their varying interests interlocking with their diverse ideals.



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
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
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